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preface
This book is about the future of development aid. In recent years there has been
increased public debate in the Netherlands, as in many other Western countries,
about development cooperation – in terms of both the media attention devoted 
to the theme and the intensity of the positions taken. In a country which liked to
see itself as one of the pioneers in the field, the self-evidence of development aid 
– about which there had long been broad political and social consensus – seemed
to have come to a definite end. It was for this reason that the Dutch Scientific
Council for Government Policy (wrr) undertook to examine this issue thor-
oughly.
The wrr is an advisory body to the Dutch government. Its task is to make propos-
als, based on broad analysis and scientific insights, on the strategic direction of
Dutch policy. To this end, the wrr submits advisory reports to the government
several times a year on issues which merit specific attention. At the start of 2010,
an advisory report on development aid was published in Dutch under the title Less
Pretension, More Ambition. Academics, practitioners, policymakers and politicians
engaged in all manner of debate about the report’s analysis and recommendations.
The government started drawing up a detailed response on the consequences 
of the report for its policy, with the intention of debating it in parliament. 
In October 2010, the new Dutch government decided to use the report as the 
basis of a thorough modernization of the Netherlands’ policy.
To make the Dutch report accessible to an international audience, it has not only
been translated into English, but also adapted and amended. Details referring to
the specific Dutch organization of development aid that are irrelevant for an inter-
national audience have been removed. Only those from which wider lessons may
be drawn have been retained. Secondly this publication has benefited from the
responses to the report (more than 100 detailed responses were posted in the
online debate organized by the website of The Broker alone; see www.thebroker
online.eu). The changes made include coverage of new themes, more elaboration
on specific lines of reasoning and more comprehensive analyses. The main argu-
ment has not been changed. The result is a book aimed at a wider international
audience, even though the examples chosen and the emphasis laid will undoubt-
edly have a noticeable Dutch bias.
The report was compiled by a project group headed by wrr member Peter van
Lieshout. The scientific team comprised Robert Went (project coordination) and
Monique Kremer. The team engaged in a long process of consultation and analysis.
We drew significantly on the insights and information provided by the abundant
scientific literature from various disciplines. We also talked with external experts
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from various backgrounds. Some were affiliated to Dutch universities, knowledge
institutes, aid organizations, ministries and embassies, and others to foreign
knowledge institutes or ministries. In addition, intensive consultations were held
with experts at relevant international organizations (eu, World Bank, imf, oecd,
wto, ilo, un organizations, etc.). In total, around 300 specialists were consulted
over a two-year period. Some of these were also asked to elaborate their insights in
the form of written texts. In May 2009 this resulted in the publication of the back-
ground study Doing Good or Doing Better. Development policies in a globalizing
world (Kremer, Van Lieshout & Went 2009; also available online at www.wrr.nl).
In addition, the wrr invited a number of specialists (Nancy Birdsall, Ha-Joon
Chang, Paul Collier and Dani Rodrik) to conferences in the Netherlands where we
examined a number of key themes of development policy in detail. The discus-
sions held in other Western countries on the future of development aid were also 
very instructive. We learned a great deal from those debates, as well as from visits
to researchers and policymakers in various countries (including Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom).
A proper analysis of development aid cannot be made without including the views
of the recipient countries. A number of specific country studies were therefore
conducted, during which we talked extensively with policymakers, practitioners
in the development aid field, members from the business community, and repre-
sentatives from the academic world and the media. Country studies were carried
out in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Uganda and
 Surinam. Extensive working visits were made to India and China, countries that
in many ways have developed successfully and are now becoming increasingly
important players on the development aid stage themselves. Singapore also
provided valuable insights. All in all, ideas were exchanged with a further 
250 people during these case studies in the global South.
We would like to take this opportunity to thank all the people who contributed to
this book. First of all, we want to thank Vanessa Nigten for organizational help 
and research assistance during our whole project, and Chris van der Borgh, Marcia
Valkenhoff and Martijn Vink for research assistance with part of the work. 
A special word of thanks also for Ton Dietz, Paul Engel, Jos van Gennep, Peter Ho,
Paul Hoebink, Rolph van der Hoeven and Jeroen de Lange for reading and
commenting on a draft of this text. A big thank you to our colleagues on the coun-
cil and the staff of the wrr for stimulating discussions of drafts and practical
support in the preparation of our report and this book. Around 550 people in all
parts of the world were prepared to exchange their views with the project group
over a long period. We are grateful for their insights. They are, in alphabetical
order of country and name:
8 less pretension, more ambition
In Afghanistan: Qasim Akhgar, Ramazan Bashardost, Anja de Beer, Martine van
Bijlert, Hans Blankenberg, Paul Fishstein, Esmathullah Haidary, Horia Mosadiq,
Floortje Klijn, Jarullah Mansoori, Joanna Nathan, Hamish Nixon, Noorulhaq
Olomi, Yunus Qanuni, Aziz Rafiee, Rachel Reid, Mariam J. Sherman, Alexandra
Strand Holm, Yvonne Stassen, Mirwais Wardak, Khalil Wedad, Faizullah Zaki,
Ehsan Zia.
In Bangladesh: Fazle Hasan Abed, Afsarul Ameen, Chris Austin, Rasheda
Choudhury, Saber Hossain Chowdhury, Arthur Erken, Ellen Goldstein, Milko van
Gool, Manzoor Hasan, Mirza Hassan, Alphons Hennekens, Urs Herren, Samsul
Huda, Ifty Islam, Einar Jensen, Kushi Kabir, Sultana Kamal, Abdul Kasem Khan,
Hasan Mahmud, Ainun Nishat, C. Karim, Stephan Preisner, Atiq Rahman,
Mahbubur Rahman, Carel de Rooy, Hans Spruijt, Rehman Sobhan, Ad Spijkers,
Pieter Terpstra, Doris Voorbraak, Muhammad Yunus, Iftekhar Zaman.
In Belgium: Danny Cassimon, André van Heemstra, Nathalie Holvoet, Liesbeth
Inberg, Francine Mestrum, Nadia Molenaers, Francoise Moreau, Robrecht Renard.
In China: Halima Begum, Irene Bain, Rudolf Bekink, Ira Belkin, Lu Bin, Wang
Canfa, Adrian Davis, David Dollar, John Fitzgerald, Mark George, Wang Guoqian,
Arjan de Haan, Kathleen Hartford, Ying Hwang, Duncan Innes-Ker, Qiao Jian-
rong, Eve Wen-Jing Lee, Hans Moleman, Hou Rui, Hou Shaoze, Jiao Shoutian,
Constance Thomas, Bettine Vriesekoop, Canfa Wang, Xu Weizhong, Li Wentao,
Zhang Xiaoshan, Dayuan Xue, Dayuan Xue, Chen Yan, Wang Yi, Lu Yibin,
Daojiong Zha.
In Denmark: Annette Aarestrup, Erik Brøgger Rasmussen, Lars Engberg-
Pedersen, Lindsay Whitfield.
In Ethiopia: Assefa Admassie, Yelfigne Abegaz, Aniley Amentie, Araya Asfaw,
Miguel Barreto, Jan Bloemen, Joep van den Broek, Douwe Buzeman, Paolo
Curradi, Mohammed Diab, Paul Dorosh, Jasmina van Driel, Marc Driessen,
Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid, Hr. Esaya, Kalayu Gebre-Selassie, Zinabu Gebremariam,
John Graham, Jan van de Haar, Ton Haverkort, Dirk Hoekstra, Pim de Keizer, Toon
van Kessel, Gijs Van ‘t Klooster, Henk Kuipers, Bas van der Lee, Maaike de Loor,
Erik Lundsgaarde, Rem Neefjes, Grethe Petersen, Arie Plieger, Hans Poley, Janny
Poley, Dessalegn Rahmato, Dino Sinigallia, Eva Smulders, Andrew Spezowka,
Fikru Tarekegn, Daniel Truneh, Ronald Vijverberg, Dörthe Wacker, Nico van
Wageningen, Geert Westenbrink, Sonali Wickrema, Franta Wijchers.
In Germany: Jörg Faust, Dirk Messner, Imme Scholz.
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In India: Michael Anderson, Niraja Gopal Jayal, K.P. Kannan, Coen Kompier,
Giovanni van der Lugt, Alex Oosterwijk, A.S. Panneerselvan, Sanjaya Panth,
Arjun Sengupta, Alakh Sharma, Aruna Sharma, Ravi Srivastava, Rajesh Tandon,
Sukhadeo Thorat, Mitu Varma, Prem Vashishta.
In Indonesia: Joachim van Amsberg, Marrik Bellen, Ward Berenschot, Shubham
Chaudhuri, Nikolaos van Dam, Daniel Dhakidae, Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo, Malik
Gismar, Hermin Indah Wahyuni, Fasli Jalal, Thee Kian Wie, Ignas Kleden,
Alexander Kofman, Cornelis Lay, Margiyono, Felencia Oktaria Hutabarat, Arianto
Patunru, Pratikno, Firliana Purwanti, Purwo Santosa, Wicaksono Sarosa, Mesdin
Simarmata, Mahendra Siregar, Asep Suryahadi, Staffan Synnerstrom, Roger Tol,
Farid Wajidi, William Wallace, Raharja Waluya Jati, Ria Widati, Arnold van der
Zanden.
In the Netherlands: Agnes van Ardenne, Age Bakker, Maarten van den Berg,
Thijs Berman, Ben Beuming, Frans Bieckmann, Kees Biekart, Arend Jan
Boekestijn, Pieter Boele van Hensbroek, Joan Boer, Diederik de Boer, Ad Boeren,
Bart van Bolhuis, Frans van den Boom, Jeroen Bordewijk, Sylvia Borren, Jone Bos,
Ben Bot, Jan Karel Bout, Jan Breman, Maarten Brouwer, Mirjam de Bruijn, Leni
Buisman, Erwin Bulte, Patrick Cammaert, Renko Campen, Lo Casteleijn, Gemma
Crijns, Ferdinand van Dam, Koen Davidse, Jan Deelstra, Marc Dierikx, Ton Dietz,
Han van Dijk, Meine Peter van Dijk, Geske Dijkstra, Jaap Dijkstra, Jan Donner,
Martin Doornbos, Edo Driessen, Gerard Duijfjes, Sjef Ederveen, Marion 
Eeckhout, Hans Eenhoorn, Sander van den Eijnden, Stephen Ellis, Dirk Elsen, 
Jan van Elst, Louis Emmerij, Paul Engel, Ewald Engelen, Kathleen Ferrier, Alan
Fowler, Louise Fresco, Jacques van der Gaag, Chris Geerling, Jos van Gennip,
Chantal Gill’ard, Pieter de Gooijer, Peter Gortzak, Richard Griffiths, Albert de
Groot, Robert de Groot, Jasper Grosskurth, René Grotenhuis, Jan Gruiters, 
Jan-Willem Gunning, Arjan de Haan, Allert van den Ham, Peter Heintze, Duco
Hellema, Henny Helmich, Roger Henke, Godelieve van Heteren, Thea Hilhorst,
Peter Ho, Paul Hoebink, Rolph van der Hoeven, Enno Hommes, Jan van Hout,
Ewout Irrgang, Wiet Janssen, Peter Janus, Annemiek Jenniskens, Renée Jones-
Bos, Eelke de Jong, Henk de Jong, Wilco de Jonge, Agnes Jongerius, Robert 
de Jongh, Gerd Junne, Paul Kalma, Frank van Kappen, Marion Kappeyne van
de Coppello, Farah Karimi, Karel van Kesteren, Nanno Kleiterp, Piet Klop, Jan 
Klugkist, Bert Koenders, Marleen van der Kooij, Peter Konijn, Niek Koning,
Martin Koper, Arie Kraaijeveld, Peter Van Krieken, Ed Kronenburg, David 
Kuijper, Arie Kuyvenhoven, Ellen van der Laan, Maarten Lak, Jeroen de Lange,
Robert Lansink, Ton Lansink, Susan Legêne, Ronald de Leij, Wampie Libon, Jules
van Lier, Marianne Linder, Ruud Lubbers, Geertje Lycklama à Nijeholt, Harro
Maat, Frank Majoor, Thomas de Man, Wijnand Marchal, Peter Martens, Roel von
Meijenfeldt, Leon Meijer, Ad Melkert, Loet Mennes, Iman Merison, Arthur Mol,
Henk Molenaar, Klaas Molenaar, Jacques Monasch, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Co
10 less pretension, more ambition
Neeteson, Annemieke Nijhof, Jan Gerrit van Norel, Isabelle van Notten, Maaike
Okano-Heijmans, Joke Oranje, Bram van Ojik, Frank van Oorschot, Joost
Oorthuizen, Hans Opschoor, Teun van Os van den Abeelen, Bram van Overbeeke,
René Paas, Arnoud Passenier, Bernike Pasveer, Pieter Pekelharing, Mariko 
Peters, Theo Peters, Marcella Petri, Jan Douwe van der Ploeg, Rick van der Ploeg,
Thijs van Praag, Jan Pronk, Willem van de Put, Maartje van Putten, Winand
Quaedvlieg, Rudy Rabbinge, Kees Rade, Niels Redeker, Paul Richards, Koos
Richelle, Louk de la Rive Box, Nico Roozen, Ruerd Ruben, Arie de Ruijter, Guido
Ruivenkamp, Theo Ruyter, Louise van Schaik, Onno Schellekens, Michiel 
Scheltema, Wouter Schilperoort, Tobias Schmitz, Nico Schrijver, Lau Schulpen,
Anton Schuurman, Jan Geert Siccama, Wout Siddré, Anneke Slob, David Sogge,
Sam Stevens, Eddy Szirmai, Jos Uleman, Dian van Unen, Myriam Vander Stichele,
Ruud Treffers, Rob van Tulder, Kees Vendrik, Roel van der Veen, Emile van
Velsen, André Veneman, Maxime Verhagen, John Verhoeven, Rob Visser, Joris
Voorhoeve, Maarten Voors, Lodewijk de Waal, Geerte Wachter, Marieke de Wal,
Jeroen Warner, Frauke de Weijer, Flip Wester, Josine Westerbeek-Huitink, 
Francis Weyzig, Bernard Wientjes, Wiert Wiertsema, Herman Wijffels, Sweder
van Wijnbergen, Pieter van der Zaag, Fred Zaal, Kees Zevenbergen, Annelies
Zoomers.
In Nigeria: Aderanti Adepoju, Yusuf Ageni, Stella Amadi, Kemi Asiwaju, Ojobo
Atuluku, William Awinador-Kanyirige, Thessa Brongers, Gertjan van Bruchem,
Innocent Chukwuma, Marjo Cromvoets, Chukwuemeka Eze, Paul Hamers, Peter
Hawkins, Michiel Herkemij, Amina Ibrahim, Felix Morka, Ifeanyi Okechukwu,
Constance Okeke, Oso Osobou, Hanneke Peeters, Peter Poulsen, Onno Rühl,
Lamido Sanusi, Benjamin Soares, Jean de Dieu Somda, Ronald Sonnemans,
Loenard Ugbajah, Ken Ukaoha, Arie van der Wiel.
In Norway: Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Hege Hertzberg, Leiv Lunde, Guri Sandborg,
Olav Stokke.
In Singapore: Chua Beng Huat, Toby Carroll, Ann Florini, Vedi Hadiz, Shamsul
Haque, Kishore Mahbubani, Tess del Rosario, Yap Mui Teng.
In Surinam: Renaud Adams, Rakesh Adhin, Mascha Baak, Jim Boussaid, Hans
Breeveld, Ancile Brewster, Mireille Brunings-Stolz, Hennah Buyne, Chan Choen-
nie, Steven Couthinho, Pitou van Dijck, Astrid Elburg, Derrick Ferrier, Sharda
Ganga, Lilian Gonçalves - Ho Kang You, Ruben Gowricharn, Aart Jacobi, Dirk
Kruijt, Hans Lim A Po, Marion Maks, Marcel Meyer, Gert Oostindie, Henry Ori,
Kermechend Raghoebarsing, Winston Ramautarsing, Anil Ramdas, Rick van
Ravenswaay, Marten Schalkwijk, Ramsewak Shankar, Stephen Simon, George
Soerjoesing, Marianne Spier, Annette Tjon Sie Fat, Wilma Udenhout, David Yate-
man, Marc Willems.
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Lennart Wohlgemuth.
In Switzerland: Michel Cichon, Heiner Flassbeck, Katja Hujo, Marion Jansen,
Thandika Mkandawire, Habib Ouane.
In Uganda: Patrick Birungi, Dónal Cronin, Godfrey Dhatemwa, Justin Ecaat,
Mayoka James, William Kalema, Chris Kassami, Arthur Larok, Gwyneth Lee,
Onesmus Mugyenyi, Andrew Mwenda, Theophane Nikyema, Michiel Rentenaar,
Jacques Schrier, Abebe Selassie, Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, Jeroen Verheul,
Paul Wade, Julian Wood.
In the United Kingdom: Ha-Joon Chang, Paul Collier, Lawrence Haddad, Alan
Hudson, James Kariuki, Mustaq Khan, Simon Maxwell, Mick Moore, David Mosse,
Nick Perkins, Fiona Shera, Kevin Sparkhall, Dirk Willem te Velde, Robert Wade,
Alan Winters.
In the United States: Dean Baker, Tariq Banuri, Marion Barthelemy, Nancy Bird-
sall, Pedro Conceição, Shantayanan Devarajan, Koldo Echebarría, Shahrokh
Fardoust, Stephany Griffith-Jones, Merilee Grindle, Ricardo Haussmann, Monika
Huppi, Gerald Hyman, Robert Kaplan, Shigeo Katsu, Caroline Kende-Robb,
Ruben Lamdany, Branko Milanovic, Manuel Montes, Richard Morford, Todd
Moss, José Antonio Ocampo, Isabel Ortiz, Stephen Quick, Zia Qureshi, Sanjay
Reddy, Dani Rodrik, Charles Sabel, Hartwig Schafer, Nikhil Seth, Rob Vos, Mark
Weisbrot, Franck Wiebe, Justin Yifu Lin, Hania Zlotnik.
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1 development aid in a changing context
In recent years development aid has become the subject of much discussion in the
Western world. In the media, a passionate debate has developed which has
addressed fundamental questions, but in which examples are happily quoted out
of context and stereotypes are rife. Books on development aid have appeared in
rapid succession and interviews with their authors have graced the front pages of
the weekend supplements of the leading dailies. A fascinating genre has emerged.
For most of the authors, the topic was clearly very loaded, as was evident by their
cutting tone, their sweeping statements, the pamphlet-like undertones, the apoca-
lyptic cover notes, the easy use of statistics and the degree to which their argu-
ments were shot through with references to their personal lives, as if this were
some guarantee that what they were saying was the ultimate truth. It would all
have made a perfect topic for a thesis by a student of literature. In The End of
Poverty (2005), Jeffrey Sachs invoked his wife, in Bad Samaritans (2007) Ha-Joon
Chang his children, in The Trouble with Africa (2006) James Calderesi his friend,
in The Bottom Billion (2007) Paul Collier his son, in The White Man’s Burden
(2006) William Easterly described his disillusions as a former World Bank
employee, while in Dead Aid (2009) Dambisa Moyo called her parents as
witnesses for the prosecution. In this way, criticism of development cooperation
has itself become a million-dollar business.
It is time to thoroughly reflect on the future of development aid. Besides the tone
of the debate, there are a number of fundamental reasons for doing this. After all,
there have been a number of significant changes. Developing countries are not
what they were sixty years ago, when development aid took its first cautious steps.
Meanwhile, the nature of aid itself has also changed – under the influence of
changes not only in the South but at least as much in the West. Western countries
no longer automatically have the hegemonic position in the world that they held
sixty years ago. Furthermore, thinking among policymakers and academics has
evolved on what development is and how it can or cannot be effectively promoted.
Developing countries have changed …
Most people in the West think of Africa primarily as a continent struggling with
an enormous scarcity of food. The single iconic image of Africa is of malnourished
children, whether they are victims of war in Biafra (1968), drought in Ethiopia
(1984), locust plagues in the Sahel (2004) or militias attacking the people of Darfur
(2007). In the 1960s Westerners got to know India as a country facing not only
great hunger, but terrible diseases, especially cholera and tuberculosis. Slowly but
surely, these images are changing. In the eyes of many people, Africa is no longer a
continent where people have nothing to eat: the soil may be exhausted in many
areas and most people still have difficulty in growing enough to meet their basic
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needs, but it is also a fertile continent. A relatively small country like Uganda could
produce enough food for the whole of Africa on its own, if its agricultural land
were to be cultivated with the same intensity as in Europe. Sudan could become
the grain basket of Europe – as Egypt used to be for the Roman Empire. A major
part of East Africa is a plateau that is exceptionally suited to agriculture and horti-
culture. It is the same story in large areas of West Africa. Nigeria, for example, has
enough fertile ground to easily become a large food exporter, if it were not to focus
so much on its oil revenues. India, the subcontinent with more poor people than
the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa, is also changing. Western eyes are focused on
the emerging it sector and the Oscars for Slumdog Millionaire mark the merger
of Hollywood and Bollywood. Fewer people are aware that the fourth largest
industry in the country is the medical sector: patients fly in from neighbouring
countries and countries further afield for good-quality and relatively cheap treat-
ment – just as Western Europeans have laser treatment for their eyes in Turkey,
and Americans go to Costa Rica for plastic surgery.
… and are still  changing
Many things in Africa are changing fast. That is most apparent in highly visible
changes like the use of mobile telephones. At the turn of the century, one in fifty
people in Africa had a mobile telephone but, by 2009, 28 percent of all Africans
were registered as mobile users (itu 2009). This is the fastest rate of growth in the
world. Africa is now preparing for an internet revolution. At the moment, fewer
than five percent of Africans have internet access, but this percentage is also set to
rise quickly and sharply. The changes are also apparent in the increasingly manifest
pride of African leaders, who speak with more and more disdain about Western
paternalism and turn to China as an example – though as yet few have refused
Western aid when it has been offered. Africa also has its committed leaders: Mo
Ibrahim, the man behind the extremely successful African mobile provider Celtel
(now Zaïn), set up a foundation that gives substantial amounts of money to leaders
who voluntarily step down – which in any case stops them from hanging on to
office because they have made no provisions for their retirement.
However, the changes are also affecting the population make-up. For example,
there will soon be a large global middle class. In The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999)
Thomas Friedman made an interesting observation: there has never been a war
between two countries that both have branches of McDonald’s. The reasoning
behind this was that McDonald’s only operates in countries with a sizeable middle
class, and these people “didn’t like to fight wars any more – they preferred to wait
in line for burgers”. Whether or not this hypothesis still holds water today, the
basic idea remains valid: a middle class ensures stability. That has radical conse-
quences for developing countries. In 2000, an average of 82 percent of people in
developing countries were poor – defined as an income below the average in Brazil
– while 8 percent were middle class and 10 percent were classed as rich – defined as
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having an income higher than the average in Italy. By 2030, the number of poor 
– defined in the same way – will have fallen to 61 percent, the middle class will
have grown to 16 percent and the number of rich to 22 percent, according to
 estimates by Bussolo and others (2008). That is a drastic shift, especially given 
the strict criteria.
Demographic changes will have an impact. By 2050, seven billion of the projected
world population of more than nine billion will live in what we now call develop-
ing countries. India will have the largest population – partly because of the ‘one-
child’ policy in China – with around 1.7 billion people. Around that time there will
be two billion people living in Africa. Europe will have around 690 million, about
7 percent of the world population, compared to 25 percent in 1950. In 1960, two-
thirds of the global population lived in rural areas. In 2009 there were as many
people living in cities as in the countryside, and by 2050, more than two-thirds
will be urban dwellers. That, too, will have consequences: people living in cities in
developing countries have much fewer children than those who live in the coun-
tryside, and also engage in different economic activities. Consequently, the falling
trend in numbers of children will continue: whereas women in developing coun-
tries had an average of six children in 1960, this has now dropped to three.
Nevertheless, prediction remains a difficult task. In 1968, Nobel Prize winner
Gunnar Myrdal published his Asian Drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations.
The book became famous and Myrdal was widely praised for his analysis of the
effects of population growth in Asia in the coming decades. He showed that Asia
is running headlong towards an inescapable drama. Like the eighteenth century
British demographer Thomas Malthus, he predicted that world food production,
which displays linear growth, would lag behind the growth of the world popula-
tion, which increases exponentially. In the past fifty years, however, advances in
agriculture have allowed food production to expand at a rate that has outstripped
population growth – and that at a time when the global population grew more
rapidly than ever before in history. Today, we not only produce twice as much
food worldwide as in the 1960s, but even more food per capita than fifty years ago
(fao 2008). Furthermore, in the period before 1990, it was often claimed that the
political structure of countries like China, India and Vietnam was not open
enough to offer much opportunity for progress, and that the economic policies of
these countries too closely resembled those of a centrally planned economy ever to
be successful. Developments since then have taught us to be less arrogant. Many
have also claimed, after the event, to have foreseen the Fall of the Wall, not to
mention the recent financial crisis.
… and interdependencies increase
In addition to all this, we are linked to each other more than ever before by prob-
lems that can no longer be solved within the borders of a single country and which
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are becoming increasingly intertwined. Climate change, H1N1 influenza, financial
stability, biodiversity, terrorism, migration, water scarcity, fish threatened with
extinction – these are all global issues that call for cooperation beyond national
borders. As a result of this sharp increase in cross-border interdependencies,
national policy more frequently has an impact in other countries, questions and
problems on policy agendas are more often coloured and influenced by develop-
ments and activities elsewhere in the world, and governments no longer have a
monopoly on international relations in which businesses, non-governmental
organizations (ngos) and individual citizens also play a role. In this way, the
policy agendas of rich and developing countries are becoming linked to each other
on an increasing number of issues, generating a complex matrix of relationships
and connections with new questions and problems for which there are no ready-
made answers (Bhargava 2006; Richard 2002).
Television, the internet and mobile telephone, and the increase in tourism – since
1950 the number of international arrivals has increased annually by 6.5 percent –
are making the world smaller and the immense differences in living standards and
conditions between poor and rich countries more tangible. The increasing inter-
nationalization of trade, financial flows and the various, separated, stages of the
production of goods and services is connecting employers, employees, consumers,
investors and individual citizens in various countries with each other, whether
they want it or not. The world currently has 82,000 transnational companies with
810,000 foreign branches, which employ some 77 million people (more than twice
the total labour force of Germany) and account for a third of the global export of
goods and services. These companies are most dynamic in developing countries –
only twenty of the top fifty emerging transnational corporations were also on the
list ten years ago (unctad 1999, 2009c).
In the long term this will lead to the emergence of a completely new constellation
of international relations. In the North and the South, races, religions, lifestyles,
languages, and cultures will become increasingly interwoven. Passports, appear-
ance, and territory will decreasingly run parallel. The focus will no longer be on
multicultural links within societies, but on multidimensional links between them.
The significance of the nation state will decline as all kinds of decisions are made
elsewhere. Region-forming is rapidly increasing worldwide, with not only Europe
forming a bloc, but North America and Southeast Asia as well, and in the Middle
East plans for a single currency are already at quite an advanced stage. New
transnational fora focus not only on issues like climate and food, but also on
accounting standards and the protection of intellectual property rights. The g20
has rapidly become a household name.
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Global relations have changed …
In the meantime it is becoming increasingly misguided to speak of a North-South
relationship, and it is overly clear that it no longer reflects the gap between rich
and poor. In Vietnam, 58 percent of the population still lived below the poverty
line of a dollar a day in 1993. By 2006, this had fallen to 16 percent and, if the coun-
try continues to grow at the same rate as between 1995 and 2007, Vietnam will 
be considered a middle-income country by 2010 (World Bank 2008c). In two
decades, it has developed from a food importer to the world’s second largest
exporter of rice. If China continues to grow at its current rate – which is by no
means certain – it can be expected to have eradicated poverty to a significant
degree by 2020, and be able to take care of its remaining poor.
Many people are becoming concerned about China’s expanding role in Africa –
every self-respecting daily or weekly has carried a report on this issue in recent
years, usually with an alarming undertone that China is plundering the continent.
That is, however, a one-sided viewpoint that takes no account of the fact, for
example, that 25 percent of trade between Africa and China consists of Angolan
oil, or that a single copper mine in Poland produces as much as the whole
renowned Copper Belt in Zambia. Africa’s share in the global production of nearly
all minerals, excluding gold, is less than 10 percent. The emergence of China is
undoubtedly having a considerable impact, but it is more likely to manifest itself
in other ways. Increasing welfare in China, for example, will probably mean that
its people will eat less grain and more animal protein products – and that will
require much more farmland to produce. Three kilograms of grain are required 
to produce a kilogram of chicken meat, five for a kilo of pork and eight for a kilo 
of beef (Rabbinge 2009). While we could currently feed 112 percent of the global
population with an almost vegetarian diet, the same would apply to only a little
over half the world’s population if we were all to obtain 25 percent of our daily
intake of calories through animal protein (iaastd 2009). In that respect it is
fortunate that the Chinese traditionally prefer chicken and pork to beef. Like
South Korea, China has started buying up large areas of fertile land in Africa to
secure its own food production. South Korea recently bought more than a million
hectares of land in Sudan, Mongolia, Indonesia and Argentina, the equivalent of
the entire area of farmland in Belgium (Daniel & Mittal 2009). China too has
bought comparable amounts of land in Madagascar and other countries.
It is as yet unclear what effect the emergence of the new economies will have on
the relations between them. There will certainly be more mutual trade. Cheap
Chinese bicycles have already completely taken over from dependable Dutch
models on the streets of Bamako and Kampala: their inferior quality is completely
outweighed by the lower price. The only threats to the popularity of Chinese 
bikes are their slightly more expensive but also slightly better Indian counterparts.
Anyone looking for adventure in Afghanistan will buy a Chinese motorcycle,
17development aid in a changing context
rather than a Japanese one. The fact that the markets in the South often benefit
more from each other’s products than from expensive Western products, can in
principle be beneficial to all of them. Furthermore, new political alliances are
developing. The Brazilian president Lula already has an idea to set up a television
channel aimed especially at Africa.
At the same time, there are clear inequalities. The position of Africa in particular
on the world market may well come under pressure. Now that cheap production
has reached such high levels in the countries of South and East Asia – and these
countries have become very advanced in the logistics and commercial organization
of the production process – Africa will have to seek other niches. However, it is
unclear where these lie. Consequently, the newly emerging economies are, to a
certain extent, more of a competitive threat to Africa than to the countries of the
West. Vietnam has taken over a large share of the market in cashew nuts from
Tanzania, not to mention the serious impact it has had on coffee production in
Nicaragua due to it producing cheap coffee on a large scale. Furthermore, if Obama
were to decide to reduce cotton subsidies to his farmers, it will not be Mali that
benefits, despite cotton basically being the country’s only export. Estimates show
that 98 percent of these measures will benefit China. The bric countries (Brazil,
Russia, India and China) have good reason for becoming defenders of free trade.
This also explains why African countries are demanding to be allowed to impose
trade protection measures.
It is clear that the economies of developing countries have to find their way in a
system of global trade that is becoming increasingly international. Between 1950
and 2007 world trade grew at an average of 6.2 percent per year and global gdp by
3.8 percent. A growing proportion of goods and services produced are therefore
being marketed in other countries. Developing countries are also taking part in
this trend: the ratio of trade (imports plus exports) to gdp for low-income coun-
tries rose from 47 percent in 1990 to 70 percent in 2007. The share in world trade
of all developing countries together increased from 18 percent in 1990 to 
28 percent in 2007. At the same time, the world economy is much more regulated
than when Japan and South Korea took such great steps forward. In the meantime,
systems of intellectual property and trade provisions relating to security and
health have become much more complex.
There are successes …
Real income in developing countries has doubled in the past twenty-five years.
Even in Africa there had been some progress in the decade leading up to the start
of the financial crisis. Macroeconomic stability has increased enormously: the days
when a tourist arriving in an African country first had to try and change money on
the black market because the official exchange rate bore little relation to the real
value of the currency are also over since, in by far the majority of African coun-
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tries, visitors can draw money from a cash machine on arrival at the airport. 
In addition, where average inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa was still 47 percent in
1994, by 2007 it had fallen to 8 percent and the enormous national debts of many
countries have been significantly reduced.
Tax revenues in Africa have doubled in absolute terms in the past six years, 
and in 2008 these were higher than official development aid for the first time, 
a sign that this part of the world is cautiously moving towards self-sufficiency. 
Foreign investments and remittances (the money that migrants send back to their
families) already outstripped official aid in the early 1990s, although their distri-
bution remains very unbalanced. Two-thirds of foreign investments go to twelve
countries, with China the largest recipient (accounting for more than a quarter),
while the thirty-three least developed countries in Africa receive less than 2
percent, and most of that goes to oil extraction and gold mining. It is the same
with remittances: the least developed countries receive the least. While India,
China and Mexico benefit considerably from migration – receiving some 
25 billion dollars a year – the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa receives a total of only
10 billion dollars. Yet, here too, there are exceptions: in Uganda, for example,
remittances account for almost 9 percent of gdp (World Bank 2008c).
Worldwide progress is also being made in other areas: smallpox was eradicated in
1977, river blindness is now very rare, 188 countries around the world are now
polio-free and striking results have been achieved in the fight against measles and
malaria – even the enormous wave of aids that ravaged Central, Southern and
East Africa in the past two decades gradually seems to be coming under control. 
In the 1990s, the number of children dying from diarrhoea was halved – primarily
through improved access to drinkable water and the availability of oral rehydra-
tion therapy. More than 85 percent of all children now attend primary school.
There even seems to be progress in political terms. While in 1989 only four coun-
tries in Africa could be said to have some form of democracy, that now applies to
around 20 of the total of 53 countries. In 1980, thirty-five African countries were
still suffering under dictatorships and that figure has now fallen to fifteen. Most
countries now hold some form of multiparty elections.
… and problems
No one can deny that progress has been made. However, it is limited – especially
because much of the material growth is offset by the still rapid population
increases. In 2008, a quarter of the world’s population, which had in the meantime
expanded to almost 6.8 billion people, had to live on less than 1.25 dollars a day
– the poverty line applied by the World Bank since 2008 – and half on less than
2.5 dollars a day (World Bank 2008d). Tonight, a billion people will once again go
to bed hungry. A third of the children in the world are undernourished. A billion
people cannot write their names, especially girls and women. Two billion people
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– around half of whom live in India and Bangladesh, and the other half in Sub-
Saharan Africa – have no access to electricity. The situation in South Asia differs
from that in Sub-Saharan Africa: India may be experiencing rapid economic
growth, but that is manifesting itself to a significant degree in widening regional
differences – the state of Bihar is four times poorer than the state of Punjab and
eleven times poorer than the Chandigarh region. Poverty reduction here is there-
fore increasingly also a problem of allocation. That situation has not yet been
reached in Sub-Saharan Africa. In coming decades the region will remain insuffi-
ciently stable and experience insufficient growth to be able to meet the basic needs
of its inhabitants without direct aid from the West. Although the countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa now also have their own elites – every capital in Africa has its
own covered shopping malls for the rich – a substantial middle class is still only
present to a limited degree. Reallocation can be advocated here on political or
moral grounds, but it offers no answer to large-scale poverty. Lastly, it is question-
able whether the growth of many developing countries is sustainable. In numer-
ous cases their economies are based on revenue from the sale of natural resources.
That is in itself a vulnerable situation, as prices are so dependent on the world
market. Although that may have worked to exporting countries’ advantage in
recent years, it certainly did not in the decades before. Furthermore, raw materials
are finite – oil and gas reserves, the most important exports, will eventually run
dry, often within two or three decades, and the question then is whether other
sectors will emerge before that time that can take over as drivers of the economy.
And there was development aid …
For six decades, Western donors have tried to use money to promote the develop-
ment of countries that are lagging behind economically. Between 1960 and 2008,
rich countries, united in the Development Assistance Committee (dac) of the
Organisation for Economic and Social Development (oecd), spent 2,941 billion
dollars on development aid. In 2008, that official aid, which had now risen to 120
billion dollars annually, was supplemented by another 15 billion dollars from 
non-dac members like China and South Korea. In recent years in particular, much
more money has been made available for development aid: in 2001, total aid was
only 60 billion euros, 44 percent of what it was in 2008. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
for example, that is equal to 44 dollars per inhabitant per year, approximately
3.5 percent of gdp. Yet what contribution has that effort made? Many believe
that it has produced insufficient observable results. There has been a series of
spectacular development successes, like Taiwan and South Korea in the 1960s,
Indonesia in the 1970s, Bolivia and Ghana in the 1980s, Uganda and Vietnam
in the 1990s, and Mozambique and Ethiopia in the past decade. To what extent,
however, can these successes be attributed to the contributions of Western
donors?
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The main line of argument is usually that, despite all the aid it has received, Sub-
Saharan Africa has not yet really developed, while Southeast Asia has developed
very successfully with no aid at all. The counter-argument is that the 17 billion
dollars – 13 percent of the us government’s budget – that Western Europe received
in the form of Marshall Aid between 1948 and 1952 was significant in getting these
countries back on their feet as quickly as possible, and that the European Structure
Funds helped countries like Greece, Portugal and Ireland catch up rapidly in the
1970s and 1980s. The 1990s produced yet more successes, with the ‘accession’
countries in Central and Eastern Europe experiencing a period of enormous
growth – partly due to the fact that they had to comply with the acquis commu-
nautaire of the European Union, which compelled them to pursue a sound
government policy, but also due to the aid they received. Comparisons, however,
always fall short – they suggest a similar starting point or situation, and that is
never more than partially true.
… but aid itself has also changed
Studies of the impact of development aid often imply that aid itself is a constant
that can be used as an independent variable in a regression study with develop-
ment as the dependent variable. The problem with that is that the nature of devel-
opment aid itself has changed. Certainly up to the early 1990s, a great deal of aid
was strongly coloured by the Cold War, and the countries which received it and
the form in which it was given were partly determined by the political persuasion
of the countries’ leaders. That proved to be not necessarily a good recipe for devel-
opment. Until the middle of the 1970s, 80 percent of American aid went to a belt
of countries surrounding the Soviet Union and China; from the end of the 1970s
(after the Camp David agreement) the large majority went to Israel and Egypt, and
in the 1980s, to a lesser extent, to America’s own ‘backyard’ in Central America. 
A number of European countries were fortunately exceptions to this rule. Anyone
familiar with the daily practice of development aid can see that much has also
changed in that respect. A few decades ago, Dutch companies very enthusiastically
supplied complete, ready-to-go dairy farms to Tunisia, Egypt and Tanzania, but
that enthusiasm waned when it became clear that the Frisian Holstein cattle could
not survive in the heat. Aid is still sometimes provided in the form of projects, but
new instruments like general and sectoral budget support have since been intro-
duced.
In the meantime the motivation has also changed …
The landscape of development aid has changed in other ways. People increasingly
want to decide for themselves how they wish to be involved. In the United States
this is related to people’s growing interest in their own personal family history. In
the us, you can have your dna tested for 349 dollars: in this way some 35,000
Afro-Americans have traced their roots. Oprah Winfrey, for example, now knows
that she descends from the Kpelle in Liberia. As a result, the slave forts along the
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Ghanaian coast have become places of pilgrimage for many Americans. In Western
Europe this trend is manifesting itself in a different way. For young people, there
is the ‘Causes’ application on Facebook, through which you bring your friends
on the internet directly into contact with development projects. As backpackers,
many of these youngsters have seen large parts of the world, including the
poverty, and chains of shops aimed at this group offer not only backpackers’
equipment but also placements in developing countries. Adults can choose for
themselves which fair trade products from which countries they wish to buy at
their local supermarket – the number of households doing just this is increasing
every year and more than three and a half million people in the Netherlands now
buy these products. If people want to support development projects, they can
make a regular donation to the more well-known ngos – which some 20 percent
of the population does ever year – or they can give their money directly to a
specific project, through a wide variety of new ngos, which pledge that 
100 percent of the money will go to the project and nothing will be kept back for
overheads (Gijsbers & Van der Lelij 2009). Furthermore anyone who has built up 
a little capital can start up a fund at various aid organizations, while some organi-
zations, like Medics without Vacation or Architects without Borders, offer you the
chance to go and help on the spot. Lastly, there is always the possibility of starting
up a project yourself, and an estimated 6,000 of these projects are already running
from the Netherlands.
And what is the place of Western countries?
In short, after sixty years, the ways in which development cooperation is
provided, the motives that underlie it, the instruments that are used, and the 
organizational form that has evolved are all still very much in flux. How are we 
to assess and respond to this? In the past year, many Western countries have
published visionary policy memoranda on the future of development aid.
Although the answers they come up with vary widely, there is one strikingly
constant thread: they are all asking what place their own country has in the larger
whole. The place of Western countries in the world order used to be clear, so that
it was also clear how they should act as donors, but that certainty has now disap-
peared. These countries are now very visibly questioning their own positions.
Citizens are hesitating
The Western debate on development aid is shooting off in all directions. A few
people suggest scrapping aid completely and allowing developing countries to go
through a kind of ‘cold turkey’. Others are looking for new, more personal forms
of development aid. Yet, although the necessity of aid is being questioned in the
public debate, support for it among people in the West is not declining. Public
support when it comes to helping poor countries has remained high in oecd/dac
countries over the past two decades, whether the times have been good or bad in
economic terms. Public donations and the number of ngos providing emergency
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aid have increased, though opinion polls in France, Italy and elsewhere show that
people have become a lot more cautious since the financial crisis (Zimmerman
2008). In the World Values Survey, the United States emerges as the great excep-
tion: only 55 percent of people in the us support development aid, while in the
remaining oecd countries this is around 90 percent. The figures must be seen,
however, in the light of American culture, in which people prefer – much more
than in Europe – to provide aid through private, charity-based channels (Paxton &
Knack 2008: 18-19).
In European countries, too, providing aid through non-governmental organiza-
tions is gaining in importance. In 2007, for example, 45 percent of Dutch 
households gave to international aid causes. A Motivaction survey in June 2009
showed that 72 percent of Dutch people had participated in some way in an 
activity relating to international cooperation in the previous twelve months. 
The most popular form of participation is to give money in the form of one-off
donations to a charity in the field of development cooperation (38% of Dutch
people), followed by donating goods and taking part in lotteries that support 
charities (both 34%). In exceptional circumstances the participation rate can 
rise substantially: after the tsunami in Asia at the end of 2004, for example, 
67 percent of Dutch people donated money. Involvement can also take the form 
of actual help on the spot. The ncdo Barometer of June 2009 shows that one
percent of Dutch people had done some form of voluntary work relevant to devel-
opment aid in the previous twelve months (Gijsbers and Van der Lelij 2009).
Difficult position
The lack of clarity is expressed in the widely varying image of Western policy on
development aid: one day we see pictures of a minister patting the heads of chil-
dren in Colombia or Yemen, and the next we see the same minister at the G20
drawing attention to the capital needs of developing countries. One day he is
reminding the private sector about corporate social responsibility and the next he
is negotiating on the further development of tradable emission rights. One day he
criticizes the way in which the price of fertilizer is being kept artificially high, the
next he is defending women’s rights. The international arena is large, very large,
with players like the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank, all
with their own agendas. The challenge is how to operate effectively within it.
Structure
All this is a good reason to take a close look at the future of development aid. This
book starts, in the following three chapters, by asking how development can best
be understood. That offers a framework within which to assess efforts to promote
development through aid, which is the subject of chapter five. This analysis leads
to conclusions about the way in which aid should develop in the future – chapter
six offers an outline of the direction that path should take. The following two
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chapters examine this general direction in more detail. Chapter seven focuses on
how Western governments could give shape to targeted efforts in the field of
development aid. Chapter eight shows that it is increasingly important to give
general policies a clear development perspective. Finally, chapter nine brings the
whole together and offers conclusions in a broader perspective.
Terminology
To conclude, a short word about terminology. The world of development aid is
fond of insisting on politically correct terms, though what is considered politically
correct changes with each decade. In this book we try to distance ourselves from
that debate. We refer here to development aid, because the term development
cooperation implies an equality that not only does not exist but also conceals the
reality of the situation. An aid relationship is always asymmetrical, and even more
so if the recipient country firmly believes that it is unable to survive without the
aid – as is often the case. Although this book does sometimes refer to developing
countries, in doing so we are also clouding the issue, as the distinction between
developing and developed countries is becoming more and more difficult to main-
tain – you can divide the world in many different ways and according to a variety
of criteria, but it is increasingly rare for that division to be in terms of North and
South. Where possible we are more specific, but sometimes we choose a collective
term.
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2 the development aid split
Development aid aims to contribute to a better world. There are all kinds of
motives for creating a better world and each has its own emphases and leads to a
specific design of development aid. The roots of these different motives can all be
found in the current practice of development aid, therefore making it the result of
a blend of motives. The more divergent the motives, the more difficult it is to real-
ize a productive whole when designing development aid. The fact that the motives
– which each have their own value – are so different has brought increasing pres-
sure to bear on the design of development aid in recent decades. This pressure is
becoming more and more of a problem. With a view to showing that this is the
case, we start this chapter with an analysis of the motives.
2.1 two basic motives for development aid
The history of Dutch development aid illustrates the way the Western world has
regarded aid over the years. When, on 3 October 1949, the Dutch government
first decided to make funds available for development aid – while still receiving
aid itself via the Marshall Plan (!) – its policy was shaped primarily by the process
of decolonization. The Memorandum concerning the Dutch contribution to the
programme of the United Nations for technical aid to economically under-devel-
oped countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1950) must be read against the back-
ground of the Netherlands handing over power in Indonesia three months later,
on 27 December 1949. The memorandum summarized the clear benefits of
development aid for the Netherlands, such as an enhanced reputation, new
export possibilities and, most importantly, finding something useful to do for
all the superfluous experts in the field. “Now that Indonesia is going to lose its
significance as an outlet for Dutch intellect, we will have to look for a field of
activity in other areas like Africa, Latin America and Asia” (p. 7). All in all, the
Netherlands decided to make 1.5 million guilders available, all with a view to
transferring knowledge.
The processing of the post-colonial trauma initially had a strong influence on
government policy in Western countries. In France, the Ministry for the Colonies
was divided into two ministerial departments: one for “related states” and 
one for French overseas territories. In the United Kingdom too, an aid system 
was constructed which was grafted strongly on old relationships and institutions
(Stokke 2009). The colonial focus endured for quite some time, most notably in
France. From the 1960s onwards, De Gaulle developed a policy for bilateral devel-
opment with former French colonies. Supported by financial, technical, cultural
and military aid, France thus gained an influential position in Francophone 
Africa. Even after De Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, successive French presidents
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carried on providing aid primarily to Francophone countries in Africa. France also
became militarily involved in such countries on a number of occasions.
In most countries the colonial focus gradually faded into the background. When,
in 1956, the second memorandum on development aid was issued in the Nether-
lands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1956), the most important motive was already
being referred to as ‘human dignity’, with this mainly being developed by out-
lining how an international economy can eventually benefit everyone (“we need
natural resources”). Knowledge transfer shifted to the background and invest-
ments of foreign private and public capital became the new priority. In 1962,
Minister Luns again presented a memorandum on development aid (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 1962) which referred to less-developed countries (this description
replaced the term ‘least-developed countries’ and was soon followed by the terms
‘under-developed countries’ and ‘developing countries’, after which they were
also referred to as recipient countries and partner countries). The main focus of
the memorandum was on a stable world order. “The discontinuation of excessive
differences in wealth is important from the political perspective as well. The social
tensions which result from poverty and hunger lead to political tensions, extrem-
ism and chaos. Even if they are initially determined at national level, such circum-
stances tend to generate international tension and risk of war. Peace in the world
is enhanced by increasing prosperity and particularly by helping underdeveloped
countries to catch up” (p. 1). It was for this reason that the Netherlands decided
to invest structurally in knowledge accumulation. “Lastly, in view of the need for
accelerated social development in the underdeveloped countries the government
proposes making a one-off contribution available, as a specific Dutch initiative,
for an institute for social development planning” (p. 14).
These views illustrate a fundamental motive for development aid, namely self-
interest. Self-interest comes in various forms. It can be very practical (for example
the provision of new employment for people returning from the colonies and
increasing export opportunities) or more enlightened (the creation of a stable
world elsewhere will also be good for us in the long term). To date, self-interest
has played an important role in policy on development aid (see also Dierikx 
2002-2008).
There is also a second category of motives for aid, namely moral motives. These
have their roots in a period when development policy did not yet officially exist.
The Christian church in particular had been sending missionaries to far-off 
places since the beginning of colonial times. Travelling in the wake of soldiers,
government officials, settlers and traders, they had carved out a niche for them-
selves in many parts of the world by the end of the nineteenth century. They
converted people but also contributed to their general development – initially by
teaching but also, in the twentieth century, by providing medical services. To a
26 less pretension, more ambition
certain extent missionaries took a different standpoint to other Westerners in that
they wanted to preserve indigenous customs and learn the local languages. In this
way they had a definite influence on cultural anthropology. The practice of send-
ing out missionaries came to an end sometime in the mid-1960s. The motive
behind this practice was partially transformed into support by the Christian
parties for an increase in the budget for development aid by Western govern-
ments, while at the same time three papal encyclicals and similar developments in
the protestant church linked these religious persuasions to international social
engagement.
Although there was less of a focus on missionary work in the 1960s, this did not
mean that the moral motive disappeared. However, the most important manifes-
tation of this motive changed and became part of a more general and secularized
idea of ‘decency’ which had been around for somewhat longer. In the 1960s and
1970s, the third world movement started to gain momentum in the form of groups
in many Western countries debating poverty and oppression, unfair trade, war
and tyranny, capitalism and imperialism. There were calls to refuse tax reductions
and introduce a 1 percent global tax. The war in Vietnam, the fall of President
Salvador Allende in Chile, and the freedom movements in South Africa and Latin
America resulted in all kinds of debates, movements and activities. In the public
discourse, development policy became more and more a question of civilization
and of not abandoning people beset with problems to their fate. This civilization
ideal was broadly supported by people in the West. It also offered excellent pos-
sibilities for a political compromise. After all, the classical liberal endeavour of
elevating the underclass could be linked to the Christian Democratic idea of love
for one’s fellow man and the socialist idea of solidarity. Although the principles
differed, in everyday practice they were easy to unite. Political conflicts surround-
ing development aid were therefore few and far between from the 1960s until the
end of the first decade of this century.
The two basic motives for development aid are still present in 2010, although they
have evolved. There are now different variants of both, and their relationship has
become more complex. The two motives are now interpreted more individually.
While it was possible, for a long time, to combine the interpretations to form a
workable political and organizational compromise, there are many indications that
this gradually became more and more problematic. Before examining this relation-
ship more closely, we will first analyze the way in which these two motives have
developed.
2.2 the moral assignment
The endeavour to help your fellow man elsewhere is a leitmotiv for a great deal of
development aid. As already mentioned, this is often founded on ideological posi-
27the development aid split
tions, whether religious (‘love thy neighbour’) or secular (solidarity, decency). 
Bit by bit, attempts have been made to bolster the foundations for those motives.
After all, motives have to do with issues to which we attach value for material or
idealistic reasons. Many theorists wish to replace those motives with principles
and try to develop a reasoning which justifies development aid in generally accept-
able terms. There are three possible variants.
Individual potential
A first group starts out from the anthropological idea that people have to be able to
realize their ‘individual potential’. This liberal branch of political philosophy
became well-known largely through the work of Amartya Sen and his notion of
capabilities. Strikingly, in his work, Sen (1999) himself always remained quite
vague about the question of which capabilities actually exist. He provides no
exhaustive list, despite referring to matters such as working, rest, being a member
of a community, being able to read and being respected.
Sen – and authors like Nussbaum (2006), who developed a justification strategy to
suit this approach – make a strict distinction between capabilities in the sense of
capacities, and the specific functioning of those capacities – that is the outcome of
what people do with capacities, given the circumstances in which they live. The
extent to which people can express their capacities is the extent to which they
experience freedom – and the creation of a greater degree of freedom is the goal of
development (Robeyns 2005).
Sen does outline how that freedom is conditioned. He identifies five sorts of
instrumental freedoms: political freedom, economic possibilities, social opportu-
nities, guarantees of transparency and openness, and protective certainties. By
doing so he tries to strike a happy medium between theorists who talk about
welfare only in terms of feelings (welfare as happiness), and others who only focus
on material circumstances (for example, income) and the equal distribution of
resources, without asking what these mean in the lives of individual people, who
are of course all different.
Sen’s way of reasoning is a feature of much of the work of the United Nations
Development Programme (undp), such as the Human Development Index and
the accompanying Human Development Report, developed by the Pakistani
Mahbub ul Haq, a fellow student and friend of Sen. The index is a function of life
expectancy, level of education and standard of life in a specific country. These days
the report includes all kinds of other themes, such as cultural freedom and partici-
pation. The undp had hoped that this concept would counterbalance what it
regarded as the excessive economic focus of the World Bank.
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Right to development
A second line of approach is to start not from the extent to which individual capac-
ities can become a reality, but from a predetermined set of individual rights. That
approach also has a long tradition, and has become a resonant feature of debates on
development aid more and more frequently during the past fifteen years. Increas-
ingly, the question is being asked of how rights should be interpreted at global
level. Why, up to now, have notions of justice applied in individual countries and
not elsewhere? In other words, as formulated in the editorial to a theme-based
edition of The Economist (2004), “Why justice at home and charity abroad?”
‘Cosmopolitan’ ethicists have developed the concept of global justice further (see
Pekelharing 2009). In particular, Pogge (2005, 2008) acquired a reputation for his
argument that everyone actively bears responsibility for the continued existence
or eradication of poverty. He even goes so far as to say that he believes the famous
first Millennium Development Goal (mdg), (halving poverty by 2015) to be a
crime against humanity because it implies that it is ‘permissible’ for half of
humanity to still be living in poverty in 2015.
The institutional counterpart of a universal concept of justice consists of the
intricate un system of human rights. This comprises a summary of universal
rights and with that a moral, legal and political obligation to realize these rights
on a global scale. This resulted in the introduction of an impressive collection of
rights, as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Declaration
on the Right to Development (1986), the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights
(1993) – in which political rights are formally put on a par with economic and
social rights – and the Rome Declaration on World Food Security (1996). In recent
years the un has tried to clarify, via the work of various task forces, why reason-
ing in terms of human rights provides a suitable foundation for development
thinking.
However, thinking in terms of rights is not everyone’s idea of the ideal way of
substantiating development aid. The tension in that relationship can be largely
traced back to the fact that human rights can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
They are often hastily interpreted as political rights (freedom of association, the
right not to be tortured) while the world of development aid, if indeed it reasons
in terms of rights, attaches more importance to economic and social rights.
Many countries in the South reproach Western countries for claiming that they
acknowledge the indivisibility of civil and political rights on the one hand and
economic, social and cultural rights on the other, but in practice show little
interest in enforcing the latter category of human rights at a worldwide level
(Alston 2005). There does seem to have been some improvement now that a
large number of countries have included social and economic rights in their
constitutions. In South Africa citizens can now take legal action to claim their
right to work. The standards of the ilo with regard to decent work have also
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acquired a more than symbolic meaning over the course of time. However, it
will be some time before social and economic human rights become legally
enforceable rights.
A rights-based approach is complicated in other ways (Gready 2008; Grugel &
Piper 2009; ichrp 2008; O’Neill 2004). For example, it is difficult to relate rights
to a distribution perspective. After all, everyone can be entitled to good health but
everyday practice is primarily one of setting priorities and sharing resources, not
ideal subject matter for a rights discourse. Neither is it always clear who the rele-
vant actors are. Who, for example, is responsible for food security? On the other
hand, rights have the advantage that they constitute a clear point of departure
from the idea that development is no more than a favour and that they, in any
event, try to designate and specify responsibilities, even if the interpretation is
contentious.
A better world
The third group starts by tackling the question of whether development is, in any
case, the right term to represent our aim of creating a better world (for example
Rist 2007). In their eyes, it has strong links with a Western image of limitless
progress – an image which itself is an expression of the enlightenment project 
that has dominated Western societies for two centuries. It is closely related to the
notions of ‘more’ and ‘universal values’. Making a distinction between ‘developed’
and ‘underdeveloped’ countries makes it very easy to advance the idea of the 
superiority of Western society. In fact, this is the twentieth century successor to
the nineteenth century division between the civilized and the wild. The alterna-
tive has not been elaborated in any detail but points towards a conceptualization of
the notion of a ‘better’ world.
As a result, the authors in this group conform to the wider, Aristotelian criticism
of the Western enlightenment project, by pursuing a ‘much more substantial’, that
is substantive definition of the good life. This approach emphasizes the fact that
growth often goes hand-in-hand with unbridled consumption, and all the conse-
quences for the environment that this entails. On the other hand, sustainability is
promoted as being crucial for a broader ‘good life approach’. Those who adhere to
this approach also value the very diverse and specific ways in which different
groups of people around the world view the ‘good life’.
These attempts to give development a more fundamental foundation are interest-
ing but have had limited political significance up to now. Reasoning in terms of
capabilities is not unusual – and even standard practice in undp circles – but it
would appear, for the time being, to function more as a vocabulary by which to
substantiate activities which are already being undertaken, than an independent
line of thought as a guideline for action. Rights-based reasoning is based heavily
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on the international legal order. However, in daily practice its meaning is not
strong enough to affect the scope or nature of development aid. The same is
evident in the context of un practice in which hardly any serious and influential
debates take place on the content of the individual countries’ development policy.
un organizations with an explicit development assignment have ended up politi-
cally in increasingly marginal positions in recent decades, such as unctad, or are
continuing to remain marginal, such as the Development Corporation Forum. The
latter was launched only in July 2007 as the platform for structuring consultation
on the implementation of development policy, but has still not progressed much
beyond being a discussion group. The original task of the undp, which still has
the strongest position, was to coordinate the development work of others.
However, its focus continues to lie for the time being on executing its own devel-
opment activities. Its position does not allow it to coordinate the development
policy of all donors, let alone guide or influence it.
2.3 self-interest
The moral motive is contrasted by the self-interest motive. That motive has also
evolved over the course of time. Once again there are three variants.
Self-interest as money and influence
A Western country can provide development aid because it generates money and
influence. That is the most direct form of self-interest – and in the perception of
many the crudest. In this context money refers almost always to the explicit inter-
ests of the business community. This motive has been around for quite some time
and remains a small element of Western government policy. A set of instruments
is available to the business community, including a scheme for export credits, but
generally speaking the point of departure that applies in most Western countries is
that a country’s own companies should not be able to count on preferential treat-
ment when it comes to spending the development budget. The United States and
Japan are the best-known exceptions to this, but else where, companies can
compete for contracts on the basis of open competition.
In recent years, the theme of financial interest has also been approached from a
different viewpoint. The question is why should we help countries to try to
develop at all? Are we not then playing into the hands of the competition? 
The classic answer is that growth elsewhere is in fact favourable for Western
economies in that it facilitates specialization and exchanges which are of benefit to
everyone. A few years ago, in anticipation of such a debate, the Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (cpb) published studies on the emergence of
China (2006) and India (2007) which calculated that the development of China
had led to a 0.5 percent increase in employment in the Netherlands, and that of
India to an increase of 0.25 percent. In a recent study (Creusen & Lejour 2009), the
31the development aid split
cpb even calculated that, since 1970, the increased openness of the Dutch econ-
omy has resulted, thanks to international agreements on freer trade, in higher
growth and now generates between around 1200 and 1600 euros per resident per
year.
There is also a geopolitical version of Western countries’ self-interest, oriented not
around money, but influence. Western countries occasionally use development
aid as an instrument by which to project an image of themselves and to buy ‘a place
at the table’ in international fora. A number of small countries in particular engage
in this behaviour. Large countries are always able to make an impact in the interna-
tional arena by adopting positions on the ‘key’ issues of peace and security. In that
context, small countries carry less weight and development aid is one of the ways
in which they can make their voice heard. That is why it generally applies that the
smaller the country, the bigger the percentage of aid they provide.
Self-interest as stability
As a variant of the self-interest motive, money and influence sometimes play a role
but neither are a significant motive for the direction and structure of Western
development aid. In so far as the self-interest motive is relevant, it more frequently
takes a second guise. The self-interest is then primarily aimed at stability. The core
of the argument is that being good to others eventually means that they will cause
us fewer problems. The benefit is then no longer a specific gain in the here and
now, but in the stability which aid helps to bring about in the long term. This is
then a form of enlightened self-interest.
A variant which features this idea is the notion that development aid can halt
migration flows. Some politicians advocate development aid because, in time, it
would mean that people in Africa would no longer feel any urge to come to
Europe. The idea can also be formulated without linking it to migration: investing
in the South makes the situation there more stable. In those terms, enlightened
self-interest has played an important role from the beginning of modern develop-
ment aid, and can already be seen in Tinbergen’s work. It is also reflected, in partic-
ular, in the pursuit of what passed, for many years, as ‘security’. After Truman’s
famous speech in 1949, in which he introduced the world to American develop-
ment policy and Marshall Aid, 80 percent of the massive flow of aid went to the
belt of developing countries around the Soviet Union and China, in the first
instance mainly to Taiwan and South Korea, later to Persia, Pakistan and South
Vietnam. In Western Europe Marshall Aid was also intended to help prevent the
development of a breeding ground for Communism. That political undertone was
a characteristic of American aid for many years. The fact that Egypt and Israel were
the most important recipients of American aid from 1979 onwards had less to do
with poverty in those countries than with the political situation in the Middle East
(Hoebink 2010).
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The United States and, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union were not the only
countries to be motivated by geopolitical considerations. For example, West
Germany was long unwilling to give aid to a country that recognized the existence
of East Germany. Australian bilateral development aid started in Indonesia and
was motivated by the fear that cattle diseases could blow over to the Australian
continent from Nusa Tenggara, the most remote of Indonesia’s islands. Combating
cattle diseases consequently became one of the first projects to be carried out
there. France, in particular, maintains links with its former colonies, with
economic and geopolitical interests being mixed in with notions of development
aid. Not so long ago, French soldiers came to the aid of the Chadian dictator Idriss
Deby. Although this took place with international approval, no pressure was put
on Deby to take serious steps towards democratizing the country. France is also
still considering whether it wants to investigate the possessions of the president of
Congo-Brazzaville, Sassou Ngueso, who is said to have eighteen houses and 112
bank accounts, or those of Omar Bongo of Gabon, who was in power from 1967 to
2009 and who has thirty-nine houses and seventy bank accounts.
Enlightened self-interest can serve as a motive for the West to help the South.
Although that may sound crass to those who act on the basis of a moral motive,
self-interest was once an important motive for creating a welfare system in the
West itself. Take, for example, the development of the Netherlands. The first form
of government care for the needy came about at municipal level in response to the
large group of vagrants who moved from one town to another in times of
economic hardship in search of work. There was a fear of them bringing infectious
diseases or rising up in rebellion. When, after 1840, a number of consecutive
potato harvests failed, the percentage of needy people rose from 10 to 15 percent 
of the population and the political unrest in the countries around the Netherlands
increased substantially, a decision was made to make care for the poor an explicit
municipal task by including it in the Municipalities Act of 1851. However, this
safety net turned out to be insufficient in the face of increasing industrialization.
Fifty years later a start was made on building up a social security system in the
Netherlands which was largely based on the model which Bismarck had developed
in Germany several decades earlier. Bismarck was a member of the German landed
nobility and a self-proclaimed opponent of the emerging workers’ movement. 
At the same time he wanted to give the recently formed country of Germany a
clear power base and mould it into a unified whole. As a result the authoritarian
Bismarck, of all people, became the first in Europe to develop a social security
system – without incidentally ever consulting formally with workers’ organiza-
tions on the matter. He introduced accident insurance in 1871, health insurance in
1883, and pension and disability insurance in 1889. These schemes would serve as
a model for what would happen in Western Europe in subsequent decades. Social
security arrangements in other countries were also mainly set up by authoritarian
regimes. Therefore, our ‘own’ Western welfare system is largely based on the
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middle class’ and elite’s fears of chaos, rebellion, crime and infectious diseases (De
Swaan 1988). A similar argument can also be applied to development aid.
Self-interest as part of the general interest
If enlightened self-interest is seen as a way of creating stability, it can quite easily
become synonymous with the general interest. Development aid then becomes a
contribution to global survival. The starting point of this variant is the fact that
countries have become dependent on each other in a number of essential areas.
This variant is rapidly attracting a greater emphasis thanks, mainly, to the signifi-
cant increase in attention to climate issues and the realization that these cannot be
solved without the involvement of the countries in the South. There has also been
a rapid increase in the awareness of interdependence. Globalization, presented in
the 1990s primarily as the intertwining of economies, similarly had far-reaching
consequences in other fields. When goods move around in a globalizing world,
people, knowledge, polluted air, financial flows, and cultures also move, and this
leads to mutual dependencies in these areas too. These developments require care-
ful analysis. We will therefore examine them separately and in more detail in the
following section.
2.4 interdependencies
Demographic changes
Interdependence first of all increases under the influence of demographic changes,
with huge consequences. Between 1950 and 2009, the world population increased
more than two and a half times, from 2.5 to 6.8 billion. These figures are also
important when pondering the scale of the ‘development task’ (ironically enough
this task has become even greater thanks to development efforts: combating infec-
tious diseases and improvements in healthcare contributed substantially to this
population explosion in the 1950s and 1960s). The world’s population will
continue to grow at a considerable rate until 2050. The rise during the coming four
decades will be equal to the total world population in 1950. That growth is going
to take place almost exclusively in developing countries. In 2050, more than 
7 billion of the 9.2 billion people in the world will live in countries which we
currently refer to as developing countries. The most significant growth will be in
India, where almost one-fifth of the increase is going to take place. Until 2025, 
the number of inhabitants of India is set to increase by 240 million to 1.45 billion,
reaching 1.7 billion in 2050. Over the same period, the population of China is set 
to grow by 100 million, reaching a total of 1.45 billion. This is partly thanks to the
single child policy which has caused China’s population to age much more quickly
than that of India. During the same period, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa
will increase by around 350 million. On the other hand, the population in ‘West-
ern’ Europe, Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zeeland will
only grow by 4 percent in the period up until 2050. The population in the West
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will actually drop by 7 percent in the same period to 1.15 billion if the predicted net
immigration of 2.4 million people per year does not occur (United Nations Popu-
lation Division 2009). While 24 percent of the world population lived in the West
in 1980, this will have dropped to just 16 percent in 2025, taking account of the
assumed net immigration. Many Western countries, including Russia, Ukraine,
and a number of Eastern European countries, will undergo population decreases in
the same period, sometimes by even more than 10 percent (National Intelligence
Council 2008).
Figure 2.1 World population in 2050
Source: Worldmapper.org 2009
The consequences of the growth in population are considerable. In developing
countries the primary task is to cope with urbanization (Van Dijk 2006). Based on
the current trend, 57 percent of the world population will live in urban areas in
2025, as opposed to 50 percent now. In around 2025, the world will have eight new
mega cities to add to the nineteen that currently exist. All but one of these new
cities will be in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the greatest urban growth
will take place in smaller cities, often along motorways and the coast. A relatively
large population increase will also take place in areas close to the coast at locations
which are very sensitive to climate change. In the meantime, population ageing will
mean Western countries are confronted by a different challenge, namely to main-
tain the size of the working population. If the eu wants to keep its working popula-
tion at the current absolute level, it will have to absorb the entire population 
growth of North Africa and the Middle East in 2040. The alternative is to increase
productivity in the entire eu to the level of the most productive European country,
Denmark, and simultaneously raise the pensionable age to 75 (wrr 2006b).
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Climate, the environment and biodiversity
The growth in world population has clearly left its marks. It is estimated that the
human race has already chopped down between 30 and 50 percent of all the
world’s forests, while three-quarters of all commercial species of fish are seriously
overfished, and the speed with which species are dying out has been a thousand
times higher during the past 100 years than in the periods before then (mea 2005,
defra 2005). Between 1970 and 1999, 50 percent of all marshes worldwide have
been drained and it is estimated that, as a result, 20 percent of all freshwater
species have disappeared, as well as half the water buffer capacity which used to be
available worldwide to prevent floods along major rivers. During the past 100
years, 75 percent of all genetic diversity in agricultural varieties has disappeared
and one-third of coral worldwide has perished or has been very seriously affected.
The effect of such developments initially manifests itself in areas and communities
which are primarily dependent on their local ecosystems. Quite often those areas
are in developing countries, but the problems they face also affect the developed
world.
On top of these forms of source depletion there is the problem of climate change.
In 1972, the Club of Rome published the report The Limits to Growth. In contrast to
the frequently expressed view, the authors did not predict that the world would
collapse at the end of the twentieth century. Instead, their findings remain of
interest to this day. Anyone who now analyzes the data relating to the period 1970
to 2000 and compares it with the various scenarios can only conclude that they fit
into the business-as-usual scenario referred to in the report, which the Club calls
the standard run scenario. This scenario puts forward the possibility of an even-
tual collapse of the global system in the mid-twenty-first century. More recent
reports, like that of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) and
the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern 2007), contain details
on how such a global collapse of the environment, economy and social order might
happen. According to these reports, both developed countries and countries in the
South will have to develop low-carbon economies in the coming decades and start
adopting a climate-adaptive approach. After all, the climate is already changing
drastically (see also Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2009b).
In addition, there is the problem that has developed over time of rich countries
being responsible, based on the principle of ‘the polluter pays’, but poor countries
mainly facing the risk of actually having to pay the price. According to calculations
by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) the
costs for the adaptation of poor countries to climate change vary from 30 to 90
billion dollars per year with an average of 75 billion dollars. Developed countries
that try to evade this moral responsibility end up facing a considerable problem
because the future of the entire human race also depends on us stopping global
warming. This requires a joint and yet differentiated effort and cooperation by all
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countries since mitigating climate change is a global public good in which every-
one in the world benefits from every contribution, no matter where it is made, to
the reduction of co2 emissions while, conversely, every extra emission of co2 will
have a detrimental effect on every world citizen. This not only means that the
efforts in rich countries to limit co2 emissions can be more than negated by an
increase in emissions in growing developing countries, but also that it is cost-
effective to separate, to a certain extent, the party that pays for mitigation from the
question of where those adaptations take place. Mitigation in the agriculture and
forestry sectors of developing countries in particular is a lot cheaper than in rich
countries, and poorer countries ought to be able to leapfrog directly to environ-
mental-friendly production methods, transport systems, energy generation and
urban development without having to pass through more contaminating phases
first.
In short, if the poor countries do not participate, it can cost us a great deal of
money, and we may even end up with wet feet into the bargain. If the five coun-
tries with the largest emissions (which represent two-thirds of global emissions)
are made responsible for reducing emissions to the desired global level, the related
costs will be three times higher than when all countries participate. That participa-
tion requires these countries not to be approached as potential recipients (and
payers) of advanced technologies which are largely the intellectual property of
Western companies, but instead to acquire the necessary techniques and knowl-
edge. According to Birdsall & Subramanian (2009) revolutionary technological
improvements in developing countries are needed since “improvements in tech-
nology at rates consistent with those we observed historically, even for the most
carbon-efficient economies among major emitters, provide little hope of meeting
the broadly agreed global target for emissions reductions of 50 percent relative to
1990”. The European Parliament has adopted a resolution to the effect that intel-
lectual property rights may not constitute a barrier to development and technol-
ogy transfers, and the British economist Nicholas Stern has suggested that the
relevant technologies for climate policy have to become available without patents.
What is more, being able to use that knowledge requires more than machines,
equipment and large-scale projects for the transfer of hardware for clean technolo-
gies. Other very important elements are the transfer of underlying (implicit)
knowledge and skills and the building of the capacity to be able to use technology
and adapt it to the different specific cultural and technological requirements
between and within countries.
It is also important to emphasize that climate changes will affect people in the
developing world more immediately than in the West. While, in the short term,
some more moderate climates may well even benefit from climate change (for
example, Russia and Canada), populations closer to the equator will primarily
experience negative effects. While agricultural production may well increase in
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some areas, developing countries may experience a decline of between 10 and 
25 percent in their production by 2080 if policy stays the same and temperatures
continue to rise. That decline may even be greater in some countries, for example
of between 30 and 40 percent in India, 52 percent in Senegal, and 56 percent in
Sudan (Dervis 2008). However, the accuracy of many of these figures is very
uncertain. What does it mean, for example, if in the near future East Africa were
no longer to have two rainy seasons, but just one? It does not take much to imag-
ine that the effects would be considerable, but it is difficult to assess what the
general impact would be (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2009a;
Ockwell 2009; Ockwell et al. 2008; oecd 2009, Srinivas 2009; un 2009c;
unctad 2009d; World Bank 2009b; wrr 2006d).
Food
Climate change will also affect food production, while food production itself will
come under pressure due to changing eating habits. The effect of a growing global
middle class, with meat and dairy-rich eating habits, is already tangible. Meat and
dairy products generate high-quality proteins, but their production is much less
efficient in terms of energy consumption, and therefore land use (for cattle
fodder). A diet based on grain requires nine times less land than a diet based on
beef for a comparable quantity of calories. This can be translated into higher food
prices and regional food shortages. The United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (fao) estimates that, in 2009 alone, and primarily as a consequence
of the relatively high food prices, the number of chronically hungry people in the
world rose by 75 million to 1.02 billion (fao 2009a). The sudden increase in food
prices in 2007 and 2008 and the resulting unrest in many cities in the South has
put food quantity back on the agenda, and with good reason. After all, the
Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization
calculated that, in the coming fifty years, the ever-growing world population is
expected to require as much food as the total quantity the human race has
produced to date (Clark 2009). Achieving this is going to require quite some
effort.
In contrast to food quality, food quantity has never been ‘guaranteed’. While
diseases like aids, sars, and bird flu have led to the setting of international safety
priorities, and the un Security Council has concentrated its attention on terror-
ism, there has never been a similar focus on food quantity. Although the World
Trade Organization (wto) has a long tradition of international safety agreements
in the field of food quality and everyone can almost assume that the food in inter-
national supermarket chains is safe, there are still no binding international regula-
tions governing food quantity (Warner & Burger forthcoming). Countries are
working on food security via regional partnerships (for example the eu agricul-
tural policy, which was set up from this perspective). The question is to what
extent this is a good idea and what form regulation could take.
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The recent significant rise in food prices (more than 80 percent in the three years
prior to the spring of 2009), and the resulting unrest, show that food security in
many countries has a very loaded political priority. It is also clear that the global
food market is becoming increasingly dependent on a range of factors which are no
longer just technical in nature, but also political. Because demand for grain has
exceeded supply in the past seven years, grain stocks in 2007 were at their lowest for
thirty years. This was a consequence of a conscious policy since 2000. The collapse
of global market prices a decade ago, together with improved trade logistics and
overwhelming reserves on the world market resulted in many governments
(including China) regarding large grain stocks as inconvenient and expensive. Bad
weather caused the grain stock to decline even further in 2005 and 2006. However,
there were other factors that played a role. When the dollar started declining
steadily in 2002, and the price of oil rose as a result, transport prices for food 
doubled and fertilizer prices tripled (Evans 2009; fao 2008). The emergence of
the biofuels industry also played a part. Industry is a significant user of agricultural
products such as sugar, maize, cassava, oil seed, and palm oil. In 2007, 4.7 percent of
the world grain production was already being used for biofuels. Lastly, world food
prices were also influenced by the policy measures by food-exporting countries to
restrict exports in response to imminent internal social unrest (fao 2008).
All this sent huge shockwaves through the global food market. It also resulted in
individual countries like South Korea, China and Saudi Arabia securing their food
production in recent years by purchasing land in Africa. They have started clearing
forests and people from the land, which is – at least for the time being – very
fertile, to cultivate food on a large scale. Stricter food export regulations are being
introduced, because countries only maintain limited grain stocks (Europe, for
example, only has enough grain for two months). If the harvests in China fail on a
grand scale and that country decides to stop exporting more grain and purchase all
its food on the world market, this would result in such excessive price rises that
many a country would have to hold on to its own food in order to avoid national
unrest. All this is compounded by the imminent shortages of energy, water and
fertilizer. Based on current agricultural production, reserves of phosphate, the
basic constituent of fertilizer, will only last another 125 years. However, if we take
the increasing demand for food into account, it is estimated that it will already be
gone in sixty years (us Geological Survey 2009).
In order to feed the future world population sustainably, stably and efficiently, it is
in everyone’s interest for the right food to be cultivated in the right way and at the
right location. Only then can there be any guarantee that, based on current world-
wide agricultural acreage, we can produce sufficient food in a nutrient, water and
energy-efficient way for a population of 9.2 billion people and, at the same time,
preserve biodiversity and the environment (Evans 2009; fao 2008; Fresco 2009;
Rabbinge & Bindraban 2005).
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A telling example is the cultivation of crops which use a relatively large quantity of
water per unit of yield in areas where water is scarce. The production of one kilo of
wheat requires a thousand litres of water and, from the perspective of water effi-
ciency, it is strange that countries where water is scarce, like Tunisia and Kaza-
khstan, or dry areas of China, produce such cheap water-inefficient bulk crops for
export to countries where water is plentiful, such as Canada or the Netherlands
(The same applies, for example, to cotton, which, although not a food crop, still
requires large quantities of water). From the perspective of resources it would be
better for Tunisia to focus on the cultivation of high-quality drought-resistant
cash crops like olives or oil seed, and import its grain from water-rich areas in
North America. In terms of water required to produce one unit of grain or cotton,
Kazakhstan, a country where water is scarce, exports five cubic kilometres of
‘virtual’ water packed in its export crops every year, and imports hardly any. Para-
doxically, the water-rich Netherlands imports almost three cubic kilometres of
virtual water annually. Of course, these kinds of comparisons can also be made for
efficient nutrient use, agricultural acreage, energy or pesticide use, and illustrate
the importance of coordination and strategic agricultural specialization for a
sustainable global food supply (Allan 1999, 2001; Hoekstra & Hung 2002; World
Water Council 2004).
Water
Huge water-related problems can be expected to occur. In many African semi-arid
and arid areas such problems are primarily caused by irregular rainfall, high levels
of potential evaporation and the fact that, due to inhospitable physical conditions
and the lack of an organized technological and institutional infrastructure, water
cannot be properly stored. Annual rainfall in Burkina Faso is actually almost the
same as that in the Netherlands. However, in Burkina Faso it falls during a short
and usually irregular period, and potential annual evaporation is usually more
than twice as high (1500-2000 mm) as the rainfall itself (fao 2007; knmi 2009).
By way of comparison, the long-term average evaporation in the Netherlands is
540 mm. Furthermore, much of the water flows out of the country during and
immediately after the rainy season via seasonal rivers (wadis) due to the lack of
water storage infrastructure such as dams and small-scale water tanks.
Africa is not facing a water shortage, but other places are. Central Asia, North
China, and the northern part of South Asia can experience considerable problems
due to glaciers receding and disappearing. For example, many of the large river
systems in Asia will, in the short term, discharge a lot more water than normal,
but will then decrease in size once the glaciers have completely melted. These river
systems provide water and food for more than two billion people.
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Financial crisis
The recent financial crisis is an entirely different example of increasing interde-
pendence. It is still too soon to say with any certainty what effect the current crisis
will have on developing countries, but what we know so far does not give much
cause for optimism. The forecasts indicate a significant drop in private flows of
capital to developing countries. In 2009, foreign direct investments (fdi) already
fell by 30 percent, that is 1 percent of these countries’ gdp. At the beginning of
2009, the un counted thirty low-income countries with reserves under the criti-
cal limit (enough to finance three months of imports). What has now become a
quite thick pile of studies point out the unpleasant truth that this crisis is the
responsibility of developed countries, but that it is also having a very detrimental
effect in developing countries that were unable to do anything to prevent it. In the
first instance it was thought that the consequences for these countries would not
be too bad but, after the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the exter-
nal environment for emerging markets quickly deteriorated. The crisis is putting
pressure on structural changes and national development processes via a number
of transmission mechanisms, including a stark decrease in private capital flows
and higher costs of external financing, lower external sales and falling prices for
products and raw materials as a consequence of the greatest decline in world trade
since the 1930s, and an expected reduction in remittances by between 7 and 10
percent in 2009 (eclac 2008; Economist 2009; Ghosh & Chandrasekhar 2009;
Griffith-Jones & Ocampo 2009; idb 2009; Ocampo 2009; Sánchez & Vos 2009;
un 2009a; unctad 2009a, 2009b; World Bank 2009a).
The effect is different per country but, generally speaking, the crisis signals the
end of a number of years of stellar performance in Asia (Loser 2009), of a Panglos-
sian period for Latin America which lasted from 2003 to 2008 (idb 2009), and five
years during which the group of forty-nine least developed countries experienced
strong growth performance (unctad 2008b). As a result, a need for financial aid
arose in many countries in the short term in order to limit their balance-of-
payments problems and create fiscal space to stimulate the economy and absorb
the social consequences of the crisis. International financial institutions, at both
global and regional levels, responded by extending their resources in order to
support countries in difficulties. There is a potential downside to this because the
focus is mostly on loans rather than on donations, meaning that a lot of poor coun-
tries are facing a new debt crisis. “It took the international community twenty-
three years from the beginning of the modern sovereign debt crisis in 1982 until an
alleged ‘full’ cancellation was agreed upon at least for a small group of the poorest
countries”, Kaiser warns in a paper for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. “This failure
of a global governance cost millions of people in the indebted world their health,
their opportunities to live a decent live and even life itself” (Kaiser et al. 2009; see
also Dijkstra 2008).
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Global, but how?
This short outline of the way in which the world has become more and more inter-
dependent shows that development aid can no longer be seen separately from such
broad issues. However, what the role of development aid can and should be in the
context of global issues is by no means a foregone conclusion. It is clear, however,
that these issues significantly increase the importance of development aid and
change its nature. The classical idea was that development aid is essentially 
one-way traffic and focuses on helping developing countries to realize their goals.
By contrast, the idea behind the new model is that important goals cannot be
realized only at national level, and that they should be addressed at international
level as well. Development aid then becomes an instrument for managing global
interdependence. If India is given financial help to build new power stations using
recent technology which reduces emissions of greenhouse gas, two birds can be
killed with one stone: India is helped to meet its energy requirement and, at the
same time, the burden on the worldwide climate is mitigated. At the same time
this throws up all manner of new questions. For example, who will then deter-
mine the priorities as regards spending the aid, and how are global themes related
to local and national development, which still has a long way to go in many coun-
tries?
2.5 how to combine big and small
Development aid can be provided on the basis of moral motives, but also on the
basis of self-interest. The existence of different motives does not, in itself, have 
to be a problem. It may even be an advantage, facilitating the creation of a broad
political and social support basis for development aid. That has been the case in
recent decades. However, the existence of a number of different motives can also
cause problems. After all, each motive leads to specific views on the way in 
which development aid should be designed. Those views do not have to be contra-
dictory, but they often accentuate different things. Those accentuations can lead 
to the ever-increasing divergence of the prevailing ideas about how development
aid should be shaped. This has also been evident in recent decades. People have
started to see development aid on the one hand as a way of alleviating immediate
need by means of concrete activities and, on the other hand, as an overall strategy
for tackling global issues.
The idea that ‘doing good’ mainly entails concrete activities is reflected in the
image of development aid in the media. ‘Goed tv’ – a digital channel which is
included in the supplementary packages of most Dutch cable providers and which
uses slogans like ‘Passion for a better world 24 hours a day’ – is currently
bombarding viewers with a constant succession of projects, including pictures of
the inevitable gathering of the residents of an entire African village to thank the
generous givers from the West. Posters suggest that donating a few euros will
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protect a child from malaria (As former Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende claims
on the www.malarianomore.nl website: “You too can help! For € 3.50 you can
provide a mosquito net and save someone’s life.”). For a number of years, Dutch
ngos have been forced to acquire a quarter of their income from fundraising and,
as a result, they have started using impressive graphics to show that their aid
directly helps the poorest.
The situation is similar at international level. In the 1960s a media culture
emerged which led to citizens being shown more factual images. In 1968, Biafra
was the first really major drama to receive broad television coverage and the
pictures had a huge effect on people in the West. Artists also started focusing on
the provision of aid to developing countries. George Harrison and Ravi Shankar
were the first of many when they organized a Concert for Bangladesh in 1971,
which raised 240,000 dollars for the United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef).
Originally the undertone was primarily humanitarian and aimed, in particular, 
at food aid. This continued until the Do they know it’s Christmas? initiative
for the victims of the famine in Ethiopia in 1984. By then the two concerts 
that Bob Geldof organized attracted more than one billion viewers and raised
140,000,000 dollars. After that, the attention switched more towards politicians.
u2 singer Bono was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize after lobbying politicians
to write off the debts of developing countries in the run-up to the jubilee year
2000. The 24 million signatures for debt relief made it into the Guinness Book of
Records. Many will remember the ten ‘Live 8’ concerts which preceded the g8
summit in Gleneagles, where a doubling of aid to developing countries was on the
agenda. Eventually, almost every right-minded celebrity could be seen doing their
thing for Africa: ‘glamour aid’ was born. As a consequence, during the past sixty
years, practical aid in the field of food, healthcare and education has increasingly
become the standard, not only in the Netherlands, but in almost all other Western
countries (Mosse 2005; Bolton 2007). How did that process take place?
Development aid made small
The first ever memorandum on development aid referred to in the beginning of
this chapter – which was actually a short clarification to the 1950 budget – was
called the Memorandum concerning the Dutch contribution to the programme of
the United Nations for technical aid to economically underdeveloped countries. 
The theme of the entire memorandum is aid in the context of the un. That would
remain so for another ten years. Rich countries jointly undertook to help poor
countries develop, primarily via the un, with a clear emphasis on technical assis-
tance and support for the building of infrastructure. Until 1963 all government aid
was issued via international organizations and consortia. In other words, the focus
was not on the immediate improvement of living conditions, and there were not
yet any ngos that provided aid locally. This changed subsequently in two waves.
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At the beginning of the 1960s, the focus switched for the first time to the bilateral-
ization of the aid, on the basis of the self-interest motive. The United States was an
important driver of bilateralization because it offered the country more possibili-
ties for supporting friendly powers. It led John F. Kennedy to set up usaid in
1960. For other Western countries economic, rather than political, motives
became a key driver. From 1960 onwards interest groups from the business
community in particular started exerting substantial pressure on governments to
provide more bilateral aid because otherwise the Western business community
would miss out on export orders. In the Netherlands, for example, employers got
their way in almost everything. Bilateral aid started in 1965 and was gradually
increased until it exceeded multilateral aid in 1968. Project aid started to be
provided on a large scale. Parallel to this bilateralization, a shift occurred from
technical assistance to financial aid. Technical assistance focused primarily on
agriculture. The former Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was therefore the
lead ministry for development aid. In the mid-1960s, the aid focus shifted towards
financial support for governments, largely in the form of shopping lists which
were drawn up with countries receiving aid under the leadership of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs. This aid had to be spent within the Dutch business community.
From then on, the Ministry of Economic Affairs was the lead ministry for devel-
opment aid for a decade.
In addition to the self-interest motive, there was now plenty of space for the moral
assignment motive. The second shift in the 1960s was therefore the emergence of
ngos, partly as a result of missionary work. These organizations also wanted to
receive money from the government, and they got their way as well. In December
1964, the Dutch government proposed, for the first time, that resources be made
available to non-commercial private organizations. The amount made available for
this soon rose, provisionally in the form of project grants. The policy-related
framework also gradually started to take shape. The ‘ngo-ization’ of aid continued
steadily, and ngos started to play a more and more fundamental role in develop-
ment aid practice and in the execution of policy. That process would continue in
phases until, in 2009, more than 20 percent of the total Dutch development aid
budget was being made available via the non-governmental channel. A compara-
ble development could also be observed in other countries, albeit to a lesser extent.
At a slightly slower rate, ngos started to become active in recipient countries as
well. In the first forty years of development aid via government, the actors in the
recipient countries were primarily governments and related, organized institu-
tions. However, since the 1990s, large numbers of ngos have appeared on the
scene. This is partly due to increased democratization in African countries and 
the development of civil society, although it is also partly an artefact of aid policy.
More and more embassies and multilateral organizations are starting to involve
ngos in the execution of their policies. Western ngos are implementing fewer
44 less pretension, more ambition
and fewer projects themselves and are leaving the task to local organizations. 
To a large extent Western ngos therefore function as switching stations with local
ngos, which are also referred to informally as ‘partner organizations’.
A key characteristic of this ngo-ization of aid is that a lot of ngos have become
increasingly dependent on the government, certainly since the 1990s. There have
been various responses to this development. In the United Kingdom, for example,
Oxfam does not want to receive more than 10 percent of its budget for develop-
ment aid from the government, to avoid becoming dependent. In the Netherlands,
more than three-quarters of the budget of the Dutch Oxfam Novib organization 
is dependent on government grants. This has led to a lively ten-year debate on
whether such a ‘suffocating embrace’ is actually desirable (see for example Groten-
huis 2008). Any comparison of the progression of development ngos since the
1960s with that of environment ngos shows that Dutch development ngos have
largely become state-dependent. Although most civil society organizations are
critical of the policy of multilateral organizations like the eu, the imf and the
World Bank, and are perfectly capable of organizing all kinds of campaigns and
political networks, they tend to be a lot less critical of Western development
policy. Their most important critical contribution is to emphasize the fact that
more money should go to development aid. The same applies, albeit to a lesser
extent, to many ngos in other Western countries.
The bilateral policy that took shape in the 1960s initially symbolized the self-
interest motive more than anything else. Gradually this shifted, partly due to pres-
sure from Western ngos, but also under the influence of a broader change in the
political climate. This in turn caused bilateral aid gradually to become more
oriented around the moral assignment motive. In the Netherlands a first important
step was taken when the decision was made in 1973 for bilateral aid to no longer 
be managed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Initially that had little effect on the tying of aid, partly because, in the
1970s, the development budget had grown so significantly that it was already 
difficult to spend the money adequately. In subsequent decades tied aid gradually
disappeared and eventually all that was left was a limited set of tied aid instru-
ments in the form of export credits.
Multilateral aid became relatively less important, albeit not in an absolute sense.
At the end of the 1960s it made up only a quarter of the budget, a percentage that
did not change substantially after that. Significant changes started to take shape
gradually from the 1970s onwards. The World Bank developed into an important
player. The same applied to the imf, which was originally set up to help achieve
financial stability in the world as a whole but which, more and more, only played a
role with regard to developing countries. The World Bank and the imf often acted
together and acquired more and more influence – some would say too much after
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the large-scale macroeconomic reforms of the 1980s. By contrast, the un gradually
started losing influence. As a political decision-making body it has become rela-
tively impotent, as the guardian of international security it is largely coloured by
the sharp differences between the power blocs, and the implementing organiza-
tions such as the fao and Unesco are often paper tigers characterized by an excess
of power politics and a lack of cohesion. This shift in the balance of power has
continued to the present day. While the World Bank gave twice as many resources
to developing countries as all un organizations together in 1990, this had risen to
six times as many in 2007.
Personalized aid
Development aid has therefore become more diffuse. Now, a wide range of parties
play an active role, including ngos, embassies and multilateral organizations, and
a number of different motives can be identified in a variety of forms. For most citi-
zens, however, the image of development aid is becoming increasingly personal-
ized. The prevailing image of development aid is one of concrete projects with
concrete results. The media, parliament, and the representatives of the ngos who
want to persuade everyone to become a member are all helping to evoke the same
image. This image also ties in with the desires of modern citizens. More and more
Westerners want their development aid efforts to produce immediate results for
which they themselves can partly bear responsibility. For example, the 1% Club
maintains a kind of digital marketplace. Private individuals, associations, schools,
foundations, and companies can create a kind of Facebook profile on the website
and choose their preferred project from a number of small-scale concrete projects
which organizations and private individuals themselves can offer on the same site.
The project leaders provide an accurate description of the costs, including accom-
panying photos and an action plan. For the time being the spotlight has primarily
been on monetary donations. However, work is also being done on creating a 
‘knowledge marketplace function’, where questions arising from the projects and
the offers of the 1% members are matched. Citizens also want to help by donating
time. A clear trend towards more voluntary work is visible in the development aid
sector. Young people can participate in work placements while people with work 
can spend their holidays working in a developing country. This has brought devel-
opment aid back to the level of concrete projects which are linked as much as possible
to people’s own personal lives. That fits in with a world in which it is easy for people 
to travel to far-off destinations and in which internet and mobile telephones are
making direct communication with these locations easier than ever before.
However, personalized aid is not the only development aid reality. Another part is
aimed much more at long-running, structural activities. From the end of the 1990s
onwards there has been a broad focus on the transition from project aid to a sector-
wide approach (in other words wide-ranging aid to governments for a certain
sector, such as agriculture or education) or general budget support (whereby the
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recipient country itself determines its priorities). Western countries are now
considering the idea of being active in no more than two sectors per country and in
drastically reducing the number of countries in which they are active. This has
only happened to a limited degree. Following on from this, current practice in a
number of developing countries is for a group of donors to give money in the form
of joint budget support. This generates a substantial amount that can be used for
structural activities, usually on the basis of a performance assessment framework
which lays down which goals have to be achieved. At the same time almost all
Western countries shy away from rigorous choices. Under the influence of the
media and parliament they want to show that they do useful work wherever there
is suffering.
Sectoral support is invisible to most citizens and the same applies to the address-
ing of global issues. All kinds of fora are focusing attention on themes such as
migration, trade, food and climate in relation to development issues, but only very
rarely do they manage to convey any of this to the wider public. Riddell (2007), the
former head of Christian Aid in the United Kingdom, talks in this context of ‘the
big lie’ of development aid: image and reality are diverging all the time and he
predicts that this will lead to a legitimacy crisis. However, it is too simple to say
that image and reality are constantly diverging. Rather, two realities are emerging.
While a lot of aid is provided in the form of concrete projects, at the same time
much is being invested in global themes. It would therefore seem to be more accu-
rate to talk of a growing split.
Conclusion
There are a number of different motives for development aid. The two most
important basic motives have resulted in practices which are continually diverg-
ing. Development aid practice partially focuses on direct projects with immediate
results. Aid provided in this way has gradually become small but visible. There is,
however, another side to aid. In a lot of Western European donor countries the
self-interest motive scarcely occurs any more in its rough, purely financial form,
and has transformed into forms of enlightened self-interest and attention for
global themes referring to a general interest. This has had the effect of making
development aid a lot bigger, even unmanageably big, since it is not clear where
the borders are – literally or figuratively. As a result, ideas about what development
aid ought to offer have started to seriously diverge.
Development aid has therefore ended up split in two. According to Freud, people
sometimes feel like worms and sometimes like gods, and life consists of constant
oscillation between those two poles. The same can be said of development aid:
from making a modest contribution to the welfare of a few to writing the coalition
agreement for the new world government, and everything in between – all this is
reflected in aid’s ambitions. The question is how to make this manageable.
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3 understanding development
Development aid – and this is sometimes forgotten – is about development. No
matter what the motives for development aid might be, it is always important to
have a clear picture of how ‘development’ should be interpreted. The answer to
that question can provide a framework for assessing how ‘development’ might be
stimulated and how this relates to the current organization and control model.
This chapter addresses the question of what development is, and how the Western
community has, in that respect, become sadder and wiser.
3.1 defining development
What people mean by development often remains implicit. Nevertheless, there
appears to be a common thread in public debates and academic literature. Devel-
opment is almost always defined as a deliberate acceleration of modernization,
interpreted as the synchronized fourfold transition of economy, government,
political system, and society. Modernization is envisaged as what has been
achieved in the West since the nineteenth century: the creation of a well-devel-
oped and productive economic system embedded in international trade relations,
a government apparatus that is able to provide or help provide essential services 
in the fields of education, healthcare, housing, and security, a political system that
ensures collective decision-making processes resulting in citizens feeling
connected to the outcome and each other, and a society which is sufficiently open
and offers space for various individual and collective ambitions.
Certainly not everyone will entirely agree with this description. Over the past
twenty years, there has been growing resistance to an interpretation that implies
that the Western model is the best, and the above formulation comes close to
doing just that. However, closer examination reveals that there are not many radi-
cal alternatives, as shown by those who have studied the many attempts of coun-
tries and people from the South to produce their ‘own’ formulations. A well-
known variant of this non-Western perspective is the Beijing Consensus (Ramo
2004), but the list of ‘perspectives from the South’ is much longer (Matthews
2004). Anyone who strips these formulations back to the bare bones will see that
they can largely be interpreted within the above framework. This is borne out by
study of the Beijing Consensus. More than in the Western economic model, this
formulation calls for constant experimentation and innovation, for Western gross
national product to be replaced as the most important criterion by criteria such as
sustainability and the fair distribution of income and, in a political sense, for more
space for countries’ national autonomy. All these formulations fit neatly into the
notion of development as accelerated modernization described above.
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Moreover, it is important to read the above formulation of development as an
outline of guiding ideas rather than an exact institutional framework. A produc-
tive economy does not necessarily mean large-scale industrial production, a
responsive government does not necessarily imply a system of representative
democracy, and an open society does not necessarily mean that freedom of speech
is of overriding importance or that group interests are ignored. The exact way in
which the different dimensions are elaborated in detail is based on history and
deliberation, and is certainly not the only option. Neither does the above descrip-
tion explain exactly how development comes about. It is highly questionable
whether development processes in the South exactly follow the paths taken by 
the West in the nineteenth century. Moreover, there were differences, of course,
within the West itself – in that respect it is perhaps wiser to follow Eisenstadt
(2002) and speak of “multiple modernities”.
Development, as accelerated modernization, is what Japan achieved after the Meiji
Restoration of 1868 when it emerged from its self-imposed isolation and devel-
oped from an isolated land in the backwater into a world power. It is also what
South Korea achieved from 1962 onwards when it evolved from a poor, weak,
powerless post-conflict state into what it is today – a country richer than New
Zealand or the Czech Republic. It is also what Brazil is aspiring to and the dream 
of many people and countries in Africa and South Asia.
Over time, various attempts have been made to identify development processes
more effectively. There is an intrinsic value in doing this: it is interesting to find
out how countries have developed, no matter whether that country is the Nether-
lands or Mauritius. However, the process also has instrumental value. After all, it
is logical to try and draw lessons from the experience of other countries. That is, 
of course, a complicated process. Comparisons always fall short. No country is
entirely comparable with another and we should certainly not assume that what
was possible one or two centuries ago is feasible in this day and age. Care therefore
needs to be taken. At the same time it would be a shame not to try to learn from
history – no matter how difficult that may be, and no matter how open to criticism
those lessons might be.
If one thing characterizes the past sixty years of targeted development aid, it is the
repeated confrontation with the fact that there are no simple frameworks which
indicate the hierarchy between the economic, political, administrative and social
dimensions when it comes to achieving development. It has always been very
tempting to try and find the One Great Answer. In every period, a different
concept is presented as the overriding principle, only to result after time in the
acknowledgement that other dimensions are also important.
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This does not mean that it is impossible to draw lessons from specific situations.
For example, it is reasonable to assume that the rapid post-war economic growth
in Western Europe was based largely on the existence of legitimate political struc-
tures, effective governments and a relatively harmonious social fabric, which
enabled economic dynamism to be restored quickly to its old level. Moreover, no
energy had to be invested in developing nation states, as a sense of nationhood
was already highly advanced. At the same time, this observation also carries the
warning that it is by no means self-evident that transposing a Marshall Plan to
another situation will have a comparable effect, because the conditions will be
completely different.
On the basis of all the available analyses it is not possible to draw up a credible
‘grand theory of development’ which could serve as a formula for success for all
developing countries. However, existing studies can provide an insight into inter-
esting mechanisms which may also play a role. We shall therefore try to identify 
a common thread in the multitude of interesting studies which attempt to gain
more grip on development processes. After all, the only thing worse than poor
insight into development processes is no insight at all. A well-known adage says
that scientists have tried too hard to understand the world and not hard enough 
to change it. In the field of development aid, however, the opposite may be true.
What drives development?
The question of why the West has become so rich, and what developing countries
can learn from that experience intrigues many authors and invites interesting
perspectives. In The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why some are so rich and some
are so poor (1998), historian David Landes seeks an explanation not only in knowl-
edge, technology and the quality of political ideologies, but also in the beneficial
effects of the warm Gulf Stream that ensures that countries like the Netherlands
and Great Britain enjoy a more pleasant – and therefore more industrious – climate
than other countries at similar latitudes. In his famous book Guns, Germs and Steel
(1998), Jared Diamond sees the key in the natural conditions in which people
lived: nomadic peoples eventually settled between the Euphrates and the Tigris
because the region offered high-protein grain, easily irrigated land, a mild climate
and animals that were easy to domesticate. The Mesopotamians could do things
with horses that the Indians could not do with bison. Others seek the explanation
more in the social context within which economic activity can take shape – they
see the industrial revolution as the product of an open climate within which
people could travel, look and learn, experiment and sell their products. In Under-
standing the Process of Economic Change (2005), North refers to this as “adaptive
efficiency”.
A few commentators look completely beyond the economic sphere. In L’enfance
du Monde (1987; published in English under the telling title The Causes of
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Progress), French anthropologist Emmanuel Todd (1987) begins by observing that
there is a precise correlation between the economic growth of Western countries
and their level of education 150 years previously. He then seeks an explanation for
the differences in educational level in the various types of family in these coun-
tries. Ultimately he comes up with a simple sequence: authoritarian family types
produce a higher level of learning because they provide more structure and that, in
turn, reduces the chances of mortality, which itself leads to a fall in the birth rate,
ultimately resulting in a higher standard of living. Clark (2007) adopts a similar
line of argument in A Farewell to Alms. A brief economic history of the world, in
which he seeks to explain the success of the West in a process of natural selection
in which families with a strict work ethic gradually make their way to the top.
All of these accounts are compelling, especially in their capacity to identify, in the
midst of a complex process of events, a single determining element that can
explain the rest. Yet this charm is also their inherent weakness – the world is too
complex to be contained by such simple blueprints. Attempts have therefore also
been made to bring together the various aspects that may play a role. They primar-
ily analyze development as a process of differentiating the different spheres in
modern societies, and of the interaction between those spheres. Theories that
differentiate these spheres take a variety of forms, but their basic patterns are
remarkably similar. Many build on the ideas that Polanyi (1944) puts forwards in
The Great Transformation. He uses this term to refer to the period in the United
Kingdom between the end of the eighteenth and the end of the nineteenth
century, when the meaning of the term ‘market’ changed from a temporary, local
place where people bought and sold goods to the key concept on the basis of which
relations between land, labour and money were organized at national level. For 
the first time, Polanyi claims, the principle of market organization became an end
in itself, instead of being subordinated to broader social objectives. After Polanyi,
many authors have produced similar descriptions of the way in which separate
domains gradually evolved within societies, with their own rules and institutions.
These domains include the economic and political spheres and the apparatus of
government, with it being possible to include others like the religious and cultural
spheres.
In the process of seeking development paths, the question is then how these
spheres relate to each other. One well-known formulation is that of Nobel Prize
winner Douglas North (2009) in Violence and Social Orders. A conceptual frame-
work for interpreting recorded human history, which he co-authored with Wallis
& Weinglas. His starting point is what he calls the “natural state”, that is a situa-
tion in which a political elite controls the economy and uses the revenues to buy
the support of the relevant groups; take, for example, medieval rulers who tied the
nobility to them with a tenth of the yield of their farmers, or the way that Western
countries used to govern their colonies. Sharing out revenues inevitably leads to
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problems – North shows clearly how what history books call civil wars are usually
armed conflicts in which one elite believes that it has the right to resources that
the other has acquired. Gradually, partly as a result of upscaling, ensuring the
support of various groups becomes not only a matter of making gifts at opportune
moments, but also of imposing rules. These are initially drawn up to the advantage
of privileged groups. Rules can, however, be fought over. Because more and more
people share power, the rules become increasingly universal – resulting in what
North and others call an “open access” society. The social order is then governed
by a broad spectrum of institutions, and there is competition between different
ideas and initiatives.
Such blueprints, of course, also have their limitations. The many detailed descrip-
tions, however, do offer a good portrayal of how the process has taken shape over
time. Interestingly, the process has become so advanced in the West that we are
hardly aware of it anymore – despite that fact that we have all learned that univer-
sal suffrage dates back less than a hundred years. Yet it is important to be aware
that, for example, the existence of an independent government is also only a recent
achievement. Independent government assumes the emergence of the ‘civil
servant’, an official who serves the public interest and who can be expected to
defend that interest. A number of special constructions were initially contrived to
achieve that: civil servants had no collective labour agreements and were not
permitted to strike, because their position was considered different to that of
‘ordinary’ employees. They were protected against dismissal, so that they could
serve the public interest and not be the subject of political wrangling. Civil
servants have only gradually become ordinary employees again in the past few
decades, with all the consequences that brings with it. The process of differentia-
tion – constructing markets, political and administrative systems and keeping
them separate from each other – takes up a lot of time and energy.
It may no longer be completely clear to Westerners how their societies have been
formed, but stripping everything back to its bare bones clarifies a lot. Barrington
Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) remains a classic
work in this respect. It shows how pressure from groups within agriculture and,
later, trade which were aiming to make a profit gradually transformed the old
bureaucracies in a way that led to industrialization, but also how that process can
take different forms, in which institutions can develop in the direction of democ-
racy or, conversely, of (left or right-wing) fascism. Thinking in terms of such broad
development blueprints not only helps us to understand the past, it is also very
valuable to our understanding of developing countries and the processes taking
place within them. In these countries, after all, societies, governments, democra-
cies and economies often have to seek a more productive relationship with each
other. Development policy aims to influence that process, and the conceptual
framework described above can help to achieve that. One of North’s conclusions is
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that much traditional development aid is focused in the wrong areas. In his view, 
it is impossible to expect elites in developing countries to interact with others in
important matters like the economy and power on the basis of impersonal rela-
tions. The recent (and problematic) nature of state-building means that identifica-
tion with the state is still limited. That identification and the process of entering
into impersonal relationships cannot be enforced, and takes a long time to evolve.
Thinking in terms of the interaction between different spheres is essential to
understanding what constitutes good development policy. Take, for example,
Botswana, one of the classical development success stories. Botswana, a small
landlocked country, has experienced the highest economic growth in the world in
the past thirty-five years. In 1950, it was the fourth poorest country in the world,
but by 2001 its real income had increased fourteen-fold. What is the explanation
for this success? At first glance the answer is simple: diamonds. From 1967
onwards, income from diamonds helped the country to grow. However, at least as
important is that the country’s government has used the revenues well and
pursued a macroeconomic policy that, in terms of the quality of governance and
the absence of corruption, can be favourably compared with that of a country like
Belgium. To find out why the institutions that pursued this policy functioned so
well, we have to go back to the nineteenth century. Colonization in remote
Botswana was so marginal that it had little noticeable impact on the existing insti-
tutions. These institutions were structured in such a way as to keep the Tswana
leaders and the political elites under tight control. That provided a sound basis for
further development after independence, aided by the fact that the country’s lead-
ers also had a material interest in the efficient functioning of, for example, the
system of ownership rights, as they had substantial interests in the large agricul-
tural enterprises that had been set up. The transition passed off relatively
smoothly: the Tswana leader became the country’s president after independence,
and has since been succeeded by his son. That led to the further development of
institutions, and then to growth. The homogeneity of Botswana today – which,
despite some Westerners considering it too much of a one-party state, is essen-
tially a binding political system – is more the result of the process of state-building
than a precondition for it. Anyone wishing to emulate the miracle of Botswana
elsewhere will first have to determine to what extent these mechanisms are also
present (Vaughan 2003).
3.2 other starting points
In this way, a framework for discussing development eventually emerges, based
on the complex interaction of the economic sphere, the government, the political
system and society. What does this framework teach us about the possibilities of
accelerating development in the desired direction? For example, to what extent
should developing countries more or less follow the same path embarked on by
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Western countries? The starting point in the West (including Japan) was
economic development through liberalization and a fairer distribution of means of
production like land and capital, which stimulated the emergence of a middle class
of entrepreneurs. That was followed by the modernization of law (including prop-
erty law), the administrative sector and the administration of justice, and ulti-
mately democratic reform. The role of the state, as it were, grew along with the
economy and the increasing complexity of society. We see this pattern not only in
European history since the Middle Ages, but also since the eighteenth century in
the us and Australia, and since the end of the Second World War in significant
parts of Southeast Asia. It shows that the development of all these countries is the
result of a gradual process of internal modernization and the emancipation of
population groups, in which economically strong groups like merchants, guilds,
bankers and industrialists play a central role (Dellevoet 2005).
The comparison of this situation with that of today’s developing countries does,
however, have its limitations. Unlike in Europe, state-building in Africa was not
the consequence of coalitions of middle classes securing their possessions. In
developing countries it often had its origins in colonization. Forming political
systems remains problematic, and there are hardly any cases of political party
systems with deep roots in society. Government structures were predominantly
copied from those in the West, and rarely fitted the situation and phase in which
the country found itself. As a result they are only partially effective in achieving
their objectives. Social elites are often not grounded in agriculture, as was the case
in Europe. The process of development in countries in the South will therefore
have to take off from a different starting point. As far as further development of
the economy, government, political system and society goes, developing countries
will, to a large extent, have to follow their own individual paths. The question is
what paths are most suitable in each case.
Agriculture
The development process, as it occurred in the West, can therefore not simply 
be copied, but that does not mean that it is without significance. It contains a
genuine lesson that can, to a certain extent, be generalized. All the evidence
suggests that, in the process of modernization that took place in the West in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, agriculture played just as crucial a role as it is
now playing for a large number of developing countries. The transition to produc-
tive economies proceeded in almost all cases through the further development of
agriculture, which allowed farmers to gradually move away from subsistence
farming to at least partial production for the market. These production surpluses
paved the way for urban development which, after all, depends on farmers
producing more food than they need for themselves. Urban development, in turn,
is an important precondition for industrialization. Agricultural policy was also the
key to the success of the Southeast Asian tigers. In 1945, Vietnam suffered a disas-
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trous famine, while people were still going hungry in Indonesia in the 1960s. Viet-
nam solved the problem by subsidizing both the production and consumption of
rice. That provided the best conceivable safety net. Indonesia’s food policy was
based on fertilizer subsidies, which laid the foundations for later economic
successes. Developments in agriculture were also often supported by land reforms
– it is no coincidence that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China all introduced
land-reform programmes in the decades before they experienced spectacular
growth. The importance of these programmes cannot be overestimated. It is
precisely on this point that these countries differ from Latin American countries
like Brazil and Argentina which, partly for this reason, have experienced much
lower rates of development. These countries have been independent for around
two centuries, yet they have seen hardly any growth in that long period. The only
countries that have escaped this pattern of rural development are the Gulf States
and small city-states like Singapore and Hong Kong, whose wealth has been accu-
mulated without major developments in their own agriculture. They, however,
form a separate category which is difficult to imitate.
The development of agriculture has benefited considerably from technological
advances. As a response to the threat of famine in Asia, the introduction of new
crops, fertilizer, irrigation methods and pesticides in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s
led to substantial increases in rice production. This second green revolution
secured the food supply for large parts of Asia and laid the foundations for the
continent’s later economic success (The first green revolution took place in Europe
and, through mechanization, the use of artificial fertilizer and new crop varieties,
secured the food supply for a rapidly growing population, establishing a solid base
for the Industrial Revolution). Despite the introduction of ‘green revolution crops’
in Africa, a similar revolution has to date not taken place on the continent, and
agricultural production has only partially kept pace with population growth. In
Asia, where agriculture displays an advanced degree of uniformity, all the physical
and institutional conditions for the success of the new crops were present. In
Africa, however, these crops were not suited to the much more diverse situation.
Harvests largely failed due to the absence of institutions providing fertilizer, of
large-scale organized irrigation and of a well-structured system of agricultural
extension. Where there was progress because governments stimulated agriculture
– for example, in the 1980s in Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia – this ground
to a halt because, under the influence of the World Bank and the imf, providing
subsidies was considered to distort the workings of the market. Large parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa are therefore still dominated by self-sufficient farmers with only
limited access to markets, who still farm in very much the same way as their
fathers and forefathers did for centuries. For these farmers, the supply of food is
directly dependent on their vulnerable production systems. With soil frequently
depleted, rains that increasingly fail to materialize, disease and very limited access
to capital, knowledge and technology, failed harvests are the order of the day.
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Although the cities of Africa now have a guaranteed food supply through the
world market, 200 million African farmers still lack food security (iac 2004;
Rabbinge & Bindraban 2005; Rabbinge & Van Diepen 2000; World Bank 2008a).
In the past, some developing countries have tried with little success to give prior-
ity to their own capital-intensive heavy industry, expecting that that would enable
them to industrialize more rapidly, as happened in the former Soviet Union before
the Second World War. Today, too, we still sometimes see low-income countries
trying to promote development by ignoring the agricultural sector and focusing all
their efforts on the accelerated development of a modern, relatively capital-inten-
sive industrial sector. Such efforts seem doomed to failure because competition
with highly-advanced companies and countries is very unequal. They can also be
counterproductive, increasing the inequalities between city and countryside.
After all, if agriculture is too heavily taxed to provide the necessary revenue for
the investments, prices become distorted and the rural population in the underde-
veloped, peripheral agricultural sector is ignored (World Bank 2008a).
3.3 effective governments and path-dependent
trajectories
The importance of agriculture is a genuine lesson that can be learned from history.
A second hard lesson is that the building of effective states precedes the process of
industrialization. While, in the nineteenth century, the process of industrializa-
tion in the West ran parallel with the process of state-building, certainly since the
twentieth century all countries that have successfully industrialized have had an
effective state. The organization of the state, including the process of political
decision-making, still has a determinant impact on the context within which
private economic decisions can be made. Those decisions, in turn, have been of
overriding importance to the process of industrialization.
This lesson has by no means been properly taken on board. Within developing
countries, the government and the market have – at least from a Western perspec-
tive – a true love-hate relationship. Lindauer & Pritchett (2002) show that, every
twenty years or so, a whole new set of ideas about the role of government emerges.
In the 1950s and 1960s, development was primarily associated with infrastructure
and capacity building – and that required the state. After that, in the 1980s, the
trend moved towards macroeconomic stability, and especially very small govern-
ment that did not stand in the way of the private sector. The problem was often
formulated in terms of a simple dichotomy, also very much in evidence in debates
on the organization of Western welfare states, of the state versus the market. The
idea was that less state would mean more market, and therefore more develop-
ment. In the past decade, there was once again a consensus that a well-functioning
state is a precondition for effective development aid.
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3.3.1 rediscovering the state
In recent years, full attention has once again been given to the fact that the state
is a precondition for a thriving economy, but it is ultimately a lesson that can be
learned from the history of the Western welfare state. In the Netherlands, for
example, the industrialization that occurred in the nineteenth century 
– relatively late in comparison with surrounding countries – was only possible
because it was facilitated and guided by an active government. The government
facilitated the physical infrastructure that made transport possible: by water 
(on canals specially dug for the purpose), by road and by rail. That transport
infrastructure would neither have been possible without a system of land expro-
priation and regulations, nor without state-run companies or private companies
that could, if necessary, rely on the state to bear the financial risk. 
A system of public utilities also developed. The government established the
infrastructure for supplying energy by setting up electrical power plants as public
companies. It did the same for communications, establishing and operating postal
and telephone systems. The government also played a crucial role in the creation
of ‘soft’ infrastructure, introducing standards for all kinds of sizes and dimen-
sions, and a system of patents (though the Netherlands was something 
of an exception in that, for a long time, it was not willing to recognize patents –
something that, in any case, meant that Philips did not need to observe Thomas
Alfa Edison’s rights regarding the light bulb). Lastly, the government put in place a
system of property rights that could be enforced by an effective legal system.
The importance of effective government was demonstrated in similar fashion by
the Asian tigers, whose growth was based on a strong government. In most cases,
they were authoritarian, sometimes even military regimes. Once many East Asian
countries gained independence in the years following the Second World War
(starting with South Korea in 1945, and ending with Malaysia and Singapore in
1957 and 1963), their governments devoted themselves immediately to developing
their infrastructure. At first all the Asian tigers pursued a policy of import substi-
tution, protecting their own industries through tariffs and developing their own
economic sectors. From the mid-1960s, they changed course. Partly as a response
to the declining volume of American aid, they concentrated on labour-intensive
production for the external market. That occurred in waves. The first generation
included South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, which, from the mid-
1960s, started producing goods that were no longer cost-effective in Japan. They
climbed the ladder rapidly (South Korea was the best example: it was initially
renowned for its production of steel, then of big ships, then cars, then household
electrical appliances, and now advanced satellite equipment). In the second wave,
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia took over the bottom of the market. These coun-
tries have now also closed their sweat shops en masse and are themselves climbing
the ladder. In the third wave, China – followed a little later by Vietnam – took over
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the bottom of the market. It is to be expected that, in the not too distant future,
this position will be taken over by India (which is currently achieving part of its
growth at the top end of the market but which realizes that this is not a sustainable
growth model because it is not sufficiently labour-intensive: only 0.25 percent of
the Indian workforce is employed in the it sector). Bangladesh has already found
an excellent position for itself, acquiring a leading role in the production of ready-
made garments, paying wages that are a third of those in India and a fifth of those
in eastern China.
The economic development made partly possible by the strong guidance of the
state, gradually makes itself felt politically and socially. The Asian countries
initially spent very little on redistribution (Haggard & Kaufman 2008). In fact, in
certain periods of their development, the Asian tigers had a de facto degressive tax
regime, under which the elites in particular benefited from growth. Most of them
were quick to emphasize the importance of full enrolment in primary education,
followed by rapid expansion of secondary education, and a high percentage of
pupils finishing it. In the 1980s, when the growth of the middle class began to take
on serious proportions, a period of democratization and redistribution of income
was initiated. The democratic revolution in East Asia started in the Philippines in
1986, when President Marcos was ousted. South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan all
followed, taking their own paths. Malaysia and Singapore are making the least
progress, though their political systems now also display clear competitive
elements. Politicians have opportunities galore to present themselves as progres-
sively minded: the relative absence of social services means that they can promise
a great deal, especially in a period of sustained economic growth. Even the severe
financial crisis of 1997 had little real impact on this process – in contrast to the
crisis in Latin America in the 1980s, the effects of which could still be felt more
than ten years later.
In this way, the contours of a broad social safety net gradually emerged. To some
extent, that project ran parallel to the privatization of state-owned enterprises that
in many countries had been an important state vehicle for economic growth.
These companies provided their employees with social services. When they were
privatized, they were no longer able to offer that degree of protection, and it had to
be supplied by a safety net provided for the population as a whole and based on
universal entitlements. It is striking that this development was not a response to
emerging labour movements or left-wing parties (or fear of them), which played at
most a limited role. The process was largely driven by conservative regimes, and
the political parties were (and continue to be) to a large extent non-ideological, at
least in terms of the classical Western left-right dichotomy. Here too – as had been
the case a hundred years earlier in Europe – conservative and centralist politicians
often used social policy for political purposes.
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Growth, that much is clear, occurred in Asia because governments were in a posi-
tion to pursue a targeted growth policy. Following Chalmers Johnson (1982) and
Peter Evans (1995), these countries are referred to as ‘developmental states’. It is
not important what ideology or common policy is pursued, as long as the state
apparatus operates on the basis of central planning, combining interventionism
with a strong focus on economic growth. These states often have a leader who is
very committed to development objectives, and who is able to incorporate
personal enrichment and short-term political gains into that broader goal (Fritz &
Rocha Menocal 2007; Leftwich 2008; Mkandawire 2001). The developmental state
is based on a coalition of leaders, elites and interest groups, and is grounded in the
common idea that long-term growth is in everyone’s interest.
These developmental states focused their attention on imperfections in the func-
tioning of the capital market that prevented them from raising the level of indus-
trialization, on problems in the labour market that insufficiently facilitated the
increase in the general level of skills and education of the working population, and
on problems relating to land rights, which acted as a brake on urbanization and
growth (see also Khan 2005). They practised a strategy in which governments
actively developed economic activity, varying from the subsidies that South Korea
gave to its state-run companies to the use of public funds to acquire and develop
technologies in Taiwan and Malaysia. The latter model is still current as shown, for
example, by the way in which Singapore recently succeeded in building up a lead-
ing biotechnical industry over a period of only a few years.
It is important not to translate the success of developmental states simply into a
plea for a policy of economic liberalization. In that respect the distinction that
Khan (2007) makes between “market-enhancing strategies” and “growth-enhanc-
ing strategies” is relevant. The first entails mainly the liberalization of markets, a
strategy that has become popular in Africa. Countries like Uganda, Kenya, Tanza-
nia and Ethiopia have the idea that admitting foreign investors (in the same way
that China did in the 1990s and, on the African continent, Tunisia a decade ago) is
the answer to their growth ambitions. They offer new investors a broad package of
facilities – a sort of one-stop-shop for new businesses. The underlying idea is that
growth will then come automatically. In the case of targeted growth strategies,
investments focus more on technological innovation (capacity), creating a well-
trained and hard-working class of workers and managers, achieving social stability
and developing a sector-wide approach. In other words, industry policy in its clas-
sical form. The instruments to achieve this coincide partly with those of a liberal-
ization programme, but are also somewhat different. This is where an important
difference lies between the strategies of China and India. Both have been engaged
in opening up their markets since the early 1980s, but the Chinese have been more
successful at allocating their resources to specific growth sectors and at making it
attractive for foreign investors to bring in advanced technologies. These are typical
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elements of a growth-enhancing strategy. Compare, too, most of the countries in
Latin America and, within Asia, the Philippines: they went further along the path
of market liberalization, including opening up their capital accounts, rather than
adopting a specific growth strategy, with limited growth as a result.
3.3.2 antecedents and variet y
The Asian tigers appeal to the imagination. Their success has been described many
times, and the importance of the state in achieving it is increasingly recognized
(Chang 2007; Wade 1990). The question is to what extent this development model
holds the key for all developing countries. Theories on this have developed further
along various lines (Migdal 2001). It has become clear that, in newly independent
countries, development is to an advanced degree determined by the way coloniza-
tion took shape. In particular, the colonialism of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury set the tone for the institutions that, in their turn, created the economies that
emerged in the second half of the century (Bruhn & Gallego 2008). The develop-
ment of developing countries is in that respect as much path-dependent as that of
the Western welfare states. Let us briefly take a closer look at this important lesson.
The standard example of a developmental state is South Korea. In an analytical
sense it is better to follow Kohli (2004) and speak of a cohesive-capitalist state.
The South Korean state had its origins in the way in which the Japanese colonized
the country for thirty-five years. In its own development, Japan had relied heavily
on the state playing a strong role. The Japanese approach in South Korea was
robust, radical and ‘architectural’: a relatively corrupt agrarian bureaucracy was
transformed into an authoritarian and far-reaching political organization; the
government developed intensive and growth-oriented alliances with the domi-
nant elites, and acquired effective state control over civil society (Vu 2007).
At the other end of the spectrum is a country like Nigeria, a state without an effec-
tive public arena, and with a government structure in which behaviour is largely
determined by personal ties and personal gain. Politicians and civil servants are
expected to function as representatives of their ‘clients’. The distinction between
formal and informal is then of little significance. The government is only to a
limited extent focused on development. This, too, has its origins in colonial
history. The British ruled their colonies on a low budget, never having too many
people present in the colonies themselves. With the exception of ‘settler’ colonies
like South Africa and Rhodesia, which attracted large groups of colonists after the
discovery of gold and diamonds, there were never more than a few hundred
Britons in the African countries. They could only achieve that by playing a compli-
cated and opportunist power game with existing local elites. An additional
complication in Nigeria is that the country was created from three areas that were
originally ruled separately, and which had little in common in terms of ethnicity,
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culture and religion. British rule in Nigeria reinforced a patrimonial and personal
government that never produced a serious central government capable, for exam-
ple, of collecting taxes. This meant that a balanced process of state-building never
really had a chance, and the leading elites have never been able to rectify that situa-
tion, particularly after sufficient oil reserves were discovered to push the necessity
of reform even further into the background.
Other states, too, bear the traces of their colonial past. The Belgians left the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo behind without any functioning political or government
institutions and, to this day, there is still no working postal system. Guinea-Bissau
also inherited nothing, and still has as good as nothing. Somalia enjoyed the atten-
tions of four foreign powers. As one of the few African countries that did have an
ethnically homogenous population, it was divided into Somalia (ruled by the Ital-
ians), Somaliland (the British), Djibouti (the French), Ogaden (formally part of
East Ethiopia), and parts of North Kenya. This essentially laid the foundations of a
future failed state (Gruffydd Jones 2008). India inherited a relatively comprehen-
sive network of functioning institutions, enabling it, after the civil war of 1947, to
develop relatively peacefully, initially with very limited growth, and since 1990
with substantial growth. To a certain degree, the same applies to the Dutch East
Indies. The former French colonies inherited a more elitist education system than
the British colonies, and that also had an impact on their growth potential (Bolt &
Bezemer 2009). Nonetheless, development is determined by other factors than a
country’s colonial past. Côte d’Ivoire started from a relatively strong position, but
the government still collapsed, while Mali – which embarked on independence
almost from scratch – is taking cautious steps forward.
The states also bear the marks of their post-colonial past. Military structures often
formed a basis on which other institutions were able – or, in some cases, unable –
to grow. The emphatic presence of the military in the development of a country
did not always have negative effects: sometimes it also led to efficient state
systems that could be deployed in the common interest. Perhaps the most striking
example is that of Vietnam, which, within a decade, succeeded in reducing the
number of people with malaria to below the level of France. To achieve that, the
country not only had to distribute malaria nets in every single village and hamlet,
it also had to ensure that they were used, and to identify and treat the sick.
Recently emerging from a war, the Vietnamese government proved more efficient
in achieving that feat than the French were at informing their citizens who were
going to the tropics on holiday.
Differentiation
The developmental state is a specific variant within a broader range of processes of
state-building in developing countries. There is a tendency to call all Southeast
Asian states developmental states, but that is using the term very loosely. The
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classical developmental states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong)
are at one end of a spectrum: they are typified by a very low degree of personal
patronage by politicians and civil servants. That clearly helped in achieving
growth, but was not a precondition for it. Other Southeast Asian countries that
also focused strongly on development had many more neo-patrimonial elements.
These states – examples of which were the Philippines under Marcos and Indone-
sia under Suharto – were sometimes referred to as ‘booty capitalist’ or ‘crony capi-
talist’ states. These concepts are less applicable to China and Vietnam, which in
that respect come closer to classical developmental states: they do have forms of
nepotism and personal patronage, but the informal selection process of the elites
also contains meritocratic elements. Neopatrimonial elements, in turn, can be
found in Japanese society, though here personal ties have more impact on career
opportunities and reciprocal involvement than on personal enrichment.
Countries in Africa and Asia – and elsewhere – all have some neopatrimonial
elements, to a greater or lesser extent. The extent to which a development perspec-
tive can take shape in a neopatrimonial structure varies. Some countries
– those which became the classical developmental states – succeeded either in
mitigating neopatrimonial mechanisms or, in some cases, rendering them produc-
tive for development (Khan 2005). Most countries, however, display a different
relationship between the two elements. They have a clear state structure, but the
capacity to operate effectively is limited for a wide variety of reasons. These
‘hybrid’ states have both authoritarian and democratic characteristics. India is a
classic example, but Brazil also fits into this category, even though its history
shows that, given time, a country can change its style: in certain periods, Brazil
shifted in the direction of a ‘cohesive-capitalist’ state. This category is an amalga-
mation of states that, from a Western perspective, are often seen as ‘incomplete’
states, but which differ from each other considerably.
The lesson here is that effective states are of great importance, but it must be added
that they are not easy to achieve, and certainly not along uniform lines. Further-
more, it is rather depressing to add that the history of countries in the West in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, and of the countries in the East and the South
in the twentieth century, shows that development is generally speaking not a plea-
surable process. Karl Polanyi (1944: 36), who identifies the origins of the process
in the expropriation and allocation of land, formulates it as follows: “The
economic logic involves a tragic necessity by which the poor man clings to his
hovel doomed by the rich man’s desire for a public improvement which profits
him privately.” As for Europe, Barrington Moore (1966: 506) concludes: “There is
no evidence that the mass of population anywhere has wanted an industrial soci-
ety, and plenty of evidence that they did not. (…) At the bottom all forms of
industrialization have been (…) the work of a ruthless minority.” There is now
plenty of evidence that people in developing countries definitely do want indus-
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trialization, but that it is indeed generally created by a ruthless minority. What
does this mean for developing countries that have not yet made the leap towards
industrialization?
3.3.3 what about africa?
In Africa, growth is not yet usually achieved through strong governments. Stable
political systems are not self-evident. Many states in Africa are artificial
constructs. Of course, states in the West are artificially constructed too, but they
are usually much older and had more time to form. Even then it was by no means a
smooth process. Take the Netherlands for example. First Holland and six other
provinces formed the alliance of the United Provinces, then came the Southern
Netherlands, and that later evolved into the Netherlands as we know it today. In
our case, the process was to a large extent aided by the existence of an external
enemy, Spain. Where nation-building started later and then advanced more
rapidly, the friction was greater. Germany has been a nation for a little less than
one and a half centuries. Before that it consisted of smaller principalities, and the
process of nation-building was characterized by heavy clashes, contributing
significantly to the outbreak of two World Wars. In Europe, nation-building was
typically accompanied by warfare. In the words of Tilly et al. (1985): “States make
war and war makes states.”
With all comparisons that are made between the ways in which Africa and Asia
have developed in the past half a century, it is important to realize that the colo-
nization process in Asia dates back much longer than in Africa. That has had far-
reaching consequences. In the nineteenth century, India had a well-educated civil
service and even an embryonic political elite. When they departed after indepen-
dence, the British left behind 26,000 kilometres of railways – in that respect the
Dutch lagged behind, leaving only 5,000 kilometres of track in Indonesia. Intro-
duction of the renowned cultural system in Indonesia started already in the
middle of the nineteenth century. In these Asian countries – and the same applied
to, for example, Malaysia – new institutions had ample time to evolve. At that
time, the colonization of Africa had not yet begun. It actually started in 1871 when
France invaded Tunisia and the following year, when the United Kingdom set its
sights on ruling Egypt. Before then, Europeans had only had a presence along the
coast, in trading posts and forts. For a long time that was all they needed to make
money, as slaves were supplied by local traders. From 1800, trade shifted towards
agrarian products that had to be produced inland. It was not until 1850, however,
that it became necessary to bypass local merchants and increase control of produc-
tion. That need coincided with a process of Western nation-building expressed in
overseas expansionism. When diamonds were discovered in Southern Africa
around 1870, followed by gold a decade later, the ‘scramble for Africa’ really got
under way (Reid 2009).
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Before 1870, there were hardly any European possessions in Africa; after 1914,
there were only two independent countries – Liberia, founded in 1847, and
Ethiopia, the only country that had successfully resisted Western domination,
repelling the Italian armies in 1896. At the conference of Berlin in 1884, Western
powers, under the leadership of Bismarck, divided the continent up with a map
and a ruler on the table. Countries that had never had colonies were even allowed
to take part in the process. Belgium – or more accurately, Koning Leopold as a
private individual – was given the Congo, which was around eighty times larger
than Belgium itself, while inconsequential Portugal received enormous countries
like Mozambique and Angola, partly because it was under the protection of the
British (Pakenham 1991; Wesseling 2003). Western countries may have divided
Africa on paper, but they still had to conquer it, map it, provide it with a physical
and institutional infrastructure and, at least in a formal sense, build nations. In
the decades that followed, explorers like Stanley and Livingstone, missionaries
and the first civil servants moved into the African interior. It became a rush from
the coast into the hinterland, and led to the demarcation of often bizarre territorial
units that ignored the existing relationships within Africa – an extremely hetero-
geneous continent with 2,000 languages and more genetic diversity than the rest
of the world put together. That took some time, as a result of which most African
countries emerged around 1900. Uganda was created in 1908, Nigeria in 1914 and
Morocco finally in 1934. Many countries were created by merging regions that
previously had little to do with each other or had even fought each other in the
past. In the strip to the south of the Sahel, a series of countries were created that
were Islamic in the north and Christian in the south. These included Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Nigeria and Sudan. They also had little in common in a broader cultural
sense, which was a persistent source of tension in the century that followed.
The role of the state remained limited until the 1920s, with healthcare and educa-
tion initially the concern of missionaries. Gradually, as with agriculture, the
government started to become more involved in these sectors, but that was only
for a short period. In Europe, economic recession led to a world war, and when it
was over, Western countries had lost their dominant position. The period of insti-
tution-building along Western lines was therefore very short, often no longer
than a few decades, and resulted in a system that was far from fully developed. At
the same time, there was no way back, if for no other reason than that the trans-
port infrastructure and the resulting incorporation of Africa into the global econ-
omy could no longer be reversed.
In nearly all cases, the process of state-building in Africa was imposed from above
and from the outside. The differences in strategy are interesting. The British were
firm advocates of ‘indirect rule’, which meant that the colonies were governed
through local power holders, such as kings or tribal leaders. The British gover-
nance and control system was therefore considerably decentralized and allowed
65understanding development 
space for local, voluntary participation. The French, true to their Jacobin tradition,
preferred a more centralized system and introduced ‘modern’ governance and
control structures. In the name of their great republican principles, they wanted to
assimilate les indigènes as citizens of a single French empire. Other countries sent
large numbers of colonists to settle in the colonies – take, for example, the many
Portuguese who settled in Latin America, Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde,
or the Spanish in Latin America (Develtere 2009).
No matter what form the state and institution-building had taken under the colo-
nial regimes, when the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa were decolonized (they
followed the Asian countries about a decade later: Sudan became independent in
1956, and Ghana in 1957), their governments inherited systems that were neither
tried and tested nor particularly popular, were inappropriate to the stage of devel-
opment in which the countries found themselves, and were not based on natural
borders and ties. They were expected to automatically transform themselves into
democratic states. “They might as well have left Ugandans the instruments of the
London Philharmonic Orchestra and told them to play Beethoven’s Ninth
Symphony”, concludes Dowden (2009: 41), director of the Royal African Institute
in London. In the first ten years after independence, everything went well in
Africa. The system that the colonial powers had left behind made private invest-
ment possible and provided good education and healthcare. That led to high
growth rates, averaging more than 5 percent per year, higher than ever before. The
relatively favourable weather conditions in this period also contributed to the
success.
Gradually, however, the whole construction collapsed. Informal relationships got
the upper hand, corruption spread, rival elites engaged in a no-holds-barred battle
for power, and to make matters worse, armed forces started to manifest them-
selves as independent interest groups (Van der Veen 2004). In addition, the
weather conditions now took a turn for the worse, with many years of severe
drought. When the first Ghanaian leader Nkrumah was forced from office in 1966,
it heralded the collapse of a series of regimes – and the institutions behind them
soon followed. From the 1970s, there was hardly an efficient system of healthcare
or education to be found in Africa, and initially reasonably good African universi-
ties went into decline. The political system also started to show cracks on all sides.
This was the period of absolute rulers who, under the influence of the Cold War,
received sufficient political, financial and military support to survive, with all the
consequences that brought with it: from Mobutu, who transferred 5 billion dollars
from the Democratic Republic of Congo (‘Zaire’) to his Swiss bank accounts and
adorned his capital city with replicas of royal palaces in Peking, to the ruler of Côte
d’Ivoire, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who had a replica of St. Peter’s Basilica in the
Vatican built in his birthplace Yamoussoukro. This is still the largest church in the
world, where the observant visitor can see a black face in the leaded glass window,
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that of the president himself. One-party states soon became one-man states, and
after the One Great Man came the One Great Military Man: there were at least
forty military coups in the first two decades after independence, and in only three
cases did the population rebel against them successfully.
Only a few leaders – like Senghor in Senegal from 1960 to 1984 and Nyerere in
Tanzania from 1964 to 1985 – succeeded in forging something approaching a
national identity in these ethnically diverse countries. Nyerere copied the colonial
example of a single language by introducing Kiswahili throughout the whole
country, similar to the way in which Sukarno had earlier united Indonesia by
creating a new language, Bahasa Indonesia, on the basis of a relatively unimportant
trade language, instead of adopting Javan, the language of the elites. In the 1990s,
with the Cold War over, political support for the great dictators in Africa came to
an end and internal conflicts flared up. That led to a series of armed confronta-
tions. Ten years later, partly through Western interventions, peace seems to have
returned, at least in terms of the absence of open hostilities. In the meantime, with
the necessary fits and starts, a process of democratization was under way, with
forty-five of the forty-eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa having held multi-
party elections since 1989. The degree of democracy remained limited, however.
Generally speaking, although many regimes had been formally democratically
elected, the quality of the process left a great deal to be desired. Of the forty multi-
party elections that were held between 1989 and 1997, only fifteen were reason-
ably fair, and only twelve led to regime change. Ten years on, most of the leaders
who came to power during the elections were busily changing their countries’
constitutions so that they could be re-elected for the third, fourth or fifth time
(Brown & Kaiser 2007).
3.4 political institutions
It is clear that strong government is of great importance to development. Such
governments are, however, lacking in large parts of Africa. The nation state is by
no means a given, nearly all political systems display considerable neopatrimonial
characteristics, and governments are weak in implementation capacity. The simple
answer seems to be to make sure governments are strong. However, as we learned
the hard way in the 1990s, it is not that simple. Institutions and governments can
only thrive in a climate that fulfils one substantial precondition: stability.
Stability
After the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts broke out in rapid succession
within countries, and these soon claimed more victims than conflict between
countries. That is historically a new phenomenon. Before 1990, internal conflicts
were limited in number and did not last long (less than three years). Since 1990,
they have increased in number and last, on average, three times as long. In the
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decade after 1990, some 5.5 million people died in thirty-five civil wars. How can
countries develop themselves in such situations? Civil war is especially a problem
in Africa. The problem is that the process of nation-building and absorption into
the global economy is now too advanced to hark back to the way in which nations
were originally formed on the continent. At the same time, many states lack suffi-
cient internal support and stability. Consequently, every attempt to promote
development also has to address the question of how to achieve stable political
systems.
The importance of stability is without doubt the most significant insight in rela-
tion to development in the past two decades. Initially this entailed a strong focus
on ending armed conflicts, but gradually the concept has acquired a broader mean-
ing. Stability is a characteristic of societies, and armed conflict is an extreme
consequence of instability. Too little stability also has other effects. Long before
conflicting parties resort to arms, a lack of stability can lead to social disruption
and destroy a positive outlook on the future and these elements, in turn, can have
an impact on economic activity. Just as Western economists like to emphasize the
importance of a good investment climate for economic growth– meaning the rela-
tive absence of strikes and other forms of unrest and the presence of a well-trained,
motivated workforce – development too benefits from stability. Etzioni (2007) had
good reason to call his book, in which he outlines a general perspective for inter-
national policy, Security First.
For Western countries the question became one of how to deal with the impor-
tance of stability. Especially after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the wars in
the Balkans in the early 1990s, there was a strong feeling that the traditional
concept of development was in dire need of revision. It quickly became clear that
the period following a conflict calls for special attention if all development aid is
not to be futile, as countries tend to lapse quickly into armed conflict. Of all
intrastate conflicts, 20 percent flare up again within four years. The traditional 
aid repertoire proved inadequate to meet these new challenges. Peacebuilding,
however, soon received a great deal of attention. In the 1990s, the un conducted
four times as many peace missions as in the four preceding decades, spending an
average of 7 billion dollars per mission. Security Sector Reform became a concept,
especially after 2002 when the number of violent conflicts started to fall again. 
It is not enough to establish peace, it is also necessary to build a stable security
sector, enabling a transition from a military regime to one in which the police and
the legal authorities can guarantee public safety and the armed forces are once
again subordinated to the political and administrative system.
Democrazy
The question is how to achieve social and political stability. In Western circles
there is a tendency to answer that question primarily in terms of good governance
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and the rule of law. More particularly, many place their faith in the value of West-
ern-style democracy. That is, however, purely in historical terms, a doubtful 
argument: democratic Senegal experienced no growth under the non-corrupt
Leopold Senghor, while Indonesia did under Suharto, the autocrat that headed the
Transparency International list of the most corrupt leaders of all time. Further-
more, it soon became clear that introducing Western-style democracy could even
be counterproductive. In a country that is just starting to recover from internal
conflict, elections and a system of political parties are often more likely to open
wounds that are only just starting to heal than generate a peaceful system of
conflict settlement. Democracy, in both a narrow and a broader sense, can in many
cases lead to less rather than more stability in a period immediately following
political violence (Jarstad & Sisk 2008; Mann 2005; Paris 2004).
Paul Collier (2009) calls the exaggerated expectations of democracy ‘democrazy’.
On the basis of a regression analysis, he goes a step further and comes to the
conclusion that, although in middle and high-income countries democracy
decreases the chances of political violence, in low-income countries the reverse is
true. In his view, democracy – when seen as a system of elections, political parties
and a parliament – has made life in low-income countries more dangerous. That is
because, in these societies, democracy can be manipulated so that it no longer
guarantees the accountability of governments or the transparency of policy
processes. He concludes that democracies become safer as income rises, while
autocracies become more dangerous. That does not make autocracies the obvious
solution – as well as being more successful, they can also be more disastrous than
democracies. However, if mechanisms of selection on the basis of quality and
meritocracy are present, often through a layer of leaders that are unknown to the
outside world, an autocracy can work well in economic terms – as is evidenced by
countries like South Korea, China and Vietnam. Without such internal correction
mechanisms, the effects can be disastrous – as we have seen in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Uganda.
Democracy is just as little a guarantee for stability as it is for economic growth.
The recent history of Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam and China (after the
reforms) shows that countries can develop perfectly well without Western-style
democracy. This is not to say that authoritarian regimes are by nature better for
economic growth: not every leader is a Lee (Singapore) or a Park (South Korea).
Furthermore, there are democracies that experience growth, like India and
Botswana, the African growth miracle. Whether democracy leads to sustainable
economic growth is therefore still the subject of academic debate (see Berendsen
2008 and others). For the time being, no direct causal relationship has been identi-
fied (Carothers 2002).
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What we can say with some degree of certainty is that a number of specific charac-
teristics of states are important for economic development, especially the presence
of an effective, responsive and transparent state apparatus, but this does not neces-
sarily have to be based on a Western-style democratic political system with politi-
cal parties and elections (Chang 2007; Fukuyama 2004; Khan 2005; Zakaria 2003).
State capacity is much more important than the rule of law or democracy, certainly
in low-income countries. South Korea and China had no strong rule of law, prop-
erty rights had little significance, and the administration of justice was negligible,
and none of these elements were legitimized democratically. Yet these countries
had the capacity to be effective. That means above all, the capacity to deliver. That
is not the same as the rule of law or democratic legitimacy. It is not even the same
as the absence of corruption. A number of countries with high growth, including
South Korea, China and Indonesia, actually had high levels of corruption. The
growth of corruption and economic growth progressed hand in hand. This was
known as the East Asian Paradox (Weiss 2008). This does not mean that there is a
causal relationship: in other countries, especially smaller ones, the relationship
between corruption and growth proved to be negative. Countries like Singapore
and Malaysia are also increasingly legitimizing themselves in terms of responsive
government: they are well aware of what their people expect, but acquire that
awareness through other means than classical Western institutions. In Singapore,
for example, civil servants have to speak directly to members of the public for half
a day every week.
It has also become clear that democratization often comes after economic growth.
Lipset (1959) claimed that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances
that it will sustain democracy”, and that statement still holds water. A large
comparative study covering the period from 1950 to 1990 showed, for example,
that democracy has a better chance of survival in middle-income countries, as in
Latin America, than in poorer countries, where the average life expectancy of a
democracy is only eight years. Per capita income proved by far the most important
predictor, more significant than ethnic groups, religion, or a country’s colonial and
political past (Przeworski et al. 2000).
3.5 social fabric
If a Western democratic model is not the only solution, how are we to understand
the stability of countries and their institutions? Clearly, a country’s social fabric is
of crucial importance. This has been the subject of a number of studies, several of
which take the behaviour of local elites as their starting point. According to one
analysis, during the process of state-building, specific elites were able to take
possession of the state apparatus in such a way that there was no adequate system
of checks and balances to prevent them from becoming rent seekers looking only
to advance their own interests. The best known advocate of this perspective is
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Robert Bates in Markets and States in Tropical Africa (1981) and many subsequent
works (Bates 2001, 2008). In a variant of the rational-choice theory, he describes
the strategies elites adopt to secure their interests and how that eventually leads in
many developing countries to weak states and ineffective development paths. This
perspective certainly has some explanatory value, as rent seeking is clearly a reality
in many countries. At the same time, however, it has its limitations. Firstly, there
is much evidence to show that the leaders of many successful countries also
engaged in rent seeking. Mustaq Khan (2005) goes even further, claiming that a
significant part of the success of the Asian tigers was due to the fact that local elites
had an interest in the further development of the country as a whole. Further-
more, these elites often benefited more than their countries, as shown by long
periods of degressive tax systems. It was a side-effect of their quest for personal
gain that their countries also benefited.
The most important problem with this analysis of elites is the assumption that
group-forming is by definition bad and that groups will always seek to pursue
their own self-interest. That is a too limited interpretation of social bonding and
social segmentation. Other analyses therefore give high priority to the importance
of social relations for development. There are two reasons for this: on the one
hand there is clearly a painful deficit in terms of social relations in developing
countries. This is clear from the prevalence of ethnic conflict and corrupt practices.
On the other hand it is becoming increasingly clear that people survive because of
their networks. To clarify the problems and potential of human relationships, the
concept of ‘social capital’ has been devised.
The honour of coming up with the concept of social capital has been attributed to
numerous commentators (Bourdieu 1985; Coleman 1990; Portes 1998; Putnam
1993) and there are as many definitions. In short, in this context, it means that it is
not what you know but who. The basic idea is that family, friends and acquain-
tances have an important social value. Possessing a lot of social capital has great
advantages. At the level of the individual, it means better education, better income
and better health, for companies it means better performance, and at community
level, more collective action (Narayan 1999; Portes 1998; Woolcock 1998). Easterly
et al. (2006) even come to the conclusion, on the basis of a meta-analysis, that
social cohesion at community level leads to better institutions, and that better
institutions lead to more growth.
What is the relationship between social capital and the formation of institutions?
In Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1993) compares different regions in Italy. He
comes to the conclusion that the degree of good governance depends on the quan-
tity of social organizations. It is not so important what these organizations do –
they may be football clubs or groups of people coming together to play cards – but
they do ensure that a country functions better politically. That is partly because
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social organizations have a number of important characteristics – such as shared
norms, mutual trust and a network of contacts – that make it easier to achieve
common objectives.
Bonding has disadvantages as well as advantages (Portes & Landolt 2000). Some
communities can become so closed that they become isolated and act against the
wider collective interest. This is the case, for example, with Al Qaida or drug
cartels. Too much bonding can also impose excessive claims on group members,
which can present an obstacle to upward social mobility. In East Africa, for exam-
ple, it is not unusual for people who have moved upwards on the social ladder to
have themselves declared dead, to avoid a sudden flurry of interest from hitherto
unknown family members. Another option is to move to a metropolis. Closed
systems also often lead to social norms being adjusted downwards. This occurs,
for instance, in fragile states where political and social organizations are often also
criminal. Social networks are therefore not the key to happiness. Three thousand
registered agricultural cooperatives and 30,000 informal groups were unable to
prevent the genocide in Rwanda. In Kenya, there are more than 200,000 agricul-
tural community groups active, but that is no guarantee for economic prosperity
(Woolcock & Narayan 2000).
What the research into social capital does show clearly is the importance of cross-
cutting ties for development. Where there are few such relationships, there can be
negative consequences. People can find themselves confined in networks of
poverty and violent inter-ethnic conflicts can occur. Putnam (2000) makes the
distinction between bonding and bridging, the former occurring within networks
and the latter referring to the ties between different groups.
In reality, of course, social relations are much more complex than can be expressed
by terms like bonding and bridging. Every society has its own dynamics and
survival mechanisms. It is, however, clear that social structures have a real impact
on development paths, and that they interact with political and economic systems.
Four important dimensions require special attention in that respect: the role of the
middle classes in developing countries, the significance of ethnicity and gender,
and religion.
The middle classes
The development of a country is closely related to the development of its middle
classes (Birdsall 2007b, 2010; Davis 2004; Easterly 2001b; Huber 2009). A middle
class, in the city and in the countryside, is not only an effect of economic develop-
ment, but also a cause. The middle classes have other interests, values and
economic habits than the elite or the poorest groups. Their long-term objective is
capital accumulation, as they want to secure their children’s future. The middle
classes therefore have a tendency to temper some of the excesses in the way in
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which their countries are organized (Banerjee & Duflo 2008; Easterly 2001b). That
makes a wide-ranging middle class an important factor in stability and institution-
building. To safeguard their investments, the middle classes force governments to
draw up clear rules and enforce laws. They also have an interest in good collective
services like roads, healthcare and public education (Birdsall 2007b). This is how
European welfare states came into being. It was not until a broad-based middle
class developed and wished to benefit from collective arrangements that public
services really got off the ground.
The middle classes can play a significant role in the development of a country.
Davis (2004) shows that clearly in her appropriately titled comparative study
Discipline and Development. The success of developmental states like Taiwan and
South Korea is partly due to the evolution of a rural middle class. Farmers were
members of associations that made agreements between themselves, thereby
limiting the power of big business. They also encouraged their governments to
promote economic development. This enabled South Korea, Taiwan and Hong
Kong to take the first cautious steps towards a welfare state (Haggard & Kaufman
2008). In Mexico and Argentina, which failed to achieve economic prosperity, a
middle class did not develop. That was hampered by regional conflicts and ethnic
differences. These countries have therefore not yet developed into welfare states:
social protection is only available to those in the formal economy. The middle
classes not only have a role to play in the economy and establishing welfare
services, but also in democracy. Rural and urban middle classes can be the main
guardians of democratic development, as they have a considerable interest in being
part of the decision-making process. The history of democratization in Latin
America illustrates that clearly (Huber 2009; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), though
the argument does not apply (yet?) to Singapore and Indonesia.
It is clear that the middle classes can play an important constructive role. Yet the
extent to which, and the circumstances under which, they do that is an interesting
but insufficiently explored question. Many are eager to apply more generally the
classic Weberian notion that the Protestant ethic of the Europeans who migrated
to America in the eighteenth century – with the emphasis on hard work and sacri-
fice – provided fertile ground for the development of raw capitalism. In that argu-
ment the importance of the middle class lies in a long-term perspective and self-
discipline. It is, however, debatable whether the emerging middle classes in
developing countries always have such a perspective. People from the middle
classes invest in healthcare and educating their children, but some also develop
their own consumption-based culture, including fine houses, expensive weddings
and holidays in far-off places (Embong 2001; Hsiao 2006). The middle classes are
also often the groups that pay their taxes and benefit from a government that
genuinely delivers. However, that too, is by no means self-evident: the middle
classes in developing countries sometimes tend to turn their backs on the govern-
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ment. In India they are more interested in the market than the government, prefer-
ring to buy cheaper healthcare than arranging it collectively (Fernandes 2006).
Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the history of Western
welfare states is that it is crucial to maintain a link between the interests of the
middle classes and the government. If that does not happen, the middle classes
become a social group that puts its own interests first, rather than helping to build
the nation.
Furthermore, economic growth does not automatically produce a thriving middle
class. India is poorer than China but by 2020, although it will still be poorer, its
already sizeable middle class will be larger than that of its neighbour, because in
India the distribution of income is more equal. Huge discrepancies may also occur.
Its growing middle classes are located largely in a number of economic
metropolises, like Hyderabad, Bangalore, Mumbai and Delhi, but the rural middle
classes remain limited in size. Furthermore, the new middle classes prove very
vulnerable in times of economic crisis. In 2001, the middle classes in Argentina
suffered severely, as did those in Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia during the Asian
crisis of 1997 – not only because they lost their jobs, but also because their lifestyle
was based on borrowed money. The middle classes are crucial for development,
but the extent to which economic growth leads to their formation, and the degree
to which they contribute to the creation of collective arrangements and democratic
institutions, vary enormously.
Ethnicity
It is also important to determine the importance of ethnicity, especially in Africa.
In much of the literature, ethnic fragmentation is seen as the main factor explain-
ing lack of development. It is often assumed that ethnically diverse countries are
more fragmented, are more likely to suffer from armed conflict, are less suited to
democratic government, and achieve less economic growth. There is a lot of
evidence to suggest, however, that diversity is not always problematic (Collier
2007; Easterly 2006). The link between social problems in Africa and ethnicity is
not as self-evident as it seems. Ethnicity did not become the most important
component of social identity until the twentieth century.
A striking example is the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The standard interpretation
is that it was a fierce ethnic conflict and that the institutions in Rwanda were not
strong enough to bridge the deep-rooted divisions in the social structure.
However, looking back into the history of Rwanda reveals that the social structure
itself was a consequence of earlier political interventions (Meredith 2005). In the
nineteenth century, the distinction between the Hutus and the Tutsis was
completely different. Although the Hutus preferred agriculture and the Tutsis
cattle-breeding, they spoke the same language, intermarried and adopted each
other’s customs. There was a good political balance, with Tutsi leaders who made
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decisions about the cattle and Hutus who did the same for agriculture, separate
groups in the armed forces, and a king who kept the whole country under control.
During German occupation, however, ethnic differences acquired a new social
significance. With insufficient German troops in the country, Tutsis were elevated
to the position of the leading elite and given responsibility for defending German
interests. The Belgians, who ‘took over’ the country from the Germans after the
First World War, went a step further. They introduced a system of identity cards
stating the holder’s ethnic origins. Because there were no records of this, they
adopted a simple formula: every one with more than ten cows was a Tutsi, every-
one with fewer a Hutu. A government apparatus was set up consisting only of
Tutsis, and when the Belgians transferred responsibility to the Catholic Church in
the 1930s, the local bishop ordered his missionaries only to teach Tutsis. In this
way, the Tutsis gradually acquired all the leading positions and, by the end of the
1930s, the resulting ethnic division had become the main principle of social orga-
nization in the country. This led, at the end of the 1950s, to the first unrest, caus-
ing the Belgians to panic and change sides, supporting the Hutus. That had little
effect and, after independence in 1962, institutions were further developed along
the existing lines of ethnic division. We all know the consequences of that. Inter-
vening in Rwanda without understanding this history produces constructions
that will not last.
The fact that ethnicity has acquired such clear political significance in Africa is
therefore, in the first instance, due to the colonial powers. After decolonization,
the politicization of ethnicity continued even more intensively. This time it was
driven by African politicians, who discovered that ethnicity was a powerful mobi-
lizer in the struggle for power and the neopatrimonial system strengthened its
importance even more. Political and economic factors were therefore to blame for
the ethnicization of Africa (Chabal & Daloz 2006; Chabal 2009).
It is possible, however, no matter how difficult it may be, to manage ethnic diver-
sity. The history of the Southeast Asian countries is proof of that. After indepen-
dence, many of them inherited a complex ethnic structure: in Singapore, for exam-
ple, as a consequence of British power politics, people from India were in a
minority but held many leading positions, those with a Malaysian background
were afraid and without a clear perspective, while the Chinese played an impor-
tant role in trade. In all of these countries, the new rulers were forced to find quick
answers to these problems. At times that was a very rough and ready solution,
such as the split between India and Pakistan, at others a less-than-subtle policy of
preferential treatment, as in Malaysia. Singapore, for example, adopted a more
cautious approach, introducing quotas for housing and jobs. In all cases, an ethnic
transition took place without too much lasting tension so that, over time, social
relations became more manageable.
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Ethnic diversity can be managed in different ways: through political systems, like
an electoral or party-based system, or through other institutions, like the civil
service. The ethnic composition of a country is, of course, an important factor
(Bangura 2006). In a country with one dominant ethnic group it is important, for
example, that minority groups have more power than their numbers would entitle
them to. That is the case, for example, in Botswana, where the dominant Tswana
group does not demand all the leading positions for itself. The Kalanga, which
only make up 11 percent of the population, hold about a quarter of the public posi-
tions in the country and 18 percent of seats in parliament. If there are two ethnic
groups almost equal in size, managing ethnicity can often be more difficult, as
became painfully clear in Rwanda. Two groups often confront each other directly,
leading to a policy of ‘winner takes all’. However, even in these cases pacification
is possible, especially if there is a system of proportional representation in parlia-
ment, government and the civil service. That is the case in Nigeria, where three
dominant groups have to share power. In the civil service, historically dominated
by the better educated Yoruba, more and more jobs have been going to the Hausa-
Fulani and Igbo in recent years. Under the Constitution, the three groups also take
turns in providing the president. Countries with many ethnic groups, like Tanza-
nia, often seem in a better position, especially if there is also a dominant national
ideology. Ethnic differences then become less important; this is another way of
managing diversity.
In short, in many developing countries, ethnic dividing lines are strengthened by
economic and political factors. Managing this diversity, instead of ignoring it, is
often a crucial factor in a country’s development.
Gender
Gender acquires meaning in societies to a similar degree and in a similar way to
ethnicity: the differentiation into sexes acquires all manner of shapes and forms,
and there is considerable variation in the extent to which this differentiation is
relevant at a cultural, social and/or economic level. Cultural anthropology offers 
a multitude of studies that record this diversity. Some even show that ‘woman’
was not a self-evident category in some societies. “The fundamental category of
‘woman’ – which is foundational in western gender discourses – simply did not
exist in Yorubaland prior to its sustained contact with the West. There was no
such pre-existing group characterized by shared interests, desires, or social posi-
tions. The cultural logic of Western social categories is based on an ideology of
biological determinism: the conception that biology provides the rationale for the
organization of the social World. (…) The body was (and still is) very corporeal in
Yoruba culture (…) but the body was not the basis of social roles, inclusions or
exclusions; it was not the foundation of social thought or identity.” This is how
Oyèrónké Oye˘ wùmí (1997) describes the way in which gender gradually became 
a category in the Yoruba society in Southwest Nigeria.
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Women take on a multiplicity of positions, and the same can be said of other social
categories like the elderly or children. In reasonably functioning rural areas in
Africa you can find old men gathered under a tree in the afternoons, while the
younger generation tend the cattle. Elsewhere, young people have moved to the
towns and cities and have reasonable standards of living there, while their parents
are left behind with few future prospects. In some villages women have most of
the economic power because they not only produce goods but also trade them,
while elsewhere the men control the market.
Male-female relations vary greatly between and within countries. The Gender Gap
Index, developed along the lines of the Human Development Index, reveals a wide
range of differences. Strikingly, Southern countries like South Africa and the
Philippines score considerably better than a number of Western countries like the
United Kingdom or the United States. There are also major differences within
continents. An African country like Mozambique not only has much less gender-
inequality than neighbouring Tanzania, but also less than an Asian country like
Vietnam (World Economic Forum 2009).
It is therefore difficult to make generalizations, although the temptation is great.
For example, many people are still preoccupied by the exact nature of the link
between sexual inequality and economic growth. In a frequently quoted article,
Klasen (2002, see also Klasen & Lamanna 2009) states that economic growth
increases when more girls attend school, as it improves the quality of employees,
increases competition and keeps wages low. According to Klasen, this partly
explains why development in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia lags behind.
This argument, however, can be called into doubt. First and foremost, the fact that
fewer girls attend school is not an isolated problem. Furthermore, the causal link
between economic growth and gender equality may also work in the other direc-
tion: if family incomes increase, so will the probability of girls attending school –
in villages in Bangladesh where women are able to work in the garment industry,
significantly more girls attend school than in villages in which that work is not
available (see also unctad 2004).
Similarly, there is a great deal of debate on the importance of women for agricul-
tural development in Africa. In contrast to Latin America or China, small farmers
in Africa are often women. Their production is often lower because they tend to
cultivate for their own households and do not, like men, make the move to large-
scale production which eventually yields more. There may be a variety of reasons
for this, including social norms dictating that men cultivate cash crops and
women subsistence crops, unequal property rights, lower levels of education and
poorer advice. According to the fao (2009b) agricultural productivity in Sub-
Saharan Africa could increase by 20 percent if women were to have equal access to
land, seeds and fertilizers (World Bank 2008a; Momsen 2010). At the same time,
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Jackson (2007) demonstrates that a broader conception of the risk women are
ready to take, makes their behaviour perfectly understandable.
Ironically enough, economic growth can sometimes even benefit from gender
inequality (Seguino 2000a, 2000b). If women’s wages are low, there is a greater
chance that much money will be invested in labour-intensive, export-oriented
industries. Korea and Taiwan owe much to the fact that gender standards and
stereotyping convinced women to take on poorly paid work. According to
Seguino, “Low female wages have spurred investments and exports by lowering
unit labour costs, providing the foreign exchange to purchase capital and interme-
diate goods which raise productivity and growth rates”. Once semi-industrialized
economies use technology to try to upgrade their economies, however, gender
inequality no longer offers any benefits because it is then properly qualified staff
that is needed. It depends on the type of economy as to whether empowerment 
of women leads to greater efficiency and higher productivity (Momsen 2010). In
many instances, it is not a clear case of good and bad. Ong’s 1987 study provided 
a good illustration of how the introduction of factory work to a Malaysian village
changes relationships. If young women are given opportunities to work, the
power of the men declines and the women start making more demands on the
men. At the same time, the price they have to pay is long hours performing
monotonous tasks. Moreover, the men are afraid that women’s new independence
will lead to licentious behaviour, which gives them cause to impose new forms of
control. In the end, the parties involved have mixed opinions about the new situa-
tion.
Even microcredits, which are for many the ideal instrument to help women
progress (many ngos only give these credits to women), have a complex effect. 
In Sri Lanka, microcredits have little effect on poverty but they do enable women
to improve their position in the household and the community. In Cameroon, 
the effects differ according to the programme. In India and Bangladesh, existing
gender relations mainly determine whether microfinance provided to women
leads to social transformation (Mayoux 2001, Hunt & Kaynathan 2001). In Africa,
there are many examples where women who receive microcredits, in addition to
being burdened with household chores and caring for children, are made solely
responsible for earning income for their household units. This increases the pres-
sure on them even more while men end up having to do less, certainly if the
women also become responsible for financing their retirement in the form of
micropensions.
Designing interventions is also difficult. In his ethnographic study entitled Culti-
vating Development, detailing the intended and unintended effects of a large dfid
development project, Mosse (2005) showed how all the gender objectives eventu-
ally had no effect on the parties involved. The women did not want more indepen-
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dence or power than men, but wanted men to take on more roles and responsibili-
ties. The problem was not the men’s dominance but their weakness.
Women are often seen as the drivers of change (Batliwala and Dhanraj 2007).
There is a tendency, as Cornwall et al. (2007) also record, to make even more
hyperbolic claims about untapped female potential: for example, women are said
to be better at resolving conflicts, saving the environment and enforcing good
governance. Policy always has different impacts on different social categories and
in that respect it is always a good idea to ask what interventions mean for specific
categories. At the same time it is extremely difficult to provide a good answer to
such a question.
Religion
Religion has also become an important factor in a similar way. In many parts of the
world, religion is a stronger factor than ever in the public domain. There seems to
be little evidence of what Max Weber called ‘the disenchantment of the world’.
The number of people who consider themselves religious has increased world-
wide. In Asia, it is currently 50 percent of the population, in Europe 60 percent,
and in Africa as many as 91 percent (Jenkins 2007). Furthermore, new religious
groups are emerging: the Pentecostal church, for example, has acquired 400
million members since the Second World War, more than the population of the
United States. The centres of gravity of many groups are also shifting. The Pente-
costal church now has strong support among the new middle class in Brazil, the
poorest groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the mountain folk of India, while a
fifth of all Muslims now live in Africa.
For a lot of people, religion is an essential component of their identity and, in
many countries, it has brought political, linguistic and structural unity. Religion
can do what a nation state is much less able to do, despite the successes of the
national football team (Chabal 2009; Ellis 2007; Kennedy 2004; Soares & Otayek
2007). There is, however, a downside: the articulation of religion, especially politi-
cally, plays an increasingly important role in conflicts (undp 2004). If ethnicity is
a spark that can ignite the flames of conflict, that also applies more and more to
religion. In Nigeria, for example, many conflicts about power (and oil) have been
fought between the three main ethnic groups, the Ibo, Hausa (Fulani) and the
Yoruba, with the war in Biafra being a case in point. The country is now in the grip
of violence between Muslims and Christians, who both account for about half of
the population. Conflict also often occurs within religions, as in Malaysia or
Turkey, where moderate and radical Muslims are fighting about the future of their
countries (see also wrr 2006c). The kind of one-dimensional dilemmas described
by Huntington (1996) in the Clash of Civilizations, do not exist. There is more
often a series of layered and sometimes politicized articulations of religious divid-
ing lines within religious groups, countries and regions.
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For a long time, religion was also seen as a cultural obstacle to development.
Following Weber, it was assumed that societies outside Northern Europe could
also only develop if they were driven by Protestant ethics, with the emphasis on
an ‘inner-worldly ascetism’ of self-discipline, hard work and savings. Other reli-
gions were considered to delay or even counteract economic growth. In the 1980s,
for example, facetious references were made to the ‘Hindu rate of growth’.
However, since the economic success of India, and of the Gulf States (Islam),
Korea and China (Confucianism) and Brazil (Catholicism), that assumption has
been belied by the facts, denying any causal relationship between religion and
development. Nor is it true that Confucian values were the driving force behind
the Asian growth wonders, as Prime Minister Lee of Singapore likes to claim. That
was only one of many factors that contributed to their success (Berger 2008).
Religion is therefore not an explanatory factor for development, but must be taken
into account in understanding it. Certainly in Africa, politics cannot be under-
stood without taking account of the way in which religion, spirituality and magic
penetrate to the very core of state and society (Ellis & Ter Haar 2004). There is no
separation of religion and state. That applies not only to the lowest layer of the
population, who often see their president as the servant of God, but also to the
elite. President Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian nation after he himself had
converted to Christianity. Earlier, in the same country, president Kaunda and his
entire cabinet were under the spell of a Hindu guru, recommended to the presi-
dent by Indira Gandhi when he found himself in a ‘spiritual stalemate’. In Mozam-
bique, president Chissano introduced transcendental meditation in his cabinet and
the civil service. Members of the armed forces were ordered to spend 20 minutes a
day meditating, which the president claimed had a proven peaceful effect.
Furthermore, while political elites act on the basis of religious inspiration, reli-
gious authorities also adopt political stances. It is not unusual for religious leaders
to hold important positions in government. The archbishop of Rwanda before the
genocide is still criticized for not doing more to stop it. In Senegal, the Mouride, a
Sufi brotherhood, play a central political role.
As in many Asian countries, like Korea and the Philippines, democratization in
Africa has led to the emergence and growth of a wide variety of religious groups,
both Christian and Islamic, many of which are politically active. In countries like
Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia, that has generated a spectrum of
new religious institutions that preach new interpretations of the traditional faith.
It has also led to the growth of religious women’s and youth organizations spread-
ing the word and providing a new platform for the articulation of interests and
ambitions that have not previously been articulated. In this way, religious organi-
zations offer new opportunities for different population groups to take part in the
political debate (Soares & Otayek 2007). On the other hand, religious movements
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can also isolate people, especially if religion is the only identity they are permitted.
The fact that Malian children now learn to read the Koran in Arabic, a language
that is strange to them, does not help bring development closer. All in all, religion
is an important force to be reckoned with, and one that can be destructive as well
as constructive.
3.6 own development paths
Development is a matter of guided modernization. It is quite possible to record the
factors that play a role in that process in a general schema. It helps, and certainly in
the case of Africa, to reason in terms of an economic sphere, a political system, a
government apparatus and a social structure, although these four layers can only
be differentiated to a limited extent and continually affect each other. It also helps
to learn from Western history, and not to be blind to the importance of agriculture
and a middle class. It helps to be aware that economies cannot simply jump-start
themselves, but often need a certain amount of support and protection from a
government in the early stages. It helps to know that the most important question
about governments is not whether they are legitimized by multi-party elections,
but whether they are effective. It also helps to understand that stability and secu-
rity are preconditions for development and that social ties should not only be
interpreted as forms of patronage.
However, there are no simple recipes. Africa, for example, will never be able to
follow the path taken by Europe. Western development was able to occur in a situ-
ation in which the West not only had centuries in which to complete the process,
but was also lord and master of the rest of the world, which it was free to exploit in
any way it wished. Such freedom of time and action is no longer possible. More-
over, with global trade integrated to such an advanced degree, economies are much
more restricted in the extent to which they can be cultivated in the relatively
protected comfort of their home markets, as Western economies were able to do.
Nor will Africa ever be able to emulate the path followed in Asia. After indepen-
dence, Africa inherited a completely different fundamental pattern of institutions
from its colonial masters than Asia. In addition, the opportunities to pursue an
independent policy have changed radically. Finally, the importance of expecta-
tions and ideals should not be underestimated.
Legacy
The political legacy of the very short period of colonization in Africa was a system
of institutions that were not grounded in local relationships and were insuffi-
ciently developed to survive despite this shortcoming. The economic legacy was
one of double dependence: the states on the continent were constructed around a
handful of key raw materials, and focused on exporting these products rather than
on internal consumption or the development of an internal market. As a conse-
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quence, prices were determined elsewhere, on the world market. In addition, the
continent experienced enormous population growth from the 1950s onwards,
which increased the pressure on the entire system. The result was extreme
economic fragility, as was evidenced by the dramatic fall in copper prices between
the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, which as good as destroyed the economies of
copper-producing countries like Zaire and Zambia. In that sense, Africa has never
had its own economy. Much of its income has not been earned, in the literal sense
that it has come from raw materials or, later, from donor contributions. The conti-
nent has never developed its own productive capacity, with the exception of a
limited number of products, like cotton, coffee and cocoa. Commodity extraction
and donations are still the essential sources of income in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In addition to this political and economic legacy, Africa has been unable to take
advantage of the global growth in agricultural productivity. Since the green revo-
lution in Asia in the 1960s, which introduced better crops, fertilizer, pesticides
and irrigation, the yield of rice per hectare – under ideal conditions – has increased
tenfold (World Bank 2008a). In Europe, too, agricultural reform programmes have
led to great leaps forward in food production. In the 1980s and 1990s, these
advances led to enormous food surpluses on the world market. In the West, the
problem of food supply disappeared into the background, to be replaced – after the
dioxin chicken and mad cow scares – by concerns about food quality. Africa has
been unable, however, to benefit from the rapidly developing global food market,
and has largely remained dependent on its local markets for its food supply. Food
production per capita has even fallen, partly as a consequence of rapid urbaniza-
tion.
Integration under new conditions
As the world has become much more interdependent in recent decades, the scope
for countries to develop in relative isolation has become progressively smaller.
Developing in the way that Japan or South Korea did is impossible today, if for no
other reason than the enormous increase in intellectual property rights. Further-
more, the phytosanitary and quality requirements the West imposes on imports
are by no means comparable with those of fifty years ago. A typical developing
country has to spend 150 million dollars just to fulfil the wto’s customs,
phytosanitary, health and intellectual property requirements. This is more than
the development budget of many countries for a whole year, and can be a serious
obstacle to the integration of poor countries into the international trade system
(Elliot 2009).
Wanting to trade more is one thing, but being able to decide for yourself what you
export – and therefore produce – is a completely different matter. In recent
decades, trade has become progressively regionalized, and regional trade blocs
have gained in importance. How much trade takes place within the local region
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varies widely from continent to continent: in Europe 74 percent of trade trans-
actions occur within the region, in North America that is 51 percent, and in Latin
America 24 percent. African countries have the lowest intra-regional exports,
amounting to 10 percent of their foreign trade (wto 2008a, 2008b).
That presents Africa with the challenge of achieving regional economic integration
if it does not want to remain heavily dependent on other trade blocs. African
exports to the rest of the world consist predominantly of oil and other raw materi-
als, and only for a small part of industrial products. Within Africa, the share in
trade in industrial products is twice as large. If African countries therefore want to
diversify to be able to make products with more added value and thereby to move
higher up the production chain, they need to strengthen and broaden their mutual
trade ties. There are many obstacles to achieving that in Africa, from the lack of
good physical communications and a mass of bureaucratic red tape to wide differ-
ences in import regulations. Nor is it easy for African countries to escape from the
‘natural’ role they have acquired within the global economic order, primarily as
suppliers of raw materials. According to some estimates, more than half of world
trade takes place within multinational corporations, and a small number of these
companies dominate the value chains of products like cocoa, coffee, tea, grain,
fruit and vegetables. For example, the world’s six largest chocolate producers
control about half of global sales (Green 2008). That makes it very difficult for
African developing countries wishing to not only supply the raw materials, but
also make the products and sell them on Western markets.
The Asian tigers found a niche for themselves in the global economy largely by
stimulating their own industries in specific areas and by protecting them where
and whenever necessary. Compared to the period between 1950 and 1980,
however, the margins for developmental industrial policy have become much
smaller, not only through the increase in foreign direct investment and greater
concentration of global production chains, but also as a result of changes in inter-
national trade and investment rules. Countries wishing to export to Western
markets have to comply with these rules, which is often expensive and laborious.
Furthermore, many instruments that rich countries used successfully to achieve
their own development – such as tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, and ‘borrowing’
foreign technologies – have now been completely banned or rendered subject to
strict regulation by the wto. In this way, rich countries are kicking away the
ladder which they themselves used to climb upwards (Chang 2002, 2009a). In
addition, the rules on intellectual property rights have been tightened. The Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (trips) agreement makes it much more
expensive for developing countries to take advantage of new technologies. Since
97 percent of patents and the lion’s share of copyrights and trademarks are in the
hands of rich countries, the costs of acquiring knowledge soon escalate for devel-
oping countries if they have to pay more, and more often, for the privilege. The
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World Bank estimates the increase in licence payments for these countries as a
consequence of the trips agreement at 45 billion dollars a year, equivalent to a
third of annual oda. On top of this, many countries have to spend a lot of money
on inspectors, scientists, engineers and lawyers specialized in patents to set up and
operate a system of intellectual property rights (hai & Oxfam International 2009,
‘t Hoen 2009). In his book Why Globalization Works, Martin Wolf, a The Financial
Times columnist, concludes that, although patents and other forms of protection
of intellectual property may for these reasons offer advantages to some of the
larger and more advanced developing countries like China, Brazil and India, “it is 
a rent-extraction device for the rest of them, with potentially devastating conse-
quences for their ability to educate their people (because of copyright), adapt
design for their own use (ditto) and deal with severe challenges of public health”
(2004: 217). Former wto adviser Philippe Legrain (2010: 20) therefore believes
that global patent regulations cannot be justified, saying that “[j]ust as one size
doesn’t fit all in terms of labour and environmental standards, countries at differ-
ent stages of development should not have identical intellectual property stan-
dards imposed on them”.
The range of instruments for industrial policy available to developing countries
has, in short, become considerably more limited in the past decade, especially
compared to the post-war period when other countries did achieve development.
However, this does not mean we have reached a brick wall as the wto’s rules are
not all equally strict and sometimes allow exceptions for the least developed coun-
tries, large multinationals are not equally dominant in all sectors, and not all goods
are equally mobile. Furthermore, the technology that developing countries need
to strengthen their comparative advantages is not necessarily the most advanced
and is often too old to still be protected by patents. Even if the rules do not change,
there is still sufficient room for manoeuvre for countries that are “clever and deter-
mined enough” (Chang 2009b). But it is by no means simple.
Physical differences
Trade conditions are not the only difference between the Asia of the 1960s and the
Africa of the twenty-first century. Physical differences also play a role. The soil in
Africa is much older, and is exhausted in many areas. Furthermore, Africa is many
times more thinly populated than Asia, and even more so if we take account of the
fact that people in Asia largely live along the coast and in river deltas. In Asia, it
was worthwhile building an infrastructure in the form of roads and waterways for
irrigation (though the latter were often only profitable when also used to generate
energy). In Africa, such infrastructure is (still) unprofitable.
The conditions under which land can be distributed also differ enormously. In
Asia, bloody conflicts like those in China in the 1960s and in Vietnam in the 1970s
brought land under control of the government, which was then able to allocate it
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to small farmers, either as owners or long-term tenants. In Malaysia, land is
owned by the government, while in the Philippines it is in private hands. That is
one major reason why the Philippines had a much lower growth rate than its
neighbours. In Africa, the situation is different, with some exceptions. In
Namibia, for example, partly thanks to German support, the government has
substantial funds to buy land and redistribute it.
Land reforms do not occur in isolation, but are very much affected by the balance
of political power within which development has to take shape. In most Southeast
Asian countries, political elites were primarily afraid of resistance from the coun-
tryside. Many countries – including not only Indonesia and Malaysia, but also
South Korea and Bangladesh and later China and Vietnam – therefore invested
heavily in rural development to ensure rapid improvements in the living condi-
tions of large groups of people. In Africa, political elites focus mainly on keeping
on the right side of the urban population. In Asia, they tried to support agriculture
with high food prices, while in Africa city-dwellers are courted with low food
prices.
New expectations
For developing countries, the legacy is different, the circumstances under which
they have to seek integration into the world market are different, and the physical
and political context is different. Moreover, their expectations are different. The
role played by changing expectations is difficult to pin down, but is nevertheless
important. Through satellite television, people living in even the most remote
areas of the South can see the attractions of modern life. That means that today’s
developing countries are starting from a completely different situation than that of
Europe 200 years ago. Back then, a farmer might hope that one of his children
would go to the nearest village and become a carpenter. That son, in turn, could
hope that one of his children might train in the city to become a teacher. Some
generations later, a talented son might even become a doctor and, a few more
generations down the line, perhaps a talented daughter could do the same. Europe
took two centuries to complete that process of rising expectations. In every
African city today you can see impatient young people whose parents still worked
on the land, but who consider themselves too good for that kind of work. In their
designer training shoes and sunglasses, they hope for quick success, Western-
style. In developing countries, agriculture generally holds little promise for the
future, and anyone who has experienced at close range the state of repair of even
the most luxurious hotel in Africa knows that learning a craft there is an equally
bleak prospect. It is as though these countries want to pass through all the stages
of development at the same time.
Migration and the modern media have ensured that developing countries have
contact with the rest of the world. That not only produces different dreams, but
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also an intensive exchange of values, ideas and knowledge (Saxenian 2006). As a
result, the middle classes increasingly lead ‘transnational lives’. Where they used
to compare themselves to their neighbours, they now emulate lifestyles else-
where. They send their children abroad to the best schools – a trend that is referred
to in Korea as a new social disease. English is becoming the lingua franca in more
and more homes (Hsiao 2006). Religion, too, is creating transnational ties. Africa
is coming into contact with the rest of the world through a wide variety of reli-
gious movements: with the United States and Latin America through the Pente-
costal church, with the Middle East through Islam, and with Asia through the
many Buddhist and Hindu movements.
Developing countries are therefore modernizing, but in their own ways. Develop-
ment proceeds through unexpected combinations of order and chaos, based on
sediments of precolonial and colonial relations mixed with modern technologies,
institutions and ambitions, with all this taking shape in an increasingly interde-
pendent world. Existing theory is finding it more and more difficult to clarify this
hybrid form of development. It is clear that the state has a number of functions to
fulfil. It has to provide a certain legal framework, a basic administrative structure
in which obligations and rights can be embedded, and a physical, social and finan-
cial infrastructure. The form this all takes can, however, vary widely and must be
grafted onto the existing social and institutional roots. Within that framework,
developing countries will have to find their own development paths in a world
that, at present, is not overly willing to adapt to their needs and ambitions.
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4 measuring development
Development is a complex business. While this might be a challenge to commen-
tators and scientists, it is above all a problem for politicians and civil servants, who
have the difficult job of explaining such a complicated concept to the man 
or woman in the street. It is equally difficult to formulate policy and evaluate
whether that policy leads to positive results. The latter causes researchers all kinds
of headaches. After all, it is their task to throw extra light on the question 
of where and when aid is useful. The question of how such a question can be
answered is key to this chapter.
4.1 is development taking place?
Describing development is one thing, explaining it in measurable quantities is
another. Nevertheless, this is what modern policy systems are expected to do. As a
consequence, policy is being made ‘result-oriented’ in dozens of ways. What, on
the whole, are the results? Demonstrating the achievement of development is easy
if specific welfare indicators are taken as the criteria, but much trickier if other
indicators are used. Welfare indicators, particularly in the field of healthcare,
education, nutrition and political and social rights (including the position of
women and children) present a predominantly positive picture. However, indica-
tors which are socioeconomic in nature project a more diffuse picture. Although
there are successes in this respect, these are very unequally distributed. There are
major differences in both the degree to which poverty decreases and the level of
economic growth, between both regions and population groups within countries.
The fact that specific indicators reveal substantial changes is one thing. The ques-
tion of what causes these changes is another. The logical follow-up question is to
what extent development aid was the decisive factor in bringing about those
changes? Let us first examine the development indicators themselves. Anyone
who wants to present successful types of development had better focus on health-
care, education and agriculture. In these areas the rate of change in developing
countries has been substantially higher during the past half century than was ever
the case in Western Europe (Maddison 2001). For example, life expectancy in
developing countries appears to have increased by ten years between 1970 and
2005, and even by twenty years since 1950. That still leaves them twenty years
behind Western countries, but they are making quicker progress.
The reduction in child mortality is also impressive. It has halved in developing
countries over a period of thirty-five years.
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Figure 4.1 Life expectancy at birth in years
Source: Own calculations based on un data
Figure 4.2 Under-five child mortality per thousand births
Source: Own calculations based on un data
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Figure 4.3 Percentage of children 6-11 years old participating in education
Source: Own calculations based on data from Szirmai and unesco 2009
The picture is similarly positive in the field of education. School attendance has
increased everywhere. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the percentage rose from 29 to 70
percent between 1970 and 2006.
A degree of progress has also been observed in the field of food production and
agriculture. The quantities of food per person have consistently grown, despite
the enormous growth in population. In particular, production of the three most
important food crops – rice, maize and wheat – has improved substantially. 
This had more to do with the green revolution than the increase in the quantity
of available land. The majority of production and consumption takes place
locally, with only 3 percent of rice being exported via the world market. While
in the 1960s there was still a dominant neo-Malthusian stream of publications
predicting that population growth would place huge pressure on food supplies
which, in turn, would lead to considerable political and social tension, it is now
clear with hindsight that world food production to date has far exceeded popu-
lation growth. However, one problem is that these observations apply primarily
to Asia and not Sub-Saharan Africa. One consequence of this is that the inter-
pretation of hunger has also changed. In the 1960s, hunger was perceived
primarily as a worldwide shortage of food, and with that availability. The
increase in global food production means hunger is becoming more and more 
an issue of distribution and regional-specific food security.
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People’s health and level of education have been found to have risen enormously
during the past sixty years. This applies to both rich and developing countries, 
and even more so to the latter than the former. However, the picture is less clear
cut if we examine other indicators. Indicators such as growth in gdp or decrease in
poverty mainly present a differentiated picture, both between and within coun-
tries. Figure 4.4 below shows this clearly on the basis of the development of gdp
per head of population.
Figure 4.4 gdp per capita
Source: Own calculations based on un data
The picture becomes more complicated if we examine the development of
poverty, as shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5 Percentage of people living below the poverty line ($ 1.25 per day)
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank data
In the period between 1981 and 2005, the percentage of the world population that
had to live off less than 1.25 dollars a day halved, dropping from 52 to 25 percent. In
absolute figures it dropped from 1.9 billion to 1.4 billion. These figures are gratify-
ing. (Incidentally, the figures can also cause some confusion because the World
Bank raised the official poverty line from 1.00 to 1.08 dollars per day in 2000 and
from 1.08 to 1.25 dollars per day in 2008. This meant that three series of figures are
in circulation.) As shown by the graph, that drop occurred primarily in East Asia.
In that part of the world the Millennium Development Goal to halve the 1990 
‘$ 1.08 per day’ poverty level was reached shortly after 2002. Within East Asia,
China is responsible for the lion’s share of the reduction. Since it liberalized its
economy in 1978, it accounts for more than three-quarters of all people who have
escaped poverty (Gittings 2006). Today, 600 million fewer Chinese people live in
poverty than twenty-five years ago. Conversely, poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa
has scarcely decreased. It remains at the 1981 level of 50 percent, though there is
some good news in that the percentage increased until the mid-1990s and then
steadily decreased. Unfortunately, percentages do not show that the absolute
number of people under the poverty line in Sub-Saharan Africa has almost
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doubled in those twenty-five years. When expressed in terms of the number of
people who live on less than 1.25 dollars per day, the number increases from 214 
to 390 million. As a result, poverty has gradually become ‘Africanized’, with the
share of the world’s poor in Africa rising from 11 percent in 1981 to 28 percent in
2005. That percentage is going to rise further (Chen and Ravillion 2008), despite
the fact that most poor people still live in South Asia, in particular in India.
The contrasts in income have become sharper. According to Amsden (2007), over
a period spanning less than three decades, the gap between the richest and the
poorest countries has doubled, and differentiation within countries has also
increased significantly. However, calculations of global income differences vary
hugely, due mainly to differences in measuring methods and datasets (Milanovic
2002a, 2002b, 2005; Sala-i-Martin 2002a, 2002b; Wade 2004, 2008). World Bank
researcher Milanovic (2003, 2005) carried out a comparison of economic growth
and income development in the period 1960-1978 and in the two subsequent
decades and concluded that, in comparison with the preceding period, the recent
globalization had had a considerably less positive effect on growth and on the
convergence of incomes between poor and rich countries. Moreover, the Indian
economist Nayyar (2006) compared the growth of developing countries from
1940 to 1970 with that of the period from 1970 to 2000 and came to a similar
conclusion that, on average, countries made a lot more progress in the first period
than in the second. Growth was not more but less in the second period, and
income differences between and within countries diverged during the last three
decades of the twentieth century. In India, inequality increased mainly after the
economic liberalization of the 1990s, in both the cities and the countryside, and
between the cities and the countryside (Pal & Gosh 2007; Sen &Hiumanshu
2004).
On the basis of more recent figures – in particular on relative prices in China –
Milanovic (2007) calculated that worldwide income inequality is still a lot bigger
than he had reported up to then. Even those who had until recently voiced opposi-
tion to the idea that, in these times of increased globalization, income differences
between and within countries have increased, are now observing more and more
frequently that this is indeed the case – in spite of theoretical expectations 
(imf 2007; Krugman 2007, 2008). In the World Economic and Social Survey 2006
(un 2006), the United Nations calculated that income differences between
regions around the world increased during the period from 1960 to 2000 and that
these differences largely explain income inequality at international level. In recent
decades, income differences within regions have also increased.
What is more, differences in wealth within and between countries are consider-
ably bigger than those in income. This was shown by a recent study by the World
Institute for Development Economics Research (wider) at the university of the
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un, which calculated the global distribution of wealth for the first time. Depend-
ing on the criterion used to determine the value of wealth, the study estimated
that the wealthiest 10 percent of the adult world population owned 71 percent
(based on purchasing power parity [ppp]) or as much as 85 percent of total global
wealth (Davies et al. 2007).
Significance
The available data does not clearly show the extent to which development takes
place. It is also becoming less and less clear what the data actually tells us. Take, for
example, the concept of poverty. In 1993, the World Bank defined poverty 
as an income of less than one dollar per day per person. This sounds like a clear
 definition and, in any event, it has the advantage of allowing comparison of all
countries throughout the world. First and foremost it should be noted that the
completeness of the data is in stark contrast to the dogmatic way in which many
people use these figures, which they have usually plucked from the websites of the
World Bank or the un. The data only relates to seventy-nine countries: in 2003, 62
percent of the people in Sub-Saharan Africa lived in countries in which no
poverty surveys had been conducted during the past five years. Over sixty-five
countries were unable to provide reliable data on the number of people under the
poverty line, while in at least 100 countries a reliable measurement of shifts in
time is impossible (Pogge & Reddy 2005; Riddell 2009).
Another question is what one dollar per day exactly means, certainly in the case of
people who have almost nothing. In so far as people participate in a market econ-
omy, they can buy very different things in different countries with one dollar. 
An additional factor is that a lot of the people involved do not even participate in a
market economy and try to live off a small plot of land, possibly supplemented
with a limited exchange of goods. Money then has very little meaning. The qual-
ity of life in a rural or fishing community which is self-sufficient but which has
no money can be greater than in a slum where people have to live without sanita-
tion and make a living selling small quantities of cigarettes (Broad & Cavanagh
2006). Consequently, there is only a weak correlation between monetary and
non-monetary indicators of poverty (Baulch & Masset 2003). As far as the poor-
est are concerned, it might be more useful to express the development of their
living conditions in terms of the nutritional value of the food they eat every day,
but this data is not available on a large scale (Misturelli & Heffernan 2008). It
would also be more useful not to see poverty as static, but to chart its duration
(chronicity). After all, living in poverty is terrible, but not being able to get out of
it is much worse (Hulme & Shepherd 2003). It would be even better to include
factors like physical safety or the chance of a job (Alkire 2007), and to link
poverty to the sustainability of natural resources and the environment people live
in (Opschoor 2007). These are all dimensions for which there is insufficient data
or methodological pointers.
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Similarly, gdp is a limited criterion. It gives a partial picture of collective produc-
tion, but that production may well increase while the quality of life of a substantial
part of the population deteriorates. Many comparative country studies have
shown that there is indeed a correlation between gdp and parameters like health
and level of education. In a study of eighty-one welfare indicators, Easterly (1999)
established that only twelve were negatively correlated (such as pollution, suicides
and some types of crime). However, taking a historical rather than a cross-
sectional approach produces a different picture, showing that there is only a weak
correlation between welfare and national growth. Global changes are more impor-
tant at political, economic and technical levels (improvements in antibiotics or
water pumps have influenced the lives of a lot of people more than economic
growth).
It is, of course, possible to devise more complex criteria which would be more
satisfying from a substantive point of view. There is a good reason why the oecd
is carrying out a major project with the splendid title of Measuring the progress 
of societies, and why the French President Sarkozy set up the Commission on the
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress in 2008, under the
chairmanship of Nobel Prize Winner Joseph Stiglitz, with the explicit task of
exploring the options for a better indicator than gdp (see also Manning 2009). 
It is clear, however, that – at least for the time being – it is not going to be possible
to find an indicator which is usable and acceptable to everyone. In its report, the
commission advocates dashboards of indicators which would allow various
people and institutes to combine indicators as they see fit to monitor development
of matters they regard as a priority (Stiglitz et al. 2009).
4.2 what does aid contribute?
It is tempting to interpret improvements, particularly those of measured social
indicators, as an indication of the usefulness of development aid. The question is
to what extent this is justified. A great deal of research has been devoted to this
issue. At first sight the research design also appears to be straightforward: compare
countries with varying levels of development aid and assess the outcome. That
approach has resulted in a series of comparative country studies. There is a serious
problem, however, in that countries cannot simply be compared. The following is
a case in point. It is popular to compare Ghana and South Korea. It features in
many a study of development aid, because in 1960 both countries had a compara-
ble gdp per capita, while in 2008 it differed by a factor of eighteen. In that period,
Ghana received a great deal of aid while South Korea did not. This is often cited as
proof of the deficient or event absent effect of aid (see for example Harrison &
Huntington in their well-known Culture Matters (2000)). Quite apart from the
fact that South Korea received a lot of American aid in the 1950s, further analysis
raises the question as to what extent this comparison has any meaning. Although
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South Korea did not have a high level of gdp in 1960, it did already have a robust
business community, a well developed government apparatus, intensive trade
links with Japan and the United States, a much better school system and much
higher levels of literacy. How is this to be compared with a country like Ghana 
(see also Sen 2006)?
Is it then impossible to design research in such a way as to separate the effects of
aid from other variables? Policymakers, researchers, evaluators and aid workers
have been struggling with this question, in particular since Paul Mosley devised
the now famous micro-macro paradox on aid in 1987: although aid may often be
successful at project level, this is not reflected in the economy as a whole. Conse-
quently, there does not appear to be any correlation between aid and growth
figures. This paradox had a major effect on research into the effectiveness of aid,
and the same applies to the rather unsatisfying statement by the World Bank, in
1998, that foreign aid has been “very effective, totally ineffective, and everything
in between at various times and places”. A variety of questions are being asked 
and various methodologies applied in order to find more unequivocal conclusions
about the effectiveness of aid (Goderis & Verbon 2007; De Haan 2009).
Comparative country studies which use complex econometric techniques to try
and measure the effect of development aid on growth are very popular, but are
plagued by all kinds of methodological and data-related problems (Riddell 2007;
White 1992). For example, cause and effect are difficult to separate (does a country
grow faster when it receives extra aid, or does it receive more aid because it grows
faster?), sensitivity to the choice of control variables is considerable, and the real-
ity is too complicated and too differentiated to capture in linear comparisons.
Following a meta-evaluation of sixty-eight papers, in which 543 comparable esti-
mates were made of the effect of aid on growth, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008)
draw the ‘depressing’ conclusion that, after forty years of research, it cannot be
demonstrated that the effect of aid on growth – in statistical terms – is significantly
greater than zero. The self-confessed aid sceptic William Easterly (2008a) refers 
to research that uses growth regressions to find variables that are important for
growth. The authors identified up to 145 factors, but these did not include devel-
opment aid.
Other researchers believe that these outcomes are actually not surprising at all
because, if you include all aid in regression comparisons, you tend to miss the
details. Differentiation is needed to acquire an insight into the effect of aid on
growth. This has been done in a number of studies, such as research examining
whether the effect of aid depends on the quality of policies (good governance) in
the recipient country, research differentiating between ‘real aid’ and ‘geopolitical
aid’, research measuring and comparing the effect of aid in the long term and the
short term, research assessing whether aid was tied or untied, and research differ-
95measuring development
entiating between bilateral and multilateral aid. However, none of these studies
produced any clear answers. A paper that reports a positive outcome is usually
followed sometime later by criticism questioning the solidity of the supposed
conclusion, the data and/or the method used. ‘Publication bias’ is another factor
that plays a role, given that articles which make strong claims tend to get published
sooner in scientific journals (and scientists have to publish, i.e. have a greater
tendency to submit such texts), and given that the popular media also prefer bold
claims in favour or against something rather than nuanced accounts (Arndt, Jones
& Tarp 2009; Burnside & Dollar 2000, 2004; Clemens et al. 2004; Easterly 2008a;
Easterly et al. 2003; Faye & Niehaus 2010; Goderis & Verbon 2007; Minoiu &
Reddy 2007, 2009; Miquel-Florensa 2007; Riddell 2007; Roodman 2007a, 2007b,
2008). Let us now examine three of these obstacles in more detail.
What is aid?
An important factor to take into account is that it is too easily assumed in simple
research designs which try to measure the effect of aid, that aid is a homogenous
category. This is certainly not the case (Radelet et al. 2004). Over the course of
time, although money has been made available for aid, the purposes that money
has been used for have changed. Headey (2008) therefore applied all kinds of
econometric instruments to establish which aid was effective and when. His
conclusion was that bilateral aid had no effect at the time of the Cold War, but did
thereafter. Multilateral aid had a certain effect during the entire period. This obser-
vation supports other evidence that, during the Cold War, bilateral aid was often a
euphemism for supporting dictators. The fact that a lot of money failed to benefit
the country and instead filled individual’s pockets is documented in detail by the
various historians of African development (Meredith 2005; Moss 2007). The
calculations by Minoiu & Reddy (2007) led them to a comparable conclusion,
although they do make a distinction between developmental aid and geopolitical
aid. In their analysis, the long-term effect of the first type of aid features in the
data, while the second type does not.
Although these might be interesting results – certainly for people who believe in
the usefulness of development aid – their validity has been questioned in some
quarters. Kenny (2009) gives this discussion an interesting twist by asking
whether you can assume that the types of aid referred to were used for homoge-
nous goals. This question touches on a key point because, as we have seen in chap-
ter 2, a lot of aid is not used to increase growth or facilitate structural changes, but
rather to directly improve the living conditions of poor people in developing
countries. The effectiveness of an instrument has to be assessed on the basis of the
intended goal. Therefore, development aid to relieve an emergency should be eval-
uated and monitored differently to aid which is intended to increase growth.
Unfortunately, there is no data which can be used to ascertain properly which aid
is used for which goal. This increases the risk of aid being measured afterwards on
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the basis of growth objectives for which, in a number of cases, it was never
intended. For example, many attempts have been made, certainly in the 1990s, to
achieve stabilization with a great deal of budget and sectoral support being granted
partly to keep governments in place and economically stable so that these could
then be expected to deal with ethnic and other conflicts (Chabal & Daloz 1999).
When measured against that objective, that aid may have been quite effective,
precisely because nothing changed. However, if the aid was intended for some-
thing else, it would have been ineffective. The problem is that no data is available
to assess aid on its own merits because goals are rarely recorded.
How does aid interfere with other developments?
A subsequent problem is that development aid is just one of the many forms of
foreign intervention in a country. This makes it difficult to properly identify the
direct effects of aid. The amount of money spent on aid is also no more than a
small part of the total flow of funds to developing countries, and that share is
becoming smaller and smaller. This is shown by graph 4.6, which compares
foreign direct investments (fdi), money transfers by migrants to their families in
their native countries (remittances) and official aid.
Figure 4.6 Remittances, oda and fdi
Source: Commission on Growth and Development 2008
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Just how difficult it is to isolate the effects of aid is demonstrated by the high-
profile evaluation of the Netherlands’ Africa policy published by the Policy and
Operations Evaluation Department (iob) in February 2008. It is a magnum opus,
which summarized a lot of previous work and tried to answer the question of
whether Dutch development aid had actually contributed to the development of
Africa during the past twenty-five years. That implied that it is possible to assess
Dutch development aid financed by taxpayers’ money separately from other
Dutch contributions, such as investments by the private sector or civil society
organizations, and that Dutch interventions can be separated from the contribu-
tions by, for example, the British or Swedish. All this is to some extent possible at
the level of concrete projects, as also shown for example in the bulky results report
on Dutch efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2009c). However, it is a lot more difficult to answer the question 
of what sustainable contribution this makes to broader development.
Flows of money to developing countries come from various sources, but these
countries have to deal with many more external developments. Chapter 3 has
already discussed how strongly the economy of Africa depends on raw materials
whose price is determined elsewhere. The effects of this can be considerable.
Between 1970 and 2000, the price of raw materials in relation to end products
dropped, except in the case of oil. Between 1980 and 2000, the price of cotton
fell by 47 percent, coffee by 64 percent, cocoa by 71 percent and sugar by 77
percent. On top of this there were all kinds of internal developments, such as the
periods of drought in the Sahel, or the lengthy periods of bitter conflict after
1990. At the beginning of the 1990s, 26 African countries were involved in a war
or were confronted by violence against the state. You do not need to have had
years of social-scientific training to realize that such external and internal factors
had a much greater impact on developing countries than aid could ever dream of
having.
Causal blueprints and the time dimension
A third problem is that there is no simple causal blueprint which facilitates a clear
understanding of what precise effect interventions have. Development, inter-
preted as accelerated modernization, is an extremely complicated phenomenon. It
relates to the complex interaction between the economic infrastructure, the qual-
ity of government, the functioning of the political system and the way in which
social ties take shape. Sometimes it is possible, and then usually with hindsight, 
to identify this complexity, but that does not produce any attractive causal models.
In an interesting project, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (Ishikawa
2005) compared Japan’s development policy in Asia with that of the British in
Africa. It concluded that there are two ways of bringing about development. 
One way is to reform institutions, which, in the long run, will have an effect on
growth. The other way is via economic growth, which will in the long term lead,
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as a by-product, to the setting up of adequate institutions. The Japanese concluded
that the first way is inefficient and time-consuming, if indeed it works at all. Their
experience told them that the second way was the preferable option. However,
conclusions like these are generally no more than hunches. “Explaining economic
development is not for the simple-minded”, is how Szirmai (2008) starts his
detailed study of explanatory models for development. “The first observation that
one can make, is a negative one: every single monocausal explanation ever
advanced for development falls down in the face of the empirical evidence” (see
also Adelman 2001).
Causal blueprints have their shortcomings. Many interventions work indirectly
and over a long period of time and the best one can hope for is to have a vague idea
about their impact. The effect of money for schools depends on all manner of
things, such as the presence of adequate teaching material and properly trained
teachers who are prepared to go and live and work in remote regions (which is
generally not the case). This too depends on there being a government or non-
governmental parties who are able to organize it. It also depends on how long
children are able and willing to stay at school and that, in turn, is determined by
the perceptions of their parents, and equally by the harvest yields, which
determine whether children can be relieved of their tasks at home. That, in turn,
is determined by the quality of the seeds and the quality of the land, which
depends on, for example, research into crop breeding. The green revolution
caused agriculture productivity to more than double in the 1970s, particularly in
Southeast Asia and this resulted, for example, in India quickly changing from a
food importer into a food exporter. That revolution was largely facilitated by
research by the International Rice Research Institute, which was partly financed
by the Rockefeller Foundation (Cullather 2004). If you want to you can go even
further back and say that Obama’s education was partly thanks to Dutch Catholic
missionary work which contributed to the working of the kampong school that
young Barack attended during the chaotic mid-1960s in Jakarta. The school itself
had been set up two years earlier by the Dutch Capuchin father Jansen (Van
Gennip 2008). Does this mean that the collections taken in Dutch churches
during the 1950s led to Obama being awarded the Nobel Prize?
Apart from the lack of a sound causal blueprint, the time dimension is another
exceptional problem. It takes decades rather than years before the effect of, for
example, healthcare, education, water supply or land reform on development
becomes clear. One solution open to researchers is therefore to assess a longer
period, ideally as long as possible. However, this only exacerbates the above-
mentioned problem of the effect of aid being difficult to isolate from other influ-
ences.
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An example: the resource curse
The question of what the goal of aid is, interference with other developments, the
lack of causal blueprints and the time dimension make it difficult to determine the
effect of development aid. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. It is therefore
tempting to keep on searching for correlations. In a widely discussed analysis,
Collier (2007) claims that the greatest problem facing development policy is that
fifty-eight unnamed countries are lagging behind the rest, and are often unstable
or on the verge of disintegration. According to Collier, all these countries are stuck
in one or more of the following four development pitfalls: internal conflicts, bad
governance, landlocked and surrounded by bad neighbours, and the curse of
having resources. Collier does not disclose what exactly the causal mechanisms are
which turn resources into a curse, but the counter-intuitive idea that natural
resources are a curse rather than a blessing for countries because they result in
lower growth and increase the chance of conflicts, has been raised periodically
since Adam Smith (Lederman and Maloney 2008). There are also clear examples.
Nigeria, an oil-rich country, has received more than 250 billion dollars from oil in
the last three decades, but Lagos became a dirty and dangerous city, while per
capita income dropped by 15 percent between 1975 and 2000, and the number of
people under the one dollar threshold quadrupled during the same period from
nineteen million to eighty-four million. The question is whether resources are
always a problem. Upon closer inspection this general theory is also problematic.
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) criticize the methodology usually used to prove
the curse of natural resources and claim, on the basis of their own calculations
using data from the World Bank, that dependence on resources is a symptom
rather than a cause of underdevelopment. According to Lederman and Maloney
(2008), anyone who studies countries with natural resources such as Australia,
Finland, Canada and Sweden in the West, Indonesia in Southeast Asia, and
Namibia, Botswana and Zambia in Africa, has to conclude that the proof of a
resource curse is, to put it mildly, weak. Van der Ploeg & Poelhekke (2009)
conclude that resources in themselves are not the problem but the volatility of
prices, that countries with a sound financial system can do something about this,
and that it is even possible to change the resource curse into a blessing, given that
evidence exists of a direct positive effect of natural resources on growth if volatil-
ity is controlled. This discussion goes further, therefore, since experiences with
natural resources are very heterogeneous and their effect on development depends
very much on how the countries involved deal with their resources and the
income they generate. Here too, the attractive simplicity of the explanation
prevents a clear view of complex mechanisms.
It is always difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate complex interventions in social
processes. Of course this is no reason for not trying to evaluate to the best of our
abilities. However, in the context of discussions of what we know about the effects
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of development aid, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that it is just as
impossible to measure the effect of policy in Western countries in the field of
spatial planning or employment, since that too is complex. Even if the question is
specified in more detail – for example, the effect of education policy or reintegra-
tion policy – the answer does not become any clearer. Every year, special issues 
of scientific journals are published in which experts adopt diametrically opposed
positions as regards the effect of these kinds of activities. There is nothing wrong
with that and we will have to make do with what we have. However, it is a good
reason not to blow our own trumpet too much, certainly if we take into account
that development aid and the regions it relates to are many times more complex.
4.3 should we then focus on the micro level?
As the hopes of the 1960s that “thinking big would translate into clear guidance on
how to move immediately into rapid growth and development” have been repeat-
edly disappointed, perhaps we should only “think small” in the future (Cohen &
Easterly 2009). An alternative for the attempts to measure the effects of aid at
macro level is to examine the impact of concrete projects at micro level. Especially
controlled randomized experiments have turned out to be very promising in
recent years. Whether the intended output has been realized during a project –
whether new roads have been laid – can usually be assessed afterwards. However,
whether the project has had the expected social impact in the short, medium and
long terms – whether incomes in the region have been sustainably increased – is
one of the most difficult questions to answer in the context of an evaluation
because you have to make a counter-factual comparison, in other words what
would have happened without the project? An interesting way of doing this is to
allow some of the potential beneficiaries to become eligible for a project and others
not, and then compare the outcomes. In a randomized experiment like this, some
of the people receive the medicine to be tested and others receive a placebo, or the
residents of certain neighbourhoods become eligible for microcredit while the
residents of others do not.
However, there are objections to this approach. The ethical objection is that you
purposefully deny aid (medicines, education, credit) to an eligible group.
Although this may be justifiable if the available resources are, in any event, too
limited to allow everyone to be eligible, or if the potential yield of the research
project is enormous, it is at the very least dubious if the interested parties are
selected primarily on the basis of donor interest. In addition, a lot of goals and
projects are not suitable for randomized experiments, and that certainly applies to
programmes. Martin Ravallion, head of the research department at the World
Bank, refers to the example of specifying the best location for infrastructural
projects like roads, bridges and railway lines. This is a core activity in the devel-
opment strategy of any poor country, but it is difficult to imagine how you could
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do that with a randomized experiment (De Haan 2009; Ravallion 2009a). Another
major question is the extent to which you can generalize the outcomes of this type
of research given that a properly designed project which works in one country or
area does not also have to work in another. This considerably reduces the policy
relevance of this method. Supporters who recognize this advocate repeating
experiments at other locations, but the incentives for doing that are small and the
literature on randomized experiments does not provide an answer to the impossi-
ble but relevant question of how many repetitions are necessary (Easterly 2009).
An additional practical problem is that scientists do not make a name for them-
selves by repeating something that has already been done and not, in any event, in
the relevant journals. Another problem is that there are indications that donors
permit randomized experiments primarily in relation to projects which they
expect to be a success. There are examples of projects being stopped before the
outcome of the randomized experiment appeared, without it being clear whether
this was due to the evaluation. Governments are also less willing than ngos to
have new projects evaluated by means of randomized experiments. According 
to Ravallion this should not really come as any surprise since policymakers also
want answers to questions which this methodology cannot provide, for example
whether an intervention works as expected, which type of people benefit and
which not, what happens if the project is intensified, and how the project can be
designed differently to have a greater effect (Banerjee 2007; Banerjee & He 2008;
Deaton 2009; Easterly 2008a; Gunning 2006;  Pritchett 2008; Ravallion 2009a;
Rodrik 2008b).
Some randomnistas exaggerate the potential of this ‘revolutionary’ new approach,
but many sceptics also regard randomized experiments certainly as a valuable
addition to the instruments researchers have available to evaluate projects. To
quote Easterly once again: “The re methodology has had a positive demonstration
effect showing the scientific method can be applied with marginal interventions,
in an aid world that too often ignores any existing evidence (or any need to find
such evidence)”.
A practical alternative for situations in which a randomized experiment is impos-
sible or not responsible is the ‘quasi experiment’ (or ‘non-randomized experi-
ment’) whereby comparisons with comparative groups or situations are made after
the project has been carried out. This is often done with advanced statistical tech-
niques, although these are not always suitable. For such second best evaluations of
projects, qualitative and descriptive assessments are sometimes also used. These
qualitative and descriptive methods are also used when monitoring and evaluating
programmes involving factors which are entirely different to those that apply to a
project evaluation. It is, for example, very difficult, if not impossible, to measure
the contribution a donor programme has made to social change, and there is prob-
ably not much point in comparing countries because the circumstances are too
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different. How to monitor the provision of aid, or to assess the cooperation
between donors and governments in the context of budget support, is a compli-
cated puzzle. In a bottom-up approach it is still possible to measure the effect of
general budget support or sectoral support by means of a representative sample
survey of intended beneficiaries. However, it is difficult to measure the extent to
which governments feel they are the owners of agreed policy, or how you ascertain
the extent to which there is actual participation in the formulation of a Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (Gunning 2006; De Haan 2009). And last but not least,
the question has to be answered what the people for whom aid is intended think
about it. In order to find that out, experiments have been carried out more recently
with another bottom-up approach in which local residents are monitored over a
longer period of time. The question the people were asked is how they value a
number of development initiatives in their region and the social changes which
have ensued (Dietz et al. 2009; Dietz & Van Zanen 2009).
4.4 does aid help?
If measured using a number of dimensions, the world has become a better place. In
particular, the scores on welfare indicators (education, nutrition and health) have
improved over the past sixty years in a way which is historically unprecedented.
Progress has also been made on realizing growth and counteracting poverty, but
that does not apply across the board, and it has been accompanied by greater
inequality. The question is what contribution development aid has made to these
changes. For the time being, that question cannot be answered unequivocally.
Publications will continue to appear which attempt, using macro research, to
prove that specific types of aid have a positive effect, in certain circumstances, on
growth or development. Results of randomized experiments also continue to
appear, showing that some concrete projects work and others not. However, none
of these methods is the be all and end all, and it is sensible not to overestimate
their possible policy implications. It is possible to show that projects work at
micro level, although certainly not all of them and not at all times, and a plausible
case can be made that, at meso level, progress has been made in a number of differ-
ent areas, particularly in the fields of healthcare, education and nutrition.
However, it cannot be unequivocally stated that this also means that people and
countries are now more able to develop independently – nor can the opposite be
claimed.
Some people even regard studies asking whether aid helps as not that relevant. In a
flurry of policy cynicism, David Roodman of the Center for Global Development,
and an expert in this field, stated that he believes that the macro research into the
effectiveness of aid has received a disproportional amount of attention because
policy rarely takes any account of research in any event. A perfect case in point is
the famous study in which Burnside and Dollar demonstrate that aid leads to more
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growth in countries with good governance. That conclusion is still affecting
donors today, as shown by, for example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation
set up by President Bush, which selects countries wishing to be considered for aid
using scores based on sixteen indicators for good governance. The popularity of
the Burnside and Dollar study appears, however, to be based primarily on what
policymakers want to hear. The fact that this study has been roundly slated and is
treated with distrust by a large number of academics has not resulted in any corre-
sponding policy change. Roodman has also asked how credible it is for a study
whose outcome is that aid may or may not result in more economic growth to
affect how much aid is given. Tradition and national characteristics are much more
influential than any study when it comes to the question of why Sweden and the
Netherlands give more aid than the United States and Japan. Moreover, the global
increase in aid during the past ten years has undoubtedly had more to do with the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and with international mobilization campaigns like
Jubilee 2000 (aimed at reducing the debts of developing countries) and Live Aid
(31 March 2005) than with the outcomes of macro studies into the meaning of aid
(Burnside and Dollar 2000; Djankov et al. 2006; Easterly 2008a; Kenny 2009;
Riddell 2007; Roodman 2007a, 2007b, 2008).
If we resist the temptation to side with the policy cynics and adopt the view that
research certainly can have an influence on political decisions – albeit often with a
certain amount of delay – the conclusion may be very straightforward: that it is
perfectly possible to show that progress has been achieved, primarily in the field
of welfare indicators. It is similarly possible to evaluate concrete approaches and
sometimes to compare them, and to provide an insight into results at project and
programme level using different types of impact studies (White 2007). However,
it would be going too far, on the basis of historical data, to actually link the provi-
sion of development aid in general to major shifts. That observation allows us to
draw a range of different conclusions, but discontinuing aid is not one of them.
The only option left open to people who consider this an unsatisfactory response
is to be clearer in the future about objectives and resources, and to continue invest-
ing in research and innovative methodologies to acquire better insight into what
aid is capable of. It is perfectly possible to evaluate whether specific programmes
have led to poverty reduction in a specific country.
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5 designing development aid
Development aid can be inspired by a number of different motives simultane-
ously. The existence of different and parallel motives does not, in itself, have to be
a problem since social activities are usually driven by a variety of motives. The task
facing the political system is to weigh up all these motives and combine them into
a manageable structure for implementation. This is, however, tricky if the differ-
ent motives give cause to engage in practices which continually diverge. In addi-
tion, as chapters 3 and 4 showed, helping with development is a tremendously
complex job. It is therefore no surprise that the institutional system is running
into all kinds of problems. In this chapter we discuss five persistent problems in
more detail: the goals (the priority of poverty reduction), the organization (the
proliferation of aid), the approach (the belief in social engineering and one size fits
all), the view of aid (the absence of an intervention ethic) and the scope (the inabil-
ity to involve other policy fields).
5.1 narrowing down: development aid becomes
povert y reduction
The image of development aid that is projected in the media is dominated by the
idea that it primarily focuses on helping people in difficult circumstances to lead
lives which are, in some way, dignified. The standard image of development aid is
one of water pumps, latrines, schools and doctors. As shown in chapter two, this
has not always been the case. This image emerged in the 1970s, continued in the
1980s and 1990s, and is now a global phenomenon.
Development aid was not always oriented around direct poverty reduction. When
it started to take shape as government intervention in the 1950s, its primary focus
was on the accelerated preparation of countries for a situation in which they would
be able to cope on their own. The economic growth required for development was
clearly the reference point. Providing loans – in particular for infrastructure – and
technical support coupled to capacity building were the most important instru-
ments. At the time, confidence in the role of governments was high and develop-
ing countries initially experienced substantial growth. The emphasis shifted in
subsequent years, due to factors in both donor and recipient countries. An impor-
tant factor in the recipient countries was that, during the period of lower growth
and attempts to reduce inflation (with high interest rates) which followed the oil
crisis in the 1970s, regimes in Africa increasingly ran into problems, which meant
that classical development instruments (financing and capacity building) were no
longer effective. Governments proved unable to deal sensibly with the available
possibilities for entering into loans, and capacity building was unable to take root
in failing institutions.
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The 1980s were dominated by the structural adjustment programmes of multilat-
eral organizations like the imf and the World Bank, with their one-sided emphasis
on macroeconomic stability and the “‘Get prices right’ mantra” (Mkandawire
2010a). This was partly a response to state failure in developing countries and
partly an expression of the Western spirit of the times (it was the era when
Reagan, endorsed by Thatcher, claimed that “government is the problem”).
Conditions were imposed on loans and governments forced to downsize. In a lot
of countries this led to considerable internal problems and a failure to achieve the
desired results. Academics, ngos and developing countries criticized this
approach and, when the negative consequences of this policy for sectors like
education and healthcare became clearer, various un organizations also started
sounding the alarm. In 1987, Unicef published the critical study Adjustment with 
a Human Face, and in that same year the Brundtland Commission placed the 
environmental dimension of development on the agenda in the report entitled
Our Common Future. In the 1990s, un organizations played a major role in getting 
the social dimension of development put on the agenda. undp has published the
Human Development Report every year since 1990 and, during the un Social
Summit in Copenhagen in 1995, education and healthcare were characterized as
being of strategic importance for development and poverty reduction. The 20-20
initiative was also drawn up at this summit, according to which developing coun-
tries had to channel 20 percent of their public expenditure into social programmes
while donors, in turn, were expected to reserve 20 percent of their official devel-
opment aid for social programmes (Cornia et al. 1987; Stokke 2009; World
Commission on Environment and Development 1987).
The pressure from developing countries and in donor countries to focus more
attention on poverty and on the social consequences of structural adjustment
programmes increasingly made its mark in large international organizations. 
In 1996, the oecd/dac published a report listing international development
goals, and the related progress was outlined by the un, oecd, World Bank and 
the imf in 2000 in the joint report entitled A Better World for All. Critical ngos
rechristened the report Bretton Woods for All and urged the un to withdraw its
support for it. Finally, the World Bank published an innovative report on poverty
to which Joseph Stiglitz and Ravi Kanbur made a major contribution, and whose
main focus was on the fact that poverty is the result of economic, political and
social processes which influence each other and can be mutually reinforcing.
Reducing poverty is therefore not just about access to income, food, housing,
education and healthcare, but also about increasing security and reducing risks,
and about having a say and mechanisms for increasing resilience to negative
shocks (imf et al. 2000; oecd/dac 1996; World Bank 2001; Yusuf 2009).
In practice, all these modifications to the dominant adjustment policy of multilat-
eral organizations like the imf and the World Bank of the 1980s have led more and
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more to the idea that development aid essentially has to take the form of direct
poverty reduction and that poverty reduction primarily means caring for the poor.
This led to the emergence, certainly from the 1990s onwards, of a development
practice which focused primarily on improving direct living conditions. Infras-
tructural projects, strengthening productive sectors, and the necessary reinforce-
ment of national systems of production and innovation (see e.g. Cimoli et al.
2009) became less and less of a priority for multilateral organizations, bilateral
donors and ngos. That trend is also clearly shown in the figures which the dac
publishes on aid flows. As the graph below shows, aid in the ‘social infrastructure
and services’ category – in which the dac includes ‘population policy and repro-
ductive rights’, ‘water supply and sanitation’ and ‘government and civil society’ in
addition to education and healthcare – has increased significantly since the end of
the 1990s, while oda contributions to economic infrastructure and services and to
productive sectors have stagnated or even decreased. As regards economic infras-
tructure and services, there have been some recent changes, but expenditure for
productive sectors is still well below the level of the mid-1980s.
Figure 5.1 Total oda of all donors per sector
Source: Own calculations on the basis of oecd/dac data
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Investing in social sectors is not the same as poverty reduction, but does represent
a shift in emphasis, as a result of which the physical and economic structure
receive little attention. The step towards poverty reduction is then a small one,
and one that many donors, both governments and ngos, have taken. The term
‘poverty reduction’ has since become a widely used, and apparently self-evident,
term. To many it has become the goal of development aid. Given that people are
familiar with the metaphor of the fish and the fishing rod, they usually add that
the ‘real’ intention is for people to be able to fish themselves. Plenty of examples
can be given of activities which indeed resemble the distribution of fishing rods,
although there was not always a river nearby. However, a lot more activities have
come to resemble the distribution of fish. One complicating factor is that reducing
development aid to poverty reduction is often accompanied by poverty reduction
in turn being reduced to the provision of direct services to the poorest.
From this perspective, development aid has come close to target group policy, and
that makes it impossible to imagine situations in which poverty can be tackled
more effectively by investing in an emerging middle class which can function as a
motor for economic growth and employment. What is more, the poor benefit
from the rule of law, property rights, taxes for the financing of public goods such
as education, social provisions and healthcare and more accountable government
as defended by the middle class. The real trade-off when making choices, accord-
ing to Birdsall (2010), “may well be between the rich and the rest, and between
short-term stability or high aggregate growth that preserves the status quo bene-
fiting a small minority at the top of the income distribution versus the political
risks and lower short-run growth of financial, tax, social insurance, country
market and other policies that are conducive to building a middle class and, as it
turns out, pro-poor as well.” An excessively narrow direct focus on the poorest
will, for example, often lead to the strengthening of primary education in rural
areas, but insufficient attention for secondary and higher education, and with that
the formation of the middle classes. Thandika Mkandawire who, for eleven years,
was head of unrisd, the un research institute in the field of social development,
and is currently the first professor of African Development at the London School
of Economics, neatly summarizes sixty years of development: “With respect to
Africa at least, ‘development’ is being watered down to poverty reduction, and the
narrow concern of social policy is social protection without the transformative
attributes that have been so central to successful development. And so, although
poverty is now discussed in the context of governance, economic growth, stabi-
lization and security, there appears to be no coherent and consistent framework
that can tie these together in a developmental way” (2008: 111).
In The Bottom Billion, Paul Collier (2007) adopts the position that the term ‘struc-
tural poverty reduction’ is an invention by the pr department of the World Bank
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to bridge the traditional discrepancy between ‘aid’ which was often ‘left’ in
nature, and ‘growth’ which, back then, appeared to be primarily associated with
‘right’. Whether this is a correct historical representation is doubtful. The term
was in any event already being used in policy documents in the Netherlands at the
end of the 1970s. However, inherent in the term is a real tension, which has only
increased in the meantime. On the one hand there is aid, which is increasingly
expected to be concrete, demonstrably effective and directly benefit the poor. On
the other hand there is a growing realization that development is a complicated
process which, even if it were easy to influence from the outside, cannot in any
event be reduced to direct poverty reduction and whose effect on the poor is not
always immediately evident because of the role usually played by context-depen-
dent “tensions and tradeoffs between strictly pro-poor and more inclusive and
sustainable ‘middle class’ growth policies” (Birdsall 2010).
In this context, interesting parallels can be drawn with debates conducted in the
West on social care. At the end of the nineteenth century the question was
whether care for the poor ought to be replaced by mass education. At the begin-
ning of the twentieth century the question was whether prevention in the form of
clean water and health education would not be better than curative care, and at the
end of the twentieth century the question was whether the primary function of
the social security system ought not to shift from providing compensation for lost
income in the event of redundancy to providing guidance in finding other paid
work. In the context of development aid the same question can be asked, namely
whether it ought not to focus on reinforcing people’s self-reliance instead of alle-
viating poverty.
mdgs: solution or problem?
An important manifestation of the popularity of poverty reduction is the Millen-
nium Development Goals (mdgs). The eight mdgs (including halving poverty,
stopping the spread of hiv/aids, and primary education for everyone in 2015)
were formulated after the un millennium summit of September 2000, the largest
gathering of world leaders ever to take place. The goals were the culmination of a
number of world summits relating to special themes during the previous decade
and a continuation of the document referred to above published by the oecd in
1996 (oecd/dac 1996; Stokke 2009). From that moment on, Western donors
adopted these goals as the point of departure for policy. They were given a signifi-
cant boost when donors decided to invest substantially in the goals of Monterrey
in 2002. Three years later the g8 met in Gleneagles and Prime Minister Blair 
had all the government leaders present show their commitment to the mdgs by 
signing – in full view of the cameras – a pledge to double their development aid
budgets by 2010 at the latest. The mdgs enjoy broad support in the world of
development aid and have become reasonably well-known outside that realm as
well. They also offer a focus for efforts in the field of development aid and enable
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results to be measured. However, the mdgs are largely static goals which are
strongly oriented around alleviating emergencies. They say nothing of the
resources, the strategy and underlying mechanisms required to achieve the goals,
nor about the capacities of societies to develop, and from a macroeconomic
perspective they are rather vacuous. In that sense they are not very development-
related. Economic growth is not included as a final or intermediary goal in the
mdgs, and important issues like transformation of the productive sectors are not
even referred to. Although mdg8 does refer to the need for a fair trade system,
this can only make a very limited contribution to the creation of productive
national economic sectors.
The mdgs are inspiring but also problematic in that they detract attention away
from structural changes and the strengthening and transformation of agriculture
and other productive sectors. They have other drawbacks as well. The targets are
not only arbitrary, they are also global goals which are directly applied to each
individual country. According to Vandemoortele (2009), one of the architects of
the mdgs at the undp, this was not the intention. The mdgs have to be achieved
collectively and not necessarily individually but they have been wrongly inter-
preted as one-size-fits-all goals. The majority of the goals have been formulated in
relative terms, meaning that they are de facto primarily unfair for many countries
in Africa and other countries with low incomes. With the best will in the world, a
number of mdgs cannot be achieved there, even if, for example, countries experi-
ence an annual increase in the number of children who attend primary education
several times higher than it ever was in the West. The failure of many of these
countries and ‘Africa pessimism’ are already built into the system. The question is
therefore, according to Vandemoortele, “whether Africa is missing the targets or
whether the world is missing the point”. This problem has everything to do with
the fact that donors imposed their mark heavily on how the goals were formu-
lated. As yet, no clear answer has been provided to the question of how that links
up the broad related idea of ‘ownership’ in the field of development. In order to
achieve a true partnership of equals, any follow-up to the mdgs after 2015 will
have to be more development-oriented and less donor-driven (Easterly 2007;
Severino & Ray 2009).
Lastly, doubts can be expressed about the large publicity and mobilizing value of
the mdgs. The term ‘mdg’ is generating its own rhetoric on the basis of which
suggestions are being made which are not adequate in all cases. Take, for example,
the notion of the poverty trap, a term which was linked strongly to a lack of
money – despite it being debatable whether the problems in parts of Africa do not
have more to do with a shortage of human, social and institutional capital than
with money (Birdsall 2007b). The superlative degree of this is the notion of the
War on Poverty. Mistry sums it up perfectly by saying, “Wars on poverty are
about as winnable as wars on terrorism and wars on crime” (2005: 676). In the first
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instance such terms appear to be suitable for motivating people, but they detract
from the real demand for underlying mechanisms, ignore the need to engage those
directly involved in formulating goals, and suggest that simple solutions are possi-
ble for complex problems.
What about emergency aid?
If there is one area which, in the first instance, has escaped the criticism of
poverty reduction’s limited scope, it is emergency aid in the event of disasters.
There appears to be no debate about the usefulness of this form of aid – which
was worth around 15 billion dollars in 2006, of which two-thirds came from
governments. The ‘evidently good’ character of emergency aid is also the image
presented to the outside world. The prototypical example of recent years is the
tsunami, which devastated parts of Asia in December 2004. A major appeal for
help was made to the populations of Western countries, resulting in a great 
deal of aid being provided, even too much in many instances. If you were being
benevolent you could regard this as a minor flaw from which we can learn.
However, closer inspection leads to the more general conclusion that an exces-
sive focus on projects aimed at saving lives visibly and acutely is also a dangerous
form of reduction.
The problem starts with the question of what a disaster actually is. You cannot
define disasters in terms of the event itself, but you can define them in terms of
consequences. A natural event becomes a disaster if a country or group of people
was insufficiently prepared for it. Whether houses are destroyed by earthquakes or
tidal waves depends partly on the location and the way in which they have been
constructed. While events can sometimes be understood as an external calamity
(earthquakes just happen from time to time), the extent to which people are
prepared is largely dependent on their skills and living conditions. The scope of a
disaster is connected to the institutional strength of the country in which it takes
place. Fewer people die in places where there are rules about how structurally
sound a house should be and where the emergency services have a high level of
expertise. That lesson also applies to countries in the South: in the 1980s, food
production in Zimbabwe declined by as much as it did in Ethiopia, but one of
these two countries had a good safety net and the other did not, and that is why
Zimbabwe did not need any aid and Ethiopia did. The same lesson applies to
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans where the city was not properly prepared for
such a storm, while Dutch dykes would have been able to resist the storm tide
without any problem whatsoever. In that sense, therefore, disasters are social
occurrences and not just physical ones. In addition, many such events are not
natural phenomena, but social phenomena. While this is very clear in the case of
armed conflicts, it is no less the case as regards hunger – given the fact that more
than enough food is, and can be, produced in the world, hunger is a financial, tech-
nical, political and logistical problem, rather than a natural phenomenon. This is
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reflected by the fact that, in fifteen of the twenty-seven countries in which the
World Food Programme (wfp) provided food aid in 2007, the cause of food short-
ages was civil war.
The fact that many disasters are essentially manmade – you could even say that
disasters have become ‘naturalized’ – attracts scant media attention. This is under-
standable from the logic of the media. However, the consequences for aid are
problematic since it means that emergency aid is structured as a short-term inter-
vention, while scarcely any is devoted to questions such as how and where recon-
struction has to take place in the future. In conflicts this kind of problem has an
even greater impact. Any form of aid is an intervention in an existing power
system, and can have a disruptive effect on it. If a choice has to be made for one 
of the conflicting parties, the situation becomes practically impossible. Based on
official ideology, emergency aid should be provided without showing any
favouritism, but this is usually an illusion. An ideal case in point is the aid many
Western ngos gave to the Hutus ousted to Congo when the Tutsis took over 
military power in Rwanda, after initially being the victims of mass slaughter. 
The refugee camps accommodated not only a lot of the old génocidaires but also
provided a location where Hutu militias could regroup. This was something West-
ern ngos clearly did not know how to deal with, all the more because their head-
quarters in the West had been exposed to scenes of humanitarian suffering on a
massive scale (Polman 2010).
In a word, emergency aid appears to be the most evident way to provide direct
alleviation in emergencies and, at first sight, its value cannot be called into ques-
tion. However, a closer examination reveals that narrow-mindedness can play a
role in this case as well, if this aid is perceived purely as a form of direct poverty
reduction. The success of emergency aid is very closely linked to the answer to 
the question of how countries structurally develop.
5.2 fragmentation: more and more chaotic organization
In practice the goals of development aid have significantly narrowed over time
into visible poverty reduction. This is reflected in the organization pattern of
development aid. Practice shows a proliferation of development organizations.
Every year more countries and donors become involved in the field of official
development aid. Around thirty years ago, the majority of aid to developing coun-
tries still comprised direct support by governments and multilateral organiza-
tions, with less than 10 percent coming from Western ngos and the private sector.
At the moment, the share of ngos and large private foundations is estimated to
make up one-third of aid flows (ida 2007; Riddell 2009). At global level the scope
of the aid provided by this proliferation of small initiatives is already at least 25
billion dollars (Edwards 2009a), although some estimate that this amount is in
112 less pretension, more ambition
excess of 40 billion dollars (Kharas 2007). A total of more than 18,000 cross-
border ngos are involved and, in the United States alone, the amount provided via
private channels has quadrupled during the past decade. Large new funds, such as
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, specialize in a limited number of sectors in
which they cover the entire chain, from research and development to the delivery
of services. In 2005, these ‘vertical funds’ represented 7 percent of multilateral aid
(Brainard and Chollet 2008).
The largest ngo in the world, World Vision, has a budget (1.6 billion dollars) that
is bigger than that of donor countries like Ireland and Finland. In addition, it is no
longer only Western ngos that are involved. Since the beginning of the 1980s
there has also been a proliferation of Islamic ngos. Some have links with radical
Muslim brotherhoods and others are usually affiliated to governments or
mosques. Many a mosque, school or hospital is financed in this way in Mali, an
Islamic country, but the same applies to the north of Ghana or Nigeria – countries
which have a predominantly more prosperous south, which tends to be more
Christian, and a poorer Islamic north. Another example is the Aga Khan organiza-
tion, an Islamic institution which carries out large-scale commercial activities (it
owns the Serena chain of hotels) and which donates 150 million dollars a year to
projects in Africa and Asia.
New donors
Besides the proliferation of ngos, and the interest in development from the busi-
ness community, the fact that the world has changed substantially in a political
sense also has consequences for aid architecture. For example the new member
states of the eu have become donors and have promised to allocate 0.375 percent 
of their gdp to aid in 2015. However, the changes go beyond this. While the world
in the 1980s was dominated by two power blocs and in the 1990s by just one domi-
nant power, it has since become multipolar. The emergence of countries with
increasingly strong economies, like China, India and Brazil, wealthy countries in
the Middle East and population-rich countries like Indonesia, Vietnam and Pak-
istan, means power relations have radically changed from what they used to be ten
or twenty years ago. The changes are also set to continue for some time to come. By
2050, the economies of the e7 (the seven largest emerging economies) are expected
to be twice as big as those of the g7 (the seven largest economies at this time).
An important new element in international relations is that China, India, Brazil
and other countries in the South have started giving aid. Even Thailand recently
started giving development aid to Bangladesh. China is already a larger donor than
Australia, and has indicated that it is going to increase its aid to 10 billion dollars in
the coming three years. China calls this aid ‘foreign assistance’ and says that it is
intended to compensate ‘economic imbalances’. In practice this means that aid
from China is always part of a broader economic agreement and is arranged by the
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Ministry of Trade. China therefore has an emphatic presence in Africa, but it basi-
cally comes down to trade with a limited number of countries. This does not
detract from the fact that Chinese activities in Africa are of real importance for the
actual or potential roles of Western donors. For example, the China Development
Bank, an important vehicle with which the Chinese government finances infras-
tructural and other development activities, regularly announces the availability 
of new funds “to support African countries’ agriculture, manufacturing, energy
sector, transportation, telecommunications, urban infrastructure, resource explo-
ration and the development of Chinese enterprises in Africa” and expresses the
ambition of having a larger portfolio than the World Bank in a few years time.
The significance of the activities of the new donors is much greater than can be
deduced from the scope of their financial efforts alone. China attracts a lot of atten-
tion because it provides aid according to its own logic and does not take refuge in
global standards regarding, for example, governance or transparency. A positive
consequence of this for developing countries is that they have greater choice and
can be more selective. However, it also applies pressure on the traditional donor
community to reconsider current agreements on the provision of aid (Kaplinsky
2009; Kobayashi 2008; Kurlantzick 2007; unctad 2008c).
The effect
From the perspective of recipient countries, the situation this all has created is
chaotic. This is reflected in the figures. In 2007, there were 14,000 donor missions
active in fifty-four countries. Vietnam, for example, sometimes even received
three missions per day. The continuing proliferation of aid activities also speaks
volumes. In 2005, three times as many ‘aid transactions’ – defined as the allocation
of funds for a specific activity (project or programme) in a recipient country – were
registered worldwide as a decade before: 60,000 rather than 20,000. In 1960, a
recipient country would be dealing with ‘only’ twelve donors. By 2005, this had
risen to an average of thirty-three. While, in 1990, not one aid-receiving country
had to collaborate with more than forty individual donors, these days this is true
of at least thirty. More donors does not, by definition, mean more aid since the
‘chunks’ of aid are in fact getting smaller. In the same period the average scope of
the transactions actually decreased by one-third, with 85 percent of projects
involving less than 1 million dollars (Kharas 2007). The consequences of this for
recipient countries are shown in figure 5.1.
Aid fragmentation is expensive. Donors incur a lot of indirect costs while identify-
ing problems, negotiating, recording agreements, implementing, monitoring,
evaluating and coordinating activities. A report for the European Commission
estimates the indirect costs of aid activities organized by the eu at between 1.9 and
3 billion euros. If those projects were replaced by coordinated budget support,
those costs would have been just 0.9 billion euros (European Commission 2009d).
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Figure 5.2 Aid architecture for recipient countries
Source: ida 2007
The indirect effects are even more expensive: fragmented aid is a burden on the
already weak institutional capacity of developing countries (Acharya et al. 2003;
Birdsall 2008; European Commission 2009d; Knack & Rahman 2008). The
number of missions alone lays a huge claim on the time and capacity of govern-
ment systems and Southern ngos. It is therefore understandable that Tanzania
has a missions freeze during the months that the budget is drawn up. A poignant
aspect is that the fragmentation of aid is most acute, and therefore most damaging,
for recipient countries with the smallest institutional capacity (Kharas 2007).
Apart from the burden, fragmented aid makes it increasingly difficult for govern-
ments to develop consistent, long-term policy, since ngos, vertical funds, bilat-
eral donors and international organizations all have varying wishes and desires.
Moreover, each project financed by donors has a different goal, with different
monitoring and evaluation rules. All this fragmentation also has a humiliating
effect, because it means that developing countries have to say ‘thank you’ far too
often.
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The fragmented aid architecture is a good example of the discrepancy between
micro and macro rationality. Although all the parties involved really want to do
things differently, and although there is no lack of speeches and conferences
during which people advocate more coherence and cooperation, the net result of
all the well-intended individual decisions is an aid maze, rather than well-orga-
nized and efficient aid architecture. This leads to a suboptimal use of aid funds.
Every donor applies its own criteria and priorities to the allocation of aid, but there
is no mechanism or ‘invisible hand’ ensuring that all those individual decisions
add up to optimal social effects. For example, unctad observed that there is no
significant correlation between the income per capita of a country and the quantity
of aid it receives per resident, although you would expect countries that need that
aid most to receive more. Like birds of a feather donors tend to stick together (see
also oecd/dac 2009a).
A solution?
Western countries have tried to counteract aid fragmentation, but without a lot of
success to date. In March 2005, in the Paris Declaration, 108 countries, twenty-
four development organizations and twelve civil society organizations promised
that they would immediately start coordinating aid, that they would arrange a
division of labour and that lead donors would be appointed per country. It was also
agreed that as much aid as possible would be given in the form of general or
sectoral budget support. The non-binding code of conduct of the eu also states
that donors are allowed to be active in no more than three sectors. These inten-
tions were reconfirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and within the
European Union in the Triple C evaluations (euhes 2007).
The evaluations of the Paris Declaration show that progress has certainly been
made, but that it is being made very slowly (oecd/dac 2008a). In a very limited
number of countries – Uganda is usually referred to as a success – a joint strategy
exists whereby funds are ‘pooled’. However, in the majority of developing coun-
tries cooperation like this rarely gets off the ground. A lot of donors are restricted
in their freedom to make joint agreements. Sometimes this is down to their capital
city – Paris is infamous for this – or to the strict rules of their own organization, as
in the case of the World Bank or the un. A significant number of donors, such as
ngos, vertical funds and countries like China, play no part at all in attempts to
coordinate. Bilateral donors do choose a limited number of sectors in which to
invest more often, but it is still common for more than ten eu donors to be active
in a specific sector in a developing country (European Commission 2009).
A second way of combating fragmentation is to exchange project support for
programme support, preferably in the form of general or sectoral budget support.
At the level of a developing country, that ambition is only visible to a very limited
extent. In the fifty-five developing countries investigated, only 22 percent of the
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Country Programmable Aid is sectoral and general budget support (oecd/dac
2008a). If countries fulfil the conditions of good governance, they are in principle
eligible for general budget support. In 2008, this represented however only 
3.8 percent of the entire oda budget and around 14 percent of the bilateral budget.
Sectoral budget support is more common, with for example around 30 percent 
of Dutch Country Programmable Aid provided as sectoral and budget support
(oecd/dac 2008a). In countries like Uganda, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mozam-
bique between 40 and 50 percent of bilateral aid consists of budget support 
(iob 2008a). All in all these figures suggest that project aid is still usual on a global
scale, and this applies to the Netherlands as well. In 2005, of all bilateral aid, the
Netherlands still spent 40 percent on project aid (iob 2008a).
Another way of combating fragmentation of aid is for recipient countries them-
selves to take on the coordination role. This is by no means impossible. For exam-
ple, in the 1990s, Vietnam was already assigning its donors into neat groups, 
so that it could decide per group who was allowed to talk to which minister and
when. Similarly, India has only cooperated with six large donors since 2003.
African countries are less well organized and more dependent on aid, and are
rarely able to adopt such successful approaches (Whitfield 2009). Less than 
25 percent of the countries that received aid in 2007 had a long-term strategy
linked to a form of budget distribution, and less than 10 percent had a frame of
reference with which aid activities could be assessed and monitored (oecd/dac
2008a).
Citizens
The incredibly varied range of aid organizations is further complicated by the
recent trend of individual citizens also wanting to play a role which goes beyond
contributing to charity and donating to organizations. A growing number of
people are keen to ‘do something good’. Schools initiate projects to support an
orphanage in Ghana. Employees devote their time and energy to help realize a
water project in Tanzania. Local authorities and organizations cooperate on twin-
ning projects with counterparts in developing countries. One example is the part-
nership between the Amsterdam police and the police in Paramaribo. ‘Europe’s
largest employment agency for professional volunteers’, pum, sends mostly
retired senior experts out to developing countries for a couple of weeks. On top of
this, a growing number of people set up foundations after a holiday. These are
referred to as mongos (My own ngo). They often focus on straightforward work
like building a school or shipping medicine. The people behind mongos are
usually affluent, well-educated and over-fifty, and often hold the view that exist-
ing aid routes via the government and Western ngos are not efficient enough.
They believe that, if they do it themselves they will be certain that ‘something will
actually get done’. They act on the basis of a feeling of solidarity and often hope
that they will gain life experience in return. No one can be completely sure how
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many people are ‘doing it themselves’. In a country like the Netherlands there are
estimated to be around 6,000. There is an increasing organizational focus on
support and the combining of these initiatives, for example via large Western
ngos.
The engagement and moral energy of these citizens as regards development policy
leads to all kinds of results: “The orphanage has been built, the hospital renovated,
the school extended to include three extra classrooms and an income-generating
goat project has been started” (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2010: 33). This does not
mean that sustainable and structural development is taking place, as shown by
research by Lau Schulpen (2007a) into private practices in Ghana and Malawi.
New private initiatives can therefore best be regarded as humanitarian aid and not
as development aid. Moreover, many of the mistakes made in the past are being
repeated. Projects do not link up very well with demand in the countries them-
selves, the attitude is often one of disparaging paternalism, there are hardly any
transfers and very little evidence of sustainability. What is more, people who ‘do it
themselves’ are often not sufficiently aware that other actors play a role, such as
local governments. Even if people do realize that their aid increases dependency,
they tend to be unaware of what they can do to counter this.
Governments do not really know how to respond to these initiatives. On the one
hand they want to encourage citizens to do good. At the same time there are risks.
Citizens not only have to realize that their interventions can have inadvertent and
damaging consequences, they also have to try to avoid them. Failure to do so
means that there is a risk that expectations will be aroused which cannot be
fulfilled, and that projects which are not attuned to local governments will violate
democratic principles. Despite being difficult to implement, a code of conduct
would therefore appear to be a minimum requirement. The problem is that West-
ern countries are not willing to do just that.
5.3 delusions of grandeur: the constant lure of 
social engineering
As shown in chapter 3, there is no all-embracing theory of development.
Academics and policymakers have been searching for such a theory for a long time.
The dominant idea was that, if the right buttons of the political and economic
system were pressed, countries would develop of their own accord. The question
was what ‘the right buttons’ were. Although development experts repeatedly
thought that they had discovered the crucial missing variable for development, in
reality it was not as easy as they had thought.
In a review of the first five decades of development after the Second World War,
leading development economist Irma Adelman (2001) observed that nowhere had
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so many abrupt paradigm changes taken place in the field of economics as in devel-
opment economics. She identified seven ‘open sesame’ factors which, in various
partly overlapping periods, were dominant as clarifications of slow development.
These were a lack of physical capital (1940-1970), too little entrepreneurship
(1958-1965), incorrect relative prices (1970-1980), too little international trade
(1980-), hyperactive governments (1980-1996), the quality of human capital
(1988-) and, lastly, ineffective governments (1997-).
These paradigms were not only printed in economic journals, they were also
repeatedly used as a basis for policy. Only slowly did it become clear that simple
frameworks and trendy fads do more harm than good and that it is counter-
productive to keep looking for universally applicable policy formulas for develop-
ment. The dominance of what Adelman calls the ‘keep it simple, stupid’ (or kiss)
principle has had damaging consequences for everything and everyone involved 
in development. It led to mono-causal explanations which distort history, simple
success indicators which do not take any account of contexts and path dependen-
cies, and sustained the entirely false idea historically that development is a linear
process (Adelman 2001; Easterly 2001a, 2006; Rodríguez 2007; Rodrik 2007;
Thorbecke 2007).
Simple explanatory frameworks are accompanied by the belief in the possibility of
social engineering, and therefore the idea that societies can be specifically changed
by adjusting a few variables (Scott 1998). That idea is not unique to development
policy – a lot of government policy in the West is saturated with it. However,
development policy is the most extreme variant: nowhere were the ambitions
greater, the theories more limited and the moral rhetoric more compelling. This
also has to do with the intellectual order of battle of policy advisors. Policy at orga-
nizations like the World Bank was determined for a long time solely by
economists and no one else. Gradually, political scientists started to play a role as
well when the theme of governance was discovered in the 1990s. Cultural anthro-
pologists do not feature in bodies that determine policy. They appear averse to
policy and, conversely, policy does not offer any scope for their insights because
they are not easy to translate into generally applicable formulas for action. Rodrik
(2007) refers to these large frameworks as presumptive theories.
5.3.1 capital and import substitution as a remedy
After the Second World War, newly independent governments in emerging coun-
tries primarily looked to economists in the United States and the United Kingdom
for advice on how to approach development. The literature on development was
dominated by economists who focused on economic growth and paid only scant
attention to broader processes of social, cultural and political development. The
unsung chroniclers of United Nations intellectual history (Jolly et al. 2004)
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concluded that the focus and emphases would have almost certainly been different
if sociologists, anthropologists or political scientists, rather than economists, had
been in charge of development policy. However, that was not to be.
The first generation of development economists who appeared on the stage
shortly after the Second World War were visionaries and worked with large-scale
theories and general macro strategies. These economists were influenced by expe-
riences with the systematic industrialization of the Soviet Union, the economic
management of governments during the great depression, the mobilization of
sources and resources during the war, and the Marshall Plan support at govern-
ment level for the reconstruction of Western Europe. On the basis of that experi-
ence they centred their ideas on developing countries on structural transforma-
tions designed to foster economic growth, with the state being assigned a
substantial role. Famous names in that period include Rosenstein-Rodan, Myrdal,
Nurkse, Fleming and Hirschman. According to the dominant paradigm, govern-
ments of developing states were supposed to encourage the accumulation of capi-
tal, ensure that the large reserve of surplus labour was used productively in their
countries, develop policy for specific industrialization by using import substitu-
tion to counteract the detrimental consequences of the inelastic export yields, and
use planning and programming to coordinate the allocation of the available
sources.
Within this approach, foreign aid was crucial in order to finance investments since
the export of natural resources would, for the time being, generate insufficient
foreign currency. The thinking of this first generation of development economists
was characterized by external pessimism and internal optimism. Their outlook
was sombre as regards the possibilities for export, but they expected rapid expan-
sion of the public sector and development of a broad government policy (Krugman
1993; Lin 2009b; Meier 2001; Yayawardena 1993). Although some of the pioneers
(such as Hirschman) were sceptical, planning was fairly generally regarded as an
important instrument for development. A un expert group published a report in
1963 which advocated a role for the state comparable to what would later be
referred to in the context of Asian ‘wonder countries’ as a developmental state. In
1966, the Committee for Development Planning (cdp) started its work as part of
ecosoc, under the leadership of Jan Tinbergen.
Development economists at the United Nations assumed that an exceptionally
large leap forwards would be needed to create the initial conditions for develop-
ment, which they interpreted as being self-perpetuating economic growth. Most
attention was therefore paid to initiating economic development, with industrial-
ization at the heart of the process. The pioneers of the development economy
often used attractive metaphors to describe their goals: Lewis talked of a ‘snow-
ball’, Rosenstein-Rodan of a ‘big push’, and Rostow of a ‘take-off’. In particular,
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Rostow’s (1960) stages theory of economic growth played a prominent role. This
theory propagated the idea that the process towards a developed economy is linear
and includes a number of successive stages: the ‘traditional society’ is followed by
the ‘conditions for take-off’ and then the ‘take-off’ itself. Rostow, who based this
theory on the development of the United Kingdom, believed that other countries
ought to adopt the same approach as well. That assertion faded when other
researchers voiced theoretical criticism (for example Rostow failed to respond to
the question of when a stage exists, and which conditions are necessary for a coun-
try to progress to the next stage) and they demonstrated that the United Kingdom
was sooner an exception than a rule suitable to be elevated to the status of gener-
ally applicable model (Crafts 2001; Jolly et al. 2004).
The ‘dependency school’, which made a significant contribution to development
thinking at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s by approaching
development in a less one-sided economic way and along more political science
and sociological lines, was similarly critical of Rostow’s stages theory and of
modernization theories in general. Both the reformist trend within this school,
whose proponents included the future Brazilian President Cardoso and the future
Brazilian Minister Furtado, and Marxist supporters like Gunder Frank and Dos
Santos, adopted the viewpoint that Latin America was held in a situation of
‘dependent capitalism’ due to its position in the international division of labour.
The periphery would only manage to put an end to the exploitation if it were to
detach itself from the centre. Dependency could be avoided through (in the words
of Samir Amin) de-linking from the world economy and introducing a subsequent
development pattern based on self-sufficiency. The assumption that only de-link-
ing would generate opportunities for growth, turned out to be too pessimistic,
since some countries in the periphery certainly did experience a process of rapid
accumulation without becoming isolated. In the meantime, however, the depen-
dency school had put the importance of external causal factors for underdevelop-
ment on the agenda. It would feature in the debates on a New International
Economic Order (see below) and in the work of unctad.
The models and policy recommendations of the first generation of development
economists came in for fierce criticism when a number of limitations and prob-
lems became clear. For example, the concentration on physical capital accumula-
tion turned out to be too restricted and investments in productive workers
(human capital) through the expansion of knowledge, healthcare and skills were
placed on the agenda. Experiences with negative consequences of government
interventions also caused many economists to become disillusioned about the
possibilities of programming and planning development since unemployment
turned out to be persistent and poverty continued to exist on a large scale. A lot of
economists blamed governments’ market-disruptive policies for these disappoint-
ing results. These policies paid too little attention to agriculture, supported ineffi-
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cient state companies, and ignored the negative consequences of industrialization
on the basis of import substitution. At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of
the 1970s, some former supporters of development planning therefore started
talking about a ‘crisis of planning’. They highlighted deficiencies in many of these
plans, the often faulty information, unforeseen disruptions to national economic
activities, and institutional weaknesses in developing countries. The first genera-
tion of development economists regarded government interventions as an essen-
tial remedy against market failure but, in the meantime, many economists had
started concluding that those interventions often resulted in market failure.
5.3.2 the washington consensus
The second generation of development economists that emerged from the end of
the 1960s onwards lacked the vision of the first generation, and was “almost
moralistic, committed to a sombre realism based on fundamental principles of the
neoclassic economy” (Meier 2001). Aggregated macromodels fell out of favour and
were replaced by the new standard of disaggregated microstudies with production
units and households as the basic units of analysis. The famous names from this
period included Bauer, Bhagwati, Harberger, Lal and Krueger, who was chief
economist at the World Bank from 1982 to 1986 and who, sometime later, served
as (vice) president at the imf. Governments of developing countries were now told
to rectify every price disturbance – ‘get prices right’ – but also to ensure that all
their policies were in order – ‘get policies right’. The very diverse performances of
developing countries were no longer explained on the basis of differences in initial
conditions, but were considered to be the result of differences in policy.
Unfavourable external circumstances were no longer a valid explanation of the
lack of economic progress, which was seen as a consequence of inadequate internal
policy. Consequently, countries were required to break with inward-oriented
strategies for development, to liberalize their trade, privatize state enterprises and
submit themselves to stabilization programmes according to the dominant
consensus of the 1990s.
The policy considered necessary for this would be based on stabilization, liberal-
ization, deregulations and privatization. The idea was that the imf would
contribute by imposing strict conditions (conditionalities) on loans, while the
World Bank would do the same by linking loans to structural adjustment
programmes. In the process, the Bretton Woods institutions gratefully benefited
from the fact that many developing countries were forced to approach them when
they were hit by the international debt crisis in the 1980s (Solomon 1995). This
crisis came about in the aftermath of wholesale changes in the world economy in
the years after the 1973-1974 oil crisis. The international shift towards neoliberal
policy dates from this time, but the problems for a lot of developing countries
became truly sizeable when the central banks of the rich countries – led by the
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United States – drastically increased interest rates in October 1979 in order to
counteract increased inflation. Mexico has the dubious honour of having initiated
shockwaves on the international financial markets in August 1982 with the
announcement that it was the first country no longer able to pay its debts. Other
developing countries followed, and the imf and the World Bank were put in
charge of the ‘creditors’ cartel’ in which banks and creditor countries were repre-
sented (Krugman 1993; Meier 2001; Toye & Toye 2004; Treillet 2002). The struc-
tural adjustment programmes (saps) usually boiled down to the marketization of
government services and reducing bureaucracy. This policy turned out to be disas-
trous for African countries in particular, since the government apparatus’s ability
to act ended up falling below the level it was already at, and the population’s level
of education also dropped (Easterly 2006; Evans 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Mkan-
dawire 2001; Molenaers & Renard 2007). On top of this, privatization increased
corruption in a lot of places and turned the government and politics into more of 
a business opportunity. Numerous countries which the imf and the World Bank
had ordered to privatize were already privatized because they were owned by the
president and his supporters. The fact that, without a legal framework, privatiza-
tion can have huge disruptive effects became painfully clear in the 1990s in Russia.
The situation in Africa was no different – just more poorly documented.
Of course there were also counter movements. Within the United Nations there
continued to be scope, even in the 1970s, for criticism of the dominant paradigm
and less orthodox approaches to development. The well-known economists who
worked within the un on behalf of countries from the South included Kalecki,
Kaldor, Prebisch and Singer, and Jan Pronk in the Netherlands. The developing
countries within the un started to cooperate more and more, with the important
turning point being the setting up of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (unctad) in 1964. The increased capacity of countries from the
South to act within the un culminated in proposals for a drastic restructuring of
the international economic, financial and political relationships into what became
known as a New International Economic Order (nieo) (see table 5.1).
Proposals and initiatives of the g77 developing countries for realizing an nieo
dominated the North-South agenda in the first half of the 1970s. Eventually this
did not lead to much because most developed countries wanted nothing to do
with real reforms of the world economy. Instead of achieving the stronger position
they hoped for within a fairer world order, the developing countries found them-
selves facing an international neoliberal agenda in the 1980s. The contrast could
scarcely have been greater. While, after the Second World War, the focus was on
national sovereignty and control of one’s own economic activities, the emphasis
shifted to abandoning national policy in the 1980s, and this at precisely the
moment that countries in the South wanted to take control (Jolly et al. 2004; see
also Toye & Toye 2004).
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Table 5.1 Programme of Action for the New International Economic Order (1974)
Source: Jolly et al. 2004
The alternative popular in un circles therefore continued to be mainly an intellec-
tual exercise – just as the un always used to be more of a source of ideas in the field
of development aid than a powerful political actor. Practical policies, at least at
multilateral level, were shaped by the World Bank and the imf and were referred
to as the Washington Consensus (see table 5.2). From the end of the 1980s, inter-
national financial institutions (imf, World Bank) and Western countries not only
propagated this package as ‘the way to go’ for developing countries, but imposed it
on them where possible. Alternative models supported by developing countries
had little chance of success in the international economic climate of the time, and
the same applied to the Independent Commission on International Development
Issues which, under the leadership of Willy Brandt, published a report in 1980 in
which core elements from the previous programme of action for a new interna-
tional economic order were linked with peace and disarmament.
Table 5.2 The original Washington Consensus
Source: Rodrik 2002, 2007a
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• Increasing sovereignty over economies and natural resources
• Increasing control over the level and nature of foreign investment
• Maintaining or increasing the purchasing power of raw material and commodity exports
• Increasing access to markets of developed countries
• Reducing the cost of technology transfer
• Increasing the flow of development assistance
• Reducing the debt burden of certain developing countries
• Increasing the decision-making power of the developing countries in the un and the Bretton Woods
institutions
01. Fiscal discipline
02. Reorientation of public expenditures
03. Tax reform
04. Financial liberalization
05. Unified and competitive exchange rates
06. Trade liberalization
07. Openness to dfi
08. Privatization
09. Deregulation
10. Secure Property Rights
The Washington Consensus is imbued with the neoliberal spirit of the times.
John Williamson, who coined the term Washington Consensus and formulated
the core points of this new orthodoxy, observed that it did not feature any of the
ideas of the first generation of development economists. These days, supporters
of this ‘consensus’ are few and far between. Economic historians have shown that
none of the rich countries observed all the points in the consensus during their
development. In fact, while the developing countries that did observe the Wash-
ington Consensus in recent decades – and these were located mainly in Africa and
Latin America – experienced no or very little growth, countries like China, India
and Vietnam, which followed their own course during the same period, actually
turned into growth paragons (Adelman 2001; Bairoch 1993; Chang 2002, 2007;
Reinert 2007a; Rodrik 2002, 2007; Williamson 2008). South Korea went on to
score a five out of a total of ten, and Taiwan probably a six (Rodrik 2007).
What is more, a lot of important issues are not covered by the Washington
Consensus. When Joseph Stiglitz, who later won the Nobel Prize for Economics,
was appointed chief economist at the World Bank at the beginning of 1997, he
wanted to expand the original ten points of the consensus with more regulation 
of the financial sector, competition policy, and transfer policy for technology. He
also proposed expanding development goals to include sustainable development,
democratization, and a more egalitarian distribution of income. The then Minister
of Finance in the United States, Laurence Summers, was unhappy about Stiglitz’
ambitions and made his departure from the World Bank a condition for us
support for a second term for James Wolfensohn as World Bank President. Conse-
quently, Stiglitz resigned from the World Bank in November 1999. Seven years
later, in an Initiative for Policy Dialogue task force, Stiglitz and colleagues summa-
rized the problems with the Washington Consensus as follows: too limited goals
(focus on price stability), too few instruments (emphasis on monetary and fiscal
policy) and an excessive focus on markets (Stiglitz et al. 2006; Toye & Toye 2004;
Williamson 1990). By then, however, the Washington Consensus had long lost a
lot of its sheen.
From the end of the 1990s onwards, when it became clear that the original
‘Washington’ package of reforms was not working, and sometimes even had
negative effects, multilateral bodies and policy economists started adding all kinds
of ‘second generation reforms’ with a more institutional character to the package.
This created even longer lists of reforms, which were considered desirable and
which went under names like ‘post-Washington Consensus’, ‘Washington
Consensus plus’, and ‘augmented Washington Consensus’. The lists can differ
from source to source but the box below contains a representative selection.
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Table 5.3 Towards an augmented Washington Consensus
Source: Rodrik 2002, 2007a
An initial review of these issues immediately raises the question of what is miss-
ing. The authors notably ignore the problem of sustainability. The improved pack-
age of reforms is also impossibly broad and undifferentiated, and still does not take
any account of local context and needs. One obvious question is whether all
twenty points are even important, or whether indeed a sequence can or should be
applied to how the various elements are approached. This list is basically a message
to developing countries that they have to become like Denmark or the Nether-
lands without anyone saying how they should do that. It is like a random burst 
of buckshot, which is little help to governments or developing countries in weigh-
ing up the various possible policy options. It can also be seen as a kind of lucky 
dip from which international organizations and donors can derive conditionalities
before they allow countries to become eligible for aid or a loan (Felipe & Usui
2008; ieo 2007; Maxwell 2005; Rodrik 2007; Stiglitz 2008; wrr 2001).
Key donors also realized that, although such an approach was analytically more sat-
isfying, from the point of view of policy it provided less direction. As an initial step
towards a new long-term strategy, the World Bank therefore published a report in
2007 (World Bank 2007) compiled by a team led by the bank’s former chief
economist, François Bourguignon, which reveals the contours of a new approach.
According to this publication, the most important principles for development
strategies are now less doctrinal than in the past. The authors call this “a major evo-
lution from the days of structural adjustment and the Washington Consensus”.
According to this report there is now international agreement on six principles.
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Original Washington Consensus
01. Fiscal discipline
02. Reorientation of public expenditures
03. Tax reform
04. Financial liberalization
05. Unified and competitive exchange rates
06. Trade liberalization
07. Openness to dfi
08. Privatization
09. Deregulation
10. Secure Property Rights
Augmented Washington Consensus  
the previous 10 items, plus:
11. Corporate governance
12. Anti-corruption
13. Flexible labour markets
14. wto agreements
15. Financial codes and standards
16. ‘Prudent’ capital-account opening
17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes
18. Independent central banks/inflation targeting
19. Social safety nets
20. Targeted poverty reduction
Table 5.4 World Bank: “Broad agreement on six core principles”
Source: World Bank 2007
The grand finale to the demise of the Washington Consensus would appear to be
the publication of the report by the Commission on Growth and Development,
which was established in 2007, in which famous policymakers and scientists,
under the leadership of Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence assess the current state
of affairs. This was a signal that the Washington Consensus was de facto dead and
buried. The report identifies “five striking points of resemblance” between every
very successful economy: (i) exploiting the world economy through openness; (ii)
maintaining macroeconomic stability; (iii) keeping high rates of saving and invest-
ment; (iv) using markets to allocate resources; and (v), having committed, credi-
ble, and capable governments. However the Commission also establishes that the
specific characteristics and historical experiences of countries have to be reflected
in the realization of these stylized facts in a strategy for growth, and that there is
no generic formula which policymakers can use. The Financial Times (22 May
2008) saliently summarized this Commission’s report as follows: “The ‘Washing-
ton Consensus’ – stabilize, privatize and liberalize – is dead. Long live the new
pragmatism” (Commission on Growth and Development 2008; Ho 2009; Lin &
Monga 2010; Rodrik 2007; World Bank 2005). However, traditions and routines
are hard to break and the additional problem that, in practice, there are not many
tried-and-tested alternative approaches means that not much tends to change in
the practice of donors and international institutions like the imf (Van Waeyen-
berge et al. 2010; Weisbrot 2010).
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1. Growth is critical to poverty reduction.
2. Sustainable growth and poverty reduction require attention to the distribution of income and oppor-
tunity.
3. The main agent for growth is the private sector, but the public sector has an essential facilitating role.
4. Openness and a dynamic export sector are powerful drivers of development. But debate persists about
the best way to obtain this result and about the factors facilitating export development. And there is
recognition of the costs from liberalization to some population groups.
5. Good governance and institutional capacity are critical to sustainable development, but there is no
unique governance trajectory.
6. There is no unique template for development. It is also recognized that growth does not always result
from a linear combination of ‘basic determining factors’, as postulated in the familiar linear growth
regression model. Some elements may be especially important at some times and in some cases,
making the model highly nonlinear, complex, and essentially country specific.
5.3.3 good governance and democracy as a remedy
The idea behind the Washington Consensus was that governments in developing
countries had blocked, rather than stimulated, development of their countries
(Burnside & Dollar 1997). Initially therefore the suggestion was to ban govern-
ment interference in the economy entirely wherever possible. ‘Bad governance’
would become ‘no governance’: less government and more market forces. When
that proved not to work, the importance of the government was rediscovered.
Instead of less governance, good governance became the new mantra. Good gover-
nance refers to several connected principles on the functioning of government and
the political system. Transparency and accountability are key: government struc-
tures must be transparent and there must be reliable procedures for accountability.
The best way to achieve this is through democratic principles. Once this ideal had
taken hold, countries were only to receive money from loans if they fulfilled the
criteria for good governance, since otherwise the aid would only be used ineffec-
tively and leak away through corrupt government systems. Many donor countries
complied with these requirements formulated by the World Bank, although deter-
mining the limits turned out to be far from easy. However, there was broad
endorsement of the idea that encouraging good governance was eminently impor-
tant. The undp now spends 46 percent of its budget on good governance
programmes, such as training staff for elections. The World Bank also spends a
considerable amount of its funds (a quarter) on ‘state capacity building’ (Moss et
al. 2006).
Was the promotion of good governance then the key to development? The wrr
(2001) showed, in an earlier report on development cooperation, that a peculiar
paradox exists – an idea which has since been steadfastly reiterated in all kinds of
international publications (see also Hout & Robinsons 2008). Countries which
fulfil the criteria for good governance hardly need any development aid since, if
they manage to fulfil these criteria, their economies will usually be in good shape
‘of their own accord’. Countries which do not fulfil the criteria, do not receive aid
but are unable to achieve the desired situation without it. As gradually became
clear, if countries do not have a system of good governance, this is usually due to
deep-rooted reasons. In many developing countries there is a complex interweav-
ing between state, market and society, of which patronage systems are an example.
The good governance requirements mean little more than the reinvention of
society, the economy and the state. “Skipping straight to Weber”, is how Pritchett
& Woolcock (2008) describe these unreal expectations. It is becoming ever clearer
that transferring governance ideals like democracy or transparency (let alone
imposing them from outside) is an almost impossible task – in any event in the
short term.
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Fragile states
The idea that the key for development lies in creating good governance was given
an impulse from an entirely different angle when, at the end of the Cold War, all
kinds of violent internal conflicts occurred, or rather mushroomed, since most had
already been smouldering for a long time. It was not always immediately clear
what repertoires of activity the new situation demanded. These wars, often civil
wars, required a different approach, by both the military – which were strongly
focused on wars of conquest – and the world of development aid. It soon became
clear that the range of intervention options has to be much wider than the stan-
dard set of instruments. How, for example, can calm be restored immediately after
military interventions? The importance of security sector reform soon became
clear. Although appropriate guidelines were developed, such as those of the oecd,
which started tackling the theme at a relatively early stage, there was no interna-
tional organization sufficiently equipped to structure post-conflict situations in an
adequate manner. The Western aid community therefore had to learn by trial and
error how to intervene sensibly in post-conflict areas, with some degree of
success, for example in Cambodia and Sierra Leone (Manor 2007).
The experiences acquired in this way were combined into studies on what came to
be known as ‘fragile states’. This generated some interesting insights since the
different un peace operations were quite easy to evaluate and compare (see for
example Paris 2004 and Voorhoeve 2008). At the same time a familiar mechanism
occurred in that the notion of fragile states was transformed into a recipe which
was regarded as applicable in all sorts of situations.
The first consequence of this was the increase in the number of countries referred
to as fragile states. Soon the focus was no longer just on post-conflict countries
but on almost all countries whose governments, according to the definition of
dfid, were not able to provide what its citizens wanted – dfid therefore counted
forty-six fragile states. These were very varied and included countries which were
really not adequate states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Somalia,
countries in which the government did not have an actual presence in all parts of
the country, such as Uganda where the North was troubled by the Lord’s Resis-
tance Army, as well as countries with a federal structure in which a lot was decen-
tralized to regions, such as Nigeria, and countries where the government can only
fulfil its role through large-scale repression, such as North Korea. Then there are
countries whose governments only had a limited capacity to act due to a large
number of factors, such as Pakistan, and lastly countries which have, to a large
extent, been ‘constructed’ and which have very varied populations, such as Syria
and Iraq (Kaplan 2008).
The broadening of the term led to a decrease in its explanatory power. After all,
very different situations were lumped together, and it gradually became more and
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more confusing how any intervention should take place (see also: Chandler 2006;
Duffield 2007; Kaplan 2009). Nevertheless, several authors started tackling the
concept of fragile states. For example, in 2008 the former Afghan Minister of
Finance, Ghani (together with co-author Lockhart, director of the Institute of
State Effectiveness), published a book entitled Fixing Failed States. A framework
for rebuilding a fractured world. The title can be interpreted ironically but the
impartial reader cannot draw any other conclusion than that the authors really
mean it – for example the chapter ‘Reversing History’ includes the statement that
it is perfectly possible for a government to relieve its country of its misery by
concerted action. Those who find that book too complicated can always opt for the
publication by the Rand Corporation entitled The Beginner’s Guide to Nation
Building (Dobbins 2007). In just 284 pages it provides an exact description of how
to build up a country. For advanced readers there is the Social capital building
toolkit (Sandler & Lowney 2006).
Democratization before everything?
The basic idea behind the good governance approach and the toolkits which are
intended to get fragile states back on their feet is that a liberal democracy is the
condition par excellence for development. The policy consensus was that demo-
cratic systems, with a properly functioning market, will contribute to the pacifica-
tion of internal conflicts, and that this is a basic condition for development. In this
context Kahler (2009) even refers to the “New York Consensus”. The United
Nations – based in New York – started to make more and more of an effort over the
course of the 1990s to build up states which had previously functioned poorly,
based on the idea that building up liberal democratic institutions should precede
the creation of an active civil society or a properly functioning economy. This idea
was a source of great inspiration to the American government, as is shown by their
military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the huge sums of money avail-
able for organizations that promote democracy, like the National Endowment of
Democracy (ned) and Democracy Assistance.
The question is whether the export of democracy indeed turned out to be the key
to development. Although peace operations have certainly led to a reduction in
violence in a number of cases, a lasting democratic transition appears to be difficult
to achieve. More and more frequently, analyses are showing that democracy can
only be created to a certain degree and that progress is incremental. At best you can
deepen an existing democratic tradition, and at worst your interventions can have
damaging consequences. According to Carothers (2002), democratization only has
a chance of success if a number of conditions are fulfilled, but this is only rarely the
case. Important internal conditions are a history of democratic institutions (if
those institutions once existed, it will be easier to restore democracy), sufficient
support for democratization within a country (sufficient political reformers),
divided and weak authoritarian rulers, and regional peace (unrest among neigh-
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bouring countries causes tensions at home). Influence from outside only works if
the country is not too big (so that the aid does not become too scattered) and the
aid is extensive and varied. Countries must also have something to gain from
democratization. This explains why the democratization processes encouraged by
the eu in Eastern Europe got off to relatively good starts (see also Diamond 2008).
The transition period is almost always a period in which democratization is
accompanied by widespread ethnic or other conflicts. An analysis and evaluation
of eleven peace operations Paris (2004) showed how an emphasis on democracy
can add fuel to the fire. In a large number of conflict countries the process of
democratization led to an intensification of social conflicts, in others it reproduced
traditional sources of violence (see also Van Bijlert 2009; Van der Borgh 2009;
Carothers 2002; Mann 2005; Mansfield & Snyder 2001). In particular the emphasis
on speedy elections – the faith in elections – has often proved to be damaging since
electoral competition can act as a catalyst for conflicts. Elections often stir up
smouldering unrest. Paris (2004) therefore concluded that elections should not
continually be regarded as the starting and finishing points of democracy. Demo-
cratic elections do not have to be abandoned entirely, but can only take place when
other crucial functional political institutions are properly in place, such as the rule
of law and a properly working bureaucratic organization. In other words, the polit-
ical system must have a certain degree of legitimacy before elections can take place.
For example the transition in South Africa took place peacefully because all the
institutions were already in place: the constitutional state, a parliament, and a
rational Weberian form of state bureaucracy. Burundi, by contrast, where the
organization of elections in 1993 was forced through by international donors, had
none of these institutions, and within a couple of months after the elections
100,000 people had been killed as a result of ethnic rivalries (Mansfield & Snyder
2001).
It is becoming more and more obvious that institutions that work well as regards
pacifying conflicts in Denmark or the Netherlands (political parties, ngos and 
a parliament) do not automatically have the same degree of success elsewhere. 
In most developing countries the parliament does not control the government. 
It is usually an acquiescent machine comprising loyal parliamentarians, or a substi-
tutes’ bench where ambitious people wait their turn to ‘take to the field’ (Mole-
naers & Renard 2007). Audit institutions or offices are also powerless and political
parties rarely have deep roots in society, often being concentrated more around
people than ideas and with many not even having a manifesto. Elections are won
with beer and T-shirts, not with long-term policies. In Kenya, Raila Odinga has
been Prime Minister since April 2008 and has been a member of ten political
parties. A political party often does not allow another party to win because of a
lack of confidence that they will regain power next time round. In particular
winner-takes-all systems, like the ones in the United States or the United King-
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dom, often malfunction elsewhere because the parties in power do not know how
to deal with ‘loyal’ opposition (Barbone et al. 2007; Chabal & Daloz 1999).
Good enough governance
These days, thinking has moved on and, like the Washington Consensus, the New
York Consensus is being replaced by a subtler variant. Researchers like Grindle
(2004), who supplements neoclassic political economy with sociological insights,
and Fukuyama (2007) propose a focus on good enough governance.
That not only implies a lot more modesty regarding the goals which can be set, but
also assumes that the legitimacy and responsiveness of a state can take on various
guises. Democracy is not regarded as some kind of holy grail, and the fact that
citizen participation and representation will have its faults is acknowledged.
The ‘good enough governance’ approach therefore focuses on the development 
of effective but limited government. Whereas the supporters of the good gover-
nance thesis have a consistent belief in progress, the principle of good enough
governance emphasizes the fact that development never takes place uniformly,
that there are negative consequences, and that changes can only come about
through political alliances and not through contracts. In the meantime, the World
Bank has also adjusted its standpoint. In its “broad agreement on six core princi-
ples” for its future strategy (see table 5.4 above), the bank now also states that
“good governance and institutional capacity are essential for sustainable develop-
ment, but there is no unique governance process”.
It has gradually become clear that the good governance agenda is not the silver
bullet it was hoped to be. Donors have learned that, although it may be possible to
build up political institutions in a formal sense, this does not yet mean that much
has changed in a material sense. In particular, African leaders have demonstrated
that they are good at dealing with this state of affairs. Under pressure from West-
ern donors they introduced formal changes (usually forms of multi-party democ-
racy), but that only led to very limited changes to the neo-patrimonial power
structures, despite examples of successes, such as Ghana where the elections of
2008 appeared to have a real impact. Although a term like good enough gover-
nance is more suitable, it does raise the question of how exactly it should be
applied in practice. If every donor starts following their own strategy, the capacity
to act will be very limited. However, the question is when is ‘good’ good enough,
and how do you organize the political process between the donors to acquire a
joint answer to that question? In 2009, even the beginnings of an answer to these
questions were lacking, and the good governance approach had lost a lot of its
shine as the ultimate key to development.
Creating a better world
Perhaps the greatest task facing modern policy systems is to fathom what policy
is, and is not, able to achieve. It is an inherent feature of political systems that they
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claim to be able to create a better world, with governments and scientists provid-
ing the required instruments. The problem is, however, that ambitions and
pretensions often tend to run away with those instruments. It is perfectly possible
that import substitution will be useful in some countries in some circumstances,
and that privatization will be productive on some occasions. It is equally clear that,
in certain circumstances, democracy can contribute to a society’s development.
Nevertheless, no matter how understandable and tempting it is, the idea that these
formulas always work in any situation, and that a simple intervention can raise a
society to a higher plane is not only untenable but also damaging, as the history of
sixty years of development aid has taught us.
5.4 lack of intervention ethics
A fourth problem development policy has to face is that there is nothing, or
scarcely anything, that resembles intervention ethics tailored specifically to devel-
opment aid. Put simply, there has not been enough reflection on when and when
not to intervene, in light of what aid interventions actually do with aid recipients.
This is indeed a thorny issue. Anyone who visits a developing country for the first
time realizes the importance of developing a code of behaviour with regard to
beggars. The conclusion is usually that begging children get nothing (if they are
given money they will have no reason – and no time – to go to school), but that the
situation is different as regards handicapped and elderly people (after all they no
longer have any other option). Anyone who visits a developing country a second
time will discover that the children are also becoming more professional. In popu-
lar locations like Timbuktu in Mali, the churches of Lalibela in Ethiopia or the slave
forts on the Ghanaian coast, children approach tourists and tell them that they 
‘of course’ do not want any money but that they cannot pay for their geography
books. The tourists are then asked to purchase one for them in a shop, after
which the children (when they think that no one is watching) resell the book to
the shop. It has not yet been possible to generalize these insights in a good donor 
strategy.
Another way of putting it is that the implicit idea about aid clung to in the West for
more than sixty years now is that it is always good. If only it were that simple. The
effect of aid is certainly not, by definition, positive. Aid not only has ‘first order’
effects, in the form of a school, a clinic or fertilizer subsidy, it also has a ‘second
order’ effect, in the sense of a dependency relationship. Aid goes beyond the alle-
viation (or not) of a problem. It also constitutes a new relationship between
people, creating expectations and dependencies, establishing habits and teaching
people how to act, whether they want it or not (Chatterjee 2004; Lewis & Moss
2006; Li 2007).
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The problem is that donors do not know exactly how they should deal with this.
Although attention is paid to a number of negative effects of aid, such as the possi-
ble environmental effects of a dam, or the disruption caused by a road being built
through an area which is home to ‘indigenous’ people, there is no focus on how to
take account of how aid changes the world view of the people involved. The 2005
Paris Declaration is a good illustration in this respect since it reduces the problem
of aid to one of suboptimal ‘effectiveness’. Nowadays it is widely recognized that
not all aid funds achieve maximum impact. That is one reason why almost every
policy document in recent years has emphasized effectiveness as a priority.
Donors only want to give effective aid and increasingly report on this issue. These
approaches assume that, if one form of aid or another achieves the specific desired
effect, everything is fine. The possibility of other, less desirable effects occurring is
ignored. People restrict themselves to measuring how the use of resources can be
optimized in such a way as to achieve maximum yield. ‘Side effects’ are not
measured, nor traced in any other way.
Very little systematic research has been done into the negative effects of aid, with
most focusing on humanitarian aid in crisis situations (Anderson 1999; Polman
2010) and the monetary effects of aid (Moss et al. 2008; Rajan & Subramanian
2007). This is partly due to the fact that people within the world of development
aid rarely want to be confronted by the idea that aid can have a negative effect, and
partly also due to methodological problems. The difficulties of determining
whether aid leads to development also trouble research into the issue of negative
effects. All in all this has meant that, while the website of the World Bank contains
more than 1400 research papers, not one of them has been devoted to aid depen-
dency in the past decade. The publication which comes closest concludes, after
carrying out certain calculations, that “aid is a bigger curse than oil” (Djankov et al.
2007).
In the meantime, numerous popular publications have appeared which use a range
of examples to illustrate the view that aid is bad. One famous example is Dead aid
by Dambisa Moyo (2009) which, within six months, made her one of the hundred
most influential women in the world, at least according to Time. The book’s empir-
ical underpinning is not commensurate with its popularity but it would be foolish
to use this as a reason for ignoring its message. There are comparable books –
Hubbard and Duggan (2009) even talk of a charity trap – and better thought-out
formulations of the same standpoint (Glennie 2008; Mwenda & Tangri 2005). In
addition, the issue is receiving more and more attention in Africa itself (Ayittey
2006; Tandon 2008). In Malawi, to name one example, parliament recently swept
the agreements the government had made with the imf from the table, arguing
that the country wanted to be in control of its own future.
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Aid creates a new reality
Which unexpected, adverse effects of aid have been revealed by the limited
research that has been done to date? One that is relatively easy to identify is the
macroeconomic effect of aid. In countries in which development aid (or debt relief)
constitutes an important part of the income, upward pressure is exerted on the
exchange rate. This has negative consequences for export opportunities (the
famous Dutch disease). Even countries with good macroeconomic policy found it
very difficult to counteract this effect thanks to measures like the allocation of
foreign currency to pay for imports or the increase of productivity (Hussain, Berg
& Aiyar 2009). At microeconomic level, the importance of aid is also unclear and
there are many examples of microcredit programmes which have tended to disrupt
the local market rather than improve it.
However, the influence of development money goes further, placing the relation-
ships within a country on a different footing. Particularly in fragile states it often
proves difficult to spend aid money effectively on concrete activities and an entire
society then focuses on the question of how to benefit from all the available donor
funds, with all the associated disruptive effects (Feeny and McGillivray 2009;
Gibson et al. 2005). In other developing countries, money from donors affects the
incentive to charge tax (Sindzingre 2007). For example, in Uganda, Museveni abol-
ished local taxes just before the presidential elections of 2006. Such a move has an
economic effect – unless the donor is prepared to make good the deficit, which is
often the case – but also a psychological effect, because it relieves citizens of the
feeling that they are financing the government and, as a result, they tend not to
place themselves in a position in which they hold the government responsible for
achieving results. Conversely the government focuses on donors instead of on 
citizens. Cultural anthropologist Chabal (2009) refers to historical continuity: in
the colonial age the colonies were governed by giving local leaders the positions,
resources and backing of the colonizers. A selective approach helped these leaders
to substantiate their positions of power. The current structure still displays this
basic pattern in which benefiting from external support and power over the
people in the country itself have become more and more interwoven because
responsibility extends upwards and not downwards.
Another ambivalent transformation is the ngo-ization of developing countries.
The time has gone that Western ngos do everything themselves in developing
countries. Now they prefer to use local ngos. This has resulted in specific donor
behaviour in the form of a persistent search for local ngos. Fowler (in Hearn 2007)
refers to this as a new “scramble for Africa”. If large-scale resources are used to
search, they will always find something. In the 1990s, numerous new ngos were
set up in the countries in the South. Although they use the increased democratic
space, they are still, to a large extent, an artefact of the available donor funds. It is
difficult to define to what extent, but a cautious estimate has revealed that in
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countries like Uganda and Ethiopia around 60 percent of local ngos are primarily
donor-driven, that around 15 percent are political groups, usually members of the
opposition, and around 25 percent can be regarded as authentic and more or less
directly representative of local groups. The latter includes, for example, a large
number of women’s groups.
Local ngos are often held more accountable to their Western sponsors than to the
local population. Against this background it is understandable that the Ethiopian
parliament adopted a law in December 2008 which severely restricts local ngos
that receive more than 10 percent of their budget from Western donors, because it
is regarded as a form of foreign interference in domestic matters. Ethiopia may
well be an extreme case since it has a strict regime and the government also has
less noble motives for restricting the work of local ngos. In that respect it can be
added to the list of countries where the activities of ngos are restricted under the
pretext of improving the security situation. This list includes Russia, Brazil,
Egypt, Cambodia, Uganda and, most importantly, the United States (Edwards
2009b). However, other African countries are also considering regulating ngo
growth. Even in Afghanistan, two years after Western troops had driven back the
Taliban, a proposal was made in parliament to reduce the number of ngos, whose
number had risen to 1400.
Another noticeable development is the influence the presence of Western aid
organizations has on the intellectual cadre of a recipient country. The ngo market
has often become the most interesting labour market for smart people in their
twenties. Some do substantive aid-related work, but many find that their
command of English or French enables them to find work as a driver or jack-of-all-
trades for Western ngos, even if they have been trained as doctors or engineers,
because the Western organization almost always pays better. This leads to a brain
drain within the country, as talented young people from developing countries
disappear into Western aid organizations (Rajan & Subramanian 2005). These
days, ngos rarely function as a ‘refuge’ for intellectuals, as was the case in the
1980s in Latin America. Usually they are simply the most generous employer.
Mutual dependencies
A subsequent problem with classical development aid is that it unintentionally
tends to undermine the state rather than support it. Instead of realizing that they
have an effective government, citizens see successful projects with donors’ flags
on their local school or clinic. In this way, the government loses some of its legiti-
macy. An alternative is to have aid organized via governments and for donors not
to be visibly present – albeit that usaid, the World Bank and the German organi-
zation gtz still work almost exclusively under their own flags (Bräutigam 2000).
However, providing direct support to governments also has its problems. That
support makes governments dependent – in countries like Uganda or Mozam-
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bique almost half the government’s income consists of contributions from donors.
As we have already seen, this can lead to recipient countries feeling more answer-
able to donors than to their own populations. However, donors, in turn, often
have their hands tied as well: what can they do if a recipient country does not act 
as agreed? A logical step would be for donors to threaten to provide less budget
support. Yet this is not the usual response. For one thing it does not fit in with the
donor culture. “Donors are softies”, is how Molenaers & Renard put it (2007: 146).
When it comes to the crunch they are keen to give money. That is why they are 
in Africa, Latin America or Asia. The money has to be set aside, not least to fulfil
international agreements. Development aid is still primarily a moral activity.
Donors want to relieve poverty, not to act like businessmen, and shy away from
the human consequences of shutting off the supply of aid funds. That also means
having to wait on the sidelines, and that is something donors do not like doing. 
A major additional problem is that donors are rarely able to present a united front
(Renard 2006).
Withdrawing aid has proven a poor sanctioning instrument. Although budget
support was stopped following Meles Zenawi’s corrupt involvement in the 2005
elections in Ethiopia, it is still de facto present in the form of sectoral support. In
2005, the Ugandan president Museveni wanted to extend his term, in contradic-
tion of the constitution and donors’ wishes. The Netherlands, one of the many
donors in Uganda, reduced the aid budget slightly, as if that would change 
Museveni’s mind. More recently, following a debate in the Netherlands, the Rwan-
dan development budget was also cut back. This happened after a draft report by
the United Nations had designated Rwanda as a possible troublemaker in the
conflict in East Congo. The Netherlands also recently imposed a reduction on aid
to Pakistan. All these sanctions were a result of Dutch national politics, and had
nothing to do with foreign policy. In fact, such politically correct interventions
undermine the negotiating position of the Netherlands in the country itself and
hamper the process of setting out a long-term development strategy. Their small
scale alone means they have no effect on the recipient countries. Six decades of
development aid have shown that there is little point imposing ex-post condition-
alities and that sanctions of this scale, imposed retroactively, have little effect
(Collier 2007; Molenaers & Renard 2007; Moss et al. 2008).
A comparable problem occurs in the context of combating corruption. Here, too,
donors should dose the aid effectively, but have difficulties in doing so. Research
has shown that corrupt regimes have received just as much money before as after
the introduction of measures to combat corruption (Collier 2007). Although
demands were imposed, donors were keen to spend their money, making the
imposition of demands usually no more than a formality (Collier 2007; Easterly
2006; Moss et al. 2006; Paris 2004; wrr 2001). A typical example is that of Kenya,
which repeatedly asked for, and received, money despite it being common knowl-
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edge that it did not meet Western conditions. Corruption has systematically gone
unpunished. Researchers like Birdsall (2007) and Molenaers & Renard (2007)
therefore contend that the problem of development policy is that conditions are
imposed too weakly with donors not making adequate use of the exit option.
The donor community has therefore manoeuvred itself into a difficult position in
many African countries. A substantial number of countries have since acquired
presidents who, for a long time, were successful in achieving economic growth,
and who were popular with the people and donors as a result, but who then gradu-
ally started to exhibit autocratic tendencies. Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and
Cameroon are obvious examples, but there are others. The question is what can be
done about it. In practice, donors do not always seem to break free. They move
neither forwards nor backwards. It seems as if a new patronage system has come
about in which donors and recipients hold each other captive (Mwenda & Tangri
2005).
‘Ownership’ and ‘participation’
Giving aid is a complicated activity which assumes that the givers permanently
take account of the effects of their interventions, and use these experiences to
adapt their behaviour. This applies to every form of aid, including development
aid. Within the world of development aid that problem is usually addressed in
terms of ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’. The question is what value those terms
have.
The basic idea behind ownership is that countries themselves determine as much
as possible how they see their future. The West must not act in a veiled neo-colo-
nial way by deciding for other countries what is good for them. In addition, so
goes the reasoning, it is arrogant to claim that others can be the owner of the
development of specific countries – development can only be brought about by the
countries themselves. In 1999, as an instrument for giving substance to owner-
ship, the World Bank and the imf determined that loan and grant activities would,
in the future, have to take place on the basis of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(prsp), a document in which countries detail their future plans, referred to in
French-speaking countries as a Cadre stratégique pour la croissance et la réduction
de la pauvreté (cscrp). The prsps defined the ownership of the development
perspective. Because Western donors also wanted to impose demands on the
extent to which these plans were sustained, design criteria were formulated,
including the obligation to draw up the texts in a participative way. There is now a
series of prsps with all kinds of different names. Some countries are already
engaged in their third generation of prsps. The question is what does this all
mean?
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Research has shown that most prsps, certainly those of the first generation, were
compiled by Western consultants. Burkina Faso initially had its prsp written by
the World Bank and even Niger’s second prsp, which dates from 2007, was still
written in Washington. Only the more ‘robust’ African countries, such as Tanza-
nia, write their own. The interactive component is usually restricted to the organi-
zation of a round of consultations whereby, in many cases, the participants are also
paid to be present on the day the plans are presented. In Afghanistan this consulta-
tion session was actually held while the Afghan National Development Strategy
was already being prepared for print. In the second generation of prsps the word
participation was sometimes even replaced by ‘partnership’, while ‘ownership’
was replaced by ‘demand-driven’. The main reason for using such terms was to say
what Western donors wanted to hear (Cheru 2006; Cornwall & Brock 2005, iob
2008a; Molenaers & Renard 2007; Rombouts 2006). Public ‘participation’ usually
amounted to little more than a technocratic legitimacy session (Hickey & Mohan
2008; Kamruzzaman 2009). There was rarely room for dissident opinions. On
paper, the construction of prsps is a step towards achieving another balance
between givers and recipients. However, in practice, that is very limited (Grant &
Marcus 2009).
Ownership is also problematic in other ways, certainly in the context of develop-
ing countries. One question is who is the owner of the country? Sometimes this 
is the president and his supporters, but that is then because he has appropriated a
lot of assets of the country, which is not exactly what is meant by ownership. 
‘The people’ is a similar abstraction, since it is seldom able to express itself in its
entirety. Parliaments function insufficiently as the voice of society and political
parties are usually opportunistic coalitions. On top of this, choosing specific
groups – for example parties in government – is always a choice which excludes
other groups.
In their turn, donors are partly responsible for the erosion of the term ownership.
Many donors still attach a lot of conditions to their aid. First of all, recipients are
less free to spend the aid than is suggested. After the deduction of debt relief, the
costs of students from developing countries studying in donor countries, the costs
of caring for asylum-seekers, the part of technical assistance hired in from the
donor countries, the share of tied aid and administration costs, the portion of
worldwide official aid that can be spent freely (referred to in the jargon as ‘country
programmable aid’) was around 50 percent in 2009 while, two decades earlier, it
was still around 80 percent. Secondly, a lot of donors interfere in the substantive
choices made. Many Western donors are keen to emphasize ownership, but also
believe that attention must be primarily paid to women, rural development, civil
society, the poorest or the judiciary. This is illustrated by the confrontations which
take place every year between the priorities of the donors which are, or should be,
passed on via the embassies and the wishes of the recipient countries. Western
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donors also determine the investment programmes during the board meetings of
the World Bank or budget discussions in their own countries.
Ownership is therefore problematic in two ways. On the developing countries’
side there are rarely any bodies which can be regarded as representative owners.
On the donors’ side, there is a tendency to continuously make permanent substan-
tive demands on how aid is spent. The problem with all this is not, first and fore-
most, that recipient countries are simply not able to implement their own devel-
opment processes, or that donors have ideas about how to spend the aid. The
problem is actually that it does not help to batter such forms of complexity with
slogans like ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ – terms which suggest the existence of
problem-free aid relations. Strikingly enough all this is a source of some irritation,
but not of more profound reflection.
It may well be useful to start borrowing from theories created in other practices.
Birdsall (2007b) suggests adopting the ‘primum non nocere’ theory from the
world of medicine: only do something if you know for certain that it is going to
work. This is an appealing thought but it ignores the fact that aid can work well on
one level and have negative effects on another. It also fails to answer the question
of who is really the ‘owner’. However, the idea can also be borrowed from the
healthcare sector that the contact between patient and doctor should not just be
about a party with demand communicating with a party with supply – although
this market metaphor is becoming increasingly popular in healthcare as well – but
rather a party with a question and a party with an answer. That answer then simul-
taneously implies a judgement regarding the question and even includes a
counter-question and an invitation to engage in a dialogue – which is what good
doctors do.
Accountability
The donor response as regards an intervention ethic does not usually go beyond
indicating the presence of accountability mechanisms, although this too is debat-
able. Development aid is an intervention on another’s territory. That requires
accountability to the country in question, and that is something that rarely occurs
in practice. It is Western citizens who vote and give money; citizens in developing
countries have little say. Development organizations are also more motivated to
please Western voters than to give account to the people they are actually
supposed to be helping. This applies both to the many ngos that receive their
financing from donor countries, and to the imf and the World Bank (Easterly
2008b). It is ironic that the goal of much development aid is democratization,
while aid can actually imply a weakening of democratic relations. Mkandawire
(2001) calls this the ‘democracy paradox’. Parliaments, civil society organizations
and the media in developing countries should be offered an active insight into the
aid provided, its goal, the method used and its consequences. In this context, it
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cannot simply be assumed that the authorities or government represent the voice
of ‘the people’. It is therefore important for donors to discuss their intervention
policy actively and to search for ways in which to involve citizens in developing
countries, without undermining democratic structures and relationships.
The outcome of this accountability cycle ought to weigh heavily in political deci-
sions in donor countries. Although the importance of mutual accountability was
emphasized in the Paris Declaration (2005) and later in Accra (2008), its signifi-
cance is primarily that governments need to be mutually accountable, and, in prac-
tice, this principle still has too few operational mechanisms (oecd/dac 2008a).
Existing examples show primarily how difficult it is to develop good instruments,
and this sometimes leads to a specialist and technical process (as in Vietnam), and
sometimes to the creation of a new parallel structure in the form of a ‘parliament’
of stakeholders set up alongside the existing structures (as in Mozambique) (Steer
& Wathne 2009). Incidentally, the World Bank is also intending to take this latter
course of action. In addition, donors could experiment more with new forms of
accountability: why, for example, could they not use evaluation reports by local
ombudsmen?
The Western donor community really has no adequate intervention ethics.
‘Anything goes’ is still the adage for aid to Africa, with each project being a
welcome addition. Western concepts like participation and ownership are
borrowed, but turn out to be either interpreted in a technocratic way, or to have
little material significance, or a combination of both. Sometimes the use of
language is even expressed in ideological terms, for example in the use of the term
‘demand-driven’. In a world in which people are short of everything, there is
demand for everything. Another specific problem is that people always ask for
things they know, and not for what they do not know. As Henry Ford once
complained, if you ask a cowboy what means of transport he wants, he will ask for
a fast horse. There is therefore little point talking about aid as being ‘demand-
driven’. The question is how aid can most adequately respond to what is needed,
and how it can be given in a way that makes a maximum contribution to the capac-
ity of recipient countries to solve problems themselves. For this a different vocab-
ulary is needed.
5.5 compartmentalization: underestimating other
instruments
The interdependencies between countries and issues are increasing and, as a
result, development aid is becoming more and more tied to broader issues. The
question is what this means for classical aid and for the development dimension of
policy in other areas. The institutional system of development aid has been strug-
gling with this problem since its inception. Originally it was still relatively easy to
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deal with, as Western countries regarded development aid purely as a task for
multilateral organizations. Those organizations, in particular the un, appeared to
provide the perfect framework for tackling almost all major global problems.
However, the un lost its capacity to act, aid started to be organized more and more
bilaterally, and the need to look beyond the classical limits of aid became more and
more obvious. In the Netherlands in 1990 this led to former minister Pronk
making a daring attempt to link classical development aid to other themes and
issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990). However, the broad picture he sketched
of the interwoven nature of themes and countries turned out to be very general. In
practice, therefore, policy aimed at development increasingly turned into develop-
ment aid policy. “Instead of being part of a coherent policy approach to develop-
ment processes, development aid has progressively evolved into something indi-
vidual, separate from war and peace, from climate and the environment, from
migration, and from religion and culture. (…) This is what development aid and
development cooperation were meant for: to contribute to a developing country,
from the inside, to help them to progress. (…) It was never ever the intention to
achieve all this directly via the development aid itself.” That was how Jan Pronk, in
his Evert Vermeer lecture (2008: 182), reflected on what has happened to develop-
ment aid. It has become too much of an enclosed space.
5.5.1 new themes
Since then the need to link aid and cross-border policy in other fields more with
each other has only increased. That has taken place via a number of dimensions,
some of which are discussed below.
Migration
Even if we limit ourselves to remittances, there can be no doubting the importance
of migration for development (Birdsall et al. 2005; Lavenex & Kunz 2008; Skeldon
2009; World Bank 2008b). The total quantity of money involved in cash transfers
by migrants to their families in their countries of origin has been much greater in
recent years than official aid by donors to developing countries. What 
is more, the effects of migration extend further than financial transfers alone and,
for example, include knowledge transfer and the creation of cross-border
networks. However, the idea that migration can be a development instrument
exists primarily in countries in the South: Turkey and India even have separate
ministries for their diaspora (compatriots who have gone to live in other coun-
tries). In the West, the debate on this theme still has to get off the ground.
Trade
Trade and development are inextricably linked in a similar fashion and, although
there has been some degree of success, defining appropriate consequences for
policy has proved a difficult process. Trade liberalization has been high on the
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agendas of many policymakers and ngos for a long time now. Opinions differ as
to whether the large wto consultation round (the Doha development round) can
still achieve much for developing countries. However, poor countries can still
benefit from preferential access to more markets, as this helps them to diversify
their economies and become less dependent on the export of natural resources.
Some work still has to be done to achieve the full tax and quota-free access to rich
countries for all export products promised to the least developed countries in the
un Millennium Declaration of September 2000. Although the Everything But
Arms (eba) initiative offers the least developed countries more possibilities to
export almost anything – except weapons – without levies or quotas to the eu, 
the strict rules of origin are still an obstacle. Collier referred to an example in 2008
that, according to these rules, a Ugandan fishing boat on which a Kenyan is
employed is no longer allowed to export fish under the eba programme. Attention
also needs to be paid to the development-friendliness of the international trade
regime, and to finding a balance between free trade and fair trade. The ultimate
aim is to help developing countries benefit from participation in the international
trade system (Gallagher 2008; Khor 2008; Stiglitz & Charlton 2006; Wade 2003).
The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technol-
ogy for Development (iaastd) report, entitled Agriculture at a Crossroads
(2009), is interesting in this context. Modelled on the structure and method of
working of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc), a report was
compiled after more than four years’ work by around four hundred experts, orga-
nized by a geographically evenly balanced bureau with representatives from thirty
governments and thirty private parties, including ngos, producers and consumer
organizations. The report highlighted the fact that the current international trade
regime for agricultural products generates too few benefits for small-scale farmers,
while excessively rapid trade liberalization can permanently disrupt the rural
sector. Without any suitable and sufficiently operational institutions and infras-
tructure, large-scale opening up of the markets will wipe out small local produc-
ers, thereby causing them to miss out on the new opportunities on the world
market. The conclusion was that the poorest countries will be the net losers of
most liberalization scenarios.
Financial stability
Financial stability is a third issue linking development policy and other policy,
since developing countries have less resilience when it comes to coping with the
consequences of financial crises. Following the financial crises in Latin America 
in the 1980s and Asia in the 1990s, many developing countries armed themselves
against financial instability by maintaining high official reserves, but that has
opportunity costs. Rodrik calculated that these countries jointly lose one percent
of their gross national product every year (Stiglitz came up with an even higher
amount), because they maintain large monetary reserves, often in low-interest
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American government bonds, while the potential yield of investments in the
economy of these countries is itself much greater. This insurance against financial
instability – which also helps to keep the imf wolf from the door – can cost coun-
tries more than the funds they have available for poverty reduction. The interests
of developing countries should therefore receive serious attention in international
financial fora responsible for drawing up policy. Unfortunately this is only
achieved with difficulty (Ocampo & Stiglitz 2008; Patomäki 2001; Rodrik 2006;
Rodrik & Subramanian 2008; Stiglitz 2006; un 2009b; unctad 2009d; unido
2008; World Bank 2009a).
During the current crisis it again became clear how big a problem it is that there are
no mechanisms for promoting the coherence, consistency and coordination of
global economic and social policy, let alone mechanisms in which developing
countries can participate. All countries suffer from a lack of coherent policy, but
the economic and social problems are particularly large in developing countries
with few resources and a limited capacity to moderate the consequences of the
crisis. One of the consequences of this is that the crisis will considerably reduce
the – already quite remote – chance of the millennium goals being achieved by
2015. In the meantime, various parties are advocating setting up a better socioeco-
nomic governance framework. For example, Joseph Stiglitz advocated the creation
of an elected and representative Global Economic Coordination Council as part of
the un, with annual meetings of heads of state, to assess and promote the devel-
opment process and to function as a “democratic representative alternative to the
g20” (Dervis 2005; Handley 2009; Rueda-Sabater et al. 2009; un 2009a, 2009d).
The realization of such a Council is not a foregone conclusion, however.
Clearly, the fate of developing countries cannot be seen separately from the way in
which the Western world deals with the system of regulating financial markets.
More and more of the large developing countries are being admitted to interna-
tional fora. However, the vast majority of developing countries have no real influ-
ence in the g7, g8, g20 or other ad hoc fora set up to host general negotiations on
the policy response to the consequences of the crisis. They thus run the risk of
developed countries devising new rules and reforms, which are subsequently
imposed as global international standards without any account being taken of the
specific situation and interest of countries with much smaller and less sophisti-
cated financial sectors (Frenkel & Rapetti 2009; Lin 2009a; un 2009a, 2009b).
Fiscal coordination
In the wake of the financial crisis, the international fiscal system has been placed
higher up the agenda of, among others, the g20. Not only rich countries are miss-
ing out on the tax revenues because of the possibilities offered by international
monetary transfers, but so too are developing countries, which have less well-
developed fiscal systems and fewer resources. The many definition and data prob-
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lems make it difficult to determine exactly what amounts are involved. Various
experts assume, however, that illegal financial transactions, the existence of tax
havens, tax evasion and transfer pricing by multinationals (more than half of inter-
national trade takes place within companies) are causing developing countries to
miss out on revenue which is many times greater than the amount of aid provided
worldwide. In a recent testimony before the Committee on Financial Services of
the American House of Representatives, expert Raymond Baker calculated that 
for every dollar Western governments give in development aid “crooked Western
banks, businesses and middlemen of various descriptions have been taking back
up to ten dollars of illicit proceeds under the table”. Without international action
and agreements, nothing can be done to stop this, so actively helping to bring
them about can actually do more to fight corruption and stimulate development
than a tenth of a percentage more or less of aid (Baker 2009; Bhat 2009; Christian
Aid 2009; Cobham 2005; Kar & Cartwright-Smith 2009; Oxfam 2009; Task Force
on Financial Integrity and Economic Development 2009).
Food
The next example we can take is food, since it too is an issue via which develop-
ment aid interferes with other policy. The pressure on food supplies will rise along
with the increase in the world population and the changing diets of millions of
Asians, Africans and Latin Americans. In order to ensure that 9.1 billion people
can still be fed in forty years time, agricultural production has to increase by 
70 percent, and in developing countries by even 100 percent. Achieving this target
is beset with problems. Some of these can be traced back to the political and
economic interests of rich (and therefore primarily Western) countries. However,
they are also related to the political, institutional and technical infrastructure in
developing countries. Large marginal rural areas in Africa and Asia currently lack
technology and markets, while their populations are growing and are dependent
on local food production. In many places this results in the inefficient use of land
and water, and often even overcropping. This leads to exhausted soils and even
more food scarcity, generating a spiral of ever-decreasing sustainability. By linking
these areas to markets and thereby offering the population the opportunity of
cultivating and selling high-quality cash crops in addition to food crops, a surplus
can be created that can be invested in fertilizer use and better agricultural tech-
nologies. This makes it possible to break out of the downward spiral and retain
millions of hectares of fertile soil for the future. Only then will these areas no
longer be dependent on food aid, and only then will it be possible to contribute
efficiently to world food supplies via a system of specialization in appropriate
high-quality export products. Consequently it is in everyone’s interest that people
in areas with marginal agriculture production start changing their production
strategies and link up with a suitable market (fao 2008; iac 2004; Rabbinge &
Bindraban 2005).
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What we are currently facing is an exceptionally fragile global food system. The
regulations governing the market for agricultural products, which oscillate
between protectionism and accelerated liberalization, the possibilities of speculat-
ing with the prices of agricultural products, the growing importance of biofuels,
the policy on intellectual property (which means that more and more crops are
being patented), the need for strategic coordination and the imminent threat of
shortages of water, soil and fertilizer mean a global perspective is required, and a
development policy that reaches much further than the classical oda instruments
(Fresco 2009).
Climate
A final example of the need to link development aid to other themes is climate
policy. Ideally, national and international efforts would focus on rich and poor
countries together determining climate and development goals in which industrial
policy in, and the transfer of technology and knowledge to, developing countries
is made a priority, alongside effective mechanisms for emissions trading and the
preservation of production and consumption in Western countries. On top of this,
adaptation and mitigation need to be integrated into what the World Bank refers
to as a “climate-smart development strategy that increases resilience, reduces the
threat of further warming, and improves development outcomes”. The negative
additional effects of mitigation also need to be examined since they can hinder the
realization of development goals. In this context the World Bank calls the reduc-
tion of co2 through the use of grain biofuels questionable, and points out that the
United States and the eu have diverted fertilizer for food to the production of
biofuels and, by doing so, have contributed to higher food prices and increased
poverty.
It is clear that all this goes beyond what classical development aid is capable of. It
involves knowledge policy and transfers and technology policy, funds for technol-
ogy transfer and capacity building in developing countries (as previously via the
successful Montreal Protocol to counteract damage to the ozone layer by cfcs),
intellectual property rights and the negotiations at the wto about Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (trips), actual and potential conflicts between wto
trade rules and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (meas), techniques and
systems for energy saving and for the generation of sustainable energy, new
financing instruments with non-governmental parties and governments (propos-
als for international taxes and redistribution have been circulating for years), the
setting up of adequate and inclusive international institutions, and the promotion,
both internationally and nationally, of policy that is coherent as regards its effect
on development. It is impossible for a minister for development cooperation to
create and monitor the overall agenda needed for this in the coming decades.
Consequently, just as for other global issues, new institutional and administrative
arrangements will have to be developed.
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In addition, the organization and design of development aid will have to be such
that it supports developing countries with the necessary long-term planning
required in the context of, among other things, reductions in the physical and
financial consequences of unpredictable and extreme weather conditions, changes
in healthcare, the establishment of insurance policies and social protection for the
most vulnerable in society, infrastructural planning, a ‘climate-intelligent’
approach to urban development, ensuring governments remain solvent in coun-
tries affected by disasters, adequate food production, and the transformation from
energy supply to energy consumption. In recent reports both the un and the
World Bank underline the fact that a generally applicable model for this is even
more unlikely to be available than in the case of other development policy because
the differences between countries are considerable and very little is still known
about how adaptation can be properly designed. The international aid architecture
is insufficiently equipped for this, since, according to the un in its World Economic
and Social Survey 2009: “Despite the demonstrated effect of the Marshall Plan
framework in Europe in the 1940s, ‘aid’ has developed over the years into a
mixture of assistance for an assortment of specific projects and ad hoc responses to
unexpected shocks with little apparent coherence, in respect either of the coun-
tries that receive it or of its global distribution. Donor conferences are driven more
by what donors want to promote than by the desire to support specific multi-year
national programmes. It is difficult to see how aid can ever be really effective with-
out an articulation of macroeconomic objectives and detailed programmes for
infrastructure investment, etc. and without a coherent account of priorities – what
should be done and in what order – and a sense of the necessary complementarities
among different investments and projects” (see also Lee et al. 2009; Ockwell et al.
2009; oecd 2009, Srinivas 2009; un 2009c; unctad 2009d; World Bank
2009b).
5.5.2 searching for coherence
Cross-border issues and the relationship between aid and other policy have always
received a certain amount of attention within the world of development aid. In
policy terms, issues like ‘policy coherence for development’ have gradually moved
up the agenda. The basic idea is, on the one hand, to prevent the positive effects of
development aid from being undermined by the negative effects of policy on other
areas such as trade, migration or environmental policy and, on the other hand, to
ensure that policy in other areas has positive spillovers for developing countries.
In practice, however, policy coherence for development is by no means easy to
achieve. Finding good instruments proved difficult. This had to do with the func-
tioning of policy systems (which work better with policy issues that each have
their own organization and budget), with conflicts of interests, as well as with the
complexity of the material itself. Coherence issues are also so international in
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nature that it is difficult for individual countries to create their own policy. For
example, trade policy in Europe is the exclusive competence of the European
Union, while climate and financial and fiscal systems are also international
matters. Coherence therefore plays a very explicit role in international fora,
despite individual countries also having possibilities to make a substantial contri-
bution. The problem is that they often have no idea how to do that.
In 2005, the Commission and the evaluation departments for development policy
of the eu member states jointly tried to acquire an insight into how to apply the
principles for coordination, complementarity and policy coherence. This revealed
that coherence for development clearly features on the agendas of the various
member states, and that a reservoir of practical experiences has since been built up
as a result of them adopting a pragmatic approach to the issue. However, there
turns out to be no real systematic approach. A key conclusion in the synthesis of
these evaluations was that promoting policy coherence continues to be a work in
progress requiring permanent political support at the highest level in the Euro-
pean Union and in the member states (ecdpm and icei 2006; euhes 2007).
The Netherlands is one of the leading nations in this respect. The coherence unit,
which has existed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since May 2002, has been
presented as a shining example to other countries in many international compar-
isons. The Netherlands has headed the Center for Global Development’s annual
Commitment to Development Index for several years now, although the index
itself can be called into question: the Netherlands’ leading position is due not only
to its high score on the aid index, but also to above-average scores on some of the
other six indicators. Like other countries, the Netherlands regularly publishes a
memorandum on progress in achieving coherence, and these show that, within
the framework of concrete dossiers, attention has been paid to the development
dimension. However, the relationship between development policy and other
themes is, for the time being, primarily an academic issue. Many of the debates
conducted are predictable in nature. The Minister for Development Cooperation is
keen to become involved in broader themes. However, other ministries are not so
keen on the idea. Furthermore, as soon as the question is asked as to whether part
of the 0.8 percent of gdp reserved for development cooperation can be used for
these areas, the willingness to debate soon dissipates (Engel et al. 2009; Ministry
of Foreign Affairs 2006, 2008).
Another country that serves as an international example is Sweden. In 2003, it
came to the conclusion that development cooperation has to be structured along
three main lines: classical aid, policy coherence and international public goods. In
March 2008, the new Swedish government sent a memorandum entitled Global
challenges – Our responsibility to parliament with the intention being to tackle
observed deficiencies in the implementation of policy coherence for development.
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The initiative was greeted with broad political and social support. Improvements
are being sought in the field of management, organization and follow-up, knowl-
edge and analysis in the ministries, cooperation with various Swedish actors, and
the eu’s work in the field of policy coherence. This has led to the introduction of
contact points in ministries, interministerial working groups on a number of
prioritized themes, and a special unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Although progress has been made, institutional structures do little to alleviate the
problem of conflicting interests. Sweden is, for example, a major arms exporter,
but this issue is not referred to in government memoranda on coherence (Govern-
ment Offices of Sweden 2008; Odén 2009; Odén & Wohlgemuth 2007).
European coherence
As with other policies, creating coherence policy within the European Union is
complicated because of the many procedures involved. However, the European
Union is in an excellent position to give the policy real substance, and has recently
become more active as regards the coherence dossier. Article 178 of the Treaty of
Maastricht (1992) already contained a slightly vague phrasing to the effect that, 
as regards the execution of policy which is “likely to affect developing countries”
the Union has to take account of the development goals formulated in Article 177.
Campaigns by ngos (with the support of French and German development
ministries) against export subsidies for meat (1993) and for fishing agreements
(1996) (again with support from the German ministry) pressurized the Commis-
sion to publish a report on coherence issues, but this did not produce any real
results. All in all, little progress was made on this dossier in the 1990s. However,
things have changed over the last few years, and there is now a serious focus on
coherence policy. In its first document on policy coherence for development, the
European Commission (2005) states that aid is important but insufficient to
enable developing countries to achieve the millennium goals. It selected eleven
areas for special attention in the coherence field – including trade, agriculture,
fisheries, transport and migration – and, after the General Affairs and External
Relations Council (gaerc) added climate change to make twelve, the ambitions 
of the eu as regards policy coherence for development were laid down in the Euro-
pean Consensus for Development, which the Council, the European Parliament
and the Commission ratified in December 2005 (Official Journal C46 of
24.2.2006).
Despite all the good intentions, however, policy coherence has had little impact on
development in practice up till now. This became clear when Europe decided, in
February 2009, to raise dairy subsidies again. It is precisely these kinds of agricul-
tural subsidies which are the casus belli for many ngos and academic researchers.
They accuse the West of hypocrisy by demanding in negotiations on trade liberal-
ization that developing countries open up their markets while, at the same time,
they support their own agricultural sectors with subsidies. The rich countries
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jointly spend around 700 million dollars a day on agriculture subsidies, and during
almost all of the past twenty-five years, the oecd countries spent more on agri-
cultural subsidies than the total gross national product of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In 1995, agreement was reached at the wto to abolish all agricultural export subsi-
dies, and in 2005 it was agreed in Hong Kong that this should be realized by the
end of 2013. It is very doubtful whether this will be the case. Until that time
national producers in developing countries may be confronted, in any event, by
unfairly subsidized competition from countries which already have a head start
because their productivity is much higher (Bourguignon et al. 2008; Bretherton &
Vogler 2008; Carbone 2008; Dearden 2008; Egenhofer et al. 2006; Olsen 2008).
European intentions as regards policy coherence also appear to have been forced
into the background in the negotiations between Europe and 77 poor countries on
the updating of trade agreements in the form of Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (epas). A group of developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the
Pacific have maintained preferential trade relations with the European Union since
1964. On 23 June 2000, the acp-eu Partnership Agreement was signed in
Cotonou. The agreement came into effect on 1 April 2003 for a term of twenty
years. As the Cotonou agreement is not in conformity with wto rules – the acp
countries are given preferential treatment over other developing countries without
an ‘objective criterion’ – the eu has divided the acp countries into six regions to
enable negotiations to take place about regional trade agreements, also known as
epas, which are wto-proof. The eu wanted to conclude these negotiations by 
20 December 2007 but only thirty-five of the seventy-seven acp countries were
prepared to sign an agreement at that juncture. To date, only one epa is almost
ready, between the eu and cariforum (the Caribbean area), while interim agree-
ments have been entered into for the other regions. Many acp countries and ngos
were critical of the stance of the eu in the negotiations, for example because it
applied pressure on developing countries to agree quickly, it wanted to broaden
the negotiations to include issues which go beyond the wto treaties (the liberal-
ization of trade in services and the ‘Singapore issues’ in the areas of competition
policy, foreign investments, tenders and trade facilitation). The eu also wanted a
restriction on the possibility for acp countries to tax exports, despite this being
important for these countries’ incomes, and on the possibility for acp countries to
protect economic sectors (infant industry clauses). An icco report (2008) shows
that nine of the thirteen acp countries questioned were of the opinion that the
epa negotiations would provide no support for regional integration. The negotia-
tions on full epas are currently ongoing and it is unclear when they will be
completed. The ministers of finance and trade of the African Union want to
review a number of stipulations in the provisional agreements in the light of their
own policy space. Moreover, the harmonization of the epa process with initiatives
for regional integration continues to be a problem (Draper 2008; ecdpm 2009a;
Lui & Bilal 2009).
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Coherence at European level is therefore easier said than done. This is also demon-
strated by the Commission’s two-yearly reports. In the first report of September
2007, the criticism of the member states was that there was too little involvement
in coherence for development on the part of ministries other than those responsi-
ble for development cooperation. In many countries the mechanisms for policy
coherence for development were still insufficiently systematic and poorly institu-
tionalized, and there was also a lack of transparency and accountability in this
field. The evaluation assessed progress at European level as satisfactory. In its
recently published second evaluation the Commission again states that progress
has been made at European and national levels, but that the lack of awareness
regarding development in line ministries is an obstacle within the member states,
while it is also often difficult to acquire a clear insight into the eventual impact of
non-development policy on developing countries. According to the Commission
these problems at national level often make themselves felt at European level, and
vice-versa. In the coming period the Commission no longer wants to monitor the
previously selected twelve policy fields but rather focus strategically on five key
development challenges (European Commission 2007, 2009a, 2009b). For some
this does not go far enough, however. In a critical report on policy coherence, for
example, European ngos argue in favour of broadening rather than restricting
coherence for development to include, among other things, measures for combat-
ing food speculation and tax evasion (Concord 2009). This debate is ongoing
and, after consulting the member states and the relevant stakeholders, the
Commission aims to establish a specific and operational work programme for
policy coherence for development in 2010.
Global regulation
Difficult as it is to formulate coherent policy within the European Union, it is an
even greater challenge to achieve that on a global scale. This again became
painfully clear during the recent financial crisis. The crisis makes two things clear:
the regulation framework for financial markets is inadequate and there is no good
system for global economic governance. The crisis of the 1930s, when protection-
ism had its heyday and countries tried to shift problems onto their neighbours, led
to the belief that a crisis like that should never be allowed to happen again. At the
end of the Second World War this resulted in the establishment (1944) of the
Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank and the imf. The un system came
later but never really got off the ground in the economic and social sense. When
the un was set up, the economic and social council (ecosoc), which met for the
first time in January 1946, was intended to function as a coordinating body for
economic and social policy. The imf and the World Bank – unlike, for example, 
the ilo which was set up in 1919 – however, never wanted to be clustered under
the ecosoc umbrella. Separate systems developed for, on the one hand, economic
regulations, with a central role for the World Bank, the wto and the imf, and, on
the other hand, security issues, with a central role for the Security Council. The
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organizations which make up the economic system never really became part of the
un system and acquired their own governance structures. un organizations active
in social and economic areas, like Unesco, Unicef, ilo, who, unctad and undp,
operate at the periphery of the socioeconomic institutional system, while the imf,
the wto and the World Bank make up the heart of it. As a result, the social agenda
has not been properly mandated and the security and economic agenda function
separately from each other.
The idea that broad themes are important is widely accepted in the world of devel-
opment aid. However, the process of finding suitable arrangements has not been
sufficiently developed to date. This has to do with political will but, of course, also
with the complexity of the material – there are no simple ways of giving substance
to coherence and global regulations and it is no easier to do justice to the develop-
ment perspective in the context of complicated issues.
Conclusion
Over a period of sixty years development aid has grown to become an extensive
and complex system. That system has acquired specific characteristics: poverty
reduction in the form of direct aid has become increasingly important while
specific support for growth has receded more and more into the background. The
focus on direct aid has partly been the reason for the enormous proliferation in
organizations. In so far as large-scale programmes for change are advocated, they
are characterized by a very optimistic belief in the possibility of social engineering
and the idea that simple and universal answers exist for developing countries as a
whole. Neither is there a detailed perspective on the question of when interven-
tion is useful and sensible, and when it is not. Lastly, the links with non-classical
policy fields which are relevant to development have not really got off the ground.
All this has generated a substantial agenda for change.
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6 the task ahead
The history of sixty years of development aid can be described as a struggle during
which citizens, governments and multilateral organizations searched, with only
partial success, for ways of getting to grips with an extremely complex
phenomenon. The question is what conclusions can be drawn from this with a
view to future policy. A gloomy assessment about what has been achieved may
lead to the conclusion that continuing development aid is not desirable or sensible,
while the fact that development is a difficult task can quickly become a licence for
continuing along the same, chosen path. The material presented in the previous
five chapters implies, however, that we should neither give up nor blindly carry
on. This chapter is devoted to formulating a more poignant conclusion.
6.1 linking will become increasingly unavoidable
Why do we provide development aid? In chapter 2 we discussed two types of
motives: moral motives and motives which can be traced back to collective self-
interest. Moral motives have always played a major role for individuals, as
reflected in the work of missionaries, modern-day benefit concerts and individual
aid initiatives. The question is, however, to what extent Western governments
should allow this motive to play a part in their policy. Although it can be argued
from a normative perspective that governments also have a moral duty to show
solidarity or charity, that argument makes allowances for political assumptions.
Whether moral reasons are sufficient for granting development aid is then a politi-
cal choice. This is less clear-cut in the case of collective self-interest: the govern-
ment has to ensure that the interests of Western citizens can also be guaranteed in
the long term, as laid down in the constitution. Western countries are becoming
more and more reliant on the international order to realize those interests. Collec-
tive self-interest can therefore be a powerful argument for development aid.
However, it does have to be clear where that interest actually lies.
An argument often put forward in this framework is that a more equal distribution
of opportunities in the world would prevent large migration flows. However,
there is insufficient empirical evidence for that reasoning – in fact, there is more to
support the opposite argument (Bakewell 2008). It is a myth to think that migra-
tion will decrease as developing countries develop. It is precisely in countries
which continue to develop that farmers gravitate to the cities, while city dwellers
migrate to richer countries. For the time being, therefore, any progress by develop-
ing countries is more likely to result in more migration to the West rather than less
(Adepoju et al. 2008; Faist 2008; De Haas 2007; Skeldon 2009; undp 2009). 
Re-migration will only reoccur in a later phase, once expectations with respect to
opportunities have increased significantly in the home country. For example, a lot
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of Greeks and Italians who had emigrated to the Netherlands in the 1950s returned
home fifteen years later. In recent years, a comparable process seems to be taking
place among young adult Dutch citizens of Turkish origin.
The argument that development aid helps the fight against terrorism is similarly
questionable. While it may be the case that extreme poverty can contribute to
terrorists being difficult to locate, this is more likely to be down to the lack of a
good government apparatus than any causal role for poverty. Poverty itself is
rarely the primary cause of terrorism, or even of insurrection. Research has shown
that recent terrorism has its roots in a feeling of discrimination which is sooner
sociocultural than economic (Burke 2007; Rashid 2006). That is also why the lead-
ers usually have middle-class backgrounds – Osama bin Laden is even a member of
the Saudi Arabian elite. The same applied, incidentally, to the many revolutions
that occurred in Europe in centuries past.
Development aid will therefore do little to counteract migration flows or terror-
ism, at least in the short term. However, the interests of Western countries extend
a lot further. For example they – and certainly those with an open economy – have
an economic interest in a properly functioning world market. In the long run,
Africa could be an interesting sales market, and is already a key supplier of natural
resources. However, the essential interests of Western countries go a whole lot
further. In the short term they lie in making agreements on climate objectives, in
the slightly longer term in the global management of energy and food, and in the
even longer term in a stable world order. After all, climate objectives cannot be
realized without countries from the South, and energy and food will inevitably
have to feature on the international agenda as well. Although the energy problem
is still being discussed in terms of the environmental burden, the focus will soon
shift to the problem of scarcity. In theory the earth can still produce enough food,
but that will require much more careful global coordination. Lastly, water scarcity,
biodiversity and the use of increasingly scarce resources are becoming more and
more pressing international problems.
In the longer term the world order itself will be precarious. The world is becom-
ing so much busier and richer that people will have to start living together on the
basis of much stricter conditions. While the world population was 2.5 billion in
1950, by 2050 this is expected to have risen to 9.2 billion, almost four times as
many people. What is more, if current developments continue, these people 
will be a great deal richer. The average gross domestic product per global citizen
in 1950 was 2,109 dollars; in 2000 it was 6,029 dollars (both expressed in the
dollar rate of 1990, see Maddison 2009). No one can predict with any certainty 
whether incomes in the first half of the twenty-first century will again rise by a
factor of three, but it would be administratively and politically prudent to allow
for this. This means we have to assume that, by 2050, there will be four times as
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many people on the planet who, on average, are nine times richer than in 1950.
An administrative and political response will have to be found to these substan-
tial changes because it is clear that, in a world as busy as that, we have to share
space and resources with more people and it is essential to search for mecha-
nisms to limit the unavoidable mutual tensions. History has taught us that 
reinforcing mutual dependencies is probably the best approach. This is how
flammable employment relations were pacified at the beginning of the twentieth
century in the West, and how the tensions between Germany and France were
channelled after the Second World War through the setting up of the eec. It
would be playing for high stakes not to exercise the same caution at global level.
Not only for moral, but also for functional reasons, policy must focus on keeping
countries and people together wherever possible. We cannot afford to settle for
less.
Embedded globalization
It has become clear that scrupulous globalization will be impossible if globaliza-
tion continues in the same form as in past decades. The financial crisis has made
it obvious to former globalization cheerleaders that global economic develop-
ment cannot simply be left to markets and companies. World leaders like former
British Prime Minister Brown and American president Obama have now
declared the Washington Consensus dead in the water, and all kinds of national
and international fora have started reflecting on how globalization can be orga-
nized in a manner which is less risky and less vulnerable to crises. One example
is the months-long discussion in The Financial Times on “The future of capital-
ism”. The focus is no longer solely on better and more effective global agreements
and supervision. At least as important is the question how – with a new popular
concept – ‘the resilience’ of national states can be increased so that they are 
better able to cope with contagion by crises (climate, food, financial) and global
(economic and other) shocks (dfid 2009b; Evans et al. 2010). This leads to
important follow-up questions. The sudden return of governments, bailing out
banks and state-owned companies and trying to counteract the lack of demand
by means of fiscal policy, “has reinforced the truism that without the state,
market economies would not be able to thrive. Without public authorities 
capable of exercising legitimate coercion, capitalism would be impossible”
(Hemerijck et al. 2009).
The question is along which lines a new world will take shape. During the period
that is often referred to as the golden years of capitalism – the post-war period of
historically unprecedented economic growth which ended with the oil crisis of
1973 – the most important role in the world system was allocated to national
states. The decision to liberalize trade was taken during an international confer-
ence organized in the Mount Washington hotel in Bretton Woods in July 1944,
which was intended to prepare the structure of the post-war international
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economic system. However, to prevent a new world crisis like that of the 1930s,
countries were given room to make their own policy choices – for example setting
a lower interest rate in order to generate more employment. Cross-border move-
ment of capital, now sometimes referred to as ‘hot money’, was strongly regulated
and controlled. To Keynes, currently enjoying a resurgence in popularity in the
wake of the financial crisis, but back then a leading figure at Bretton Woods, those
capital controls were the most important outcome of this conference.
These agreements were a clear response to a previous period. In his famous publi-
cation entitled The Great Transformation (1944), Karl Polanyi argues that the
economic liberalism of the 1920s with its belief in a self-regulating market mecha-
nism had resulted in the elimination of “all interventionist policies which inter-
fered with the freedom of markets”, and had disembedded the economy from
society. The ensuing increase in inequality, instability and insecurity resulted in
the recession of the 1930s and the rise of fascism. To Polanyi, “the notion of
embeddedness underlines the fact that economic activity is created and shaped 
by political decisions, social conventions, and shared norms and understandings.
Although free markets are often misperceived as natural, sovereign, self-
contained, and self-regulating, a market economy cannot exist independently of
the society and rules in which it is located”. John Ruggie, professor of interna-
tional political economy at Harvard, therefore referred to the hey-day of capital-
ism since Bretton Woods as “the compromise of embedded liberalism”.
This post-war structure started to reach its limits during the international reces-
sions of 1973-1974 and 1981-1982, and the golden years of post-war capitalism were
followed by the neoliberal decades of Thatcher and Reagan and the Washington
Consensus, which were characterized by lower growth figures. We are now in a
transnational phase in which global markets are becoming more and more disem-
bedded from societies and national states due to new technologies and liberaliza-
tion, privatization and deregulation. In recent years, more attention has gradually
been paid to the downsides of this, and to actual and potential losers in the
increasing internationalization of trade, financial flows and production (see for
example the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 2004).
The financial crisis and imminent climate and food crises are like salt in the
wound.
Acknowledging that globalization is not fatal but (re)shapeable throws up funda-
mental questions about the architecture of international economic and political
relationships (Findlay & O’Rourke 2007). Two parallel movements can be
observed here. Although they appear to be contradictory at first glance, closer
examination reveals that this does not necessarily have to be the case. On the one
hand there is a proliferation of proposals to regulate and organize more at global
level – for example monitoring national economies and codes of conduct for the
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financial sector, appeals and modest initiatives to tackle tax havens, proposals for
global taxes such as a tax on airline tickets or a levy on financial transactions or
Tobin tax (Schmidt 2009), research by the imf into an obligatory insurance
premium for banks to pay compensation for problems they cause, a proposal by
the governor of the Chinese Central Bank to introduce a new global backup
currency (instead of the dollar), the agreement by the g20 to allow the imf to issue
new ‘special drawing rights’ (sdrs), and last but not least activities by various un
organizations to realize a global “social protection floor” (ilo & who 2009). On
the other hand more space is being created by countries to protect them individu-
ally from the negative consequences of globalization. Examples include measures
to protect companies or economic sectors and new initiatives for industrial policy,
measures to limit speculation and the negative consequences (higher exchange
rates) of volatile international financial flows – hot money – as implemented, for
instance, by Brazil and Taiwan in November 2009 (Coelho & Gallagher 2010;
Ostry et al. 2010), and lastly the increased focus on regional cooperation, integra-
tion and fundraising for mutual financial support and more policy space with
regard to global organizations and within the world economy (for example the
Chiang Mai initiative by the asean countries, the Andean Reserve Fund, the Latin
American Reserve Fund).
These attempts to embed markets more powerfully again at national level and to
give national states more policy space to protect themselves against international
crises and their consequences without losing out on the real or potential benefits
of globalization, together comprise a complicated balancing act with numerous
uncertainties and unknown outcomes. No one knows yet what this ‘embedded
globalization’ is going to look like. That will be thrashed out in the coming period
and we ourselves will be involved in the process. However, because autarky is not
an option and no one expects to see a federal world state come about in the short
term, were that to be desirable at all, new international coordination mechanisms
need to be developed so that interdependencies can be managed more effectively,
global public goods provided, cross-border problems solved, and rules of the game
agreed which give national states sufficient policy space to solve the problems
globalization can cause for some or all of their people.
In the near future it will be worthwhile exploring this general point of departure
in more detail and also, in that context, to ascertain the exact nature of the long-
term interests of specific countries and what these imply for the way in which the
international order can best be shaped. In that respect one could follow the exam-
ple set by Norway which recently adopted a theme-based approach to establishing
its long-term interests. It is telling that this exercise was undertaken by a minister
for development aid who wanted to find an answer to the question before starting
to write a policy document on aid. His conclusion was that investing in the world
order is both necessary and sensible and that development aid can serve as an
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instrument for achieving this. In that respect we must, as Nobel Prize winner
Stiglitz put it, go beyond “the shame of enlightened self-interest”. The develop-
ment task is no longer something we do out of kindness, but because it is unavoid-
able.
6.2 the task: to be more development- oriented, more
specific and broader
How can this task be fulfilled? First and foremost it is important to be clear about
what development aid is supposed to achieve. This can be determined in three
ways, at least in an analytical sense. Aid can be aimed firstly at improving direct
living conditions, secondly at encouraging the development of people and coun-
tries and thirdly at safeguarding and providing global public goods. Each goal has
its own type of legitimacy. Aid aimed at improving direct living conditions can be
defended in moral terms, as can the pursuit of development, although the latter
also creates conditions for a more stable world order and, in that respect, is a form
of enlightened self-interest. Finally, working on global themes is a clear form of
collective self-interest.
It seems necessary to give greater substance to the second and third types of aid.
Increasing the self-reliance of developing countries and promoting common,
global self-interest ought to be a more central element of Western development
policy. In abstract terms this is a statement which many will whole-heartedly
agree with. The problem is, however, that development aid has been institutional-
ized in such a way that attention focuses systematically on the more ‘palliative’
types of aid. Aid has become increasingly characterized by the desire to achieve
attractive results which get plenty of positive media attention. This has led to a
strong focus on the social sectors, often with no specific development strategies
which are, indeed, difficult to develop at a time during which the emphasis is on
attractive results and achieving rapid political successes. We need a different
approach, one which breaks with a number of the historical mantras of develop-
ment cooperation, such as the primacy of poverty reduction, the direct focus on
the poorest, and the strong belief in the unconditional importance of investing in
provisions like drinking water, primary education and healthcare.
The need for a clearer accent to be placed on development and global themes does
not deprive direct poverty reduction of its raison d’être. However, choosing
between development aid goals always means choosing between the here and now
and the future (Barder 2009a). Poverty reduction relates to things which are visi-
ble now while development relates to future possibilities. Weighing up acute
needs and future possibilities is an essential feature of political systems. All
governments have to weigh up the interests of the current population against the
interests of future generations and find a balance between the two. Experience has
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shown that political practice in most developing countries often leads to a choice
being made in favour of the short-term division of often scarce resources among 
a variety of needy population groups, with long-term development taking second
place. However, the same can be said of many Western countries. Neo-patrimo-
nial structures contribute to the tendency to focus on the present. The develop-
ment battle will therefore always have to be fought to some extent in a field of
practice which is more inclined to use resources for (re)distribution among the
current generation. Incidentally, making distribution issues a priority is some-
times not only politically opportunistic or easily defensible on normative grounds,
but also functional. After all, a more equal distribution of wealth helps to maintain
social stability, a goal which is, in itself, important in order to facilitate develop-
ment. In more general terms, excessive inequality tends to be bad for economic
growth and is not conducive to development (Nissanke & Thorbecke 2006).
All this encompasses the task for development aid in the future. Although it is
sometimes necessary to invest in stability or desirable to reduce poverty directly,
the challenges lie in stimulating long-term development and addressing global
issues. Clearly this is far from easy, but that is no reason not to try. After all, policy
in Western countries is also a question of trial and error. When applied to the
organization of development aid this means that movement is required in two
directions simultaneously. In order to contribute more effectively to development,
interventions must be more tailor-made and that means a shift towards locally
defined country perspectives. By contrast, global issues require a broader
approach. That calls for instruments which, at the moment, hardly feature in the
oda repertoire.
On the one hand, therefore, it is necessary to move towards professional
customization. Universal ideas on development do not provide a good basis for
local aid. Responses regarded as generally applicable have all too often produced
little of value. Anyone who compares the country-specific and complex nature of
development as a phenomenon (chapter 3) with the policy-related responses
(chapter 5) can only conclude that there is a substantial mismatch. This is under-
standable because, after all, there are both moral and self-interest motives underly-
ing the desire to further development, and the pressure to act is considerable. 
The point of departure of any politician confronted with an urgent task is that it 
is ‘better to have a weak policy theory than to wait for the right response’. In the
meantime, however, this mismatch has become uncomfortably large. An even
bigger problem is that the system of development aid is insufficiently oriented
towards permanent self-adjustment. Making mistakes is forgivable, not learning
from them is not.
While the more detailed specification of aid implies a reduction in scale, on the
other hand an increase in scale is also needed. Development is not only country-
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specific, it also depends on global relationships, rules and agreements. In extreme
terms, aid runs the risk of becoming little more than a plaster on the wound, with
developing countries being allocated resources to compensate for what they are
simultaneously denied in other ways. To take one example: Mozambique is losing
almost as much as a consequence of the eu sugar policy as it receives in European
aid. This implies that there is a lot more development benefit to be gained outside
the world of classical development aid than within it. At the moment there are
imbalances in the world trade system, in the system of fiscal controls, in the way
in which financial flows are regulated, in the climate agreements and in the free (or
restricted) movement of people. The effects of this on development are much
greater than those of direct aid, as revealed in chapter 5. As a consequence, devel-
opment aid not only has to become more specific, but also broader.
6.3 the first consequence: being more development-
oriented
No matter how morally defensible and politically understandable poverty reduc-
tion is, it should not be the direct or primary goal of development aid. As Mkan-
dawire reminds us (2010b), development was always about more than poverty.
Although the greater degree of attention for poverty is a welcome antidote to the
dominant stabilization policy of the 1980s and 1990s, he argues that “in correcting
a narrow policy agenda the new focus pushes a good point too far when it focuses
attention only on the proximate causes of poverty and narrows the development
agenda.” According to Mkandawire, in countries which have successfully
combated poverty, the most important policy measures were not explicitly
poverty-oriented: “the eradication of poverty is always embedded in social and
economic development.” The accent of government development aid has to be on
increasing the development possibilities and on the self-reliance of countries and
regions. Stimulating employment to help people earn their own livelihood and to
generate inclusive growth are therefore important parameters in development
policy, as are reinforcing economic sectors and the productive and innovative
capacity of countries, diversifying the economy, the quality of institutions, and
strengthening local capacity to find solutions.
6.3.1 growth
The fact that growth is badly needed in developing countries is not down to it
being inherently good or a goal in itself, but rather to the general idea that societies
are only able to develop constructively if there is the prospect of ‘more’ (see
Stiglitz et al. 2009). Although it is perhaps possible to justify the idea of Western
countries still being able to develop mainly because of an improved distribution of
the available resources, and the idea that the development of the world as a whole
is increasingly becoming a question of (re)distribution and of sustainability and
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less related to growth (Jackson 2009), that option is not open to developing coun-
tries because they need growth to shape further modernization and improve
material provisions for citizens. This was a point reiterated recently by Martin
Ravallion, head of the research department at the World Bank (2009b). He started
by asking the question of whether developing countries could end absolute
poverty (according to the most recent World Bank standard this is an income of
1.25 dollars per day, in 2005 ppp) by means of internal redistribution. Redistribu-
tion then ought to be carried out by imposing on people who earn more than 
what is considered poor in the United States (13 dollars per day) a higher marginal
tax rate (mtr) for all income in excess of those thirteen dollars per day. The tax
incomes generated in this way could then be used to try to banish absolute
poverty from the country concerned through income transfers and/or social
programmes. Ravallion concludes that there are currently two categories of coun-
tries: in middle-income countries redistribution can be productive while, in most
countries (and that certainly applies to the least developed countries) with an aver-
age income of less than 2,000 dollars per person per year, growth is needed first
and foremost to finance social programmes. In concrete terms Brazil would only
need a marginal tax rate of 1 percent in order to redistribute, and China 37 percent.
However, if China really wanted to progress beyond the wider poverty line of two
dollars a day, an mtr of 100 percent would be needed. Even a mtr of 100 percent
(which is, of course, impossible) would allow India to eliminate just 20 percent of
absolute poverty. In short, growth is an absolute condition for combating poverty
in most developing countries. If the average income is as low as it now is in a lot of
poor countries, redistribution could lead at most to, in the words of Amartya Sen
“the redistribution of misery” (Krueger 2009).
More or more effective economic activity?
For the sake of their own development and to combat citizens’ poverty in the long
term, countries must reinforce their economies, and shape and upgrade their
productive sectors to create national production and innovation systems (Cimoli
et al. 2009). Although this sounds logical, there is no generally applicable answer
to the question of how it should be done. The government of a poor African coun-
try which proposes improving its own competitiveness and investment climate in
order to boost economic growth will be able to count on both international and
national approval. Yet how are they going to achieve this? The World Economic
Forum assesses the competitiveness of countries in its Global Competitiveness
Report using more than one hundred indicators, while the World Bank marks the
quality of the investment climate in countries on the basis of the Doing Business
Index using a total of more than one hundred variables. Competitiveness is a
complex business. Moreover, these kinds of league tables do not provide any
certainty and their composition is open to all kinds of criticism (ieg 2008; Moore
& Schmitz 2008). What is more, it is impossible to assess all the low scores that
developing countries achieve in indexes like these at the same time, and a list does
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not clarify what the priorities should be in a specific country. As a consequence,
priorities for reforming the governance of processes with which capital accumula-
tion, technological progress and diversification of production can be promoted,
and for building up institutions for the accumulation of productive skills and
industrial development, are often determined on the basis of what is fashionable
in the international development community or what is currently considered best
practice, without any specific account being taken of the local situation. It would
be more effective first to make a diagnostic analysis to determine the key problems
at a specific place and time, to then seek tailor-made solutions, and to leave addi-
tional problems for later. The key bottlenecks will change over time, making
development a dynamic and sequential process. Only by experimenting and learn-
ing from successes and failures will it be possible to find strategies which work in
one concrete context or other (Cimoli et al. 2009; Hausmann 2008; Hausmann et
al. 2008; Rodrik 2007; Wade 2009b).
A country cannot achieve development without investment. Although the finan-
cial crisis recently resulted in a relative decrease, foreign direct investment (fdi)
has increased enormously worldwide since 1980. Between 1982 and 2008, the
value of fdi rose from 58 billion to 1,697 billion dollars, or by roughly 30 percent
per year (unctad 2009c). The number of multinationals has now grown to
around 82,000. In principle, this is good news since economic activity is crucial
for development and fdi is particularly important in this respect. Foreign direct
investments are more stable than other financial flows and are the most important
external source of funding for developing countries, which, incidentally, benefit
from this funding very unequally. Portfolio investments, which represent large
flows of funds into and out of countries, are more likely to result in bubbles and
fluctuations, while fdi is usually aimed at sectors in which a country has compar-
ative benefits and brings technology, management, access to markets and social
networks (Lin 2010).
One crucial point is, however, that not all investments are equally good for devel-
opment. Developing countries benefit not only from more investment, but above
all from better investment. As unctad concluded (2007), the involvement of
multinationals in commodity extraction industries can have both positive and
negative effects on developing countries. On the one hand, these companies can
contribute to “higher levels of efficiency, productivity and innovation in the
industries concerned. On the other hand, their activities may also generate or
increase economic, environmental and social costs.” It is possible to earn a lot of
money in developing countries without this leading to development, and this
applies not only to extraction industry (Collier 2007; unctad 2005). In Economic
Development in Africa: rethinking the role of foreign direct investments, unctad
(2005) makes the point that the African continent is commonly misunderstood as
being unattractive to investors. The main problem is that a lot of these invest-
162 less pretension, more ambition
ments do not result in economic development. Development-oriented invest-
ments involve the sustainable transfer of skills, technology and innovation, and
strengthening economic activities by increasing returns to scale, dynamic compar-
ative advantages and rapid technological progress. To all intents and purposes this
aspect is ignored in a lot of African countries which try to attract investors with
tax benefits or by offering companies a privileged status.
The experiences in a number of Asian countries which have benefited from fdi
have shown that foreign investments are primarily worthwhile if they were part of
a wider industrial and agricultural strategy focusing on promoting, diversifying
and upgrading endogenous economic activities. According to Justin Lin, chief
economist of the World Bank, it is crucially important to accept that economic
development is a continual process which cannot be divided into rigid or specific
stages – as suggested by Rostow (1960) – and certainly not into a dichotomy
between ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ countries. Each stage of economic development is “a
point in a wide spectrum from a low-income, subsistence agrarian economy to a
high-income industrialized economy”, and given the endogenity of the industrial
structure of a country “at each state of development, the targets of industrial
upgrading and infrastructure improvement in a developing country should not
necessarily refer to the industries and infrastructure that are in place in high-
income countries” (Lin 2010).
In more concrete terms, least developed countries (ldcs) scarcely have any large-
scale industry and any industrial production that does take place is largely related
to low-technology and labour-intensive products: in 2006-2007, an average of 90
percent of industrial exports by ldcs consisted of low-quality commodities like
food, drinks and textiles. In itself this is not that strange, because it is relatively
straightforward for a producer to diversify ‘nearby’, for example from shirts to
overcoats and, generally speaking, rich countries export goods which have been
produced on the basis of higher wages, while poor countries export low-wage
goods. The challenge for proactive industrial policy is to develop a country’s
exports more in the direction of sophisticated goods, while bearing in mind both
the considerable potential benefits and the potential problems and risks (Rodrik
2007b; Wade 2009b).
unctad therefore states that international and national policymakers have to
realize that structural changes are needed in least developed countries to facilitate
dynamic growth and increasing returns to scale. This requires appropriate knowl-
edge and innovations to continue developing endogenous economic activity and –
other than was thought during the hey-day of the Washington Consensus – an
active role for the state. Industrial policy (Rodrik 2007b; Wade 2009b; Zarsky
2010) and an ensemble of ‘infant nurturing measures’ (Cimoli et al. 2009) have
historically been used by countries that have undergone successful development, 
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because national systems of production and innovation cannot come into existence
of their own accord. The role of the state in the context of industrial diversification
and upgrading concerns, for example, the coordination of related investments for
new industries by various companies, support for new industries with incubation,
and the direct fostering of foreign investment (Lin and Chang 2009). In addition,
the state has to play a more classical leading role in improving the ‘hard’ infrastruc-
ture – such as energy, transport and telecommunication systems – and the ‘soft’ in-
frastructure – for example the financial system, education system, social networks,
and legal structure (Lin 2010). The policymakers in these countries have to be given
the time and space to set priorities, discover which policy mix works best in their
situation, and adapt institutions and behavioural conventions to changing circum-
stances and evolving political and social preferences (unctad 2009b). An impor-
tant additional related aspect is the elaboration of regional cooperation to facilitate
common activity in and between countries wherever possible.
Trickle down?
Without economic growth there will not be enough wealth to distribute.
However, and this cannot be stressed enough, growth is not a goal in itself but a
means for facilitating development, in the form of accelerated modernization.
Growth is measured on the basis of national income. Although this provides an
indication of the volume of resources available in a country to increase the popula-
tion’s prosperity, it says nothing about the extent to which a society succeeds in
sharing that potential wealth. Therefore, specific measures and institutional safe-
guards are needed to ensure that the majority of the population actually benefit
from economic growth, employment levels increase, and inequality is reduced
(Stewart 2003; Malamed 2010). Scientists and un organizations like unctad,
unep, undp and the ilo have worked to define the distribution of growth in more
detail and expand the definition of ‘growth’ to include concepts such as fair
growth, shared growth, pro-poor growth, growth with equity, inclusive growth,
sustainable growth and growth with specific attention for women and environ-
mental limits. Incidentally, it is by no means always clear what exactly this means
(Birdsall 2010). In one of the variants of pro-poor growth, for example, a country
that undergoes 1 percent growth with an average income rise for the poor of
2 percent is pro-poor, while a country that experiences 6 percent growth and
generates 5 percent more income for the poor is not, because of the increase in
social differences (Negre 2010).
Growth can help to deal with income differences, but there is no necessity that it
will do so. In recent years, for example Angola has experienced enormous growth
thanks primarily to oil exports, but this growth has mainly benefited the elite
minority. Assessing the income distribution effects of growth is a complex matter.
For some time the maxim was based on the famous words of World Bank
researchers Dollar and Kraay: “Trade is good for growth and growth is good for the
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poor”. However, research supporting this claim was roundly criticized on
methodological and theoretical grounds. As a consequence, policymakers and
scientists currently believe there is no automatism, and that the postulated trickle-
down process has by no means always resulted in practice, or was too slow to have
a sufficient effect without supplementary measures. Kraay (2004) concluded on
the grounds of a cross-country study that the growth in average income of coun-
tries explains 70 percent of the variation in poverty reduction in the short term
and 97 percent in the long term, and that a large proportion of the rest of the differ-
ence is determined by distribution.
Whether the poor in a country also actually benefit from more growth is depen-
dent on, for example, the agricultural and industrialization pattern: economic and
social policy improves the situation of the poor if it is aimed at raising the income
they generate from working, in many cases in agriculture or from unskilled labour.
An inherent element of this is one of the major problems with development in
Africa: a lot of growth relies on the extraction of natural resources and rising
commodity prices. The related industries are capital-intensive and it is the owners
who primarily benefit. What is more, job creation is still too infrequently a spear-
head of development policy – Amsden (2010) refers to “dementia over jobs” to
indicate how little employment is actually referred to in development literature.
Growth in labour-intensive activities affects a much larger group of people and
leads to more employment. As Ravallion (2009c) observes, in India, China and
Brazil “the sectoral pattern of growth mattered to poverty reduction, indepen-
dently of the overall rate of growth”. In short, it is not growth in itself, but the
type of development in a country and the policy pursued that determine the
outcomes for the poor (see also Adelman 2001; Demartino 2000; Dollar & Kraay
2001a, 2001b; Donaldson 2008; Jolly et al. 2004; Kaplinsky 2009; Kniivilä 2008;
Nayyar 2003; Nissanke & Thorbecke 2006; O’Connor & Kjöllerström 2008;
Rodrik 2000; Saad-Filho 2007; Sen 1999; Son & Kakwani 2008; Stanton 2007;
Stewart 2003).
In recent years, a number of attempts have been made to assess in more detail the
effects of various types of growth on poverty reduction (on the basis of capital
intensive raw materials extraction, labour intensive industrial production and
more efficient agriculture). As might be expected, there are no general formulas
available. However, some general guidelines do apply. “Inclusive development and
the ending of social exclusion require focusing on the development process as one
of structural change and transformation that shifts economies from low-produc-
tivity, low-technology paths of development to technologically dynamic, skills-
intensive paths towards the generation of equitable growth and development that
benefit all”, is another very general, but not unimportant conclusion by the
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) at the United Nations in its
report entitled Rethinking Poverty (UN 2010). Van der Hoeven (2010) refers to
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research that shows that “high employment levels reduce inequality, and, espe-
cially for developing countries, high employment levels in the industrial sector
reduce inequality.”
However, agriculture must not be neglected in the process. In the 2008 World
Development Report entitled Agriculture for Development the position is taken
that a rise of 1 percent in gdp growth in the agricultural sector will lead to a 2.5
percent rise in income for the poorest groups. Later studies show that this percent-
age can increase to 4.5 percent, but that this mainly applies to people who have to
make ends meet on 1 dollar a day, with people who earn 2 dollars or more a day bene-
fiting more from growth outside the agricultural sector (Christiaensen, Demery
& Kuhl 2010). The argument is that this is where the opportunities lie, particularly
for Africa. After independence, Africa was for a long time self-sufficient as regards
food. Agriculture was neglected partly under the influence of donors, with the hope
that a new stage of development would soon be reached. To date, no real green 
revolution has taken place in Africa – partly because of institutional factors and the
mediocre quality of the soil, and partly because of the low population density, which
resulted in an expansion rather than an intensification of agriculture (with more
new land being used). Gradually, however, the population density in some African
countries reached the same level as in some Asian countries when they experienced
the green revolution (Kuyenhoven 2007). This makes agricultural improvements
in Africa a real challenge, even if the way in which that revolution took form in Asia
– state-driven, market-mediated and small-farmer based – is not easy to imitate in
the African context (Ruben, Pender & Kuyenhoven 2007). What is more, the green
revolution in Asia started during a period of high agriculture prices, which then
dropped systematically from the 1990s onwards, leading in turn to a considerable
weakening of incentives for African farmers.
Different forms of growth have different effects. This applies not only to the
extent to which rich and poor benefit from growth, but also to other groups.
Boserup (1970) pointed out that women do not benefit from development in the
same way as men, although here too, it is not possible to draw simplistic conclu-
sions. It depends primarily on how countries develop and what sort of economic
activity takes place. In South and Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia, as well 
as in Latin America, women especially are benefiting from employment opportu-
nities in the emerging manufacturing industry. Many globalization-related
economic activities offer women more employment opportunities than men.
Tourism is a good example, where 46 percent of formal jobs are fulfilled by
women. Women educated to higher levels are finding work in call centres and data
entry jobs in India and the Caribbean in particular. It is also becoming easier for
women from developing countries to find work in the Western services economy,
although that not only generates useful income in the countries of origin but also
creates social problems. Where development is mainly accompanied by informal-
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ization of work, however, the position of women tends to weaken. The prospects
of domestic workers employed in countries like Singapore, the us, Dubai and, to a
lesser extent Europe, are often poor (Momsen 2010). More often than not the work
is not performed in factories, but in small workshops or at home, to keep costs as
low as possible and to ensure maximum flexibility (Pearson 2007).
The question of what kind of policy and what type of growth are effective in
reducing poverty structurally in a concrete context cannot be answered in abstract
terms. Based on a comparison of the reduction of poverty in Brazil, China and
India, Ravallion (2009c) concludes that countries can sometimes learn a lot from
each other but that “a country’s initial conditions matter to understanding the
specific strategy it takes for fighting poverty”, and “as those conditions change so
too should the strategy.” How a country deals with preferences and social differ-
ences is first and foremost an issue for the inhabitants, interest groups and social
movements of that country itself. If we look at the forty-nine least developed
countries, the poorest countries in the world according to the United Nations,
with jointly around 800 million inhabitants, unctad annual reports show that
growth in these countries since 2000 has had very few significant positive conse-
quences for poverty reduction. According to unctad, this is because growth in
these countries primarily depends on exports, and has not resulted in an increase
in consumption. Other causes are the significant increases in the population and
especially the working population. For example, Breman (2001) observed that, in
the case of India, integration into the global economy has to date not led to a
reduction in the divide, with a process of informalization on the underside of the
economy causing a deterioration in the standard of living. Growth will therefore
have to be accompanied by a form of (re)distribution of wealth in order to have 
an actual positive effect on reducing poverty. However, no general statements 
can be made on the trade-offs which then apply and which need to be assessed on
a measure to measure basis in each country, and which will also change in time as
circumstances change (Birdsall 2010).
6.3.2 what about water supply, education and healthcare?
Many people regard placing less of an emphasis on social sectors as counter-
instinctive. After all, such a focus would appear to be on in-depth investments in a
society’s development. The question is whether this is really the case.
Drinking water and irrigation
A classic example of the tension between investing in improvements to living
conditions and investing in development has to do with water. Anyone who
builds water infrastructure to a far-off village in a developing country can do two
things: use it to supply water for household use or to establish an irrigation
system. The usual choice is to supply water for household use, in line with mdg
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7c. A number of leading water institutes, including the International Water and
Sanitation Centre (irc), recently published an empirical study showing that
investing in a water supply which can also be used for agricultural production, has
a much greater impact on local development than drinking water and sanitary
services alone. Using eight case studies in Asia, Africa and Latin America, they
demonstrate that investing in a water infrastructure which can be used for both
household and communal production purposes leads to higher income, more
sustainable production and eventually less poverty and better hygiene and drink-
ing water. What is more, a water supply like this, which goes beyond supplying
‘services’ and which is also important for family incomes, is looked after better.
Furthermore, poorer population groups themselves proved to regard water for
production purposes as being more important than water for hygiene. As a result,
drinking water services are, in practice, often used for production purposes for
which they were not designed (Van Koppen et al. 2009).
Irrigation is a driver for agricultural production. Numerous studies have shown
that the multiplier effect of an investment in irrigation on agricultural productiv-
ity is often between 2.5 to 4, with the additional income from outside agriculture
even growing twice as quickly as the growth within the sector itself. This positive
impact is visible in the form of increased employment, affordable food prices and
more reliable harvests (Molden 2007). It is therefore no surprise that empirical
proof from forty countries shows that 1 percent growth in agricultural productiv-
ity in the past also pulled 1 percent of poor people up over the poverty line (Irz et
al. 2001). It is interesting in this context to note that only 4 percent of the agricul-
tural acreage in Sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated. This means that agricultural
production is still only a fraction of what it could be with widespread irrigation. 
In many cases the problem is not the absence of water, but the lack of adequate
investments in institutional and physical infrastructure (World Bank 2008a).
Water supply is still dominated (too much) by a humanitarian perspective: it
seems more important to drink water than to earn from it. The same applies to
ideas on how to deal with waste water. For example, the prevailing notion now
seems to be that everyone in the world is entitled to a water closet connected to a
sewer system. People are all too keen to elevate the Western model to a universal
standard. Yet there seem to be plenty of indicators that such technology is
certainly not the most sensible strategy in thinly populated areas – and that means
in large areas of Africa. Water closets require a great deal of water and sewer
systems are expensive to construct and maintain. There are often better options
available which, however, are rarely chosen (Mara 2008; Massoud et al. 2009).
Education
It seems to go without saying that education always leads to development. Educa-
tion is therefore a key focus of Western development efforts, with a relatively large
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portion of the budget being assigned to primary education. One of the mdgs also
relates to universal access to primary education. The argument is that, if all chil-
dren attend school, the rest will follow automatically. Unfortunately, this is not
the case. Almost every country in the world has expanded its education system
substantially since 1960, but not every country has also exhibited growth. More-
over, growth figures fluctuate significantly in time, while investments in educa-
tion have exhibited a clear upward trend. In other words, there is no visible corre-
lation (Pritchett 2009a). Education sometimes contributes to growth, but
sometimes growth depends on other factors. If there are no jobs, a properly trained
working population has no additional value, at least not in an economic sense.
Cuba is a prime example. In a number of cases there may even be too much educa-
tion: if the employment market cannot provide work for educated people, this will
mainly lead to frustration. This can be seen on a daily basis in many African
towns, especially those with universities (Dietz & Van Zanen 2009).
Modern macro approaches aimed at stimulating economic growth by developing
countries’ endogenous productive and technological capacities – such as ‘new
structural economics’ (Lin 2010), or ‘new developmentalism’ (Zarsky 2010) –
demand a much more specific focus on the extent to which the development of
human capital is an important factor for a country’s overall development strategy.
According to chief economist Lin of the World Bank, improvements in human
capital “should be commeasurable with the accumulation of physical capital and
the upgrading of industry in the economy. Otherwise, human capital will either
become a binding constraint for economic development if it is undersupplied
because of inefficient investment, or the country will have many frustrated
highly-educated workers who cannot find adequate jobs if investment in training,
knowledge and learning is not consistent with the speed of industrial upgrading in
the economy” (Lin 2010).
It is also clear that not every form of education contributes equally to develop-
ment. In that respect, the emphasis on primary education – the mdg 2– has actu-
ally caused a great deal of harm. A lot of countries (and ngos) focus on getting as
many children as possible to attend school without devoting much attention to
whether they learn anything and what they learn. Attending school can therefore
mean that a child ends up in a class with 200 other children. In some Sub-Saharan
African countries, primary education is more like a form of childcare. Neither is it
completely certain that a teacher will actually turn up to teach: in many African
countries teacher attendance is less than 20 percent. Moreover, if a teacher is actu-
ally present, the quality of the teaching is often very poor. The educational impact
is then measured by the number of children attending school rather than what
they actually learn. It would have been better to have called the Millennium
Education Goal the ‘Millennium Learning Goal’ (Pritchett 2009b).
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Rather than education itself, it is the quality of education that is linked to develop-
ment (Hanushek & Wößmann 2007). The question then is what good education is
and what type of education can stimulate development. Education can increase
human capital and therefore productivity, or improve the innovative capacity of
the economy, or the transmission of existing knowledge within a society (Help-
man 2004). Education can also contribute to the formation of a critical middle
class, which can bring pressure to bear on democratic and government institutions
(Kapur & Crowley 2008). However, the current education system in many devel-
oping countries is not oriented around this. Lant Pritchett, a leading education
economist, has expressed his amazement at how similar education is wherever he
goes, no matter whether it is Bangladesh, Vietnam or Ghana – everywhere there
are children in classrooms learning things by heart. Education all over the world is
oriented around preparing children for jobs as civil servant or for Western-styled
production processes, with new workers coming off the education production line
ready for a future in the factories.
The question is whether this education model is the most suitable. Developing
countries have different economies and different institutions, and it is now more
than 100 years since the introduction of classrooms with rows of desks. How can
education in developing countries be adapted to local development opportunities?
In the few years that they attend school, poor children in the villages of Mali learn
how to use the ‘accent aigu’ correctly but nothing about sustainable agriculture. It
is therefore no surprise that the emphasis on primary education has barely
resulted in development. In that context it is interesting to note that the focus of
the most recent five-year plan of the government of India – a country with a high
percentage of illiterate people – is on improving children’s skills instead of trying
to realize universal access to primary education. The emphasis is on what people
learn rather than where. Education can be a great deal more productive if it is
combined with work and job prospects. A functional perspective on education like
this ought to be adopted by Western donors, something they have failed to do to
date. Bodies like the World Bank and the un become fixated by the mdg, and with
that by general access to primary education, while Unesco focuses primarily on
high culture, and the ilo on terms and conditions of employment. Donors have
failed almost entirely to invest in ict on behalf of education and in the central
production of good teaching materials.
Education can lead to development if it links up with a society’s needs. If develop-
ment is the goal, attention needs to be paid to vocational education and to tailoring
education to the employment market. In addition, there generally has to be more
of a focus on tertiary education. Take, for example, the green revolution. It was
much more successful in Asia than in Africa because the local technological capac-
ity was much greater there – local universities and research groups were able to
adapt the new technology to local conditions (Kapur & Crowley 2008). Despite
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worldwide interest in the ‘knowledge economy’, bilateral donors and the World
Bank overtly discouraged developing countries to invest in higher education: 
they believed that Africa first had to ensure universal access to primary education.
Partly as a consequence of this, the quality of higher education has drastically
declined in many developing countries, and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
What is more, only 5 percent of the population there had completed a higher
education in 2006. Although this is a lot in comparison to the 1 percent in 1965, it
is only as much as in the Western world forty years ago (Bloom et al. 2006). Very
few African countries have the minimum number of scientists needed to create a
functioning scientific community. Fewer than one in a thousand inventions and
one in two hundred scientific publications come from Africa and, in so far as
research capacity exists, it is concentrated in a couple of countries, in particular
Egypt and South Africa (Pouris & Pouris 2009). What is more, the programmes
offered by African universities are rarely attuned to what is needed for national
and regional development.
In many developing countries, in so far as higher education is available, it often
links up poorly with the employment market. While 50 percent of university
students in China or Korea graduate in science subjects, a technical subject or busi-
ness administration, in Africa this is 20 percent. A country like Ethiopia needs
graduates in life sciences and agriculture management, while most students want
to study business administration. In Ethiopia, therefore, limits were recently
introduced to ensure that 60 percent of students choose a science subject. The
problem goes beyond this, however. Just as primary education is modelled on
nineteenth-century Western classical education, universities are modelled on
nineteenth-century Western universities. Education acquires the form of classical
knowledge transfer from teacher to student. Whereas Western universities use all
possible means to establish links with the world around them – no Western
university is complete without a Science Park – a lot of African students do not
even go on work placements. Universities and r&d institutions in developing
countries are far removed from the practice of development, production and
marketing. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that innovation in Africa is
rarely the result of research and development, but usually of existing knowledge
being tailored more effectively to one specific target group or other. Productive
knowledge development which links up more directly with areas where knowl-
edge is actually needed is therefore extremely important (Juma 2006).
Healthcare
Like education, healthcare can be important for a country’s human capital, but this
does not apply by definition. Significant breakthroughs in public healthcare,
disease control and – often most importantly – better and varied food (WHO
2001) may have underpinned major take-offs in economic history like the rapid
growth of England during the Industrial Revolution and of Japan at the beginning
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of the twentieth century, and the dynamic economic changes in Southern Europe
and Eastern Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, but they were not the causes. As the
Commission on Growth and Development (2009) concluded: “Historical
research, cross-sectional analysis, and innovative ways of integrating household
factors into cross-country studies have pushed the methodological envelope, but
the results remain inconclusive”. Research shows that growth often leads to better
health; it remains unresolved whether the opposite is the case (Jack & Lewis
2009).
A wide range of microeconomic studies show that good health can affect a coun-
try’s development. Children who attend school learn and develop less if they are
undernourished. Healthy employees are more productive. This seems trivial.
When the French, led by the man who had also built the Suez Canal, Ferdinand de
Lesseps, started to dig a canal through Panama in 1882, they lost around 22,000
employees over a period of six years to yellow fever and malaria, and they even
had to cut short the project. The Americans eventually finished the canal in 1914,
after first tackling the mosquitoes. The question is, however, whether such a situ-
ation also applies on a macro level in Africa. There is no shortage of human capital
in many countries in Africa. Even the recent aids outbreak that has hit Africa,
and which particularly affected the working population between the ages of
fifteen and fifty years, appears to have had only a very limited effect on the
economic functioning of the majority of countries (Bloom & Canning in cgd
2009). There are regional differences, however, and the effect is more noticeable 
in some sectors than in others. Some companies in southern Africa sometimes
find it difficult to find quality employees, and there is also a shortage of public
sector workers, particularly teachers. The aids epidemic in Africa has stabilized
since 2000, particularly in southern Africa (South Africa, Swaziland, Botswana,
Zimbabwe), although it is still at a high level. In that area approximately one-fifth
of people aged between fifteen and forty-nine is infected.
Growth cannot, therefore, be stimulated automatically by promoting better
health, just as health improvements cannot be automatically stimulated by invest-
ing in good healthcare. Improving healthcare is therefore primarily important
from a humanitarian perspective, and in that respect certain improvements defi-
nitely need to be made. There is for example considerable tension between a verti-
cal, illness-related approach and a more horizontal approach in which the general
healthcare infrastructure is improved.
Almost all the considerable health-related successes which have been achieved in
Africa, such as the eradication of smallpox, tackling river blindness and the devel-
opment of dehydration programmes for children with diarrhoea, are the conse-
quence of vertical programmes organized per illness. The problem with a vertical
approach is that it may solve an illness, but does not improve people’s general
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health. Sometimes vertical programmes even override the existing infra -
structure, as was noticeably the case with a number of capital-rich aids
programmes (Easterly 2008a). Organizations like the World Bank and the who
therefore argue against a vertical and in favour of a horizontal, integrated
approach, preferably aimed at universal primary healthcare. Incidentally, this
approach also has a downside: in many middle-income countries it leads to
demand for secondary and tertiary care being left entirely to market forces.
To avoid a situation in which a publicly financed system of primary care is accom-
panied by a privately financed system of hospitals, attention needs to be paid to
the development of publicly initiated or subsidized insurance systems which
provide cover for a broad range of care expenses. Numerous experiments are being
conducted especially in West and Central Africa. The Ghanaian government, for
example, is even actively encouraging the national coverage of local community-
based insurance. It is not yet clear how tenable those constructions are. The idea of
insurance is often far removed from the perception of a lot of the residents of
countries in the South. Many either expect healthcare to be provided by the
government, or the money they pay in to be repaid after a certain period of time.
6.3.3 and what about securit y and stabilit y?
In the context of aid, the assumption is that, in any event, there is a sufficiently
stable environment in which aid can thrive. This is not always the case. What does
it mean to pursue a more development-oriented policy in areas in which there is
hardly any security and stability? Classical concepts from the development world
are insufficiently equipped to deal with such situations (Voorhoeve 2007). The
good news is that there appears to be a reciprocal relationship between the
number of publications on fragile states and the fragility of states. Certainly after
the large number of armed conflicts in the 1990s, and the subsequent un peace
operations, an impressive series of studies appeared which reflect the events of
this age and the West’s role in it – and the end does not yet appear to be in sight:
the World Development Report 2011 is also going to be dedicated to fragile states.
At the same time the number of countries in conflict situations is decreasing
significantly. The majority of developing countries are more or less stable,
although only the future will show how stable that is. None of this alters the fact
that there are areas still torn by conflict: Somalia, the Central African Republic,
Southern and Western Sudan, Southern Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo.
While the number of inter-state and intra-state conflicts is gradually declining 
– a process that has been going on since the 1970s if you regard the conflicts 
which flared up at the beginning of 1990s as ‘delayed conflicts’ – the international
community has become increasingly willing to intervene. The number of un
peace missions doubled between 1987 and 1994, and the un has continued to be
involved in conflict situations since then as well. Currently it has a presence in
eighteen countries.
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People are gradually realizing that peace operations have to be embedded in a
broader package of measures, including structural development. The 3D concept
(Defence, Diplomacy, Development) was introduced to deal with this. It has
considerably increased the complexity of the task. Building up institutions in
post-conflict situations is a laborious process. Experience has shown that it is
much more difficult to restructure countries which undergo enforced regime
change, like Iraq and Afghanistan, than many had thought because institutions
cannot be set up overnight. Kaplan’s evaluation (2009) of the American experi-
ences in Iraq is telling: “The significant reduction in violence in Iraq since the
middle of 2007 has been based largely on four years of hard-won knowledge of
Iraq’s complex tribal and sectarian politics that allowed local commanders to
follow a template for governance in Iraq that has existed for centuries and which
even dictators like Saddam Hussein had to rely on.” The same applies to
Afghanistan. For a number of years the international community has been work-
ing without any major success on formulating plans and strategies for ‘fixing the
failed state of Afghanistan’. As Van Bijlert (2009) records, the work is carried out
as if the state is a tabula rasa. No attention is paid to the reality of the existing
institutional structures, cultures, traditions and memories. There is an idea of
what the state should be like in Afghanistan, based on the enlightened leadership
of King Abdul Rahman Khan and memories of the communist system with its
coupons and subsidies. Yet this notion does not tally very closely with that of a
Western liberal democracy. Neither can a Weberian bureaucracy simply be intro-
duced into a country with a strong patronage system, where everyone tries to have
the right (read: most powerful) contacts (wasetas) and where it is indeed unethical
not to provide services to clan members, family members, and also neighbours
and colleagues who need them. What is more, the political system is saturated
with an insider-outsider logic which is not commensurate with a liberal demo-
cratic state as inclusion depends mainly on threats and shows of strength. This is
how the old warlords and commanders have been included in the political system,
for example as members of parliament or ministers. They then use their influence
to exempt their legal and illegal trade or acquire personal control over parts of the
security system, often thanks to their capacity to mobilize large numbers of armed
men. “Fixing Afghanistan has thus largely become an intellectual exercise, with
intelligent people drafting project designs – on issues such as governance, institu-
tional reform, counter-narcotics, anti-corruption, social outreach or gender-equal-
ity – which possess an internal logic, but have very little relation to the realities on
the ground” (Van Bijlert 2009: 166). There is good reason why, in 2007, once the
expected successes failed to materialize, dfid started an Understanding
Afghanistan project, flying in cultural anthropologists with sufficient local knowl-
edge of the population and language to describe how the country ‘really’ func-
tioned.
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In the meantime, the debate is growing about whether it is at all possible to build
states by means of military interventions. The successful involvement of the allies
in state-building in Japan after 1945 served as a shining example for a long time.
However, it is arguable whether the same process can be repeated elsewhere. The
question then is what has to be done in conflict and post-conflict situations? Some
now argue against any kind of military intervention in failing states, and leaving
local actors to settle conflicts themselves, even if it means war (Duyvesteyn 2009),
or at most separating the warring parties, and avoiding state-building activities
completely (Hellema 2007). In their view, it is an illusion to think that order can be
brought to Afghanistan – or any comparable country – by a Western power that is
only present in the country for a few years. It requires either a long and emphatic
presence or adjusting and tempering the initial objectives.
This is the lesson Western donors need to learn. Achieving stability is an impor-
tant contribution to development – but is also a very difficult and troublesome
one. It requires a much better assessment process than the one currently in use.
Sometimes, with a great deal of effort, it is possible to separate warring parties as
demonstrated by, for example, the experiences in Cambodia where, incidentally,
Vietnam should be given most of the credit for taking action in 1979 and ousting
the Pol Pot regime, making it possible to start the rebuilding process with interna-
tional support. That is, however, a long and difficult process which takes a great
deal of time and effort. Often donors appear not to have the required patience and
expect everything to be sorted out in just a couple of years. This was already
referred to in the famous Brahimi report (2000). Based on an evaluation of a
number of disastrous un peace missions, the report recommended that peace
operations should only be conducted if there was a clear mandate, limited goals
which can be achieved within a reasonable period of time and based on a profes-
sional approach and a consensus in the Security Council. Although those points of
departure still apply today, there is still no proper assessment framework for when
and how to take action in fragile states and (post)conflict situations.
One huge problem associated with drawing up such a framework is that, in the
coming years, the way the options are viewed will be determined by the experi-
ences in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would seem certain that Afghanistan is going to
serve as a model for the impossibility of rapid, externally-managed society build-
ing based on a Western model. This could well result in Western societies being so
unwilling to create stability through military intervention that, at least for a
number of years, no action will be taken in conflicts in Africa, where it might well
be meaningful to do so. In African countries the situation is often fundamentally
different. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were primarily based on
geopolitical and security motives, with the development dimension being added
for good measure. In Africa, stability can usually be achieved at a much lower level
on the violence spectrum. There, shows of strength are sometimes enough, as
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shown by the British Operation Pallister in Sierra Leone. The operation involved
little more than occupying the airport and firing a few warning shots. In that
specific context, that proved sufficient to restore calm. In Afghanistan and Iraq the
focus was on Development to achieve Defence, while in Africa it was on Develop-
ment by Defence.
It would be regrettable for military interventions in Africa to be banned because
there are a great many more possibilities for successful action in African countries
than in the extremely complex situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Collier (2007)
suggests that it would have been good for the West to have ‘practised’ military
interventions in a country like Togo. Togo has 6 million inhabitants and has been
the scene of a number of coups, latterly in 2005. Collier also makes other far-reach-
ing suggestions in a later book (Collier 2009). In his eyes, the most effective
instrument would take the form of a guarantee by the international community to
take action if the stability of a country in Africa or elsewhere is jeopardized. This
appears to be a more rigorous interpretation of what has been referred to for some
time in un circles as the responsibility to protect. In theory there is a lot to be said
for this, but in practice it is rarely straightforward to make a proper assessment of
when action should be taken. This is borne out by the experience gained during
the un peace missions. For example, during the genocide in Rwanda, the French
sided for a long time with the Hutus, long after the Canadian un commander
Dallaire had asked them to take action. Many Rwandans have never forgiven the
French for that, and it was a key motive behind the recent decision by President
Kagame to change the country’s official language from French to English –
although the formal reason was that it would improve trade relations with neigh-
bouring English-speaking countries. Foreign interventions aimed at bringing
stability often help to define the dilemmas of intervening more distinctly than
those focusing on development, raising the question of how dirty your hands
should get in the pursuit of what goals?
Smaller Western countries should not aspire to bring stability on their own – it is a
task that really needs to be fulfilled by the international community. Nevertheless,
it would seem prudent to take proper heed of recent experiences. One lesson is
that it is unhelpful to make a contrived distinction between stability and develop-
ment. Another is that the possibilities of exporting democracy should not be
approached too simplistically. The gravity of the intervention must be attuned to
the objectives: there is no point trying to build up a country almost from scratch
and then leaving it to its own devices after only a couple of years. It is therefore
important to make a proper prior assessment of whether it is possible to stay in a
country for a number of decades during the period of relative calm that may follow
a military intervention. If this is not possible, any intervention must have a more
modest goal from the beginning.
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6.4 the second consequence: being more specific
Development aid requires tailor-made interventions: the development problems
in the various countries concerned must be the point of departure, rather than the
umpteenth universal development theory (based on infrastructure, civil society or
good governance) or impressive sounding goals agreed by the un (such as the
mdgs). Such goals formulated at global level are important in achieving an inter-
national consensus and can also have a mobilizing effect, but they go too far if they
result in a one-size-fits-all approach. Aid-related thinking is slowly but surely
being influenced by the realization that an approach like this is unsuitable for tack-
ling the very diverse problems facing countries in the South. Unfortunately,
however, too few conclusions are still being drawn for policy.
6.4.1 country and regional differentiation
Development issues must be approached in a more differentiated fashion and the
same applies to developing countries. The term ‘third world’ should be banned
forthwith. Specific development policy requires a more appropriate differentia-
tion between countries. The question is how exactly should countries be grouped
and classified? Answering this question is far from easy. Some classifications are
based on income, others on different national performance league tables. In 2008,
the undp already counted 178 different indexes compiled by various organizations
and institutions. However, none of these do justice to the complexity of develop-
ment and the nature of the differences between countries (Harris et al. 2009). In
its long-term strategy, the World Bank, long the paragon of gdp-based thinking,
identifies Sub-Saharan Africa, fragile states, inclusive development in middle-
income countries, and global and regional public goods as the four critical chal-
lenges facing global development. Each of these challenges is based on a different
way of dividing the world.
The focus then has to be on establishing different relationships with different
countries. Germany, which reduced the number of partner countries in its devel-
opment policy from 120 to 75 at the end of the 1990s (and then later to 60), has
now identified fifteen ‘anchor countries’ (including China, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt
and Nigeria), based on economic weight and political influence, which require a
special approach because they are important for reducing poverty, sustainable
economic development, peace and security, global governance, and global public
goods. Other Western countries will also have to differentiate their relationships
on the basis of key characteristics. Relationships can be established with countries
in Southeast Asia and Latin America based on the mutual exchange of knowledge,
and agreements on climate, trade, the diaspora and other relevant factors. In this
approach the transfer of funds is inappropriate – and is mostly considered as such
by the partner countries in question. While the relationships with these countries
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will be oriented primarily around organizing transfers of knowledge, people and
goods, there are also countries for which it is predominantly important to build up
a relationship oriented around key geopolitical issues. For example, China is
crucial for the procurement of global public goods. Within Africa it is equally
important to be as specific as possible. The differences between African countries
are considerable and there is no simple template which provides answers to the
question of which type of relationships should best be entered into.
Although most people in Asia still live below the poverty line, a simple ‘aid rela-
tionship’ is no longer appropriate to most of the countries in the continent.
Governments feel responsible for their own poor, and are unwilling to tolerate
external interference without good reason. Poverty in which Western govern-
ments might play a more direct role in alleviating is becoming increasingly
concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the thirty countries at the bottom of the
undp’s Human Development Index, which encompasses all the countries in the
‘low human development’ category, only one is not in Africa (East Timor, a coun-
try with 1 million inhabitants). It should be noted, however, that no score is allo-
cated to Afghanistan due to the exceptional situation there. What does this mean
in more detail?
Since 1980, China has managed to extract 600 million people from poverty and, at
the current rate of growth, a basic subsistence level will be achieved for the major-
ity of the population within one and a half decades. This does not apply to India
which, in effect, consists of 29 countries. Although India is experiencing growth,
this is primarily increasing the contrasts between the rich west and south of the
country on the one hand and the poor east and north on the other. This problem
will persist for some considerable time to come because, for the time being, popu-
lation growth in India is expected to be substantial – in 2030 it is expected to
surpass China as the country with the most inhabitants. There is not much to do
for Western donors in India, however, not because there are no problems but
because the Indian government does not appreciate Western donors labelling
India as a developing country. In 2003, it explicitly asked the Netherlands to with-
draw as a donor. India regarded the Dutch approach to be too arrogant, certainly in
proportion to the amount it donated.
Other countries in East and Southeast Asia are undergoing rapid development:
South Korea and Taiwan have a Western level of income, Thailand and Malaysia
have a substantial middle class, while countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambo-
dia and Laos are well on the way to reaching that stage. The Philippines is still
lagging behind, partly because the revolution by the middle class against Marcos in
1986 has not been followed by a more equal distribution of wealth, in particular
land. Bangladesh still deserves most attention, if only because it is home to 160
million people – even though, if present trends continue, it will be a middle-
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income country in around 2020. The circumstances in Afghanistan and Iran are
unique. In principle the ‘Stans’ (the former Soviet republics in Central Asia) have
more than enough raw materials to look after themselves. In Turkmenistan, petrol
costs less than water: water scarcity, excessive grazing and pollution are the most
pressing problems facing the population there, the majority of whom live in
remote areas. Most of the regimes in the region are very repressive and are preoc-
cupied with safeguarding their own interests, meaning that redistribution and
structural development fail to get off the ground. In short, despite the wide differ-
ences between the countries, in Asia development aid in its classical form will
only apply to a very limited number of countries. The word in the corridors of the
World Bank is that bank staff enjoy going to Asia because successes can still be
achieved there; the bank has a presence there primarily because it has to be seen to
be successful, rather than out of necessity.
Latin America also has numerous middle-income countries, which are increas-
ingly going their own way. Bolivia and, to a less extent, Colombia and Ecuador are
not growing sufficiently and Haiti is a special case, but, in general terms, Latin
America is carving out a place for itself on the world stage. However, the develop-
ment of the local regional organization, Mercosur, is not as advanced as other
regional partnerships. This is partly because it has a less distinct mutual orienta-
tion than, for example, asean, the Southeast Asian regional organization, and
partly because of considerable political differences (Chavez is not universally
popular) and the predominant role of Brazil. Many countries in Latin America are
characterized by considerable income differences, although there are indications
that this inequality is decreasing. Between 2000 and 2006, the Gini coefficient 
in twelve of the seventeen Latin American countries dropped thanks to, among
other things, a reduction in the income differences between educated and poorly
educated employees (as a consequence of the quantity and price effects) and
progressive government cash and non-cash transfers (Lopez-Calva & Lustig
2009).
Then there is Sub-Saharan Africa, a strongly underpopulated continent, with an
economy the size of that of a country like the Netherlands or a city like Chicago.
There is much less growth there and plenty of indications that it will be some time
before the continent will be able to look after itself. Africa got off to a false start
and nations are having to be built on the basis of arrangements which do not, or
scarcely, fit in with existing social relationships. The institutional structure left
behind by the colonizers was, in many cases, too weak to support the countries.
Political parties have little meaning and almost all governments are overtly patri-
monial. In addition, the nation and state-building process is by no means
complete. For example, a number of African countries are still expected to
collapse, starting with Sudan in 2011. However, the conditions for aid are improv-
ing in Africa because the situation there is becoming more stable. At the beginning
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of the 1990s, twenty-six African countries were involved in wars or large-scale
violence against the state. At the start of 2007, five conflicts were still raging and
there was more or less permanent fighting in two (Darfur and East Congo). A
number of countries appear to be making impressive progress (Ghana, Tanzania,
Mozambique and Rwanda), though there are also examples of setbacks (in 2009 in
Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Guinea and Gabon).
Additional differentiation needs to be applied in Africa as well. A small number of
countries have de facto failing governments, and the involvement of individual
Western donors is modest – and primarily aimed at providing humanitarian aid,
via ngos or more ambitious channels – and based on multilateral attempts to build
states which have a reasonable basis in the country’s own social structures. Never-
theless, the majority of countries in Africa are building institutions in a way which
creates some stability. Development aid could play a significant role in these coun-
tries, if done in the right way.
6.4.2 diagnostic approach
Contributing to development means first of all making accurate assessments of
how countries are developing so that tailor-made initiatives can be taken. At the
moment, development aid is insufficiently context-dependent and country-
specific. Institutional reforms propagated by international organizations – and
often followed by bilateral donors – are still grafted onto a best practice model.
This assumes that it is possible to devise a single unique set of suitable institu-
tional arrangements based on successful practice and prescribe it elsewhere. This
quickly results in a demoralizing list with adaptations, all of which are important.
Although that makes it easier to make comparisons between countries and to
benchmark, it does no justice to the complex reality and the differences between
and within countries. The development processes of rich countries (Chang 2009a)
and six decades of development policy have shown that there are no examples or
generally applicable formulas which can simply be copied and applied to develop-
ment. Assuming that this is the case can all too easily backfire (Fukuyama 2007;
Grindle 2001, 2004; Rodrik 2008a).
However, this does not mean that nothing sensible can be said about fostering
development. Between universal claims and ‘anything goes’ handy guidelines are
available for economic policy and ‘good enough’ institutions which can be devel-
oped in a variety of ways – not only ours. Knowledge about development in other
places and times is important, but professional development aid needs contextual
interpretations which take account of countries’ specific history, circumstances
and path-dependencies. In other words, professional development aid requires
tailor-made solutions based on a proper understanding of the complex or even
chaotic systems which are the object of intervention (Adelman 2001; Chang 2002,
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2005, 2007; Evans 2004; Ho 2009; De Lange 2010; Mansfield & Snyder 2001; Paris
2004; Rodrik 2007, 2008a, 2008b).
The difficult question is then: how do we know which interventions contribute to
a country’s continued development? Wherever development aid is caught in a
paralyzing ‘everything is linked to everything else’ ideology, it spreads out in all
directions and aims at the general transformation of entire societies. Choices are
therefore inevitable in order to concentrate the effort in terms of time, money and
knowledge. Instead of a charitable attitude – all aid is welcome – a pragmatic
approach is desirable based on an assessment of which initiatives will be most
effective.
Diagnostics
Professional ‘aid for development’ is comparable to the way in which good doctors
go about helping their patients. To start with it is important to diagnose profes-
sionally, with a trained eye, per country or region where the most essential pain is
and what is causing it, to be able to reflect on what effective resources could be
used to bring about change (Collier 2007; Hausmann et al. 2005; Hausmann et al.
2008; Lindauer & Pritchett 2002; Pritchett & Woolcock 2008; Reinert 2007b;
Rodrik 2007; Sachs 2005).
A ‘diagnostic’ approach to development therefore means trying to define, as accu-
rately as possible, the greatest barriers to development in a country. These may be
related to the economic situation (for example too limited availability of credit for
companies or a lack of proper infrastructure), at the level of government and the
state (for example a lack of safety, or insufficient rule of law) or within society as a
whole (for example insufficient people with the right training, or a lack of trust or
social capital). The next step is to determine which of these binding constraints is
the most important and needs tackling first. The issue then is to assess how this
can best be tackled in a specific context. All in all this approach makes interven-
tions more specific and leads to sequencing and timing instead of everything
appearing to be equally relevant or urgent and being tackled in a uniform manner.
The situation in the developing country therefore becomes the point of departure
for development aid, rather than the wishes, experiences and preoccupations of
donors and voters in the West. In practice, this is by no means a foregone conclu-
sion. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the focus of much aid was on supporting
farmers, including those in Europe. However, in recent decades development aid
has neglected agriculture and has been primarily invested in social sectors – just as
happened in the West. Development policy is also characterized by trends, as a
consequence of the ineradicable habit of wanting to provide general responses,
even if the problems are specific. It is, however, high time to say farewell to this
approach. A country-specific strategy facilitates the specific use of knowledge,
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money and other resources and takes account of the differences between and
within countries, with the added benefit that developing countries do not have to
change everything simultaneously: Djibouti is not required – nor is it at all capable
– to become a kind of Denmark or the Netherlands. Other than in the case of the –
not overly successful – large utopian adjustment and reform programmes which
dominated the development agenda of the 1980s and 1990s, the focus in the near
future will be on the development of a precise and specific effort based on
modesty and realism.
Various examples of such a diagnostic approach can now be found in both scien-
tific literature and policy practice. In addition to researchers, various international
institutions – such as the Asian Development Bank (adb), the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank (iadb) – and donors – like the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (mcc) set up by the United States and dfid – have started
using growth diagnostics. The logical structure developed by the pioneers of this
approach is depicted in the decision tree in figure 6.1. The idea is that, if you read
the tree from top to bottom, you will identify the most important obstacle to
growth at this moment in time and in this context. Is the problem an excessively
low return on investments or excessively high financing costs? If there are indica-
tions of low returns, this will be because the social returns on investments are too
low (if this is the case, the question is what this is due to: a poor infrastructure or a
shortage of human capital?) or because private returns for investors are too small
(in this case the question is whether this is due to market failure or government
failure?). If it is more plausible that the financing costs are too high and there is
insufficient affordable capital available, the question then is whether this is due to
inadequate access to international capital markets, or to domestic problems (a low
savings quota, for example, or an underdeveloped financial sector). Many of these
problems are present in most developing countries, but not always simultane-
ously, nor to the same degree. As a result, they are not always equally restricting,
nor a problem at all in some cases. Dani Rodrik (2010), one of the pioneers of
growth diagnostics, organizes executive programmes for senior World Bank
economists at the Harvard Kennedy School and uses the above decision tree to
discuss South Africa’s binding constraints. “Every year,” he writes, “I am
surprised at how quickly these practitioners dismiss some of the conventional
culprits that typically preoccupy them in their country work (such as poor gover-
nance, macroeconomic instability, bad infrastructure, lack of openness to trade)
and come to focus on a few problem areas (typically, lack of competitiveness in
tradables and high cost of labor).” Specific research into binding constraints and
discussions with the various parties involved can clarify what are the biggest
problems and where something has to be done as a priority to increase the chance
of more and sustainable growth.
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Figure 6.1 Growth diagnostics
Source: Rodrik 2007a
To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to realize that this decision tree is not
the only conceivable one, and certainly not a magic wand which can be used
anywhere and anytime to identify key obstacles to development. The chance that
tackling one large binding constraint can solve all the problems that exist in a
particular country is, in any event, zero and it is also likely that “complementary or
interrelated policy adjustments” are needed to achieve an optimal result (Misch et
al. 2010). What is more, it will always be necessary to identify new obstacles and
tackle them sequentially. Neither can all questions and problems be accommo-
dated in one schema.
This schema relates to economic growth, but diagnostics can also be used for
subanalyses like the one used, for example, in Trade Diagnostic Integrations Stud-
ies (see www.integratedframework.org), and they can also be useful in the political
and institutional fields. In fragile states, in particular, everything appears to be a
priority: infrastructure, sanitation, food, maintaining order, employment, educa-
tion … everything is a problem. The many international actors therefore work
simultaneously on all fronts, but it is impossible to realize all the items on their
overfull development agendas (Cousens & Kumar 2001 in Van der Borgh 2009;
Patrick 2007). According to Grindle (2007), it is becoming increasingly clear that
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the first priority has to be to set priorities. As shown in Figure 6.2 this can be 
done by, for example, first taking a careful look at the form of a failing state (is it,
for example, a post-conflict state or dictatorship?), assessing the possibilities for
change and then estimating how much effort every individual change will cost.
Here too countries do not have to rush to fulfil the norm that applies in the
Netherlands or Denmark: good enough governance is good enough.
Figure 6.2 Political diagnostics
Source: Grindle 2007
In addition to being useful in the economic and political fields, diagnostics can also
help to make well-reasoned choices and set social priorities. Again, everything
appears to be equally important: child mortality, education, healthcare, clean
water, malaria, hiv/aids – it is almost unethical to choose. The mdgs imply a
general approach for all countries in a multitude of social dimensions, and are
therefore really the antithesis of choice. Neither can instruments used by the
World Bank and bilateral organizations be regarded as having a social diagnostic
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function. Although the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (prsps) which devel-
oping countries have to draw up improve every year, most are primarily spending
department wish lists, particularly for education, healthcare and agriculture. prsps
are often poorly thought-out and far removed from being clear-cut development
strategies. In the words of researcher Whitfield (2009) they “tend to be an aggre-
gation of existing government and donor sector strategies and projects, rather than
an ideological coherent national strategy for achieving growth with poverty reduc-
tion in the next ten years and prioritized, concrete steps to achieve it”. The prsps
of different countries also appear to be suspiciously similar, with all the fields of
social development being covered, and almost all of them stating that the govern-
ment wants to improve education for girls in remote areas. They do not include
analyses of the distribution of capital, assets, income and power, nor proposals
relating to administrative and political organization. There is almost never any
attention for the private sector, nor for the role of decentralized governments.
Lastly, the paragraphs on implementation usually lack content.
The Asian Development Bank is now also experimenting with social analyses and
has developed an analysis tree to identify the binding constraints for social inclu-
sion to ensure equal access to opportunities for all and poverty reduction in the
event of growth. The tree has been applied in, for example, Nepal, the Philippines
and Papua New Guinea (see figure 6.3). A conceptual framework like this makes it
possible to investigate structurally where the greatest hindrances are to raising the
population’s standard of living and reducing inequality, and to acquire a well-
reasoned insight into the question of whether it is, for example, actually worth-
while, in a concrete context, to reduce poverty by focusing on ‘safety net policies’
which offer protection against risks, or on ‘cargo net policies’ which increase the
productive possibilities of the long-term poor through specific education or
healthcare. Tricky trade-offs may be necessary between helping more people or a
smaller group. As Barrett et al. (2006) explain, “For example, cargo net asset trans-
fer programs that are ‘a mile wide and an inch deep’ may be predictably ineffective
in the presence of critical wealth thresholds”.
Not a technocratic exercise
Economic, political and social diagnostics can be used to help to design a country-
specific development strategy, but they are not a technocratic instrument which
will produce the ‘right’ outcome without discussion. Neither should they be
viewed in isolation because education and healthcare, for example, are not only
important for people’s personal development and self-reliance, but can also be of
consequence for the quality of ‘human capital’ and also, in certain circumstances,
for a country’s economic development. Diagnostics is not an exact science: to start
with, situations can be assessed in different ways. Here too, an analogy with
medical diagnostics provides greater clarity since, while the degree of objectivity
in medical diagnostics is greater than in the case of development diagnostics, the 
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Figure 6.3 Diagnostic framework for inclusiveness
Source: Khan 2010
possibility of a second opinion is still regarded as a fundamental right. Analogous
to this, it is essential to find an adequate structure to compare various diagnoses. 
A diagnostic approach must also enable alternative interpretations and models to
be submitted to the various parties involved, to inspire them and allow a more
effective analysis of the trade-offs and risks of the different ways of tackling the
diagnosed problems. It cannot be stressed enough that diagnostics is therefore not
a search for some kind of holy grail, but a way of setting deliberate and specific
priorities, and weighing up what constitutes a good country-specific development
strategy. The priorities in Mali will be different to those in Burkina Faso, simply
because their concrete problems and political and institutional situations are
different, even though they are neighbouring countries with many similarities.
In a growth diagnosis for Cambodia, one World Bank researcher concluded that
this can be difficult enough in practice: “Looking for one or few binding
constraints is (…) politically counterintuitive. First, in the Cambodian, Buddhist
context, there is a view that everything should be improved at the same time, a
theme that echoes that of a ‘balanced growth’ path. Second, given the uncertain-
ties (conclusions are often based on signals or hints, rather than being firm), the
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rapid changes of the economy, and the time it will take to address constraints that
might emerge only in the future (e.g. skills), it would be unwise to ‘put all one’s
eggs in the same basket’. This suggests a process-oriented diagnostic that enables
adjustments over time. Third, whether within Government or a multi-sector
organization like the World Bank, radical prioritization at the expense of a sector
or issue is challenging” (Guimbert 2010). Which of the possible solutions for
prioritized binding constraints is eventually chosen will usually be the subject of
debate, and evoke resistance and sometimes also conflict. A diagnostic approach
is therefore not an alternative to a political process. Its primary goal is to substan-
tially improve the quality of the political debate on development to permit the
various considerations to be weighed up.
6.4.3 choice of instruments
Every few years, the world of development aid adopts a different trend, which is
then invariably replaced, some years later, by a new one. That mechanism comes
about because general solutions and instruments are continually propagated for
specific problems. Convincing examples can always be given of situations in
which such a solution or instrument works, but these are soon followed by coun-
terexamples of situations in which they have detrimental effects. After a while
someone will present a new general concept, based yet again on new examples,
and the cycle starts from the beginning.
At very regular intervals, for example, the point is made during the development
debate that it would be sensible to focus primarily on the government as a source
for development. Unexpected reflections on this view can be found in the recent
encyclical letter entitled Caritas in veritate by Pope Benedict xvi, which advocates
re-evaluating the role of the state in areas in which this is functional for develop-
ment. However, whether governments are the deciding factor in providing health-
care and education, or whether the initiative comes from civil society or private
parties, is a question which cannot be answered in general terms. The answer
depends on the country in question, and can vary over the course of time. It is also
directly related to the question of whether aid has a productive or destructive
effect. In a country with a fragile state structure it is, for instance, often sensible to
place the building of a system of healthcare and education primarily in the govern-
ment’s hands because setting up parallel structures will quickly erode the govern-
ment’s legitimacy. However, if governments excessively serve specific political or
ethnic groups, it may actually be better to build healthcare and education struc-
tures without the government’s involvement. It is also a good idea to distinguish
between a government’s various tasks. In many African countries, a distinction
between the government’s role as financier and implementing party could have a
positive effect on the quality of healthcare or education.
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Similarly it is important not to think too simplistically about how to stimulate
economic activity. Although it may start with companies, this is not always the
case. Sometimes the government may have to create facilities for companies – such
as attractive credit facilities for small and medium-sized businesses which are
often absent in African countries – and sometimes it will mainly be physical
infrastructure that is needed, or legal infrastructure, or something entirely differ-
ent. If we can learn something from sixty years of development policy it is that it is
important not to adopt often fairly ideological positions unquestioningly but to
examine specifically what the most important bottleneck is in a concrete country-
specific context and how it can be removed.
Interventions will therefore have to be carefully selected. In a small number of
cases this is a relatively straightforward process. Countries with natural resources
do not primarily need money but support with managing those resources, includ-
ing the building of an institutional system which is able to do this, and focusing on
diversification of the economy because the quantity of natural resources is finite.
In some cases it is a better idea to invest in agriculture. Countries with fertile soil,
and there are many in Africa, have often failed almost entirely to develop their
agricultural potential, either to feed their own populations or to develop an export
market. There are good reasons for the latter: the resource-rich Middle East has a
severe lack of good quality farmland, as does China where only 7 percent of the
soil is suitable for arable farming.
For agriculture, too, it is important to establish the right approach. Investments in
fertilizer, irrigation and better crops, in hygienic food storage, in electricity and
roads, and in a sound financial sector are obvious steps to take, including the
development of trade chains. Sometimes, however, it is better to place the empha-
sis on knowledge development and diffusion. Since the introduction of new agri-
culture technology in Asia, Latin America and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s (the
green revolution), few large-scale innovations have taken place in Asian agricul-
ture, while the failure of this revolution in Africa meant there were no large-scale
increases in food production there at all. This relative stagnation can only partially
be attributed to the impossibilities presented by the physical environment or tech-
nological limitations: it is primarily down to a lack of applied knowledge develop-
ment, in particular the lack of a scientific network which facilitates local innova-
tions (iac 2004). The emergence of large centralized knowledge institutes like the
International Rice Research Institute and the International Maize and Wheat
Improvement Centre (cimmyt) laid the foundation for innovations in cultivation
techniques which provided a basis for the green revolution in Asia but meant that
innovation in agriculture became increasingly centralized and scientific, and
thereby even more removed from the possible users of knowledge and techniques.
The centralized scientific knowledge became detached from the various everyday
practices, and knowledge and technology developments therefore frequently fail
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to link up with the specific conditions of agricultural practice. Conversely the
many small-scale innovations by farmers in the field are not sufficiently identified
and facilitated through appropriate scientific embedding on a sufficient scale
(Maat 2008).
Knowledge development and diffusion also assume a tailor-made approach. For a
green revolution in Africa, or rather for large-scale growth in African agricultural
production, more is needed than centralized technology intervention. Due to the
seriously fragmented character of African agriculture with its dozens of cultiva-
tion systems and many hundreds of sub-cultivation systems, each adapted to
specific environmental factors, it is important that innovation is coproduced by
science and practice. Scientific researchers will have to identify the bottlenecks
and the opportunities facing production increases for each cultivation system, and
will have to understand existing local innovations in order to link up with devel-
opments in scientific technology (Richards et al. 2009). The context-specific
nature of such innovation will be fundamentally different from the one-size-fits-
all innovation on which the green revolution in Asia was based. The many specific
agricultural contexts in Africa require a wide range of local revolutions in order to
increase African agricultural production (iac 2004).
6.5 the third consequence: being broader
Western development policy is often two-faced: we give countries financial and
other support but, at the same time, pursue policy that can undermine develop-
ment. The key question ought therefore to be how to avoid the positive effects of
development aid being undermined by the negative consequences of policy in
other areas such as trade, migration or environmental policy. Unfortunately, this
implies more than a simple technical policy adjustment. At national level there are
often opposing interests at play and, in addition, much of the policy in question
cannot be changed at national level. For example, trade policy is governed by the
eu, and environmental policy by global level agreements. Policy coherence, since
that is what is at stake, can generate more development for developing countries
than aid, but giving it concrete form is a difficult task.
The importance of (joined-up) cooperation with parties outside the classical
development domain in order to contribute to development and solve global prob-
lems has now also been broadly acknowledged. The question is, however, what
form this is going to take. As was described in chapter 5, not much progress has
yet been made as regards the practical implementation of policy coherence. At the
same time, the possibilities are enormous. The European Commission recently
called on the member states to provide extra financing for development, with the
idea being that every euro assigned to development aid should mobilize five euros
for activities which were officially not development aid but which involved, for
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example, the transfer of technology, trade financing or private investments. This is
intended to create ‘development leverage’, and that is at the very least an intrigu-
ing idea (European Commission 2009a).
The consequence of this reasoning is also that the oda concept has to be applied in
a less forced manner than has been the case to date. Non-development actors, who
often have better contacts with specific international fora than traditional devel-
opment organizations, should also carry out development tasks and could, there-
fore, also partially be funded from oda resources. In this context there is consider-
able international interest in the operation and impact of Norway’s International
Climate and Forest Initiative, and Germany’s International Climate Initiative,
which link climate policy and development, and are partially funded by oda.
However, according to Paul Engel, director of the European Centre for Develop-
ment Policy Management (ecdpm), an important lesson to be learned from previ-
ous experiences has to be, in all these cases, that “development objectives should
be leading, or at least demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. No matter what
other objectives international actors may define for their cooperation, develop-
ment impact must be the single criterion guiding the use of oda”. A good plan
therefore needs to be accompanied by options for a continuing dialogue on the
results between all the parties involved, with donors also having to give account of
their actions (ecdpm 2009b; European Commission 2009a, 2009c).
Global public goods
Broadening development goes beyond the involvement of new policy instruments
in development work because developing and Western countries also increasingly
have common interests. After all, we all stand to gain from ‘global public goods’
such as a stable climate, knowledge, and financial stability.
More and more of the wide range of cross-border issues do not relate to interests
which conflict (or potentially conflict) and therefore have to be moderated by
means of coherence policy, but rather relate to common interests. These interests
offer possibilities for linking development policy to themes which are also in the
interest of rich countries. undp put this issue on the international policy agenda
in 1999 by introducing the concept of global public goods. International public
goods are not about sharing or transferring cross-border consequences of domestic
policy (spillovers or externalities), but about benefits for everyone in the world (in
the case of global public goods) or in the region in question (in the case of regional
public goods), which can only be realized or retained through specific action and
cooperation.
Within national states, public goods have been a recognized category of services
and goods for some time, from which no one can be excluded (non-exclusivity)
and whose use by one party is not detrimental to use by others (non-rivalry) –
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peace and good macroeconomic policy are well-known examples. Such public
goods do not become available in sufficient quantities via the market of their own
accord because everyone can benefit from them free of charge (free riders). With-
out coordination, a ‘collective action problem’ arises, whereby everyone waits for
others to act, with insufficient supply as a result. The ‘public’ element of public
goods lies in the fact that they, in principle, affect everyone, or ought to be avail-
able to everyone, but this says nothing about the way in which public good will be
provided. How this happens can differ from case to case, and can become the task
of both private and public parties, individually or jointly.
In the meantime, the national nature of public goods no longer corresponds to the
world in which we live, because cross-border public goods like counteracting
global warming and safeguarding financial stability are becoming increasingly
important for our collective welfare. In addition, globalization has created new
international public goods. Examples are the prevention of global public ‘bads’ like
internet crime and fraud, the spread of diseases by trade and travel, and global
public goods like the international regimes for cross-border transport and commu-
nication, trade, international monetary policy, or harmonized fiscal policy. Only
specific action or cooperation will make it possible to halt global warming or avoid
the negative consequences of interdependencies, like for example the spread of
infectious diseases through international travel. This cross-border perspective not
only gives us a different relationship with developing countries, it also means we
have to focus our attention more on global governance (itfgpg 2006; Kanbur
2001; Kaul et al. 1999; Kaul & Conceição 2006; Kaul & Mendoza 2003; Morrissey
et al. 2002; Rajan 2009; Sandler 2002b; Went 2010).
Linking the development agenda to other fields is, in itself, not new but offers
more opportunities and is more urgent than ever before now that potential global
and regional shortages (water, food, natural resources) and the increasing impor-
tance of international public goods (climate, financial stability, preventing
pandemics) are with good reason high on the national and international agendas.
Within the context of an international cooperation agenda, development policy is
increasingly expected to help tackle global issues whose solution is not technical,
and is disputed by various players. There are differing views on the desired poli-
cies on trade, security, migration, climate, governance, food or the global financial
sector and considerable interests are at stake. This offers new opportunities for
development policy based on positive synergy with other policy and for increasing
the basis of support for such policy.
All countries in the West – and elsewhere – are currently struggling to define their
position in the world, and how they want to cooperate in establishing transna-
tional arrangements. Given the increased interdependencies, Western countries
are finding a focus on global development more and more inevitable. Although
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this search will still take some time, it is already clear that development policy has
to be an essential part of the process. Playing on several boards at the same time
will be a core requirement development policy will increasingly have to fulfil. 
If collective self-interest is made to count, in addition to moral motives, the devel-
opment task will become increasingly unavoidable, and that will make greater
demands on how it is designed.
6.6 a dual strategy for development
Development policy must become more development-oriented, and that can be
achieved in two ways. On the one hand it has to become more specific – more
tailor-made – in and for developing countries and focus on the spot where devel-
opment needs to acquire specific content. It must not be based on expansive West-
ern schemes, but be related to specific situations. On the other hand, policy has to
become more general, with development also being implemented in fields in
which ‘non-development actors’ have traditionally been active. The answers will
not only, or primarily, lie in the spending of oda resources which can, at most, be
used cleverly to bring in other parties. Development policy will therefore become
more specific and broader or, from a different perspective, both smaller and larger.
What does this mean for the structure of Western aid policy? The most important
implication is a dual strategy. The dominant image of development policy is still
mainly one in which Western countries support individual countries – and are
keen to receive appreciation for this to show their taxpayers that useful things can
be done with the resources they provide. It is much less clear how development
policy can be shaped in a broader context. In an intellectual sense, many acknowl-
edge the importance of global issues in the specific promotion of development.
However, in most Western countries there has been scarcely any response to the
question of how to deal with this. Here and there attempts are made to give
substance to policy aimed at coherence or global public goods, but these have to
date been little more than finger exercises. For some time, a number of ngos have
also been calling for attention to be paid to the development dimension of global
issues – and sometimes with some success. However, this too is sooner the begin-
ning than the end of a development.
While perceptions have focused primarily on the first pillar of development
policy, there are many indications that the second pillar must become the most
important one. The space for classical development policy, whereby donors
support individual countries locally, can be expected to diminish in the coming
years. In the near future it will certainly still be worthwhile contributing in that
way to the development of a number of countries, primarily in Africa. However, 
if these countries can maintain the same rate of development that they have exhib-
ited in recent years in the coming decade, they will want to take a very different
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position in respect of Western donors in around fifteen years time. The focus will
then no longer be on classical development aid, but on partnerships which are
comparable to the relationship which Western countries currently have with
countries like Indonesia. Exit classical aid. On the other hand, these countries will
become increasingly interrelated in a world order in which all parties become more
and more dependent on each other. As a consequence, development will be deter-
mined more and more by the way in which global issues are dealt with.
As far as Western donors are concerned, all this implies a restructuring of their
development policy. Nowadays, ministries are still predominantly organized
around the implementation of aid programmes, while the emphasis must increas-
ingly be placed on the way in which countries deal with broad issues. This does
not mean that sudden changes have to be made to the organizational design but
that, over a period of say fifteen years, the structure will have to become funda-
mentally different. It is therefore important to start introducing changes now: the
country-specific pillar must be made more development-oriented and gradually
decrease in importance, while the global pillar must start acquiring form and
content.
The following chapters deal with the issue of how to design both pillars. Chapter 7
explores how aid can be made more specific and outlines the way in which West-
ern governments can continue developing their existing system of aid to ensure
that it is genuinely aimed at development based on local situations. Chapter 8
assesses what it means to adopt a wider view and, with coherence policy and a
strategy for international public goods and global governance, to take cross-border
issues as a reference point.
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7 being more specific: professionalizing aid
What is required to make a serious contribution to development? As we have
seen, there is no Big Answer to that question. Societies cannot be ‘fixed’. Develop-
ment aid should aim to increase self-sufficiency, and be tailored to the specific
situation and problems in the country concerned. Anyone who takes this as a seri-
ous starting point will not act on the basis of yet another grand, universal theory of
development, but on a heterogeneous, better substantiated and targeted collection
of local policy practices.
7.1 appropriate aid modalities
Asking how to shape development is to ask not only what, but also how. The
debate on ‘what’ is many times more intensive than the question of ‘how’. Aid
presupposes a thorough reflection on which instruments to deploy, but that is a
surprisingly neglected issue. There has been little systematic reflection on how aid
can best be provided. To be more precise, there is a whole body of literature on
specific intervention variants – for example, the various forms of microcredit have
been evaluated extensively – but the question of how this aid relates to the ‘politi-
cal economy’ of a country is almost invariably ignored. At micro level there is a
wide range of insights into the exact design of aid projects, but the issue of
whether aid can better be provided through ngos or local government is much
less systematically examined. Choice of instruments is often a matter of prefer-
ence, with some people believing that governments are the best channel, and
others placing their trust in multilateral organizations, ngos or the private sector.
This neglect is partly based on the implicit assumption that all aid is worthwhile.
As long as it is aimed at reducing poverty, every person who is alleviated from
poverty is a positive result, no matter who provides the aid. When the objective
shifts to increasing the self-sufficiency of countries and peoples, it is necessary to
ask what kind of aid is best suited to achieving that. In addition to increasing self-
sufficiency, it is also important to address ways of avoiding negative side effects of
aid, such as the unproductive perpetuation of neopatrimonial structures. The exis-
tence of such structures is a reality in many developing countries, and it is impor-
tant to determine how aid relates to them.
How are we to approach this problem? Nearly all donors have to ask themselves
this question nowadays. Anyone who aims to make a recipient country self-suffi-
cient, and sees aid as a temporary measure that should be rendered unnecessary as
soon as possible, is faced with a serious dilemma. History has taught us that it is
an illusion to assume that modern states can be built up without a properly func-
tioning government. It has also taught us that governments in Africa are always
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inclined to use aid for their personal benefit or that of their immediate group
rather than for the country as a whole. Donors cannot build on governments with
complete confidence, but it is equally difficult to act without them.
It is therefore crucial to seek forms of aid that aim to avoid negative side effects
from the start. In theory there are many possibilities. The option of limiting the
aid in scale and/or time could in any case be considered. To prevent too much aid
dependency, the volume of aid could be restricted to a certain level, for example
15 percent of a country’s gdp. It is equally possible to limit the duration of the aid.
A country can make it clear in advance that it wishes to be a donor for a specific
number of years, perhaps somewhere between five and ten, and to prevent depen-
dency in that way. The striking fact that neither of these options is used very often
is an indication of a failure to address the effects of aid.
Another rarely applied method to avoid recipient countries becoming excessively
dependent on a donor is to make greater use of the option of not making funds
available to the central government, but to see regional and local authorities as the
primary recipients of aid. Most donors are inclined to focus primarily on national
governments. That reflex is understandable and there are often also good reasons
for it. However, it is also possible to focus primarily on other authorities that are
willing and able to deal with aid adequately – and this leads to a reward system
within a recipient country. Such a step also links up well with the growing need to
invest in the development of quality of regional and local authorities, which are
becoming increasingly important tiers of government with the strong increase in
urbanization.
It is also possible to introduce slightly stricter conditions, and focus more on
results. One example is through a ‘matching budget’ system, whereby donors
double the revenue a country collects through some form of taxation. This perfor-
mance-based approach also includes variants of ‘cash on delivery’, in which aid
funds are provided once a previously agreed objective has been reached. All of
these variants have their advantages, but often look better on paper than in prac-
tice. Governments in many developing countries are insufficiently equipped to
deal with output financing as an incentive.
There is also room for improvement in avoiding aid dependency when designing
aid programmes. The productive safety nets in Ethiopia – a variant of the Food 
for Work projects which have been successful for so long elsewhere – are a good
example. In recent decades, Ethiopia has been confronted by periods of severe
drought, which were serious enough to make the front pages of Western newspa-
pers. To be prepared for subsequent droughts, it was very tempting for donors to
build up large stocks of food through the un World Food Programme. However, 
a more intelligent concept has since been developed, based on the wide variety of
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local needs in areas where drought occurs on a regular basis. A scheme has been
developed, for example, which provides farmers with paid work on infrastructural
projects if they cannot work on the land because of drought. They can then use the
money they earn to buy food themselves. That makes it unnecessary to keep food
in reserve, as there is plenty on the market. However, it does mean that there must
be workable plans for infrastructural projects, as well as the tools and materials
required to carry them out. This makes aid funds twice as productive and ensures
that the aid does not make people passive. They retain their pride and dignity and
the local market is not paralyzed by large quantities of free food.
In short, there is a wide variety of ways to provide aid in a way that minimizes the
risk of dependency. However, there are no simple answers. Aid is dirty business,
and it is wise to keep that in the back of your mind. Not only can aid have unde-
sired effects but, even in the best case, it means making choices. Whenever a road
is laid, an economic sector is supported or a region acquires extra schools, there is
always another road, sector or region that does not benefit. Implicitly a choice is
always made for (and therefore also against) specific groups. Some political groups
also benefit more than others. These are usually the groups in the government,
because they can present the results as their own successes. In that sense develop-
ment aid is itself unavoidably political. There is no point in denying that, just as
there is no point in claiming that Western donors never give money to corrupt
regimes. What is worthwhile is to work hard to design aid in a way that its positive
effects outweigh its negative ones. There is no watertight formula for that, but it is
important to be continually aware of it. That includes seeking and continuing to
seek appropriate aid modalities, which will differ from country to country. In
general terms, these can be divided into five strategies.
7.2 supporting governments
The first strategy consists of providing development aid primarily through
governments. That is no simple task. In developing countries political and govern-
ment systems are often dysfunctional. Political elites with an unclear pedigree
cannot always be circumvented, and there are very few developing countries with-
out some form of corruption. Half the people of Cameroon, Liberia, Sierra Leone
and Uganda indicate that they have paid bribes over the previous twelve months,
and there is not a single developing country where the figure is under 6 percent
(Transparency International 2009). There are neopatrimonial structures, govern-
ments are heavily bureaucratic, or a large number of factions vie for power. 
Developing countries are by no means populated only with pitiful people who
need urgent help. They comprise a wide variety of groups, each of which pursues
its own interests, including elites out to enrich themselves and shadowy warlords
(Van Bijlert 2009; Chabal & Daloz 1999). At best, in addition to pursuing its own
interests, the elite may also wish to develop the country, and there may be coun-
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tervailing powers that function to some degree, but these are almost never fully
effective. In many developing countries, the parties that donors have to negotiate
with are often not in a position themselves to influence ministries or other impor-
tant players. Saying “yes” and then doing nothing (or not being able to do
anything) is a strategy that is frequently used (Whitfield 2009). It means that
donors have to become involved in local power relations, and development aid
always takes place within a political force field.
Nevertheless, it is possible to provide aid directly to governments. The most
common forms of direct aid are general budget support and sectoral support. Both
of these variants make the recipient government primarily responsible for spend-
ing the funds provided. Donors see it as their task to agree on frameworks that
give them sufficient guarantees that the money will be spent wisely, but in princi-
ple the responsibility lies with the recipient government. General budget support
is in theory the best strategy within this approach, as sectoral support always
involves donors in making choices about which sector deserves support. The
distinction is, however, primarily optical, as governments can easily move funds
around within their budgets. If donors want to provide money for education, that
releases funds for sectors they are less enthusiastic about, such as defence. The
distinction is therefore more significant for the donating country, which can
assure its public that the money is being used for worthwhile purposes, than for
recipient countries.
Although only a limited part of the aid budget is reserved for this form of aid (in
2008 that was 15 percent of aid to Africa) it leads to heated discussions in donor
countries. Some consider budget support the ideal form of aid, as it allows coun-
tries to make their own choices and frees them from good intentions tinted with
neocolonialism. Others see it as the most dangerous, because it makes govern-
ments lazy, given that they are no longer required to act responsibly towards their
own people or account for their actions through taxation and elections. The Ugan-
dan president Museveni referred to budget support – presumably when he himself
was in a more favourable position – as “a life-support system for brain-dead
regimes” (in Ellis & Ter Haar 2004).
With this form of aid, donors rely heavily on ‘budget tracking’. Systems have been
developed, often with the support of technical specialists from the World Bank, to
enable the monitoring of expenditure and results. Yet these also encounter prob-
lems. Good systems of public finance management are difficult to implement
because they assume, for example, that there is a competent ministry of finance.
Local governments must also provide information efficiently and keep people up
to date on the building of clinics and schools, despite this being more difficult to
achieve at local level.
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Accountability
Some donors prefer to extend accountability beyond the classical financial instru-
ments, for example by improving accountability practices in the countries them-
selves. It is significant that dfid, which often takes a lead in the policy debate on
development aid, announced in a recent policy memorandum in the summer of
2009 that it would reserve 5 percent of the budget of all future projects to achieve
accountability. That is no longer a matter of simply counting and measuring. Other
forms of accounting are at least as important, including supporting organizations
that use internet to make government spending (and what they should spend)
transparent, meaning that the directors of schools in remote towns can see
whether their schools are actually receiving the agreed amount of funding. There
is a much-quoted example from Uganda. Every time the Ministry of Finance allo-
cated money to a school, it informed the local media of the exact amount and sent
a poster to the school so that everyone could see how much it should be receiving.
As a result, less of the money got lost en route. This approach has proved to work
better if people are more vocal and can at least read (Hubbard 2007). Projects in
India went even further, sending text messages to schoolchildren at random
moments asking them to take a photo of their teacher with their mobile tele-
phones. If the teacher was not present, the school did not receive its funding.
Another strategy is to allow users to assess the quality of public services. In 2001,
for example, Korea introduced a Citizen Audit Request System, under which
people can request audits of public services which they consider to be inadequate
(un 2007). Bangalore’s Report Card System is another example. For more than ten
years, the local newspaper has been publishing the scores the city’s residents give
to municipal departments. The scheme was the initiative of a small group of active
citizens (un 2008).
Political nerve
Budget tracking and other accountability systems have a significant Achilles heel.
The results they produce by no means always lead to action. Donors are not in a
position to take any decisive measures on the basis of their findings. Partly because
of increasing donor pressure, they have little scope for negotiation and are rarely
important players in individual developing countries. The World Bank and, to a
lesser extent, the undp are often major players, but their negotiators seldom dare
to take up political positions. In the case of the World Bank that is because they are
not permitted to do so by their headquarters, whereas the undp is a un agency
and the recipient countries are also member states and tolerate no intervention in
their internal affairs. In most developing countries, the eu also has little influence.
In addition, there are more complicating factors. Because they are by definition
willing to be generous, donors are in a vulnerable position from the outset.
Furthermore, they have the tendency to compete. Everyone wants to provide aid
in a country where they can achieve easy results. Since the emergence of new
donors in the past decade, the situation has become even more complex. China’s
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capacity to invest in developing countries is so great that the World Bank some-
times feels that its influence is negligible. Moreover China does not impose irritat-
ing requirements. Lastly, where donors do have sufficient negotiating power, 
it is not always easy to use it. Even in Surinam, where – to compensate for its long
colonization of the country – the Netherlands was by far the largest donor for
many decades, it was not always possible to exert even subtle political pressure.
It is striking that, while donors make so little progress in developing a good politi-
cal strategy, developing countries do seem to be making progress in their ‘emanci-
pation process’ as aid recipients. African countries are looking at the way Asian
countries have already taken control of where and how donors provide aid. The
donor effort is increasingly managed by recipient governments in Southeast Asian
countries. The same process is rapidly taking place in Africa, with governments
becoming more self-confident and daring more and more to stand up to donors.
They are prepared to risk cuts in aid, knowing that it is mostly temporary, and that
it will not make so much difference anyway.
Donors are conspicuously reluctant to develop instruments that go further than
transparency. Joint donor strategies are few and far between. Most individual
donors therefore try, above all, to be pragmatic. They form alliances, do not make
empty threats and develop sharp insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the
other party. After all, political systems and governments in developing countries
are by no means monolithic.
It is also striking that individual countries do not wish to accept the consequence
that they should develop a more appropriate funding model. The model currently
used by most Western donors is based on budgeting annual funds that are no
longer made available if they are not used. This annual pressure to spend has a
distorting effect on decisions on the progress of aid. It would seem more logical to
treat money provided for development aid as a kind of investment fund. It could
be provided for a longer period, perhaps five or even better ten years, with deci-
sions about when it is made available being made at local level. What happens if
money is not spent quickly enough became blatantly clear shortly after the estab-
lishment of the Millennium Challenge Corporation by George Bush Sr. The orga-
nization was set up as a counterbalance to usaid and only provided governments
with money once they had presented a sound plan, with a transparent but tough
assessment of quality. Consequently, plans were submitted less quickly than had
been hoped and funds remained unspent, causing political unrest about the low
level of expenditure.
Budget support has another important shortcoming, which is less often discussed
but equally evident: it is primarily aimed at spending departments, and particu-
larly at the social sectors. Budget support fits in with a kind of aid which focuses
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mainly on supporting social policy. Anyone with other priorities must consider
other instruments. For example, if you want to improve the provision of financial
services to small and medium-sized enterprises, sectoral support is of little use
(the financial sector is not a sector in the sense of being a separate budget item that
is centrally financed). Support for this sector therefore has to be provided through
other mechanisms than budget support. Budget support is more suitable for a
development policy aimed at improving living conditions.
Here too, however, generally applicable positions are not appropriate. There are
countries that have shown in recent years that they can cope well with budget
support (Ghana is the best example), while it remains to be seen how it will turn
out in others (for example, Tanzania and Uganda).
7.3 other actors: ngos for development
After it became clear in the mid-1980s that development interventions aimed 
at the state did not produce the desired results, hopes were increasingly focused
on civil society. The scientific underpinning was provided by the social capital 
Figure 7.1 Percentage oda to ngos
Source: Nijs & Renard 2009
Note: Total funding to Western and Southern ngos
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theory, which emphasized that a robust civil society was a condition for democra-
tization and development. This heralded the start of two golden decades for ngos
in both the North and the South. They received money in large quantities from
individual citizens, celebrities and national governments. Now, no less than 30
percent of all the public and private money provided for aid is spent through ngos
(Riddell 2007).
Despite the great financial and non-financial confidence in ngos, many – espe-
cially those in the West – are struggling with their task, form and function
(Bebbington et al. 2008; Biekart & Fowler 2008; Grotenhuis 2009; Lister 2004;
Riddell 2007; De Wal 2009). That is primarily a consequence of changes in the
South. There has been, for example, an enormous increase in Southern ngos.
Furthermore, the distinction between Western and Southern ngos is becoming
less clear. For example, the Bangladeshi ngo brac is active in nine countries,
and Oxfam recently set up Oxfam India to allow Indians to support aid to their
own country (Lewis & Kanji 2009; Lister 2004). Capacity development of ngos
in the South is also having an impact. Southern ngos no longer always need
their Western counterparts. They increasingly receive funding directly from
other sources, for example from philanthropists, vertical funds or their own
governments. This is now partly the case in India and Brazil. Now Southern
ngos are becoming stronger, it is important to ask what added value Western
ngos can offer.
Changes in donor countries also play a role. In recent decades, Western civil soci-
ety organizations, and especially those that have received funding from the
government, have been emphatically required to render account for their expendi-
ture and activities. Many organizations were pleased to do this to illustrate their
legitimacy. However, the emphasis on presenting results, monitoring and self-
evaluation can also have negative effects. ngos become more bureaucratic rather
than more professional. After all, professionalization means having enough room
to manoeuvre to be able to respond to the changing situation in countries them-
selves, to experiment, to be part of a learning system, and to render account for the
main framework of their interventions, rather than the details. Southern ngos
funded by Western ngos have also sometimes suffered under this burden of
accountability, which has forced their development objectives into the back-
ground (Lewis & Kanji 2009; Bebbington et al. 2008). Moreover, there is a
tendency to finance existing, larger organizations, especially if they are able to
demonstrate their successes. As a result, institutional logic seems to triumph over
the logic of development (Edwards 2004).
Institutional logic also requires that Western ngos show that they have support in
their own societies. That means that, in addition to the thick reports of ‘expected
results’ they have to submit to the ministry, they also have to present their West-
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ern publics with images of children living in pitiful circumstances – or smiling and
happy after receiving aid. ‘For just a few euros a year you can send Shanti back to
school’ – appeals like these demonstrably deliver the largest number of new
donors. Riddell (2007) calls this approach ‘the greatest lie in development aid’.
Unlike the picture presented by the sales pitches, development is a capricious and
unpredictable process, and most ngos know that. They are often not helping
Shanti at all, but are dealing with the local ministry of education or village heads.
The question is what effect dissemination of this ‘lie’ as a means of gaining public
support has on Western ngos. How do their efforts to create societal support in
donor countries relate to other objectives, like greater professionalization and
seeking legitimacy in developing countries (see also Dietz et al. 2006)? 
The emergence of Southern ngos, advanced bureaucracy, and a hybrid mandate in
the West have all raised questions about the future of Western ngos. How these
questions are answered will depend on whether these organizations are able to
contribute to global development in the future, and whether they will still have
their own added value.
Being more specific
Answering the question of the added value of Western ngos means first examin-
ing their significance in developing countries themselves. As with earlier
paradigms, the civil society paradigm has proved not to be a panacea for develop-
ment problems. Studies have increasingly shown that the role of ngos must not
be underestimated – but also not overestimated (Bebbington et al. 2008; Biekart
2008; Bräutigam 2000; Edwards 2004, 2009b; Lewis & Kanji 2009; Molenaers &
Renard 2007, 2009; Rahman 2006; Riddell 2007; Roy 2008). Civil society and
social capital cannot simply be considered synonymous with ngos. ngos do not
by nature do ‘good’ (Grotenhuis 2009).
The first question is what civil society should be taken to mean. It is an extremely
heterogeneous category or, as Carothers (1999: 20) puts it: “Civil society every-
where is a bewildering array of the good, the bad and the outright bizarre”. Claim-
ing to work with ‘civil society’ does not say much at all, without stating whether
your partners are pro or anti military, pro or anti birth control, etc.
The next question is what an ngo has the capacity to do. Like states, civil societies
cannot be built up from the outside. You then need to ask how ngos can
contribute to civil society, and what organizations can make a difference. A lot of
Western ngos primarily have contact with Southern exponents of Western social
movements, and they are often by no means the most important groups. It is not
uncommon for Western ngos to completely miss the social dynamics in develop-
ing countries. One source of dynamism may be religious groups, like the Pente-
costal church or Islamic communities, which Western ngos have little contact
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with (Edwards 2009). Many ngos also focus their activities in the cities and there-
fore miss the social dynamics of the countryside, which can often be a source of
development.
Donor financing of Southern ngos can even lead to an artificial civil society in
which money attracts entrepreneurs. That can sometimes lead to improbably high
numbers of ngos: for example, Bangladesh and Nepal both have more than a
hundred ingos (international ngos) and 1,800 and 5,978 local ngos respectively
(Mayhew 2005). This not only raises questions about unworkable donor pressure
and lack of efficiency, but also about the binding of these organizations to the soci-
eties in which they work. In Uganda, where there are 7,000 registered ngos, it is
said that they have hijacked civil society. In addition, the concept of ngo used by
Western financiers is not appropriate to all societies. There may be forms of social
dynamism that cannot easily be fitted into an easy to subsidize organizational
form. In other cases, some organizations – like Islamic or clan-based organizations
– may not fit in with the Western picture of a ‘good’ civil society, yet they can in
some cases make substantial contributions to development (Edwards 2004,
2009b; Molenaers & Renard 2009; Rose 2009).
Another factor is that governments in developing countries can by no means
always work well together with the ngos in their countries. The theory of social
capital presupposes that trust is learned within ngos so that a healthy yet charged
relationship develops between society and the state. However, it is arguable
whether people really learn to trust if governments – like those in Iran or Ethiopia
– primarily project mistrust. Governments that are too weak, or too authoritarian,
do not allow themselves to be influenced by ngos (Radelet 2005; Gaventa &
McGee 2010). The Right to Information Act in India, for example, only makes
sense because there is a state. India has an enormous bureaucracy, strongly based
on the colonial art of keeping records and files, which generates retrievable infor-
mation (Baviskar 2010). The contribution made by ngos to development is there-
fore not equal in every country and at all times. In several countries that have
developed rapidly in recent decades – like Botswana, China or Taiwan – ngos
hardly played a role of any significance. In countries like Brazil and South Korea
after democratization, on the other hand, ngos did play a part. Like the market or
the state, ngos cannot transform societies on their own, as there are many differ-
ent forces at play (Bräutigam 2000; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Edwards 2009b; Mole-
naers & Renard 2007; Rose 2009).
To estimate the contribution that ngos make it is important to distinguish
between the different functions they can fulfil, even though these can often over-
lap. Three immediately come to the fore: service provider, watchdog and
supporter of social processes. Other authors also emphasize the importance of
differentiating functions for understanding the role played by ngos in developing
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countries, but use different categories, often with slightly different meanings
(Edwards 2004; Fowler 2000; Korten 1990; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a; De
Wal 2009).
ngos can fulfil the role of service provider in developing countries by, for exam-
ple, distributing food or setting up a hospital. This role resembles their old
mission, and the way ngos have functioned in continental Europe in the past two
centuries. This function was especially dominant in the 1980s and 1990s when a
lot of aid was provided on a project basis. Service provision is particularly effective
if a government fails in its obligations or if specific groups are difficult to reach.
Some governments acknowledge this. In India, for example, the government has
quadrupled funding for ngos in the last decade to improve service provision to
marginalized groups (Riddell 2007).
However, there is also criticism of service-delivery ngos. They can become part
of patronage systems, or undermine the tasks and responsibility of governments.
In some countries parallel systems evolve. For example, in Uganda in the 1990s,
healthcare was kept afloat by ngos (Bräutigam 2000). The same applies to brac,
from Bangladesh. This ngo not only has 97,000 employees, but also provides
nearly the whole population with healthcare, making it a kind of quasi-govern-
mental organization (Thomas 2008). Critics from within and without these coun-
tries believe that, because such ngos primarily focus on service provision, and
often (without criticism) take over the role of the government, too little is done to
change the structural causes of underdevelopment (Edwards 2004, 2009b; Fowler
2000; Molenaers & Renard 2009; Rahman 2006; Riddell 2007).
Through external criticism and self-reflection on this sort of service provision
many ngos have assumed different roles (Thomas 2008). One of these is the
newer, more Anglo-Saxon role of watchdog and of influencing policy. ngos in
developing countries try to follow national government policy and administra-
tion, preferably to change them. In addition ngos are increasingly acting as watch-
dogs in respect of local and international companies, and are especially monitoring
corporate social responsibility. These organizations are more politically minded
and try to change policy. The keywords for watchdog ngos are transparency,
responsiveness and accountability. They also frequently focus on research and
information provision and set up budget-tracking systems. These critical ngos try
to give a voice to as yet nascent middle classes.
According to Riddell (2009), ngos are relatively effective in terms of institutional
development, especially in comparison with bilateral efforts. Yet they cannot be
certain of success in all countries. For example, governance in a number of Indian
states has not improved despite substantial pressure from a large number of ngos
(Roy 2008). The paradox is that a critical watchdog function is only valuable if
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there is a functioning state apparatus which is ready and willing to change in the
long term (Molenaers & Renard 2009; Radelet 2005). It is therefore no coinci-
dence that watchdog ngos have mainly contributed to social rights and civil soci-
ety building in Latin America (Biekart 2008).
The last function that ngos fulfil is that of supporting social processes, usually
referred to in the international context as community development. This
embraces a wide range of tasks that have changed considerably over time, often
because donors have imposed other priorities. For example, in the past a lot of
effort was made in the agricultural sector to support farmers, frequently through
cooperatives. In the 1980s and 1990s, the focus shifted to the empowerment of
deprived groups, such as women and ethnic minorities. In recent years, ngos have
devoted greater attention to development of the private sector, particularly by
supporting small producers and arranging microcredit (Helmsing & Knorringa
2009). There is also growing attention for conflict mediation. In ethnically or reli-
giously fragmented societies, ngos that play a functionally binding role, such as
football clubs or trade unions, are important in, for example, preventing violence,
as an Indian study shows (Varshney 2002). Religious organizations, whether
Muslim or Christian, also increasingly play a conciliatory role, while the impor-
tance of their function as service provider is declining (see also Biekart 2008). Yet
here too it is important to note that if ngos focus too much on bonding rather
than on bridging – as in Rwanda – they can themselves fan the flames of conflict
(Narayan 1999).
ngos therefore have different roles to play, and whether and how they can
contribute to development will depend on the country and the context in which
they operate. That means it is necessary to examine each case specifically to see
whether ngos can play a role in the further development of a country and, if so,
what role that should be. Each role has its own assessment framework. A service-
providing ngo will generally have added value in a fragile or weak state. A tender-
ing model is best suited to finance service provision in states like this, with ngos
competing with others for specific assignments which can also be expressed in
terms of tangible results, such as the number of people the service reaches, the
quality of the service and, in the context of preventing the unintended conse-
quences of aid, what needs to be done to eventually transfer provision of the
service to the local or national government. As mentioned above, an ngo can only
operate effectively as a watchdog if there is a reasonably well-functioning state. In
such cases, tender-based financing is not appropriate, as the embedding and legiti-
macy of the ngo are of major importance. The accountability framework must
therefore be based on those criteria. Finally, the role of supporting community
development should reflect not the wishes of the donor community but existing
development in the local community. Conflict mediation is especially required in
societies that are ethnically or religiously fragmented and where the government is
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not conciliatory (Narayan 1999), while the empowerment of women is only
worthwhile if there is already considerable activity aimed at achieving it. In the
latter case, the assessment framework will have to be based mainly on broad
support and quality.
The future of Western ngos
What does the future hold for Western ngos? As they should only provide
services where governments genuinely fail to function, they are then in effect
temporary substitutes, offering services that governments should provide them-
selves. This role should therefore be restricted to a limited number of cases. There
is more scope to contribute to a properly functioning social system by keeping a
close eye on the government and helping to bring about productive social rela-
tions. However, these are major tasks, so great that it is arguable whether they are
achievable at all. A lot of ngos are proud of these major tasks, but few address the
problem of what it means to tackle them with limited resources. Here, more than
ever, it is important for ngos to concentrate on what they are good at. They could
focus on a limited number of countries with and in which they have longstanding
and far-reaching contact. In this way, they will build up good country-specific
knowledge. A second option is to specialize in themes.
Incidentally, it is striking how little systematic knowledge is available on how
investments in civil society can contribute to development. However, there is
hardly any exchange of knowledge between development organizations or initia-
tives. With the exception of a few recent initiatives, there is a serious shortage of
horizontal feedback (see also Dietz et al. 2006). Developing a policy theory on
social development is therefore an important point for attention.
7.4 other actors: businesses for development
Aid can be directed at governments or ngos. It can also be aimed at economic
activity. After all one of the major challenges of the twenty-first century is to
devote greater attention in African and other least developed countries to knowl-
edge that can contribute to growth and development. For example, studies have
shown so far that growth and structural transformation is often facilitated if an
economy is diverse and not only based on industrialization. An important ques-
tion is then how to make better use of the interaction between domestic and
foreign capital (unctad 2005, 2009b; Wade 2009b). Investments can lead to
development if they have a positive, catalyzing effect on the existing economic
infrastructure and small and medium-sized enterprises (smes). However, they do
not necessarily have such a positive impact. After all, business linkages in all direc-
tions can have both positive and negative consequences (unctad 2005). Multina-
tionals can create employment for smes in poor countries and transfer technology
and knowledge to these companies, but they can also compete local smes out of
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the market. Moreover, while transnational companies can offer consumers cheaper
products, they can also contract supply (Coghlan & Poskitt 2009). To assess
whether investments are development-related, it is necessary to examine the
entire chain. This is incorporated in the oecd directive and the ilo statement on
corporate social responsibility. The sustainability of chains is also receiving more
attention. “A promising way to improve the sustainability of production chains”,
says the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (pbl) in a recent report
“is by international agreements between companies, ngos and governments to
set criteria for the sustainability of these production chains” (Netherlands Envi-
ronmental Assessment Agency 2009b).
Economic activity is usually stimulated in two ways. Western donors can try to
regulate their own multinational corporations so that their activities benefit coun-
tries in the South. However, it is also possible to support economic activity in
Southern countries, in particular by contributing to a good business climate.
Engaging international companies
Encouraging Western companies to contribute to the development of countries in
the South usually occurs in the context of corporate social responsibility (csr).
csr takes a variety of forms. According to Van Tulder & Fortanier (2009), devel-
opment-related business practices are the most far-reaching form of corporate
social responsibility. They distinguish four different approaches to csr: inactive,
reactive, ‘active-go-it-alone’ and proactive. American companies generally tend to
adhere to the more inactive and reactive variants. That means that they donate part
of their profits to aid projects on, for example, microcredit or hiv/aids. This has
more to do with public relations than development. Most of the projects, if they
have any impact at all, may help reduce poverty. In Europe, there is more of a
tendency to be proactive, and to integrate social objectives with the profit motive.
This is more promising and gives rise to the question of how companies can be
supported in this development-related approach and how governments, in turn,
can make better use of what companies have to offer.
Governments try more and more to involve businesses in pursuing development
objectives. Since the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg
(2002) there has been an increase in cross-sector partnerships. At the end of 2006,
the un secretariat registered more than 300 bipartite and tripartite partnerships,
yet little is known about their nature, dynamics and effectiveness. It is clear that
they can help fill gaps in governance, knowledge and investment but – as the
capacities and competences required to achieve development are diverse – they are
not able to replace all other actors in the development field (see also Edwards
2009a). Governments can sometimes play an initiating role in the relatively new
field of partnerships for development.
208 less pretension, more ambition
The policy of most Western governments on corporate social responsibility is
based on self-regulation, cooperation and facilitation. The basic principle is that
companies should primarily fulfil their obligations regarding csr and the associ-
ated socially responsible chain management in their own way in dialogue with
their local communities. Transparency and consultation with stakeholders is
considered to be of great importance. ‘Soft law’ approaches to csr can count on
more support than regulations and legislation. A good example is the Global
Compact, initiated by the un in 2002 with the words: “There was great potential
for the goals of the United Nations – promoting peace and development – and the
goals of business – creating wealth and prosperity – to be mutually supportive”
(Therien & Pouliot 2006). By the end of 2005, around 2,400 companies had
signed the Compact. They undertook, within their sphere of influence, to endorse
voluntarily ten principles distilled from four major international agreements,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A lot of un agencies have
now adopted an approach based on private sector partnerships (Ruggie 2007;
unctad 2008a). The considerable emphasis on self-regulation is not without its
critics. Western ngos insist that voluntary and binding corporate social responsi-
bility are not mutually exclusive and argue that csr should be embedded in
national legislation, international regulations and widely accepted principles of
good governance and socially responsible behaviour.
Gradually a normative framework for international csr is emerging on the basis of
a series of international declarations, directives and recommendations by the ilo,
oecd and the International Chamber of Commerce (icc), and national organisa-
tions like the Dutch Accounting Standards Board. It is essential not only to
endorse the normative framework laid out in the Social and Economic Council’s
Statement on International Corporate Social Responsibility (ser 2009) but also to
render account for it. That calls for transparency, independence and a system for
dealing with complaints.
Insisting on and facilitating soft law is a task for the government if the private
sector itself shows insufficient initiative. A number of initiatives have been taken
in this respect in recent years. For example, together with the private sector and
ngos, the British government introduced the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (eiti), which aims to prevent illegal trade in natural resources from
Africa. Another example is the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (idh), set up
with the support of the Dutch government, which has now created eight public-
private partnerships to promote sustainable trade. These ppps involve over 100
organizations which are expected to invest 425 million euros in the sustainable
production of cocoa, tea, tropical timber, natural stone, tourism, soy, cotton and
aquaculture between 2009 and 2015.
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The government can go a step further and ensure that companies comply with the
law. In this respect it could be more proactive in tracing illegal capital transactions.
This problem urgently requires greater attention and action now that there is
growing evidence that developing countries are suffering massive damage as a
result of illegal financial flows, tax evasion and the use of ‘creative’ transfer prices
within multinationals (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 2008, 2009d). A report
by the Commission on Capital Flight from Developing Countries (2009) set up by
the Norwegian government makes the interesting recommendation to explore the
possibility of making it compulsory for multinationals to include more details in
their annual reports on the scale of their activities, the number of staff, and the
taxes paid as a percentage of the taxable profit in each country in which they are
active. According to the commission, companies that already engage in csr can
start doing this on their own initiative without waiting for the government to
introduce legislation.
The decisions by the g20 to take action where necessary against tax paradises may
bring about changes in favour of developing countries. However, they also repre-
sent a missed opportunity in that the g20 did not also insist on transparency about
bank accounts, especially those of African leaders, in Switzerland and other coun-
tries that maintain banking confidentiality. That could have helped change the
situation in a number of African countries. Transparency International calculates
that African elites keep some 700 billion dollars outside their countries (Glennie
2008) and Acquaah Gaissie (2006) reaches a similar estimate. Nigeria’s Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission alone has recovered more than 5 billion dollars
and convicted 82 people since 2003. That required a lot of time and effort and was
only the tip of the iceberg: it took a great deal of pressure to persuade Swiss banks
to repay most of the money stolen by Nigerian dictator Abacha in the 1990s.
Increasing business opportunities
Economic activity can be promoted more directly by stimulating investments in
countries in the South. The traditional instrument used by many Western donors
to achieve this is still to offer Western companies grants, credit facilities and guar-
antees. However, it is debatable how worthwhile it is to use such financial instru-
ments to encourage the private sector to operate in developing countries. First of
all, the effect of these instruments should not be overestimated. Schemes set up
since the 1960s to persuade Dutch companies to invest in developing countries
have primarily been used by smaller businesses, and then only piecemeal, while
the private sector itself has never come up with creative proposals to be more
proactive in favour of developing countries. It is highly unlikely that a Western
agrarian company will enthusiastically invest in the high plains of Ethiopia, for
example, just because it will receive a grant to do so from Western development
funds. Most companies that decide to make such an investment would of course be
pleased to receive a financial contribution, but would make their ultimate decision
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on other grounds. Companies making decisions about where to invest crucially
need to know whether a country has clear laws governing, for instance, property
rights or legal procedures, an effectively functioning labour market, and a state
that can guarantee physical safety. Western development efforts should focus on
these areas if they aim to encourage investment in, for example, Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Financial stimulants should only be used if they lead to more and better invest-
ments in developing countries. Positive effects on employment and the possible
transfer of knowledge and technology that strengthen the productive capacity of
the country concerned could be relevant parameters in decisions to provide guar-
antees and loans, especially given the positive evaluations of Western develop-
ment banks. The question then is whether it is better to seek general schemes that
invite the private sector to invest broadly in developing countries, or to devise
more specific instruments. Since we have repeatedly argued here that develop-
ment policy should be based on the specific situation in specific countries, it
would be logical also to make instruments specific. Whereas it may be worthwhile
in one country to invest in, for example, the transport or food sectors, in another
country these may not be a development priority at all.
Credit facilities
As we saw in chapter 6, the core of the effort to develop economic activity in
developing countries must lie in strengthening indigenous activity and promoting
the diversification and upgrading of local production. After all, development aid is
not intended for Western companies but to strengthen and develop the economy
of the recipient countries. It seems that, in any event, extra attention is needed for
a system that provides sufficient financing instruments for companies in develop-
ing countries. Currently this is still often insufficiently developed: frequently
there is no proper banking system and high-risk investments on a scale between
microcredit and fdi are difficult to realize. The policy of developing countries
often favours large banks and the equity market, irrespective of the structure of
their national economies, while many donors and ngos focus on microfinancing.
As Roodman & Murdoch (2009) remind us, the attraction of microcredit, “is
manifold. It is at once radical in its suggestion that the poor are creditworthy and
conservative in its insistence on individual responsibility. It offers, as the cliché
goes, a hand up, not a hand-out. Because its currency is currency itself, microcre-
dit makes supporters feel that their hands are reaching out directly to the poor.
And it is seen as demonstrably lifting people out of poverty, especially when chan-
neled to women.” There is, however, scant real knowledge on whether microcre-
dit is an efficient way of combating poverty or stimulating growth. This is the
focus of more and more research, but that by no means always generates clear
conclusions.
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Karlan and Zinman (2009), for example, investigated the impact of microcredit on
small entrepreneurs in Manila. They examined the effects of expanding the issue
of credit to micro-entrepreneurs by the First Macro Bank (fmb). Of the 1,601
applications for loans from this group, 1,272 were approved at random, while the
other 329 applications were rejected. A survey of all 1,601 applicants a year later
surprisingly concluded that greater access to credit had not resulted in more busi-
ness investments, but did lead to an increase in profit, in particular – contrary to
what is often claimed – among men with a higher income. Another quite unex-
pected outcome of this research is that no evidence at all was found for a positive
effect of more microcredit on subjective well-being, and it may even have caused a
slight decline. However, in an equally well-structured study, Banerjee et al. (2009)
draw entirely different conclusions. In their randomized evaluation microcredit
was introduced in half of 104 slums in Hyderabad (India) and not in the other half.
They concluded that “microcredit does have important effects on business
outcomes and the composition of household expenditure. Moreover, these effects
differ for different households, in a way consistent with the fact that a household
wishing to start a new business must pay a fixed cost to do so.” While, in this
instance, microcredit had positive consequences for expenditure by households
and for the creation and expansion of activities, the researchers found no effects on
healthcare, education or the empowerment of women.
The debate on microcredits therefore continues. Some people are even highly
sceptical. For example, Bateman (2010) defends the position that “microfinance
is largely antagonistic to sustainable economic development and social develop-
ment, and so also to sustainable poverty reduction.” He points out the undesir-
able disadvantages and risks which can result from the place and role of microfi-
nance within the financial system, such as underestimating the importance of
scale effects and investments in small and medium-sized businesses, including
in agriculture, the well-known ‘fallacy of composition’ (for individual street
vendors it is rational to purchase larger stocks at lower prices, but if everyone
does the same the market will become saturated and prices and incomes will
decline), and the driving up of interest by commercial parties rushing to become
involved in microfinancing. According to Bateman (2010), the key point is that
we have to “accept that it is not simply the quantity of finance available, which
determines the rate of growth and sustainable development, but also how,
where, when and in what form financial resources are deployed.” For the time
being it would seem to be difficult to draw general conclusions on the effect of
microcredits. It will continue to be necessary to establish whether, when and
under what conditions microcredit can have positive effects on growth, develop-
ment and poverty reduction.
The existing industrial structure, the average size of companies and the main
types of risk these companies face are important factors in determining the opti-
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mal financial structure at a certain level of development. It goes without saying
that countries with a low income opt for a financial system whose backbone
comprises small local banks rather than trying to copy the financial structure of
advanced industrial countries. These might include financial and credit coopera-
tives, community and state development banks or subsidized sme loan and
credit programmes. It is essential that adequate financial services can be offered
to small businesses in agriculture, industry and the services sector (Lin 2009a,
2010).
There are, however, encouraging trends. Researchers from the imf, World Bank
and the Nederlandsche Bank have ascertained that banks from developing coun-
tries are also becoming increasingly active in other Southern countries (Claessens
et al. 2008). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of Southern banks in the total
number of foreign banks rose from 37 percent in 1995 to 43 percent in 2006. In
2006, the largest bank in Madagascar was the Bank of Africa from Benin, while the
Bank of Africa and Ecobank (from Togo) are among the six largest banks in Burkina
Faso. The main driving forces behind this pattern of investment include the simi-
larities in the political, economic and business environment in the various coun-
tries: “Ecobank, for instance, understands the size and the significance of informal
businesses in these countries and works to develop African solutions to address
these problems. It puts a lot of emphasis on smes and focuses heavily on retail
banking. These banks seem to be better able to digest the uncertainties of the busi-
ness environments in the host countries than some of their high income counter-
parts” (Claessens et al. 2008).
Private equity is also becoming more readily available, although not enough. The
whole private equity industry in Africa was set up by investment banks, but the
Dutch fmo and other bilateral and multilateral investment banks only make up a
part of the shortfall, despite doing very useful work. There are a number of addi-
tional possibilities that have not yet been explored, or not sufficiently. If Western
countries wish to make an extra contribution in this respect it might be interesting
to explore whether a subsequent step could be taken, in consultation with West-
ern pension funds, by setting up a ‘fund-of-funds’ to invest in commercial invest-
ment funds in developing countries, especially if it focuses on the agricultural
sector and smes. Pension funds have experience with, and a growing interest in,
direct investment in emerging markets, are already investing in microcredit and
sustainable energy, and have already proved themselves willing to show their
social face when it emerged that some of their funds were invested in the arms
industry. Investment funds could also be developed in which private capital funds
participate. Such revolving fund constructions are not part of the standard reper-
toire of development aid (nor do they count as oda, because they are in principle
aimed at making a profit), but can be very effective and offer considerable leverage.
Lastly, in the same context, the possibility of giving individual citizens more
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opportunity to participate can also be considered, for example by expanding the
existing fiscal incentives to invest in social and ethical funds in developing coun-
tries.
7.5 other actors: citizens for development
Development is not the exclusive domain of governments, ngos or companies.
Development policy can also directly affect individual citizens, in both the West
and the South. In the West, it focuses primarily on the role of citizens as
consumers, a role in which they are increasingly concerned with development.
Fair trade, for example, has become a progressively widespread concept since
the 1950s. In 2008, 28 percent of Dutch households bought one or more fair trade
products, and the market has grown by 55 percent since 2006. At the moment
it is mainly people from the higher social classes who support development in
this way, and the market share for fair trade products remains small (Hamers &
Mathijssen 2008). For example, even after twenty years, the Max Havelaar label
has only acquired 3 percent of the coffee market and 2 percent of the banana market
in the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom and other countries that percentage is
higher (Quak 2009).
Consumer pressure is therefore not yet that high, but it is becoming more and
more important for companies to acquire and maintain a good image, not only
because consumers otherwise choose other products, but because the companies
wish to inspire loyalty from their middle and senior management. People do not
like working for companies that are known for pollution and exploitation. More-
over, more and more businesses are seeing the advantages of, for example, using
sustainable raw materials even though they may not themselves carry the fair
trade label. Lastly, campaigns and internet sites increase the pressure on compa-
nies to preserve a good reputation, as they offer a greater insight into the extent 
to which their policies are sustainable and take account of development.
Despite the increased availability of information, it is not always easy for
consumers to know what products are responsible purchases and what are not.
Not all information is reliable and it can sometimes be difficult to make a well-
considered decision. For example, is it contributing to development if you buy
products made in a factory that pays its workers the statutory minimum wage, 
if that wage is not enough for them to live on? In addition, sustainability and
development can sometimes be at odds with each other. It might, for instance, 
be inadvisable from an environmental perspective to export agricultural goods 
from Africa by air, while marketing products in Europe may indeed be good for
the continent’s development (Quak 2009).
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Migrants
Migrants are a completely different category of engaged citizens. On a global scale
migrants send three to four times as much money to developing countries in the
form of remittances than all official aid put together. From a small country like the
Netherlands, migrants sent remittances home to the value of 6.7 billion dollars in
2006; that is as much as countries like Bangladesh or Indonesia receive in total
remittances every year (World Bank 2008b). This financial influx accounts for a
considerable proportion of the gdp of some developing countries, and is less
subject to fluctuations than other financial flows (World Bank 2006). Migrants are
indispensable in improving living standards (humanitarian aid), even more so as
they tend to send extra money if their home country is in need. During the finan-
cial crisis, compared to oda and foreign investment, remittances fell relatively
little (undp 2009), showing that transnational family ties are considerably more
reliable than bilateral or multilateral relations between countries.
However, migrants alone cannot ensure the development of their countries, with
the possible exception of a number of small countries that depend to a large extent
on remittances, such as Tajikistan (45%), Tonga (35%) and Lesotho (29%). Often the
transferred money is spent on consumption, while the countries that need the
income most, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, receive the least. The
Matthew effect (‘For to all those who have, more will be given, and they will have
an abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be 
taken away’) clearly applies here too (see figure 7.2). That is because it is usually not
the poorest who leave, but those who are a little better off, and they generally do not
come from the poorest countries. Money is therefore largely sent to countries
where the migrants have been successful and where development is already under
way, such as India and China. Furthermore, if money is sent home to be invested,
that usually occurs when the situation in the recipient country is favourable and
there is a clear prospect of economic prosperity. After all, it is better to sow seeds in
fertile than barren ground. That is also why migrants prefer to send remittances to
the city than the countryside, which is poorer (Adepoju et al. 2008; De Haas 2007;
Faist 2008; Mazzucato 2008; Skeldon 2009; World Bank 2006).
The money that migrants send home does therefore not necessarily lead to devel-
opment, but they do contribute to development in two other ways. They often
function as bridge-builders in global knowledge networks, and are frequently
good at finding knowledge in the international context to fill in gaps at local level
(Saxenian & Sabel 2008). South Korea, for example, acquired technological knowl-
edge through its diaspora networks, and Indian businesses in the service sector
have benefited from close contacts with friends and family members in American
companies (Kuznetsov 2006). In addition, migrants often drive institutional
reforms in their home countries, promoting values like accountability, democrati-
zation, transparency and responsibility. This is most evident among transnational 
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Figure 7.2 Remittances to developing countries
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank data
migrants who not only send money to their family members but also invest in
companies in their countries of origin. Many banking systems have improved
under pressure from migrants involved in business activities, and in India the
transnational it branch has successfully lobbied for transparency and effective
regulation, especially at local political level (Global Commission on International
Migration 2005; undp 2009; World Bank 2006). Diaspora communities can also
exert pressure on democratization processes. Exiles in Zambia and Tanzania, for
example, helped bring about the departure of president Hastings Kamuzu Banda
in Malawi, while those from Liberia and Sierra Leone succeeded in getting blood
diamonds on the European, American and un agendas (Ellis & Van Kessel 2009).
However, diaspora communities can sometimes have a negative effect on develop-
ment (Kapur 2007). They can use their money and ideas to keep conflicts going, as
we have seen with Israeli, Palestinian, Irish and Tamils living abroad. Because they
themselves do not have to pay the price of the conflict, members of the diaspora
sometimes seek confrontation more easily than people living in the countries
themselves and have been referred to as “the nursery of nationalism” (Faist 2008).
Migration is currently considered to be primarily beneficial to development. For
many years, that was not the case, and it was associated with the brain drain. This
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is, however, only a problem in a small number of countries like Malawi and
Zambia, and in Surinam. For the majority of labour-exporting countries it applies
to less than 10 percent of the educated population, a similar percentage to the
number of Britons or Americans who work elsewhere (De Haas 2007; Skeldon
2009). A larger problem is brain drain in specific sectors, especially healthcare. 
It is estimated that around 12 percent of doctors trained in India work in the
United Kingdom, while only a third of the doctors trained in Ghana stay there,
and half of those trained in South Africa have left the country (World Bank 2006).
In these same countries unemployment among academics is often high, while few
wish to work in the healthcare sector because of the poor working conditions.
Brain drain is therefore more a symptom of failing systems than a cause (De Haas
2007; Skeldon 2009; undp 2009).
Some attempts have been made to reduce the ‘care drain’, especially in the United
Kingdom. For example, the National Health Service (nhs) has decided not to
recruit people actively in certain countries and areas, and to adhere to an ethical
code in taking on staff. In 2003, the British ministries of health and foreign affairs
and dfid signed an agreement with the South African government to regulate the
flow of health workers from the country to Britain. The objective is to make the
British healthcare system self-sufficient, instil the relevant actors with ethical
awareness, exchange information and knowledge, provide South Africa with tech-
nical assistance, promote cooperation between health institutions, and support
exchanges of staff for limited periods of time. The programme has not yet been
evaluated, but the percentage of South African nurses and midwives in the United
Kingdom fell considerably between 2000 and 2006 (Chappell & Glennie 2009).
Another way of reducing the detrimental effects of brain drain (already proposed
by Baghwati in the 1970s) is to make migrants pay tax not only in the country
where they live and work, but also in their countries of origin. The Philippines
tried the system for a while, but it proved unworkable and unfair, as many
migrants had paid for their own educations, and were already sending a lot of
money back home.
To preserve the advantages of migration and combat the negative effects of brain
drain, a number of international organizations and academic researchers have
suggested a form of ‘rotation’ or brain circulation (Global Commission on Interna-
tional Migration 2005; undp 2009; World Bank 2006). The idea is that people go
to developed countries to upgrade their skills and knowledge, and then return to
their home countries to contribute to development. It is a brilliant idea, on paper.
However, in practice, once migrants have had a taste of a good salary, services and
security, they find it difficult to return (Adepoju et al. 2008; Faist 2008; De Haas
2007). That does not necessarily mean that they cannot contribute to development
in their countries of origin, as the transnational transfer of knowledge, values and
ideas can take many forms. In other words, migrants do not need to rotate to have
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a positive impact on development, if there are opportunities for cross-border
movements. Transnational families, hometown associations, knowledge commu-
nities of experts and academics, and diaspora knowledge networks are often very
functional for development (Faist 2008; De Haas 2007; Saxenian & Sabel 2008).
A logical consequence of this is that Western countries should take a long hard
look at their policies on migration and integration in the light of their development
objectives. That does not mean that they should immediately throw open their
borders, but that there should be more scope for selective migration by those with
a better education. The challenge is to involve as many people as possible from
Sub-Saharan Africa. Other Western countries already have interesting bilateral
migration programmes focusing on development: New Zealand has a temporary
migration scheme in the agricultural sector, Canada and Jamaica have an innova-
tive programme based on local quotas, and Spain is setting up a coproduction
project for development with its main migration partner countries (Pritchett &
Fanjul 2009). In the Netherlands, very modest experiments are also being
conducted with migration projects from a development perspective (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice 2008).
However, current bilateral programmes have their limitations, if for no other
reason than their small scale. It can be argued that labour and study migration
would be better organized as part of a system of global agreements. Migration
policy should not only be part of national or European efforts to achieve policy
coherence, but the free movement of persons should be the subject of global
engagement. There is good reason why many Southern countries argued at the
Doha round of wto talks for better regulation of labour migration within the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (gats), while Western countries primar-
ily insisted on free service provision and wanted no free movement of persons.
Proposals were also made to set up a global organization for migration, more wide-
ranging than the current International Organization for Migration (iom), to
develop a General Agreement on Labour Migration and set up a more fluid and
educational system to which multiple parties (migrants, trade unions, employers)
can contribute, in addition to governments (Pritchett & Fanjul 2009). Interesting
developments in this respect are the Colombo process, started in 2008, and the
Abu Dhabi dialogue aimed at concluding regional agreements between South
Asian countries and the Gulf States (undp 2009).
It is important that migration can take various forms. Migrants should have rights,
but this should not necessarily imply them gaining full citizenship of their host
countries. The development of countries in the South benefits particularly from
recognizing transnationalism and the importance of cross-border movements.
That implies that it should be easier to travel back and forth, to allow more
exchanges of knowledge and ideas. It would also be a good idea to give diaspora
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networks more support with development in mind. This would include not only
political but also commercial and academic networks of migrants, who are not
only engaged but talented (Kuznetsov 2006; see also undp 2009). The Norwegian
government has already taken steps in this direction and is currently compiling a
diaspora database so that it can explore whether and how the development rela-
tionship with selected countries can be deepened.
Citizens as recipients of aid
Citizens can also be direct recipients of aid. If a government does little more than
spend aid money on a bad system of agriculture, healthcare or education, it may be
better to give the money directly to those who most need services in these sectors.
In Latin America, there have been successes with cash transfer programmes, in
which citizens receive money if they, for example, send their children to school.
This creates a direct link between aid and results: no school attendance means no
money. Similar programmes have been set up outside Latin America in the past
ten years. Cash transfers are now given to more than 110 million families in at least
45 countries. Each programme is different, ranging from general child support in
Mongolia to pensions in Africa. Sometimes the monthly amounts are small – only
a few dollars – but some can be up to 100 dollars or more. In Latin America and the
Caribbean, these programmes now reach more than 12 percent of the population
(Hanlon, Barrientos & Hulme 2010; Fiszbein & Schady et al. 2009; ilo & who
2009; Valencia Lomeli 2009). Schemes in which citizens receive vouchers they can
use at a school or clinic of their choice go a step further (Easterly 2001a, 2008b).
Such schemes apply pressure to those offering the services, though they only work
if there is a real choice of providers. This is often the case in urban environments,
but rarely in rural areas.
Cash transfers and vouchers are forms of aid in which citizens are the direct recipi-
ents. There are of course other ways to involve citizens more directly in spending
aid funds, for example in the form of participatory budgeting. In its most advanced
form this means that citizens actually decide on how budgets are spent. Here too
Latin America is often a good source of inspiration. In 1988, a project of this kind
was set up on a large scale in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, with a population
of over 1 million. Evaluations show that there are disadvantages associated with
this approach – for example, marginalized groups had less say – but these proved
to be far outweighed by the advantages, especially the dismantling of patronage
systems. In Brazil itself, 100 other municipalities have followed the example of
Porto Alegre, and the approach has now been applied in many other parts of the
world, including Thailand, India and South Africa (Shah 2007). Participatory
budgeting is not only significant for governments, some donors also see it as an
excellent instrument. For example, in the context of community-driven develop-
ment in Indonesia, the World Bank placed a large part of the budget in the hands of
local municipalities.
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Another form of aid that goes directly to service users is the setting up of mutual
insurance schemes to cover, for example, the costs of medical treatment or acci-
dents. Such schemes are difficult to achieve, are not possible everywhere and take
a lot of time. Citizens are often reluctant to participate in them as they have
learned that they can demand that their governments provide them with health-
care. They also rely on the existence of a more or less homogenous group with a
high degree of cohesion, which is often not the case, especially in urban areas.
However, they do contribute to a social policy that is no longer based on one-off
gifts from donors, but becomes part of a consistent national policy. There are
parallels to the way in which social policy was first set up in Europe some 100
years ago. Continental West-European countries have a tradition in which small
mutual insurance schemes evolved to cover workers and farmers for the costs of
industrial accidents and medical treatment. This was later extended to invalidity
and old age, and later still to unemployment. Over time, these mutual insurance
schemes became increasingly comprehensive – which was necessary from the
perspective of risk pooling – and after the Second World War they were national-
ized and made into general systems that also applied to non-employees. In a simi-
lar way, social policy in Asian countries has also become part of wider policy in
recent decades and is increasingly recognized as an investment (Mkandawire
2004).
Yet another form of direct support is investment in citizens’ networks. With the
aid of new technologies, like mobile telephones, email and the internet, people are
coming together in looser networks and in networks of networks. These technolo-
gies enable people to contact each other fast and in great numbers. Good examples
are the green movement in Iran, the Orange revolution in the Ukraine, and the
protests in the Philippines in 2001. They also help to make information public. 
For example, in Kenya there is an internet platform called Ushahidi – which means
‘witness’ in Swahili – which gives individual citizens the opportunity to report
complaints, incidents, and cases of fraud and abuse of power online. Development
policy can also support platforms and technology that can bring citizens together
rather than subsidize institutionalized, well-organized ngos.
7.6 programme aid
Aid can primarily be based on providing money, as in the case of budget support,
or on building up civil society organizations or the private sector, or supporting
active individual citizens. All of these methods can make a difference. However, it
is also possible not to make a choice between them, but to be aware that effective
interventions can best be achieved if these elements are combined in a productive
way. Changes can seldom be brought about by a single actor. If a government
persistently tries to introduce a change, but does not have the support of non-
governmental parties, there is a good chance that it will give up after a few years.
220 less pretension, more ambition
Achieving sustained changes often means playing on several boards at the same
time.
This implies not only involving more actors in effecting a change, but also deploy-
ing multiple instruments. In addition to money, this often means knowledge, and
sometimes commitment and process management as well. Money is not always
unimportant – even the organization of a good system of land rights or the devel-
opment of a trade chain costs money – but is often not as important as people
believe. Knowledge is frequently more important. In the past, the emphasis was
often on transferring specific insights and skills to concrete individuals, ranging
from the best way to build a chicken run so that the birds remained healthy to
designing forms for the clerk of a court. That form of support is progressively
making way for knowledge at system level, varying from the way water manage-
ment is organized to improving the quality of teachers, and consists mainly of
supporting a country in its efforts to upgrade these activities to a higher level.
Furthermore, engagement is equally as important. Many development projects
succeed not because donors give money – which they often do – or provide exper-
tise – which they also often do – but because they manage a process of change in a
way that local parties, hampered by all kinds of traditions and conflicts of interest,
are unable to do. This applies particularly where multiple stakeholders have to be
brought together. The result is what we might call programme aid.
Programme aid implies long-term relations in which sufficient specific expertise
and a range of instruments are deployed in a coherent way. For example, to
develop agriculture it may be necessary to maintain relations with knowledge
organizations in both the donor and recipient countries, not only for the purposes
of research and development, but also at various levels of practice and schooling, 
if necessary right down to primary education level. It may also be advisable to
reduce trade-related obstacles, which will require interaction with ministries and
sometimes with legal experts in the field of import restrictions on markets.
Furthermore, it may be a good idea to expand transport possibilities or devote
attention to the availability of fertilizer and seeds. Other relevant partners are
private firms that pack or process food or serve markets, and local farmers’ 
organizations. It may be essential to work with them to find out how to organize
cooperatives or set up insurance schemes. In addition, if you want to move from 
a classical agricultural policy to a value-chain approach you will need to generate
knowledge of the market that farmers can use in deciding what to produce
(oecd/dac 2009c). In short, it is important to approach the market in its entirety
or at least a substantial part of it.
Programme-based development aid calls for far-reaching expertise and long-term
involvement of local actors, and goes further than only giving money. It is a form
of aid that is becoming increasingly popular, and developing countries, especially
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middle-income countries, will request donors to provide this type of aid more and
more. In short, money itself is becoming less of a problem, and good organization
of expertise more so. In this respect it is significant that the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank has decided to replace a few hundred people with knowledge on
loans with experts on the organization of large-scale programmes. The reasoning
behind this was that the money could also be found on the international capital
market (although this has become more difficult as a result of the financial crisis).
The underlying idea is that it is more worthwhile for donors to add something
substantive than to focus on primarily providing a financial contribution. A small
financial share in large projects may be sufficient as a guarantee that will help
persuade private investors to participate. The shift towards seeking expertise can
also be seen among low-income countries. For example, China is no longer inter-
ested in money from the West, but in knowledge exchange and the supervision of
pilot projects in the field of institutional reform. It is interested, for instance, in
the pros and cons of the Dutch system of land registration (Ho 2009). Vietnam,
which is designing a system of water management, is no longer interested in who
will give it money for nothing. It would rather pay for services it really needs than
be given something with little added value. Countries like Uganda and Ethiopia
are also increasingly interested in contributions that combine money with exper-
tise.
This all stands or falls with the ability to manage relationships within both the
recipient and donor countries. It becomes more a matter of involving the right
parties at the right moment than doing everything yourself. That means bringing
together a variety of initiatives, both oda and non-oda. Programme-based coop-
eration between ministries has mostly proved difficult, and this form of working
requires cooperation with many more parties, including civil society organiza-
tions, universities, banks and insurance companies. For most donors it is difficult
to find that best way to make an appropriate substantive contribution. However,
the contours required of such a contribution can be clearly outlined.
Knowledge
To make choices and good diagnoses and to be specific, it is first of all necessary to
have knowledge about the development processes and the social, political and
economic situation in a country. Furthermore, interventions must be accompanied
by knowledge development about what is being done and what changes it brings
about (Easterly 2006), and that all has to be recorded and made accessible. It is a
matter of organizing the institutional memory. The question is what the level of
ambition should be. Within other social sectors, like healthcare and education,
considerable amounts of money are invested in research and development. In
healthcare, at least 6 percent of public and private investment is spent on r&d, and
that has been the case for a long time. As development aid is a much more
exploratory activity, 6 percent should be a minimum, which is rarely the case. In
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that respect, many donors can take a lead from dfid. The British development
agency finances research centres affiliated to universities that contribute to its
development strategy. There are knowledge centres on governance (University 
of Manchester), the future state (University of Sussex) and the new International
Growth Centre knowledge network. dfid has high expectations of diagnostic
growth analyses and will be spending 10 million pounds annually on growth
research alone between 2008 and 2013. According to the British research strategy,
dfid’s total research budget for this period is a billion pounds.
Knowledge development is not only a matter for donors, however. In a
programme-based approach it is primarily in the interest of recipient countries.
This means that adequate programmes always have to devote sufficient attention
to knowledge and how to perpetuate it. To some extent this is a matter of making
country and sector-specific arrangements. Donors will therefore not only have to
invest in their own or European institutions and networks, but also help build up
the knowledge infrastructure in individual developing countries. The knowledge
infrastructure has become especially fragile in Sub-Saharan Africa and former and
current conflict areas (Wagner 2008). Good development diagnoses and profes-
sional interventions in developing countries are only possible if the level of
knowledge, and with it the capacity to adjust their own policies on the basis of
evaluation, is improved. Development can, after all, not be puzzled out in Wash-
ington or New York. It has to be done on the spot. In this context Hausmann &
Rodrik (2006) refer to self-discovery, meaning that countries have to ‘discover’
their own specific paths to development.
Instead of becoming channelled into ‘disciplines’ like those that evolved in the
West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the knowledge infrastructure to
be built up in these countries needs to be multidisciplinary and varied. Economics
and anthropology, knowledge on agriculture and social medicine are often
required parallel to, and in combination with, one another. Investments in this
interdisciplinary knowledge infrastructure can take different forms. A donor can
simply finance knowledge institutions and networks in the South, but it is also
possible to do more to promote cooperation. For example, the Netherlands has
sanpad, an innovative cooperation project with South Africa, in which African
academics study problems that are relevant for development in South Africa,
together with counterparts at Dutch universities, and follow an extensive training
programme (Box 2009). Similar variants can be found elsewhere. These relation-
ships transcend the obsolete notion of ‘knowledge transfer’: innovation arises
from learning by seeking local applications of methods developed elsewhere and
feeding back these lessons. The current expanded possibilities for access to inter-
national knowledge are accompanied by a much greater demand for context-
specific knowledge and innovation, but the supply is limited. To address this
problem, professor of innovation Soete (2009) proposes linking Western univer-
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sities to universities in the South, or at least to make development one of the
objectives of all universities. This is already practice in Belgium, where part of the
development budget is allocated to development cooperation by universities.
A knowledge strategy should also take account of the fact that it is not only ngos,
officials of ministries and international organizations, and scientific researchers
who produce knowledge, but also service-users, businesses and others. Every
sector requires a different ‘type’ of knowledge and a different search pattern: trade
calls for technical expertise, while improvements in education benefit from
consultation (Jones et al. 2009). Private sector parties are crucial to industrial 
and agricultural policy, and it is important not so much to ask the direct question
of what activities should be encouraged or what instruments will work the best, 
but how best to give shape to discovering worthwhile objectives and devising
appropriate instruments. The challenge is to learn how to give producers constant
incentives to diversify, upgrade and work together with foreign companies (Haus-
mann 2008; Hausmann et al. 2008; Lin 2009b; Rodrik 2007b; Wade 2009b).
Lastly, diversity also deserves more attention. Development benefits from disso-
nant voices and different development paradigms. Countries in the South must be
able to consider different development paths and elaborate on them or change
them as they see fit. In this context the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi speaks
of the need for a broader ‘conceptual infrastructure’. In practice, the World Bank
now often has a quasimonopoly on the pallet of policy options from which devel-
oping countries can choose. In the words of Ha-Joon Chang they offer countries
the “Henry Ford principle of diversity”. For their part, many bilateral donors are
too oriented towards Washington, often in the absence of an alternative. In both
Europe and developing countries, thinking on development is dominated by
Anglo-Saxon authors. There is little or no knowledge of alternative development
paths and corresponding interventions. There is therefore a great need for greater
plurality in research work and the supply of advice available to international insti-
tutions, donors and experts.
Organization
What is the implication of this programme-based development strategy for the
implementation structure? Professional development aid is not possible without a
professional system of aid provision, and that is what most donors try to achieve.
The majority have their own implementation structure, with a clear division
between policy and implementation. Good examples are the Swedish and Norwe-
gian aid agencies. Their country offices are responsible for diagnosis and strategy.
Day-to-day political work is also left to professionals on the spot.
The country offices have a certain amount of autonomy from their embassies, but
there is always some tension in the relationship. A certain distance is useful for the
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professional development of the organization. This argument was also used to
justify the decision to split the dfid from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(fco) in Britain in 1997. The move is still widely seen as positive, though it has led
to new tensions in recent years as issues like trade and security have moved higher
up the agenda. The new Conservative-Liberal government that took office in 2010
therefore decided that dfid, which many see as a Labour invention, should once
again strengthen its ties with the fco. In the United States, when Condoleeza Rice
announced in 2006 that she wanted to gradually integrate usaid into the State
Department, it led to fierce protests and contributed to the resignation of the
agency’s director (Pickard & Buss 2009). Most Western donors accept this tension
and either already have two organizations or intend to set them up. Canada
recently announced its intention to make its aid departments more autonomous
from the other departments at its embassies. Some countries have a different
model. For example, the Danish development agency danida is only a virtual
organization, as its work is conducted completely within the Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The Netherlands also has no separate development organization,
and the integration of aid within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has resulted in
much less attention to professionalism.
Although a separate organization is important, the working method is more so. 
A new organization must not be bureaucratic and official, but professional and
geared towards learning. Country offices should ideally exchange experiences of
interventions between and within themselves, with the ministries behind them
acting primarily as brokers and knowledge conduits, both internally and exter-
nally. This will require restoring the prominence of country-specific knowledge
and the long-term involvement of professionals. What is more, a lack of engage-
ment is not very conducive to professionalism. Knowledge is acquired through
long-term involvement and endurance, so that insights can continually be
reviewed. It is not only a matter of knowing a country, but also of being known.
Professional development aid requires building up trust by a long-term presence
and a thorough knowledge of the situation. Currently the personnel policy of
many of these organizations is founded on rotation rather than specialization.
Often, they have copied the personnel policy of the foreign ministries, but this is
not appropriate to a professional development organization.
Lastly, contributing to development means being able to navigate between local
practice and development theory. Creative ways must be sought to try out existing
ideas and distil new ones from practice. In a professional organization it is impor-
tant to nurture what Scott (1998) calls metis. Compare a chef to someone who
follows a recipe in a cookbook: the chef will know the ‘rules’ of cooking but will
continually adjust himself to the season, his guests and his inspiration. Similarly,
people who work in developing countries cannot blindly follow rules or best prac-
tices; copying existing recipes without question will lead to bad interventions. It is
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therefore crucial for organizations to allow scope for experiment and to take on
personnel with creativity and nerve.
Selecting and specializing
How does a programme-based approach to development aid best fit into an inter-
national aid architecture that displays more and more fragmentation? In the 2005
Paris Declaration, donors agreed to harmonize and coordinate their efforts, divide
up their tasks and designate a lead donor per country. One practical consequence
of this would be that donors would provide their financial contributions for some
sectors through other donors, thereby also relinquishing control over political
decision-making on the money. In practice, little progress has been made in this
respect and, to the extent that donors have joined forces, this is primarily opera-
tional and not political. Pooling resources is somewhat different to transferring
political control. Actual transfer of authority – known as joint strategic behaviour –
is difficult to achieve. Donor capitals have trouble accepting strategic agreements
made at country level. The fact that accountability still occurs at national level
does not make this easier (Hoebink 2010; oecd/dac 2008a; Whitfield 2009).
If there were a single fund with a single office for each developing country, there
would no longer be fragmentation, duplication and undirected interventions.
Donors could then speak to the representatives of the country with one voice.
Riddell (2007) proposes this as an escape route from the current aid monster, as
does Birdsall (2008), though she is reluctant to completely exclude the principle of
competition. However, establishing a single multilateral fund for each country is
an ideal that faces a lot of national and international political obstacles, and has
little chance of becoming reality for the time being. Nevertheless, it would not be a
bad thing for a donor country to seek like-minded donors who might wish to work
together towards achieving this ideal.
What can an individual donor country do to become more effective as long as
there is not yet a joint development strategy specific to each recipient country?
The answer is logical: make strict choices between countries and issues, so that it is
possible to enter into long-term relationships, with knowledge of the subject
matter and of local relationships, with a limited number of countries. In each
country a wide variety of instruments can be deployed, and a wide variety of
parties can play a role. This will generate more political leverage and individual
donor countries will automatically contribute to a better division of labour
between donors. Figure 7.3 shows that a lot of countries still fragment their aid
substantially (Acharya et al. 2003; see also Easterly & Pfutze 2008).
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Figure 7.3 Donor proliferation index (average 1999-2001)
Source: Acharya et al. 2003
Note: The donor proliferation index is the reverse of a Theil index, multiplied by 100 to avoid decimals. There is
more donor proliferation (aid distribution) if the aid from a donor is allocated to a large proportion of the
potential recipients, and when each recipient has a relatively equal share of the total aid received from the
donor.
The dilution of aid funds and the mismatch between expertise and financial
contributions have negative consequences on both sides of the fence. They reduce
political effectiveness in the developing country and the capacity of donor coun-
tries to specialize and acquaint themselves sufficiently with the social, cultural,
political and economic structures of a country. There is therefore a lot to be said for
individual countries specializing: aid is most effective when it is based on knowl-
edge and other expertise. Norway has already taken steps in this direction, special-
izing in peace and reconciliation, and leaving healthcare and education to others,
though it does sometimes provide financial support in these sectors. That means
that in many developing countries peace and reconciliation is almost automatically
left to the Norwegians. The distribution of labour agreed in Paris (and later in the
eu) and which is so difficult to achieve, takes shape itself if, like Norway, donors
themselves take resolute steps in the right direction. These substantive choices
mean that Norway is primarily active in the Middle East, Sudan, Sri Lanka and
Guatemala. In addition to areas in which they consciously build up targeted
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knowledge, the Norwegians also specialize in issues with which they have consid-
erable experience in their own country. This is why they have an extensive Oil for
Development programme, through which they exchange their own home-grown
knowledge with that of oil-rich developing countries. Donors like Sweden,
Denmark and Canada have expressed similar intentions. It is logical to seek ways
of coordinating these efforts and to tailor them as a whole to the wishes of coun-
tries in the South.
Learning
Programme-based aid is professional development aid. That assumes that those
implementing aid activities are given sufficient room for manoeuvre and have to
give a general account for their actions to the appropriate political fora, both here
and there. That in turn assumes that there is mutual professional accountability,
and that lessons are learned from what goes well and what does not. After sixty
years of aid, you would expect there to be some kind of ethic for professional inter-
vention, offering some idea of when you may intervene and when it is better not to.
However, in the aid sector, there is a shortage of professional exchange and critical
reflection on interventions. How can we best give shape to this learning capacity?
In the United Kingdom there is discussion on codes of conduct for development
organizations, particularly to counteract the unintended negative consequences of
aid. One issue is whether local staff employed by ngos financed by donors should
not be paid more than government officials. It is important to make mutual agree-
ments on these and similar questions, and that should be done in an international
context. Even more essential is that accountability should contribute to the learn-
ing process. Interventions can only improve by learning from both successes and
failures, and that means checking time and time again whether they indeed
produce the desired results. If that does not prove to be the case, it is necessary to
investigate why and what has turned out differently than expected. This is known
as vertical feedback, because knowledge and experience from local practice must
be continually fed back ‘upwards’. Feedback from the recipients of aid is also part
of this learning process, but this is often still forgotten. Aid recipients are rarely
asked for feedback – they are simply assumed to be grateful (Dietz et al. 2009;
Easterly 2006, 2008b; World Bank 2003). In addition, exchange between develop-
ment organizations and initiatives, or horizontal feedback, is important as it
enables an insight to be acquired at aggregate level of what works in a specific
context. Because of the fragmentation of aid, it is increasingly difficult to learn
from each others’ experiences, and even Western development organizations
rarely have mechanisms to exchange experiences at country level, even though
this is where development begins (see Dietz et al. 2006).
A learning system must also leave open the possibility of making mistakes. After
all, learning means not only evaluating and adjusting methods, but also develop-
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ing new ones. It involves what Argyris & Schön (1978) call single loop and double
loop learning. With development aid unorthodox policy initiatives are sometimes
the most successful, but it is impossible to say in advance which will produce the
best results. To safeguard the scope for experimentation and learn new things,
there must be feed-forward mechanisms that offer space for innovation. Further-
more, faith should be placed in those who are prepared to experiment (see wrr
2006a). In other words, mistakes are not a problem as long as we learn from them.
In this respect Easterly (2006) talks about ‘seekers’. His description of them has a
little too much of the ‘innovative loner’, but seeking is essential. A culture of
accountability is only professional if it offers space for institutionalized seeking,
where errors are made before progress is made.
Evaluation
An essential part of learning and accountability is evaluating what has taken place.
There is often a lack of independent study of the consequences of aid interven-
tions. Birdsall (2008) calls this one of the seven deadly sins of development aid,
and is not alone in this (Banerjee & He 2008; Duflo & Kremer 2008; Easterly
2008b; Gunning 2005). A lot of time and money is spent on independent studies
of Western education or healthcare, but the same does not apply to aid. There 
are various reasons for this lacuna. Sometimes it is not politically opportune to
conduct a thorough study of aid, as it might lead to criticism of decisions that 
have been taken. In addition, significant institutional and other interests may be at
stake, such as employment in the sector or the continued existence of ngos. 
In addition, as we saw in chapter 4, it is often a complex matter to evaluate the
effects of aid properly. The charity-based nature of aid is also an obstacle as money
spent on evaluation is seen as better spent on helping the poor. Yet independent
evaluation is of great importance. It is necessary to determine whether the aid
provided is of sufficient quality, and to feed the political debate in both donor and
developing countries. Good independent evaluations can lead to better decisions
on the contribution we can make (Savedoff & Levine 2006).
What makes a good evaluation depends on what the objectives of aid are. If it aims
to improve living standards, it is primarily a matter of measuring output; 
if development is the aim, the evaluation must focus on impact and outcome.
Studies of the latter are scarce, although there is growing demand for them. Most
international organizations do not have effective evaluation systems, with the
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the imf as honourable exceptions
(Banerjee & He 2008). Many people call for this kind of evaluation to be
conducted jointly. This is in line with the Paris Declaration, which calls for more
aid to be pooled, and therefore for more collective programmes. That will make 
it increasingly difficult to isolate the contributions of individual countries
(oecd/dac 2009b). Birdsall (2008) also argues for a collective solution to the
‘evaluation problem’, using independent international funds. Multilateral organi-
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zations could set up a fund with contributions from donors, and bilateral donors
could do the same for programmes. In addition there is much to be said for allow-
ing impact analyses to be conducted more often by researchers and organizations
in the recipient country itself (Savedoff & Levine 2006).
Programme aid has advantages: frequently knowledge is at least as important as
money. Countries can best project themselves on the basis of their added value,
an increasingly important factor in a world in which recipient countries can
choose between more and more donors, and in which they increasingly want to
direct the aid process themselves. This approach has the added benefit that aid
will once again acquire the appearance desired by many people in the West: by
linking it more strongly to our own knowledge and traditions, we bring it closer
to home. That is also an important advantage at a time when the legitimacy and
added value of aid is increasingly being questioned in most northwest European
countries.
7.7 doing good can and must be done better
If military interventions were to take place in the way development aid is orga-
nized, the Pentagon’s instructions would be “Go and shoot some Iraqis”, accord-
ing to a former architect of usaid. Development aid is currently comparable with
throwing confetti: well-intended but mainly a matter of pot luck. However, aid is
also not an activity which can facilitate a series of planned changes by means of
simple and specific action. Neither the logic of the confetti, nor that of the magic
bullet, apply to interventions in the field of development aid. Planned changes
always take place within a complex network of relationships, require a great deal of
insight and tact, and rarely turn out exactly as originally thought. Despite all this,
however, they can still work out well in the end. A purely arbitrary or a simple
systematic approach has to make way for a well thought-out attempt to bring
about change in systems.
Change is not linear. Rather, it occurs slowly and unpredictably and needs support
from insiders and outsiders. “Successful policy change occurs not through profes-
sional advocacy alone, but involves complex and highly developed mobilizing
structures which link national reformers to local and faith-based groups, the
media and repositories of expertise. Such structures are built over time, deeply
grounded in the societies where they are found, and linked to the biographies of
those who lead them. Alliances between social actors and champions of change
inside the state are critical to make policy change happen. Social mobilization
structures provide opportunities for state-based reformers to generate change
from within, just as political opportunity structures provide spaces for social
actors to do so from without.”(Gaventa & McGee 2010)
230 less pretension, more ambition
Development is a complex and country-specific process that is not compatible
with universal theories and a bureaucratic implementing organization. Instead, aid
has to be professionalized to learn from experience and allow action based on
expertise. A new, professional system will reflect the importance of context and
country-specificity and will be based on the understanding that furthering devel-
opment means making choices. A diagnosis will have to be carried out in each
country to establish where the most essential problems are, so that a tailor-made
remedy can be sought. Experimenting, permanent learning and multiform knowl-
edge are the conditions for achieving an effective development strategy. Imple-
menting parties must have the scope to engage in a dialogue with those around
them and assess which approach will achieve the best results. Lastly it is important
that professional aid actually be able to make a difference, on the one hand by
exerting political influence and, on the other hand, by contributing expertise. This
is very important given the field of influence in which development aid operates:
donors compete with each other and the relationships in developing countries are
often a minefield.
At the same time it is impossible to say in advance that there is a preferred inter-
vention method. To some donors general budget support is the best possible vari-
ant. Although this might be the case from the point of view of ownership, it may
not be so in terms of added value or preventing aid dependency. Others prefer
programme aid, especially those who believe that the organization of knowledge
eventually has more added value than money. At the same time, programme aid
can too easily send existing power relations in the wrong direction. Aid via ngos
sounds like a safe bet but their capacity to act is usually limited and their added
value is often based more on assumption than evidence or reason. Companies do
not allow themselves to be easily persuaded to invest, and investment-related
decisions often follow once other conditions are in place. Citizens are becoming an
increasingly important reference point for development policy. Much Anglo-
Saxon literature and the policies of donors like the World Bank often place great
faith in the potential of individual citizens to bring about change: people who are
aware of their citizenship rights will force authorities to function more effectively.
Here, the key words are monitoring, transparency and accountability. Citizens
must show authorities the way and demonstrate what providing good services
means. Often this overestimates the possibilities that citizens have, and some-
times it is important to invest in stability first.
It is very tempting to exacerbate the differences between the various methods of
working, but there is little point in doing so. Preferences are not just contingent:
the different mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. There is, for example, a
frequent tendency to position citizens and civil society on the opposite side of the
fence to the business community and the government. ngos in particular increas-
ingly see themselves primarily as watchdogs and are especially anxious about
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being hedged in by the government. This often liberal attitude fits in with a West-
ern interpretation of citizenship, but is not always fruitful. Change does not come
about primarily in society or in the state but in the relationship between them.
Civic driven change (Biekart & Fowler 2009) is more likely to occur when differ-
ent actors jointly and reciprocally play a role. This was evident, for example,
during the agricultural reforms in the Philippines. They were only possible
because the progressive state secretary, Ernesto Garilao (1992-1998), entered into
an alliance with experts from the leading ngos in this field, as a result of which he
was able to shape his policy against the wishes of his conservative government and
land owners. As Gaventa & McGee (2010) report, this is why donors should not so
much subsidize ngos, which are often urban and middle-class, but instead try to
support coalitions between state actors, media, technical experts and national and
local actors.
In the end, sustainable change can only come about “by winning hearts and chang-
ing minds”, and in order for donors to play a positive role in this, thorough knowl-
edge of the situation and power relations is indispensable (De Lange 2010). dfid
has designed a Drivers of Change analysis to increase its understanding and that of
other donors of how change takes place in developing countries, precisely because
they noted that donors usually have a better understanding of what has to be
changed than how it should happen. However, being more critical on the how of
development appears to be far from simple. According to Unsworth (2008) an
increased number of political analyses have scarcely led to any changes in donor
behaviour. This is hardly surprising given that it often has to do with power rela-
tions and acquired positions, as Hausmann et al. (2008a) point out in a Mindbook
on the setting up of growth diagnostics: “Big constraints on growth are there for a
deep reason and they are not always easy to affect, even when they are clearly
identified. Vested interests may be present and the political economy of change
may be difficult” (see also Asian Development Bank 2007). However, the ultimate
task of high-quality development policy remains to search for mechanisms to
initiate self-reinforcing processes of endogenous change.
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8 a broader perspective: looking beyond aid
Development aid can take the form of direct aid from one country to another.
However, aid in this form will gradually decrease in importance in the years to
come. As development questions become increasingly interwoven with broader
global and regional issues, the focal point of development activities will also have
to shift in the same direction. That shift does not have to be made too hastily. For a
number of developing countries, bilateral aid is still of vital importance and can be
useful under certain conditions. However, that applies to a decreasing number of
countries. If the pace of development between 2004 and 2008 continues, by 2020
classical developing countries like Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and even
Chad will be middle-income countries, at least according to current methods of
measurement. The fate of these countries will then depend less on what financial
support individual donors still wish to give them and more on how they respond
to the opportunities they find and take for themselves in a globalizing world.
The question is how development issues can gradually be placed more and more in
such a global perspective. Donors are still making heavy weather of this shift in
focus, and most of them have not yet even reached the conclusion that it is neces-
sary. This chapter describes how to achieve this change in three stages. The first is
how more aid can be provided through multilateral channels, which offers greater
opportunities to address development issues from a broad perspective. The
second stage relates to how national and European policies in areas that do not
belong to the classical development domain can devote serious attention to their
impact on development-related issues. After addressing coherence for develop-
ment, the third step is to examine how development issues fit within an approach
based on international public goods. This also means examining the implications
for global governance of the increasing need for coordination and strategic integra-
tion of policies with cross-border consequences.
8.1 multilateral aid
Addressing development issues in a way that goes beyond classical bilateral aid can
first be achieved by placing aid in a multilateral context. That has a number of
advantages, including less need for coordination, greater effectiveness, lower
transaction costs for recipients and donors, but especially more opportunities to
tackle issues from a broader perspective. We first examine the extent to which
attention is devoted to the latter possibility.
European Union
Does the European Union perhaps offer an appropriate context within which to
provide a framework for the aid provided by member states? Since the 1992 Treaty
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of Maastricht, development aid has been the shared responsibility of the European
Community and its member states, and there has been a European development
policy alongside national development policies (Van Schaik & Maes 2008). Ten
years ago, the British Minister for International Development, Clare Short,
described the European Commission as the “worst development agency in the
world”, but since then reforms of management and strategy have substantially
increased the effectiveness of European aid (Barder et al. 2010). Only a little over
20 percent of eu aid passes through the European Commission, but through the
contributions of its growing number of member states, the eu has become the
second largest donor, after the World Bank, and the combined aid provided by the
eu and its member states accounts for some 60 percent of the global development
effort.
In theory, the European Union could take on a prominent role. In the first place,
this might take the form of coordination, by clustering the knowledge and finan-
cial resources of the member states. There are limitations to such a role, as not all
member states are leading donors, while some major donors – like Switzerland,
Norway and Canada – are not members of the eu. At the same time, however, it is
worthwhile exploring the opportunities that do exist. One good reason for assign-
ing the eu this role is that, certainly in comparison with France and the United
Kingdom, it is seen as ‘politically neutral’. More importantly, however, the eu
intervenes in areas that are crucial to development, including migration and trade.
The European Commission negotiates on behalf of the member states at the wto
and conducts free trade negotiations with countries and regions, while migration
policy is also increasingly becoming a Europe-wide issue. The eu possesses a wide
range of instruments – loans and, more especially, grants – which make an inte-
grated approach possible.
However, there seems to be, as yet, little political will among the member states to
attribute the eu a prominent role in development aid. In practice, rather than
being an umbrella organization or a body that pursues a coherent policy, the eu
has become much more an additional donor, contributing to the further fragmen-
tation of aid. For the time being, it seems likely that the eu will play little more
than a limited role in harmonizing and coordinating policy. Some progress,
however, can be noted. At its 2974th External Relations Council Meeting on 
17 November 2009, the European Council succeeded in agreeing, in an Opera-
tional Framework on Aid Effectiveness, on a division of labour stating in which
developing countries which of fourteen member states and the Commission
should be lead facilitator or supporting facilitator. What will become of this in
practice remains to be seen. Attempts to go further than this appear to enjoy the
support largely of civil servants, and of the Commission, but rarely of the Euro-
pean Council. Those attempts are by no means meaningless – on some points they
go much further than agreements made within the dac, in which the most impor-
234 less pretension, more ambition
tant donors are represented. The eu has, for example, published a number of inno-
vative documents, including The European Consensus on Development in 2005,
the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in 2007, and comprehensive reports on
policy coherence in 2007 and 2009. The impact of these documents is, however,
limited, not only within the member states but within the eu itself. More inten-
sive coordination between the European member states will take much longer, if
for no other reason than differences in orientation: the new member states, for
example, prefer to focus on Central Asia more than on Africa, partly because they
want to reduce migration from that region, and also because their own recent
history makes them familiar with what the countries in the region are currently
experiencing.
The Lisbon Treaty can give European foreign policy a new momentum, with a
recognizable, politically responsible figure (the new High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs) and with its own offices in other countries (European
External Action Services). What this is all going to mean, however, will only
become clear in the next few years. Many fear that the eu will for the time being
remain primarily a ‘large Switzerland’ when it comes to foreign policy, because
Germany, France and the United Kingdom do not seem prepared to subordinate
their own foreign policy to that of the European Union as a whole. The role of
development policy in relation to classical foreign policy (security and trade) will
also have to be specified in greater detail – some even fear that development aid
will be used as a bribe to achieve foreign policy objectives.
In the field of development cooperation, as in other areas, Europe remains for the
time being largely a promise. There are, however, clear opportunities. First of all,
knowledge, policy and instruments can be better coordinated, for example by
creating a sort of European version of the World Bank, which would undoubtedly
be called the Europe Bank. More than eight billion euros a year are already
provided through EuropeAid, making the European Commission the second
largest donor of humanitarian aid and the third largest of development aid. That
expanded role is, however, not linked to a good knowledge infrastructure, like
that of the World Bank, or to large-scale credit provision – that is the responsibil-
ity of the European Investment Bank (eib), which primarily operates within
Europe, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ebrd),
which focuses predominantly on the former Soviet States, and is distinct from the
policy of EuropeAid. Combining and expanding these European banks offers
considerable opportunities for creating a genuine European development policy.
A next step could be to take serious steps towards adopting a coordinating role at
the level of individual recipient countries. Combining the role of coordinator of
member states’ policy with being the 28th donor is not workable and leads to
much friction with other donors in recipient countries. Focus on its coordinating
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role could be combined with a concentration on the themes and areas in which the
eu clearly has added value, and which European citizens consider legitimate issues
for the eu. In that respect, the eu still appears to have difficulties accepting the
signals that European voters sent out en masse during the process of ratifying the
Lisbon Treaty: that Europe should primarily focus on what the member states
cannot do themselves. The eu development policy has for a number of years
already favored what are considered ‘less political’ domains, such as infrastructure
and regional economic development (Grimm et al. 2005). That trend 
should be continued, and the eu should specialize on issues with a regional (that
is: supra-national) character. That means no interventions in healthcare or 
education, as many (perhaps too many) other donors and funds already do that,
but making know-how and resources available to set up and further develop
regional public goods and regional economic and political cooperation. The eu has
recognized experience in these areas, citizens see them as its legitimate tasks, and
African countries in particular have much to benefit from them (unctad 2009e).
World Bank
If the eu proves unable, in the near future, to combine the forces of its member
states, will aid then have to be left more to global multilateral organizations? Until
1963, with the exception of aid to former colonies, the lion’s share of Western aid
was provided through the multilateral channel. However, immediately after the
Second World War, expectations of intergovernmental institutions were running
high: “At Bretton Woods in 1944, John Maynard Keynes and the British delega-
tion proposed a monetary fund equal to half of annual world imports, while Harry
Dexter White and the American side proposed a smaller fund worth one-sixth of
annual world imports” (Weiss & Thakur 2010: 19). Although the world is now
much more interdependent than back then, around a quarter of the Netherlands’
development budget is currently transferred to multilateral organizations like 
the World Bank and the United Nations. The United Kingdom spends nearly 
half of its budget through the multilateral channel and Italy more than half, while
countries like Denmark and Sweden devote a greater share of their budgets to
multilateral organizations than the Netherlands, which plays an important role
through its high total level of oda. The question is whether these organizations
are the best bodies to combine and coordinate aid efforts and thereby to address
supra-national issues.
The World Bank has a number of clear advantages: it has extensive macroeco-
nomic knowledge and is good at managing, for example, budget support and
infrastructural projects. More than other organizations, the World Bank gives
priority to knowledge development, and it conducts internal and external evalua-
tions. Having said that, there are still too few feedback loops between the knowl-
edge and research departments and country desks, and the Bank does not give
sufficient account of its interventions to aid recipients.
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The World Bank also has a number of clear limitations. Firstly, because of its
history, some developing countries distrust the Bank, especially for the one-size-
fits-all policies it pursued in the past. The imf also struggles with an image prob-
lem. That is not so surprising since, for a long time, both organizations worked
along exactly the same lines, with the World Bank only providing support if the
imf issued a statement that the country concerned fulfilled the set requirements.
Although their policies have diverged somewhat, the link between the two orga-
nizations remains very close, even at the most practical level with the staff of the
Bank able to use their passes to enter the imf building, and vice versa (the build-
ings are on opposite sides of the street and are joined by a tunnel). The World Bank
is still closely associated with the Washington Consensus. This reputation is not
entirely deserved, as the practice of the different country offices varies widely.
However, it is a fact and, given the sluggishness of institutional change, it is
unlikely that this image will change very quickly. The second disadvantage is that
the World Bank implements its own policy, and combining its tasks of architect
and main implementing agency is troublesome.
The main point, however, is that while the World Bank – which likes to present
itself as a ‘knowledge bank’ – possesses more resources and an almost complete
knowledge monopoly compared to regional development banks and more hetero-
dox researchers and institutes, the failure of its one-size-fits-all approaches calls
specifically for great diversity and plurality in knowledge, ideas and research for
development. Countries differ from each other in their history, culture, traditions,
institutions and level of developments, and paths to development are specific to
each. Policy choices are political as well as technical and often no one knows what
works best or how to create ‘good’ institutions. That is why “(p)olicy diversity [is]
as important for development as bio-diversity is for the survival of the ecosystem”
(Storm 2005). The implication of this is that we should abandon attempts “to
spread a single variety of capitalism through the wto, the imf and the World
Bank” (Wade 2009a).
The consequences of this for policy are that existing international institutions
should not have a monopoly. Development benefits from a mosaic of organiza-
tions in different regions, that compete with each other at the level of ideas, but
which are also linked together in networks and learn from each other (Sabel &
Reddy 2007). In addition, the quality and robustness of the generated knowledge
can also be called into question: after analyzing the knowledge on the recent food
price crisis produced by the international financial institutions, Cuesta (2010)
concluded that “perhaps the current ifis may be more cautiously described as
knowledgeable institutions rather than knowledge banks.” The world does not
therefore benefit from a single World Bank functioning as a global knowledge
institute, but needs three or four ‘knowledge banks’ with a similar mandate to that
of the World Bank: knowledge, financing and project implementation. There is
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much to be said for having one of these banks in Africa and one in Asia. This could
be achieved by merging the regional offices of the World Bank with the existing
regional development banks, and making them responsible for the main functions
currently performed by the World Bank, such as providing loans.
United Nations
In theory, it seems more logical to make the United Nations lead the way in devel-
opment aid. Unlike the eu or the World Bank, the un embraces all countries,
including developing countries. In addition, its legitimacy is less controversial.
The un is particularly important in generating attractive and critical concepts and
influential ideas (Jolly et al. 2009), like the Human Development Index and the
concept of global public goods, has proved valuable as a norm entrepreneur in
formulating and setting global standards, and has in some cases played an impor-
tant role in coordinating worldwide humanitarian efforts after disasters like the
tsunami in December 2004. Nevertheless, the un still seems limited in its capa-
bility to take on the role of director.
The un has a crucial part to play in global governance, defined as the whole of
laws, standards, policies and institutions that define, constitute and mediate rela-
tions in the international arena between citizens, societies, markets and the state.
But the gap between the global character of many present-day problems and solu-
tions that are currently available is very wide. Weiss & Thakur (2010) identify five
‘gaps in global governance’ that are reflected in the un: knowledge gaps, norma-
tive gaps, policy gaps, institutional gaps, and compliance gaps. The un is not a
world government, nor are the specialized un agencies departments of a global
authority, and although “such distinguished commentators as Nobel laureate Jan
Tinbergen and the World Bank’s former president Robert McNamara have
declared the need for the un system to have some of these powers, such a goal
remains elusive, highly contested, and very far from being accepted politically,
even as a distant objective” (Weiss & Thakur 2010: 35).
For all kinds of reasons, the un is unfortunately not very effective as a political and
directing force. A broader directing role for development aid is therefore, for the
time being, a bridge too far. It still remains to be seen whether the Development
Corporation Forum, set up in July 2007 to combine development efforts within
the un, will become more than just a discussion platform. In recent decades,
instead of adopting a more directing role, the un has focused more on implemen-
tation. A wide spectrum of implementing bodies has developed within and under
the wings of the un, each inevitably with their own institutional interests.
Adebayo Adedeji, former executive secretary of the un Economic Commission for
Africa (eca) noted that “once you establish an institution, in this society of ours
in the world in which we live today, they are like cemeteries. You can’t remove the
graves” (Weiss & Thakur 2010: 48). The un has become a fragmented organiza-
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tion in which a growing number of institutions – often with too limited resources
– all follow their own paths, notwithstanding all efforts to create ‘one un’. Inter-
national institutions that focus on specific problem areas or issues and operate on
the basis of norms and a consensus accepted by the member states – like the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (iaea), Unicef, or the International Telecommu-
nication Union (itu) – are generally considered worthwhile. However, that was
not the case with, for example, the former Commission on Human Rights (chr).
Implementing organizations like undp have, to put it mildly, achieved mixed
results. It would have been more logical to have made undp a directing rather
than an implementing agency, as was the original intention. It would have fitted in
with the un’s position as an umbrella organization.
It seems sensible to safeguard and support the stronger aspects of the un and its
specialized agencies (fao, un-desa, unctad, undp, unep, unicef, unido,
unrisd, etc.) – for example, generating ideas, conducting thorough analyses, tack-
ling failing collective action on issues like climate, trade and security, and formu-
lating worldwide standards – and only to assign it implementing tasks where it
clearly offers added value or can operate better or more effectively than bilateral
donors. Besides, the un should certainly be the first option for providing aid in the
case of disasters: it is better not to leave emergency aid to a multitude of individual
ngos and individual countries. The un can direct the effort, especially if the
government of the affected country is not politically involved in the cause of the
disaster and has no major, biased interests in the way aid is provided – as is often
the case with ‘classical’ natural disasters. With man-made disasters, interventions
are usually more politically charged, which restricts the un, as it obviously has to
deal with governments. In such cases, interventions are better directed by large
professional international organizations like the Red Cross or Médecins Sans
Frontières.
Donor countries should develop criteria to determine what they see as the core of
multilateral organizations, to avoid a proliferation of financial contributions to
international organizations so that in the end no one knows which organizations
are being supported and why (and which ones are not and why not), and what the
concrete objectives of doing so are. That calls for a more serious evaluation of how
these organizations function than current, often rather diplomatically formulated
monitoring. A clear idea of the core roles of these organizations and of the desired
international structure is an important aspect of this exercise. In that respect it
will be interesting to see what comes out of the large-scale review of multilateral
organizations announced in June 2010 by the new British government, which
spends three billion pounds a year through them.
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8.2 coherence for development
Development dimensions also play a role in policy that does not strictly fall within
the sphere of development policy. Despite good intentions expressed at meetings
and laid down in statements and reports, the concrete results of coherence policies
for development have so far been disappointing. Without detracting from what
has been achieved, it must be said that many of those involved believe that the
potential benefits have only been realized to a very moderate extent. A major
obstacle is that creating coherence is a relatively new objective, with which no
single country has a great deal of experience. However, that is not the only prob-
lem. While holding a former position, the current chief economist at the British
Department for International Development (dfid), Alan Winters, wrote that
coherence is an emotional concept which no one can resist: who wants to be
accused of incoherence? According to Winters, hard reality teaches us that a
certain degree of incoherence is unavoidable, because coherence policy involves
considerations and choices in which different objectives and interests are at stake
(Winters 2001).
It is fashionable to consider practically everything as a win-win situation, but with
many coherence issues that is not always possible. Complete coherence is unrealis-
tic in a pluralist society in which different interests, perceptions and values co-
exist. Whether coherence has been achieved in a given situation depends on your
viewpoint. A ban on trading arms with poor countries is coherent with the effort
to achieve stability, but not with the interests of employers and employees in the
arms industry, or of ministries wishing to promote international trade. In some
cases there genuinely is a win-win situation – for example, in the field of knowl-
edge, science and innovation policy (awt 2009) – but generally speaking incoher-
ence cannot be avoided and legitimate interests can often clash (Carbone 2008;
Odén 2009; Winters 2001).
This can be made more concrete by looking at current practices. The choices that
are made between the various interests involved are not necessarily those that
would be made if development interests were given priority. There is good reason
why, during the run-up to the last European elections, a coalition of large ngos
placed a number of themes on the web – including trade in illegally harvested
timber, medicines, migration, military export credits and arms transit – through
which, in their view, individual member states and the eu were damaging the
interests of developing countries. There is also tension between keeping a country
attractive as a location for multinationals and the price they pay for that in other
countries. Researchers at the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations
(somo) estimate, for example, that thanks to the Netherlands’ fiscal regime, devel-
oping countries lose out on some 640 million dollars (or 15 percent of the Nether-
lands’ aid budget) per year in resources that they would otherwise be able to spend
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on healthcare, education or other public goods and services (Weyzig & Van Dijk
2008).
Coherence policy for development is, in short, not a technical exercise, but a polit-
ical process in which policymakers often have to weigh up conflicting interests
and widely varying estimations of the potential consequences of policy against
each other. By allowing development interests to prevail in this process more
often, rich countries can make a greater contribution to growth, development and
structural poverty reduction in poor countries than is possible with classical aid.
The continuing asymmetrical relations between rich and poor countries and the
great differences and inequalities between countries can be invoked to justify this,
but whether that actually occurs is a political decision. This can be – and is – the
cause of differences of opinion and political conflicts.
In light of the above, the institutional design of coherence policy for development
is decidedly difficult. Experience so far shows that four interconnected issues play
an important role in this respect: political commitment, coordination between
and bridgeheads with material experts at the various ministries, building up
knowledge and expertise and, last but not least, monitoring and evaluation (Odén
& Lundquist 2007). We shall examine these four issues in turn.
Political commitment
Without political commitment at the highest possible level the aim of achieving
more coherence for development will never get off the ground – that much is clear
from international experience so far. Because there is no one in the relevant policy
bodies who directly represents the interests of developing countries, there is little
incentive, without sufficient political pressure and engagement, to take them into
account. In Sweden, for that reason, there were proposals to make coherence
policy the direct responsibility of the prime minister, though the idea was eventu-
ally abandoned for practical reasons. Coherence policy has now been placed under
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, though opinions continue to differ about whether
that is a wise decision. A coordinating role for the prime minister fits in well with
the expanding role of heads of government in international fora and more gener-
ally with the theming of global issues. It is problematic for a prime minister to take
direct responsibility for all major global issues, but one thing is clear: coherence
policy will only seriously get off the ground if it is placed high on the political
agenda. There are, however, no ready-made answers to the question of how that
can best be achieved.
Coordination and bridgeheads
The second requirement for achieving an effective coherence policy is an adequate
architecture. This calls for transparency and flexibility. It is important to be able to
adapt quickly to changed relationships, identify instances of incoherence, and
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develop a culture in which sectors work together, enter into dialogue and settle
disputes amiably rather than fighting them out. That can take a number of differ-
ent forms. In Finland, one minister is responsible for both trade and development.
Some countries are experimenting with combined departments. The United King-
dom, for example, has a joint directorate of the trade and development ministries,
which concerns itself with trade policy and the British standpoint at the wto talks
in Doha (International Development Committee 2007, 2008), and a Stabilization
Unit that coordinates the efforts of foreign affairs, development cooperation and
defence ministries in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Sweden has taken the
lead internationally with an integrated perspective on global development based
on ‘whole-of-government approaches’, in which policy coherence is a govern-
ment-wide responsibility. Norway, too, has taken the first steps in this direction.
The European Commission also wants to move towards a ‘whole-of-the-Union’
approach, but it is not yet very clear what that precisely entails (Anten et al. 2008;
Carbone 2008; European Commission 2009b, 2009c; oecd/dac 2008b; oecd
2009). In the Netherlands, coherence policy has been addressed dynamically by a
small unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The unit scores well in international
comparisons, but there are limits to what six people, no matter how dedicated
they are, can do to make government policy more coherent with development
policy. In the near future it would seem logical to set up contact points or coher-
ence units with material experts at other ministries, which can build up knowl-
edge and identify issues at an early stage. A unit at the foreign ministry, with more
manpower, could play a coordinating role. The unit would have direct access to the
Cabinet through the Minister for Development Cooperation. The resulting
government-wide network could also be used to discuss coherence issues with
developing countries with which the classical aid relationship is being phased out.
Sweden is currently running an interesting pilot project exploring, together with
the countries concerned, ways in which it can contribute to development in coun-
tries where it is phasing out their financial aid. The first reaction when terminating
a donor relationship is to look at trade opportunities, but there are all kinds of
other cross-border movements that can promote or hamper development – flows
of money, people or information – and there will be increasing demand in devel-
oping countries for tailor-made knowledge in specific areas. It is therefore a matter
not of simply leaving a country, but of a subtle change in the nature of the relation-
ship.
There are also benefits to be acquired by exploring ways of making coherence
issues and the trade-offs that they entail more visible. One logical example of this
would be to integrate accountability for development spending in a broader
process of accountability including policy in other areas. That would be practically
feasible if it were combined with the policy proposed in the previous chapter:
resolute concentration on a small number of countries or regions. The policy
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pursued in each country or region would then be mapped out, not only in terms of
expenditure of oda funds, but also of policy on trade, migration, knowledge,
climate, etc. Addressing binding constraints on the basis of a diagnostic analysis
can require a combination of complementary activities in various policy areas.
Policy coherence benefits from ngos that not only expose existing incoherence
between, for example, policy on migration and the arms trade, but also offer alter-
natives. Michael Edwards (2008), former director of the Ford Foundation, consid-
ers this a much more important task than activities that focus more on developing
countries (as described in the previous chapter). In his view, the main task of ngos
is to contribute to the formation of a vocal civil society with the aim being to
modify international rules, agreements and standards that are a more important
condition for a resilient development policy. It is a matter of creating a fairer play-
ing field, giving people from the South a voice, and generating a support base that
can help achieve global changes in consumption patterns.
The obligation to address the issue of coherence in every dossier is a kill-or-cure
remedy that can easily lead to more bureaucracy and yet another item on the
checklist of requirements that have to be met by documents sent to parliament and
the Cabinet. On the other hand, such a formal rule can help civil society organiza-
tions identify coherence issues at an early stage and exert influence on them.
According to a recent evaluation, a similar way of working during preparation of
the Netherlands’ standpoint on new proposals by the European Commission –
which does not take place in public – has had a positive impact (Engel et al. 2009).
Building knowledge and expertise
Material expertise and involvement on the part of ministries is the third indis-
pensable factor for coherence policy. Two successive evaluations by the European
Commission have shown that a lack of these elements is often a major obstacle 
to building up coherence policy (European Commission 2007, 2009b, 2009c).
Expertise on the relationship between different policy areas and development will
therefore have to be accumulated and deepened ‘on the job’. Generating and mobi-
lizing relevant knowledge also requires more links with knowledge institutes,
scientists and civil society organizations with expertise in specific areas, both here
and in developing countries. It is crucial not to forget the latter, as stakeholders in
developing countries themselves have so far had little opportunity to contribute
to donors’ coherence policy. The European Commission recently announced that
it is going to make a greater effort in this respect for the Union in the coming
period, a step which is also logical at national level.
Building up more expertise also means actively promoting countervailing power.
Greater transparency on trade-offs and the choices made in coherence dossiers and
debates on coherence can mobilize knowledge available on these issues in all kinds
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of places. It also involves ngos, citizens, interest groups and experts more closely
in policy, and this countervailing power is important because interest groups that
operate in or on behalf of developing countries are not themselves present around
the table when civil servants and politicians in donor countries discuss and make
decisions on coherence issues.
Monitoring and evaluation
Because expectations about the intended or unintended consequences of policy
that play a role in coherence dossiers are often controversial, monitoring and eval-
uation are the final indispensable elements in an effective approach to coherence
policy for development. They not only enable us to learn lessons for the future,
but also enable us to modify an ongoing course of action if it proves to have unex-
pected negative effects. The Norwegian Minister for International Development
provided a good illustration of this in 2006 when he decided, unilaterally and
unconditionally, to cancel the equivalent of eighty million dollars in Norwegian
kroner in debts owed to Norway by Egypt, Ecuador, Peru, Jamaica and Sierra
Leone. These countries had used the loans to buy ships from Norway, assuming
that they would contribute to their development. An evaluation, however,
showed that this was not the case (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway 2008).
In addition to monitoring individual activities, it is useful to commission an inde-
pendent evaluation of coherence policy as a whole, for example every two years, to
help keep policymakers on their toes and to learn from successes and failures. In
its recent peer review of Sweden’s development policy, the dac reminds the
Swedish government of this recommendation. Like many other donor countries,
Sweden has not yet introduced such an independent review. Furthermore, experts
from developing countries should play an important role in general evaluations of
coherence policy (Odén 2009; oecd/dac 2009c).
The next step
In coming years, donor countries and the eu will continue to seek ways of formu-
lating good coherence policy. In most Western countries a logical next step would
first of all seem to be to interweave all the activities of the line ministries that have
a substantial development component with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obvi-
ous models for achieving this are joint departments that report to two ministers or
programme departments, but other organizational forms that go much further
than the friendly exchange of information are conceivable. It would also seem logi-
cal to set up a bridgehead at each ministry with expertise on coherence policy for
development, and to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of coherence
policy.
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8.3 international public goods
International public goods are becoming an increasingly important reference point
for international policy, and more and more relevant to the possibilities and room
for manoeuvre available to national states. That raises the question of how best to
give substance to their development dimension (Wijffels 2008). All kinds of
goods, perhaps sometimes too many, are considered to be global public goods and
not all are equally relevant to development. Donors and recipient countries there-
fore need to devise strategies to prevent budgets and energy from becoming frag-
mented, and to promote the internal coherence of development policy. For donor
countries such strategies should, in any case, contain four elements. First of all
they need to find a balance between national, regional and global public goods to
help ensure that developing countries do not jump out of the frying pan into the
fire. Secondly, they have to examine ways, perhaps together with others, of taking
catalyzing initiatives. That will often mean, thirdly, developing new funding
mechanisms. Lastly, it is important to render account for the action they take and
other choices.
Public goods on different scales
It is important to seek the right balance between public goods on different scales,
as they are mutually dependent (Hettne & Söderbaum 2006) and the available
funds can only be spent once. Little will be gained if the funds used for global
public goods, such as climate policy or protecting biodiversity, are taken from
budgets already allocated to national public goods in developing countries, like
education or border controls, or to regional public goods, such as water manage-
ment or regional infrastructure. Nor should developing countries be pressurized
to sacrifice efforts relating to regional public goods (for example, to clean up a lake)
in favour of global public goods (such as combating global warming) just because
donors believe the latter should have top priority. Development countries need
public goods at national and regional scale not only for their further development,
but also to benefit from and contribute to global public goods.
National public goods in developing countries, as in rich countries, are indispens-
able for economic growth and development (unctad 2009b) and, in principle,
donors are already aware of them. If countries can diagnose where the main inter-
nal obstacles to development exist, it is possible to help remove them, for example
with money or knowledge. In this way, where national public goods fall short,
they can be supplemented. It is more difficult if a country’s development is held
back because it has insufficient access to certain global public goods – for example,
land is drying out because of rising temperatures caused by climate change (Care
2010) – or regional public goods – such as an inadequate infrastructure linking it to
neighbouring countries. Unilateral action by national government is generally not
sufficient to ensure access to these public goods. It requires cooperation with other
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countries, calling for something different than the country-based approach tradi-
tionally applied in development cooperation (Arce & Sandler 2002; Estevadeordal
et al. 2002; Kanbur 2002; Te Velde et al. 2006).
Taking catalyzing initiatives
What role can an individual donor country play in all this? History shows that
catalyzing initiatives are of great importance in facilitating and creating global and
regional public goods. Such initiatives can be taken by governments or multilateral
organizations, or by companies and other non-governmental parties. The legal
framework for human rights, for example, is not only the result of the activities of
national states, but also of the efforts of the United Nations and of civil society
organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that promote
human rights. For international norms and standards in the field of labour rights,
the tripartite (government, employers and employees) International Labour Orga-
nization (ilo) has been playing an indispensable role since 1919. For the preven-
tion and treatment of hiv/aids, in addition to national specialized organizations
and the un, non-governmental groups like the Rockefeller, Ford and Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundations and countless ngos also make an important contribu-
tion. Biodiversity is preserved thanks to the efforts of national states, multilateral
institutions and a large number of non-governmental actors, like Greenpeace and
the Worldwatch Institute. The landmine treaty was a success thanks to coopera-
tion between a number of middle-sized countries and ngos. And, as a final exam-
ple, businesses and investors can play an important role, together with ngos,
experts, governments and multilateral organizations, in bringing about interna-
tional covenants and global norms and standards, like the Global Reporting Initia-
tive (gri), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (eiti), and the
Kimberly Initiative for diamonds (Collier 2007; International Task Force on Global
Public Goods 2006; Zadek 2008). According to Klaus Schwab (2008), founder of
the World Economic Forum (wef), businesses, governments and civil society
should join forces on Global Corporate Citizenship: “Corporations must engage
on global issues while understanding that the business community cannot, on its
own, solve global problems such as poverty, poor education, and inadequate
healthcare. Governments and multilateral organizations cannot be discharged
from their responsibilities to deliver such public goods.”
In the field of global regulation, ngos have also achieved a number of demonstra-
ble successes (Edwards 2008; Lewis & Kanji 2009; Riddell 2007). In 2005, for
example, after sustained pressure from ngos, the British government changed its
standpoint on tariff walls and trade protection. It now recognizes that a one-size-
fits-all approach to trade can be disadvantageous for some developing countries
(Riddell 2007). International organizations, too, can be sensitive to pressure from
ngos. The World Bank admits that it became ‘greener’ in the 1980s and 1990s
thanks to ngos, and that international ngo campaigns for debt cancellation led to
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the hipc (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) initiative on debt reduction. More-
over, the chroniclers of the United Nations conclude that, over the years, ngos
have gradually but steadily increased their influence within the un system. They
even describe ‘ngos and consultants’ as the ‘third un’ alongside the first (govern-
ments) and the second (international secretariats) (Jolly et al. 2004; Jolly et al.
2009; Stokke 2009). There are, however, still a few challenges facing ngos. They
are, for example, better at addressing ‘soft’ themes like poverty or landmines, than
forcing change in ‘hard’ areas like the economy or defence, and it remains difficult
to propose innovative or workable alternatives (Lewis & Kanji 2009). The power
of civil society organizations is often that they can link country-specific problems
to global themes – a link that needs to be made more often. They are excellent, for
example, at showing how the economic situation of a farmer in Uganda is clearly
related to agreements at the wto, or that specific climate agreements are necessary
for a region of Bangladesh. That is also why civil society organizations are well
positioned to contribute to further elaboration of international public goods and
strengthen their development dimension (Florini 2005; Edwards 2008; Groten-
huis 2009).
For donor countries wishing to contribute to development, giving high priority to
promoting development-relevant international public goods means not only a lot
of hard work in international fora and institutions, but also looking for possibili-
ties to instigate relevant initiatives, either independently or together with like-
minded countries and other parties. Preferences and possibilities will differ from
country to country, and whether that can best be achieved by focusing on a small
number of niches in which public and private expertise and resources can be
combined productively is a question that has to be addressed when developing
such a strategy. That will also require organizing and mobilizing more capacity for
research and expertise.
Developing new instruments
Funding is often, though not always, necessary for international public goods.
How this is organized differs from case to case, as public goods come in all shapes
and sizes. Take, for example, public goods from which everyone – including non-
payers – benefit, such as measures to combat global warming. Financing these
measures calls for initiatives by the international community, for example in the
form of taxes or subscriptions. The situation is different for what are known as
‘weakest link’ public goods, which are very dependent on the activities of those
who make the least effort (for example, measures to combat infectious diseases).
In such cases, one option is to set up partnerships between public and private
parties, so that all stakeholders make an acceptable contribution. These partner-
ships can also provide funding for ‘best shot’ public goods, from which everyone
benefits once measures have been taken at a single location (for example,
vaccines). A final example is ‘club goods’, whereby it is possible to exclude people
247a broader perspective: looking beyond aid
from the benefits of the good concerned (e.g. satellite communication). Here the
incentives lie elsewhere: the ‘members of the club’ (users) can form a private
collective that provides the financing (Arce & Sandler 2002; Sandler 2002a, 2002b,
2006).
These examples illustrate that it is necessary to think carefully about the concrete
dimensions of an international public good. Not all global public goods are the
same or need to cost a lot of public money, and it is not always necessary to wait
until all countries wish to participate before taking initiatives. Global contracts and
charters can sometimes be very effective without costing a great deal of money,
and it is important to respond cleverly to incentives that can encourage govern-
ments or non-governmental parties to contribute to regional and global public
goods. Should it prove necessary to organize funding for public goods, experience
so far suggests three possible strategies, which can also be applied in combination.
– Better mobilization of resources. International agreements on the distribution of
costs, with which everyone complies, and which take account of the widely
varying capacity of countries to contribute, and with the way the benefits of the
public good are distributed. This assures international organizations that
provide the global public good concerned of predictable incomes.
– Cooperation with the private sector and civil society. Governments can do more
to tap into and strengthen the specialized knowledge of the private sector and
civil society and, with regulation frameworks and incentives, to facilitate and
stimulate new initiatives in healthcare, environment and knowledge.
– Innovative financing mechanisms. There are ideas for generating additional
funds for development and global public goods which have not yet been put
into practice to any significant degree. These include, for example, the propos-
als for a tax on financial transactions (which the imf has also recently started
looking into), the issue of global development bonds, the British idea for an
International Finance Facility that would make funds directly available by issu-
ing bonds on the basis of long-term pledges by donors, and new financing
mechanisms like advanced market commitments, which are used to provide
vaccines for people in poor countries and regions. The latter appears to be a
promising innovation and is examined in a little more detail below.
Advanced market commitments (amcs) offer an answer to the problem that,
compared to the social demand, little research and development (r&d) is devoted
to vaccines and medicines to tackle diseases in poor countries, like malaria or
tuberculosis. A much-quoted statistic from the World Health Organization
(who) is that half of the r&d in the health sector in 1992 was conducted by the
private sector, but that less than 5 percent of that was devoted to diseases that are
specific to poor countries. Biochemical and pharmaceutical companies that have to
turn a profit are reluctant to invest in r&d into these kinds of diseases if they are
afraid that they cannot market the vaccines at a price that will allow them to
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recover their costs. Michael Kremer, Bill and Melinda Gates Professor of Develop-
ing Societies and Economics at Harvard, devised a solution to this problem by
focusing on the demand side, which had always been seen as hopeless. The basic
idea behind his proposal to tempt manufacturers to conduct more r&d into
vaccines for the poor is that one or more sponsors commit themselves to pay a
minimum price for each person who is effectively rendered immune to a specific
disease by a newly developed product, until a certain number of individuals has
been reached. This means that, if the manufacturer does not succeed in developing
an effective vaccine, they receive no payment. Amcs have now been endorsed by
the World Bank, former British prime minister Gordon Brown and the pope, to
mention but a few of their more well-known supporters. In addition, the govern-
ments of several countries, including Italy, Canada and Norway, and the Gates
Foundation have raised 1.5 billion dollars for the first amc project, research into
lung diseases, in the hope that this will lead to vaccines that will, up to 2030,
prevent the deaths of 5.8 million children. Meanwhile, the discussion on the pros
and cons of this approach continues (Berndt et al. 2006; Light 2009).
Where donor countries can have added value depends on a variety of factors. It
seems logical, for example, for a country like the Netherlands, with a quite
strongly developed financial sector, to see a role for itself in helping to develop
new financing mechanisms for international public goods. But more and more
global funds are being established, for climate policy, healthcare and other public
goods, and that brings with it the risk of fragmentation. As a consequence it is first
necessary to examine where opportunities and needs lie and, although more and
less well-known global public goods deserve attention, specific attention also has
to be paid to less high-profile regional public goods, because funding them is espe-
cially difficult. Regional public goods can be difficult to organize because it is
unclear how the benefits will be distributed among different countries, and there-
fore how the costs should be divided up. Furthermore, because donors focus on
countries and ‘ownership’, there is a risk that both recipient countries and donors
consider regional public goods to be less interesting than global or national goods.
It can therefore be necessary to devise creative solutions, if there is no regional
entity that can contract or provide security for loans for regional public goods, for
example in cooperation with regional development banks and joint ventures
between countries (Birdsall 2006; Estevadeordal et al. 2002; Kanbur 2001; Sandler
2005, 2007; unido 2008).
Accountability
The final component of a more intensive approach to international public goods
for development is the need for donor countries to establish appropriate forms of
accountability for the deployed funds. As the available funds are limited, it is
crucial to consider carefully where the extra financial resources for global and
regional public goods must come from. Sometimes they will be ‘new’ or ‘addi-
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tional’ funds that do not come from the existing budget for development coopera-
tion, but they can also be allocated at the expense of funds reserved for the direct
improvement of living conditions in poor countries or for national or regional
public goods in developing countries. To ensure that this occurs in a well-consid-
ered manner, it has been proposed that countries should keep a record in their
national budget mechanisms of how much they spend on global and regional
public goods. The oecd could then include this information in its statistics, as it
already does for development aid. If donor countries were to take up this sugges-
tion in the near future, it would not only become possible to obtain a clear picture
of the contributions they make to international public goods and how they change,
it would also give a signal to the international community and lead to the estab-
lishment of new standards (Dervis 2005; International Task Force on Global Public
Goods 2006).
Following on from this, it is an interesting challenge to start thinking about what
should follow the Millennium Development Goals. Gradually, an international
discussion is gathering momentum on the agenda for development after 2015,
when the mdgs should have been achieved. Partly because of increasing doubts
that many of the mdgs will be achieved, a number of fundamental questions are
being raised, some of which have been raised before. We have already seen, for
example, that the relationship between the mdgs and economic growth and devel-
opment is unclear, and their relationship to international public goods is equally
obscure. Furthermore, there is still a lack of clarity as regards the scope of the
mdgs, and about who actually ‘owns’ them, or should own them (dfid 2009a;
Manning 2009). Developing a reference framework that is better structured
conceptually and in which well-founded links can be made between international
objectives, the application of different instruments (including oda and interna-
tional public goods) and the growth and development of countries, is not simple,
but certainly badly needed.
The next step
International public goods are not only important for development policy, and
require specific substantive knowledge from case to case. It is therefore not logical
to give general responsibility for these goods in donor countries to a single minis-
ter and to the ministry of development cooperation. It would appear more sensible
for line ministries to be responsible for international public goods in their own
specific areas of work and, as not everything can be addressed at the same time and
as priorities will have to be set, a political and official coordination point will have
to be established at high level, which can set priorities and account for them. In
addition, since it is not going to happen automatically, the interests of developing
countries must be explicitly defined. It is logical that the ministry of the prime
minister or president will have to take more explicit responsibility for this coordi-
nation function, if for no other reason than that different cross-border themes will
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increasingly be linked to each other in international fora like the G20 and institu-
tions like the United Nations. Whether the coordination point will take the form
of a sub-cabinet of ministers for global development, or a new entity, or take some
other form completely, is a matter of further elaboration and will depend partly on
the specific structure, tradition and culture of the administrative organization of
each country.
8.4 global governance
In the past sixty years, most Western governments have offered no, or almost no,
critical reflections on the functioning of multilateral organizations. That is
increasingly becoming a sore point. Today’s world calls for a far-reaching review of
these organizations – slight adjustments here and there will not suffice. Tectonic
changes in the global configuration of influence and power have led to a multipolar
world no longer dominated by a single superpower. The increasing influence of
Brazil, Russia, India and China (the bric countries) and other developing coun-
tries will sooner or later lead to new relations between and among international
organizations, and to new forms of, and ideas on, global governance. A country
that does not want to lag behind but to help design the new world, will have to
develop innovative ideas and proposals.
A new vision is required on Western countries’ place in the world, and what
contribution to the international order is appropriate on the basis of that position.
That is a long process. On a development agenda for the future, however, there are
three issues that donor countries clearly need to address seriously: the composi-
tion of international fora, the lack of multilateral coherence in economic and social
policies, and the relationship between global and regional coordination mecha-
nisms. We briefly examine these issues below.
Composition of international fora
The first issue that can no longer be avoided is the basis on which the composition
of major international fora is determined. In the un General Assembly – the
g192 – all countries, large or small, have equal power, while in the imf and the
World Bank it is the size of their economies and their financial contribution that
determine how much power each member state can wield. Although the g20 may
be more representative than the g7 or g8 and more than 80 percent of the global
economy meets there around the table, a considerable proportion of the global
population is not represented. Proposals have therefore been made recently to
determine the weight of countries in multilateral organizations by a combination
of the size of their economies and of their populations, and possibly also to take
account of the extent to which countries make a contribution to global public
goods. It is high time for a fundamental debate on how we wish to address this
issue (Dervis 2005; Rueda-Sabater et al. 2009).
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In addition, a country like the Netherlands can no longer evade questions about its
own position at the imf and the World Bank. Since mid-2010, when the quota was
adjusted, the Netherlands (with 2.16 percent of the votes) has had almost as much
voting power at the imf as the much larger India (2.44 percent of the votes) and
more voting power than Brazil (1.78 percent). It is also overrepresented at both the
World Bank and the imf, with a director on the board. With nine of the twenty-
four seats on the board and more than 30 percent of the votes, the European coun-
tries jointly are also heavily overrepresented at the imf. That representation will
have to be reduced to allow more space for emerging countries. If we take our
support for more representative multilateral organizations seriously and want the
rest of the international community to believe that eu members understand that
the world really has changed, it will not be possible to avoid giving up certain
positions in favour of emerging countries that are currently underrepresented.
That means, for example, that the European Union will have to settle for one or
two representatives on the boards of the imf and the World Bank. An added
advantage of this is that the representation and the standpoints of the eu in multi-
lateral organizations will receive greater attention in national and European policy
preparation and the debates in national parliaments and the media.
Global coherence
Secondly, from the perspective of development, global coordination and coher-
ence (or the lack of them) of economic and social policy are important for stabil-
ity in developing countries. This is also an important issue for the rest of the
world – we need only to think of the financial crisis (un 2008). At the moment,
none of the multilateral institutions have either the position or the legitimacy to
move this forward: ecosoc does not have sufficient bite and has no influence on
the imf, the World Bank or the wto, which in turn have a legitimacy problem.
The vacuum between weak international institutions and the growing need for
global governance is filled by an assortment of informal institutions, public-
private, government and ngo arrangements, and specialized organizations. That
is to a considerable extent unavoidable as long as there is no effective world
government – as we have seen, the un is far from that – and only very few people
see that happening or even consider it an attractive prospect. That does,
however, have a downside, as it leads to a proliferation of international, regional
and subregional standards and initiatives that far exceed the absorption capacity
of many countries. Where rich countries, with their extensive resources and
hundreds of officials, think-tanks and lobby groups, already have serious prob-
lems in overseeing the many governance fora, picking their way through them
and trying to bring about coherence in their policies, poorer countries, with their
much more limited capacity, are faced with an impossible task. According to
Cilliers (2008), the implication for countries in Africa, for example, is that
regional organizations must operate more rapidly and selectively if they are not
to become irrelevant, and that governments must set much clearer priorities and
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become much more intelligent and more competent if they are to find their way
in the changing world.
Initiatives to promote multilateral coherence can only start in the participating
national states. The inherent problem with this is aptly formulated by Alan
Winters, currently chief economist at the British dfid: “Individual governments
do not define precisely what they want from the world system and so the various
organizations end up with conflicting goals or, at least, conflicting weights on
different goals” (2001). A task force set up by the un General Assembly, led by
Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, has proposed establishing an
elected Global Economic Coordination Council within the un to replace the g20
and g8. The Council would be responsible for promoting coherence and consis-
tency in the multilateral system, for example at annual meetings of heads of state
and government. Despite plenty of good intentions, this has not yet led to much
in practice, but the discussion continues and, given the increasing interdepen-
dence of various international problems and crises, proposals of this nature will be
tabled more and more frequently, demanding responses and initiatives (un
2009d; Went 2009).
Both multilateral and regional
A third issue that needs to be fundamentally considered, and not only from a
development perspective, is the scale on which coordination and cross-border
initiatives can best be organized. The current trend is to address as many topics as
possible multilaterally at global level, which seems logical in light of globalization
and the increasing interdependence between countries. After all, the national level
is insufficient to address cross-border issues. The global level is, however, often
too badly organized and politically heterogeneous to take any kind of effective
action at all. That makes it easy to underestimate the extent to which regions and
forms of regional cooperation are, or should be, playing an increasingly crucial role
in tackling cross-border problems and challenges. African countries have much to
gain by more intensive regional economic cooperation (unctad 2009e), although
eu negotiators on epas do not yet seem to have realized that sufficiently (see, for
example, South Centre 2010). In chapter 6, we already drew attention to the
increased importance of regional funds (e.g. the Chiang Mai initiative of the
asean countries) in strengthening mutual financial support and policy space in
respect of global organizations and within the global economy.
Following the recent financial and economic crises, there is little left of the eupho-
ria about the assumed capacity of globalizing markets to regulate themselves, and
around the world, think-tanks and governments are seeking ways to re-embed
markets more deeply at national level, and give states and regional institutions
more policy space to protect themselves against international crises and their
consequences without unnecessarily losing the potential and actual benefits of
253a broader perspective: looking beyond aid
globalization (see, for example, Rodrik 2010b). Strengthening regional coopera-
tion can be interesting not only in the context of embedded globalization, but also
because it is easier to mobilize political will and joint action at that level. The eu is
a case in point. When global coordination does prove necessary it can perhaps be
organized, depending on the issue, through cooperation between regional institu-
tions at different levels. If we also take account of the fact that providing regional
public goods often encounters specific problems, it is clear that it is necessary to
develop a new pragmatic vision on the relationship between the multilateral,
regional and national levels (Hettne & Söderbaum 2006; Hettne et al. 2008;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009b; Ocampo 2002; unctad 2009e).
Shallow rather than deep integration should be the motto of multilateral institu-
tions and cooperation, to give countries sufficient policy space to make their own
choices. Here, too, the eu provides a good example of the way in which collective
action is combined with the sovereignty and policy freedom of individual member
states. Developing countries need that to ‘learn-by-doing’ and where necessary 
to be able to take protective measures, perhaps temporarily, to be able to develop
new dynamic economic sectors (see also George 2010). National development
strategies can only work if international regimes and governance structures and
mechanisms facilitate and promote sufficient policy space and flexibility and, for
example, allow exceptions to general rules and standards. The question as to how
globalization can be combined in a more productive and less destructive way with
national states that have sufficient policy space, and with regional institutions, has
been on agendas around the world since the financial crisis. Closer reflection on
the form and content of what we have described above as ‘socialized or ‘embed-
ded’ globalization, is unavoidable (unctad 2009b; undp 2003).
8.5 beyond ‘international cooperation’
The world has changed radically. In the past, international relations were ‘Newto-
nian’ by nature: states were sovereign, settled disputes with might, and were mea-
sured by weight – the size of their territory, population, industry, natural resources
and military power. In the current era the situation is different, in that states can 
no longer be considered autonomous isolated entities, are losing their monopoly on
economic, political and military power, and increasingly have to share them with
transnationally operating organizations like multinationals, ngos, political multi-
lateral organizations, not to mention criminal and terrorist organizations. Global
interdependencies are increasing and the internationalization of trade, financial
flows and production (economic globalization), cross-border communications 
and global challenges are forcing countries that compete with each other also to
seek areas of common interest. That is taking place in a world that is no longer 
dominated by a single superpower, but is multipolar and has, to an increasing
degree, different regional and national power centres (Gu et al. 2007).
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As a consequence, development objectives are becoming more interwoven with
other policy areas, and development policy is more frequently expected to
contribute not only to ‘pure’ development goals, but also to be a partner in inter-
national cooperation in pursuit of other aims, and therefore to work with non-
traditional development actors in the North and the South. Ideally, this can mean
that the leverage of development aid can be used more effectively to find solutions
to global issues in other policy areas which are positive for development, but that
is by no means self evident. It may lead to cofinancing and the joint deployment
of development aid and financial resources from other sources, but that may also
have consequences for what can be considered official development aid (oda)
(ecdpm 2009b). It is important to examine this closely, but constructively
(Severino & Ray 2009). How donor countries approach the 0.7 percent standard
for oda, agreed at the un in 1970 and reconfirmed on many occasions since, is
seen internationally as an “indication of the preparedness of governments to
comply with internationally agreed commitments relating to the social and
economic development of developing countries” (Stokke 2009: 512). Definitions
of oda are, however, not set in stone and should reflect thinking on what a
responsible development strategy entails. They have therefore changed several
times since the dac first agreed in 1969 what expenditure could be regarded as
oda. The discussion on the definition of oda still continues. This debate will,
however, reach a completely new phase once policy coherence and global public
goods issues are also brought in the equation.
Global development
While the term ‘international cooperation’ was appropriate in an era when the
relationship between states was based on sovereignty, ‘global development’
expresses the fact that national policy increasingly has an impact in other coun-
tries, that issues and problems on national agendas are more frequently coloured
and influenced by developments and activities across the border, and that develop-
ment takes place in a global context in which a variety of actors operate. Because,
after sixty years of development cooperation, we are now sadder and wiser about
what can be achieved from outside, and know that for the majority of developing
countries the importance of aid is much more relative than we thought, issues like
financial stability, trade policy and migration are becoming increasingly significant
to the development agenda. A focus on global development does not mean that we
should adopt the megalomaniac pretension that we have to develop the entire
world, but that we have to be more systematic in identifying the cross-border
consequences of our policies and actions. That will enable us to take a more
conscious approach to coherence policy for development and in providing targeted
support and initiatives for international public goods. Striving to take that chal-
lenge seriously, through trial and error, is a long-term investment in effective
mechanisms to stimulate and direct efforts to achieve a new world. No single
country knows as yet exactly how that is to be achieved.
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It calls for a radical re-think of the relationship between domestic and foreign
affairs and, by extension, of the institutions designed to give shape to that rela-
tionship (see, for example, Evans et al. 2010). In particular that means continuing
to develop the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is structured and how it oper-
ates. Maintaining relations with foreign powers and defending the national inter-
est through a single institution is a nineteenth-century construction from a time
when states were still autonomous, isolated entities, and diplomatic processes
were largely dependent on the speed of the mail coach. Ministries that ‘do over-
seas’ and labour under the misconception that they direct or even control all cross-
border relations, are no longer appropriate to the issues that the world now
presents us with. Many international organizations, too, work in a way that dates
from a time when air travel, internet and telecommunications did not exist.
It is not possible to draw up a blueprint for a new system to manage cross-border
relations, and experimentation and further development will remain necessary. 
It is a very logical step, however, to streamline external representative and multi-
lateral institutions and transform them into networks in which national and inter-
national experts work together on the basis of their specialized knowledge and
expertise, and make use of new organizational forms and technologies. Instead 
of diplomats, agricultural experts would exchange proposals and information on
subjects that they know about. That is not only more cost effective, but also good
for the quality of the exchange of ideas and decision-making in international orga-
nizations. They will become substantively more valuable when diplomats no
longer read their pre-written interventions to each other, and experts in the field
in question work together to solve problems. Diplomats can then do what they are
good at: indicate how the process of cooperation can best be structured.
What remains is the question of how to achieve the coordination and strategic
integration of the mosaic of cross-border relationships and networks that is gradu-
ally evolving. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerns itself with professional
diplomacy, but can no longer play a substantive role in many areas. It is therefore
logical to look for better ways of organizing cross border issues. One obvious step
would be to modify the portfolio of the Minister for Development Cooperation.
The new minister would have two important areas of responsibility: organizing
and providing aid itself, and a globalization agenda in which aid, coherence policy
and international public goods would be approached in an integrated manner on
the basis of a vision of global development. This minister would then function,
like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, primarily as an extension of the prime minis-
ter, and less as someone with their ‘own’ domain. Following on from this, it will
then be necessary to re-assess the entire division of labour surrounding the theme
of ‘foreign affairs’ to determine whether it is appropriate to meet the challenges of
the twenty-first century.
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Thinking more broadly
“The ones most likely to ‘save Africa’ are Africans themselves”, concludes
William Easterly (2008a) in a comprehensive evaluation of Western attempts to
save Africa. Everyone agrees that countries and peoples can only develop them-
selves, and that financial aid from outside can at most help them to do that and
should be designed to render itself unnecessary as soon as possible. Of great and
sustained significance for possibilities for development are the international
context in which poor countries have to try and find a place for themselves, and
the cross-border consequences that they encounter from actions conducted in the
rest of the world. Development policy therefore has to devote considerable atten-
tion to well-functioning and stable financial markets, coordination of efforts to
combat tax evasion, migration policy, knowledge transfer and sharing, a develop-
ment-friendly trade regime, and policy space for countries to determine their own
paths to development. Yet, in most donor countries, nearly all attention is still
devoted to the expenditure on the official budget that the Minister for Develop-
ment Cooperation spends every year, the material evidence that we wish to
contribute to a better world. Public, political, official and media interest in other
mechanisms with which we have a positive or negative impact on development
continues to be far too limited.
In doing that, we are not doing developing countries any favours, as other non-
coherent policies can more than cancel out the impact of development aid. In addi-
tion, by devoting so little attention to the cross-border externalities of national
policy, we are also selling ourselves short, because the active involvement of
developing countries is indispensable in the provision of important global public
goods that are also in our own interests. Eradicating infectious diseases, combat-
ing financial instability and a climate policy to combat global warming, are topical
examples that are familiar to everybody. In addition to aid, coherence policy for
development, a strategy for international public goods, and a vision of global
governance founded on the new relations in the world are indispensable in
contributing to global development within a globalization agenda.
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9 conclusion
Development aid is the subject of heavy debate. In many ways the world has
improved immensely over the past sixty years. However, the question is increas-
ingly being raised as to what contribution aid has made to this development.
Progress has primarily become apparent over the last few decades. In the past
twenty-five years, life expectancy in all developing countries taken together has
risen by ten years, and the percentage of children attending school has doubled.
Poverty around the globe has also halved, to a quarter of the world’s population.
This success, however, has primarily been achieved in Asia, with China alone
accounting for three quarters of the decrease. In Sub-Saharan Africa, real incomes
have doubled over the past twenty-five years, but the percentage of people living
on an income under the poverty line has not fallen. Can these successes be
attributed to development aid, or should the lack of success be blamed on aid? The
answer to both questions is: ‘No’.
Development aid definitely contributed to the massive leaps forward made in
Asia, from the economic support to Taiwan and South Korea in the 1950s to the
aid for agricultural improvement provided to India in the 1970s. However, these
contributions were limited – all manner of other factors were important. Similarly,
the lack of success – in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa – cannot unequivocally be
traced back to the failure of aid. A lot of aid, particularly in the 1990s, had geopolit-
ical objectives. Even today, much aid primarily aims to improve the immediate
living conditions of the poor instead of bringing about structural development.
Moreover, economic, political and social structures in African countries are of a
very different order. These countries still clearly reveal the traces of colonialism,
with their artificial borders and institutions that are barely rooted in society.
Strong governments with a clear view of the future development of their country
are rare in Africa, in sharp contrast to Asia.
Simple analogies between development paths in various parts of the world soon
become misleading. For example, a parallel between development aid and the
Marshall Plan is inaccurate because the latter started out as an attempt to rebuild
Europe after the war. It was essentially a matter of reviving a formerly healthy
patient, while many of the countries which need aid now have never had a
healthy market economy or a functioning state system. The point of departure for
the countries in Asia which have achieved rapid development in recent decades
was very specific. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were able to integrate into a
world market which was many times less regulated and overcrowded than it is
today. African countries currently wishing to produce for export not only face
fierce competition from China and other Southeast Asian countries, but their
products and production processes also have to meet a wide range of require-
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ments. In other words, development paths are pre-eminently country and time-
specific.
The first lesson to be learned from sixty years of development aid is that we
should be modest. Modesty is due first of all because of the relative importance of
aid. Development only depends on aid to a very limited extent. This applies finan-
cially: in most developing countries, foreign investments and migrant remittances
account for larger flows of money than aid. It also applies institutionally: with the
exception of the aid to fragile countries and the very poorest countries, financial
transfers are not, by definition, the best tools for contributing to development. In
the majority of countries, unilateral trade concessions, more stringent interna-
tional global tax regulations that also apply to multinationals in the West, financial
stability, less strict intellectual property rights, the abolition of tax havens, knowl-
edge and technology for the climate-friendly development of agriculture, compa-
nies, transport systems and cities, and the return of stolen funds can make a bigger
contribution to development than classical aid.
Modesty would also be good for our thinking patterns. For too long now, we have
tried to use all-encompassing plans to provide universal explanations for a multi-
tude of specific situations and to subsequently write out equally universal
prescriptions. In previous decades, these were macroeconomic reforms and good
governance, while in recent years investments in social sectors have been popular,
but every time the prescriptions have been too general. After sixty years of gener-
alizing, it has become apparent that specificity is required because it is impossible
to be able to say in general what works best and why. This lesson is unavoidable:
countries in Asia, such as China and India, which took little notice of Western
economic orthodoxy and worked pragmatically and creatively, have undergone
unparalleled development, while growth lagged behind in Latin American and
African countries when they tried, partly due to pressure from the imf, to reshape
themselves according to the general guidelines of the Washington Consensus.
Moreover, the world is changing. China, India and Brazil have become important
players on the world market. This process has been accelerated by the current
financial crisis, which these countries – where the government has a more impor-
tant role, including in the financial sector – have managed to survive better than
their Western counterparts. The world is rapidly becoming more crowded and
more interdependent. The global population is expected to quadruple between
1950 and 2050 and, if the current trend continues, it will become nine times as
rich. This means that social, physical and sustainability limits will soon come into
view. Development will increasingly become regional and global in character. As a
result of issues like climate, trade, migration, energy and security, national policy
will decreasingly be a sole determinant factor; the pressure to take action and to
make agreements at regional and global level will only increase. The principal task
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is to find ways to shape the globalizing world so that the balance between shared
interests and the space for countries and people to take control of their own
futures is preserved. This will only be possible if every country and people feels
that they have a place, that they count and can keep pace with others. In that
respect, the development of poor countries is increasingly becoming an unavoid-
able necessity.
This multiplicity of developments means that the aid sector faces countless major
questions, and the range of answers is equally broad. For example, some advocates
of aid stubbornly maintain that we could permanently rid the world of poverty for
just a few trillion dollars. This is an appealing message which appeals to the good
in every human being, and many people are only too willing to believe it – not in
the least due to the efforts of many celebrities who want their own ‘Bono
moment’. However, there is no empirical basis for this claim: if only it were true
that we could buy a better world for a reasonable sum of money. It is unfortunately
impossible to lift countries out of poverty from the outside in one fell swoop.
On the other hand, there is also widespread scepticism about the value of develop-
ment aid. Many people are particularly concerned that the preconditions to allow
aid to act as a catalyst have not been fulfilled in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is easy to
invoke the image of neo-patrimonial structures, with excessive corruption and
local elites with a glaring lack of a sense of responsibility. That impression is not
entirely incorrect, but is too one-sided. Developing countries vary and are
complex entities with all manner of fractions, path dependencies and their own
dynamics. The challenge is to align with this intelligently and facilitate the right
development processes.
There is therefore no general answer to the question whether development aid
helps. Sixty years of evaluation studies also bear this out. The development of
countries is influenced by so many factors and is so complex that any attempt to
provide a general answer encounters exceptions. On closer inspection, it should
come as no surprise that projects and initiatives sometimes fail. In complex situa-
tions, intervening is always a matter of trying things out, experimenting. That
things go wrong every now and again is not bad, but it is important to learn from
these mistakes. That means constantly determining where the most binding
constraints lie, and where the best opportunities present themselves. This is not
easy, but it is very productive.
9.1 development more central
The main task for development policy is to dose and structure development aid in
such a way that it makes a difference in a world which is becoming increasingly
interdependent. That first of all means being clear about goals and means, and
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creating close links between the two. There is no lack of visionary ideas in the aid
sector, nor is there a shortage of possible activities. Moreover, every ideal has its
counterpart somewhere in a specific project. A minister for development coopera-
tion can therefore easily demonstrate that he has thought of everything and that
his policy covers every possible idea. However, the challenge is to structure aid in
such a way that it is systematically aligned with the selected goals. It is therefore
also important to make targeted choices and to link them to serious consequences.
Modern development policy should organize itself in accordance with clear objec-
tives. These may vary. Analytically speaking, three types of objectives can be
distinguished at this point in time. To start with there is concrete poverty allevia-
tion and the immediate improvement of living conditions. The majority of 
aid focuses on this and can rely on widespread support in Western societies. 
It shows that many people are becoming increasingly involved in this type of aid,
and are taking the initiative themselves. The government’s role is limited. It can
help those involved to find out the best thing to do and how they can do it. 
The government can also try to prevent Africa becoming a playground for irre-
sponsible amateurism. In the uk, work is already under way to develop a code 
of conduct aimed at preventing abuses in the South. That is an example worth
following.
The second objective of aid is development focused on structural improvements 
in developing countries through sustainable economic activity. The principal
preconditions for this are an effective government which can play a facilitating
role and a sufficiently stable social climate. Providing aid which aims to make
countries self-sufficient is very complicated. To start with, it presupposes that it 
is possible to determine how development can be stimulated. Secondly, it assumes
that this can be achieved from the outside. In addition, the aid should have more
positive than negative effects, such as creating aid dependency or reinforcing neo-
patrimonial structures.
The third important objective for development aid is to contribute to global public
goods. Our self interest is clear here: national objectives for climate, food, energy
and safety cannot be achieved without active contributions by other countries and
should be coordinated at a supranational (regional and global) level. The main
problems here are that it is difficult to find an adequate structure for this, and that
most donors are not major players.
Not all three objectives receive equal attention in current development policy.
Direct poverty alleviation is relatively simple to visualize, and is high on the
agenda for moral reasons, but the aid sector’s attention has been very strongly
focused on this aspect. The lion’s share of the budget is currently spent on social
sectors, while productive sectors like agriculture and infrastructure, which are
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less likely to produce visible results, but which can alleviate poverty structurally
in the long term, receive little funding (though they have been receiving greater
attention in the past two years). Part of the investment in social sectors will,
perhaps, in time also contribute to development, but the effect is very indirect, all
the more because education in many African countries is not only of poor quality,
but is also hardly attuned to local needs. In addition, aid is often so fragmented –
across countries, themes and channels – and often so untargeted that it insuffi-
ciently stimulates structural development.
This can and must be improved. The goal of development should once again
receive more emphasis. Economic growth is emphatically part of this, because
without growth there is nothing to distribute in developing countries. It also
means that poverty alleviation should not be seen as a mantra, and that the poor
do not always have to immediately benefit from the aid provided – the develop-
ment of the middle classes is essential to development. It demands that more
attention be paid to agriculture – not only for food security, but also for export – to
strengthen productive sectors and the importance of market players. That means
giving more attention again to entrepreneurship and supporting the provision of
credit to developing companies, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises.
In addition, the question as to whether job opportunities should be created should
become an important parameter for development policy. Economic and social
policy improves the situation of the poor if it is aimed at raising the income they
generate from working, in many cases in agriculture or from unskilled labour.
After all, it is not growth in itself that determines its consequences for the poor but
the nature of agriculture and industrialization in the country and the economic,
social and labour policies it pursues. This is one of the major problems with devel-
opment in Africa: a lot of growth relies on the extraction of natural resources and
rising commodity prices.
Putting development first as an objective also entails a more emphatic orientation
towards regulating global affairs. For example, properly functioning and stable
financial markets, fiscal coordination to combat tax evasion, migration policy,
knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing are much more important to many
developing countries than direct financial aid. In addition, in as much as they are
international public goods, they are also to our benefit. In spite of this, when it
comes to development aid, many Western societies still devote almost all their
attention to the very small percentage of gnp allocated to the budget of the minis-
ter responsible for development cooperation.
The implication of this argument is that development policy that is really focused
on development will take shape along different paths. The first path is that of clas-
sical aid, but then designed in a responsible way. The second path is that of general
regional and global policy within which the development component is given
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specific attention. There is much evidence that the first path is increasingly
approaching the end of its lifecycle. It is still worthwhile to follow this path in the
coming decade but after that, unless very strange things happen, the number of
countries that can be helped further in this way will be very small. In Asia there
will be hardly any such countries left once Bangladesh, as is expected, becomes a
middle-income country in 2020. India will remain a poor country for many years,
but is decreasingly willing to accept Western aid in tackling its poverty problem.
In most of Latin America, too, classical aid is no longer appropriate. In Africa, it
will remain necessary for some years to come, but that need will also decline
steadily. In ten years’ time, it will probably only be required in a limited number 
of countries where nation-building remains fragile, such as Congo and Somalia.
Development policy will to an increasing extent be shaped within broader
regional and global policy. It is therefore an important task for governments to
gradually redesign their policy systems (institutions, instruments) with this in
mind. How can these two paths be shaped further in the future? Section 9.2 looks
at the first path, of direct aid, while section 9.3 examines ways of addressing devel-
opment issues in a broader context.
9.2 professionally organized development
Development should once again become central to development aid. Organiza-
tionally, this entails a much more pronounced country orientation, combined with
substantial professionalization. A more pronounced orientation starts by recog-
nizing that development always comes largely from the inside, and that develop-
ment paths vary from country to country. Development aid basically means help
in developing. At most, and even this is not a certainty, aid can make a small
contribution to a country’s development process. Where and how this support can
be of use, varies from country to country.
A good diagnosis per country is necessary to determine what kind of aid is
required. The capacity to provide aid depends entirely on having extensive local
knowledge and contacts. Aid is therefore primarily useful as a long-term,
programme-based investment comprising a coherent package of interventions,
and which is carried out in collaboration with local institutions or actors. To
provide a concrete example: there is very little point in trying to develop agricul-
ture in Ethiopia without determining whether there is sufficient credit available 
for entrepreneurs, whether the infrastructure is of sufficient quality for transport
products, whether good seed is available, what the irrigation systems are like,
what options are available for university research and development, what skills are
taught at primary and secondary schools, what role private investors have or could
have, what trade limitations Europe enforces on exports and what wider develop-
ments are taking place on the global market in that context. Fully comprehending
these kinds of cohesive systems and knowing when, where and what can be done
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in a worthwhile manner presupposes a long-term presence, thorough knowledge
and the capacity to utilize a multitude of parties in both donor and developing
countries (from good legal experts in the field of agriculture and trade to people
who can help set up education programmes and private investors). Finally, all
these efforts are only worthwhile if they take place on a large enough scale to really
make a difference.
At the moment these conditions are not sufficiently met. Take, for example, the
demand that the lines along which the development of a specific country can best
be furthered should be clear. It may sound trivial, but such analyses are rare. There
is a lot of valuable information to be found on the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ website or in its budget, but this is usually not the most essential informa-
tion: i.e. an account of why the Netherlands believes that the contributions it is
attempting to make are actually the most sensible ones. In practice, the Nether-
lands primarily provides a lot of support to education and healthcare because it has
always done so: usually there is no more reasoning behind it than that. Investing
in primary education is, however, not necessarily the best way to stimulate struc-
tural development in every country. In this respect a country like the Netherlands,
which is no exception, could learn from other countries: Britain, Sweden and
Norway are better at making these considerations more transparent. This enables
others also to consider the most sensible contribution in any specific situation.
Precisely because there are no simple or general answers to the question of how
development can best be promoted, it is important to continually exchange
insights on this.
If development aid truly wishes to make a difference, it should also be profession-
ally organized. Sweden has already arrived at that conclusion and created its own
development organization. In Britain, the dfid was split from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office in 1997 for the same reason, and Canada is also intending
to organize its development aid separately, at some distance from the embassies.
In addition, Canada has opted to focus on a substantially lower number of coun-
tries and sectors, a route the Nordic countries have also taken. An obvious choice
for countries that have not yet taken this path, including the Netherlands, would
be to select a limited number – a maximum of ten – development aid units based in
the recipient countries concerned. These local organizations would be located
somewhere near the embassies in the recipient countries, but would have their
own personnel policies, focusing on the professional requirements of a long-term
presence and specific expertise. The demand for professionalism is related to the
underlying subject matter (if you want to develop the water sector, you really have
to know something about it) and to processes (the capacity to involve the right
parties at the right point in time, both private and public), but also to being street-
wise (being able to deal with local contacts).
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This organizational model proposes that donors stop fragmenting their aid and
limit themselves to a small number of locations where they have a proper pres-
ence. This is also sensible for three other reasons. First of all, it will make it easier
to deal with the negative consequences of aid. After all, aid is never innocent: it
places countries in a dependent position and gives rise to all sorts of power politics
in which individuals try to benefit themselves and their own people. In that
respect, corruption is only one of the problems. Such dependencies should be kept
manageable, and two requirements have to be met to ensure this. Firstly, a donor
should be a serious player; threatening to withhold relatively small sums scares 
no one. Secondly, donors should have a wide range of aid tools to ensure, as far as
possible, that aid does not create dependency or undermine local accountability
procedures. This means constantly weighing up the methods used to provide 
aid. Aid can be provided entirely indirectly (by improving trading conditions or
migration policy) or directly (by transferring funds or knowledge). In the latter
case, the channel used is also of importance: through the government or, for
example, service users. Lastly, this should be accompanied by removal of the
annual pressure to spend the money available and making financial resources
available for a longer period of time in the form of a fund.
A second advantage of concentrating only on a few countries is that it makes
concrete steps possible to combat the enormous increase in donors per country.
All donors, both governmental and non-governmental, endorse the 2005 Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which promised to increase aid coherence, but
which has so far insufficiently been put into practice. Donors enthusiastically
discuss the importance of good governance, but when it comes to the way in
which they themselves structure their aid, it suddenly seems a lot less important.
The European Union has done good work by outlining a form of division of
labour, but in practice almost no progress has been achieved. It is therefore impor-
tant for a number of countries to set a good example and start pruning their own
activities. This should be done in conjunction with likeminded donors and recipi-
ent countries. The time is now ripe.
Finally, a focused, professional organization would also enable us to organize our
development aid better as a learning system. If we invest seriously in a limited
number of countries and sectors, we can set up a knowledge infrastructure around
that comprising both the staff involved and national and international knowledge
institutes. A significant portion of the total budget should therefore also be made
available for systematic research and development. Six percent of the aid budget is
not an excessively high figure, given the constantly investigative nature of devel-
opment aid. Compare this to the dfid which, as of 2010, will spend over 200
million pounds a year on research and development, and could permit itself to
make 34 million pounds available to develop a growth strategy and set up an Inter-
national Growth Centre, because it feels that this is an issue that it does not know
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enough about. In such a knowledge structure, a form of monitoring and account-
ability can be developed that focuses on content and the impact of activities, rather
than – as is typically the case with current practice – being trapped within an
accountant’s perspective and confined by the question whether funds have been
spent legitimately. Independent research to determine whether it can reasonably
be assumed that a positive contribution has been made fits within this framework.
It should also include the assessment of stakeholders in the recipient countries.
That creates the building blocks for a country-oriented accountability framework
that should constitute the basis for consultations between the responsible minis-
ter and parliament.
In line with this, it is the task of donors to actively promote the decentralization of
knowledge development, i.e. developing countries should be enabled to create
their own knowledge infrastructure. The West currently has a quasi-monopoly in
this respect. That might be justifiable if knowledge on development were incon-
testable, but that is not the case. Global variation and selection are required and the
best way to do this is to set up three or four ‘knowledge banks’ around the world
which gather knowledge on development and introduce ideas for policy which
both learn from and compete with one another. At least one of these knowledge
banks should be in Africa and another in Asia. It would also seem obvious to work
towards a type of European ‘World Bank’, bringing together European tools for
knowledge, loans, subsidies and policy. Linking the European Development Fund
to coordination mechanisms for bilateral aid, credit provision by the European
Investment bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
and with a knowledge function such as the World Bank in Washington already
has, can generate improved conditions for strong, effective European development
policy.
What about the others?
An as yet unanswered question is why this type of development aid should be
provided through individual donors. Is it not more logical to organize aid mainly
within larger forms of cooperation? After all, that would prevent fragmentation
and mobilize real political power and implementation expertise. In theory this is
true, but in practice it will definitely not be fully feasible for the time being. To
start with, it is a political challenge to provide Western taxpayers with sufficient
insight into what exactly has been done with their money; it is simply not enough
to say the money was transferred to the World Bank and that it is doing good
things with it. In addition, multilateral organizations face legitimacy problems in
developing countries. The World Bank is burdened by its history and monopoly,
and in many poorer countries it is still viewed as the imf’s natural accomplice.
In the long term, doing more through the eu is definitely an option, but not in
the way it is done now. Instead of an umbrella organization, the eu has become a
new donor, active everywhere and in a wide number of themes, thereby exacerbat-
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ing the fragmentation of aid rather than reducing it. It is a missed opportunity that
the eu does not concentrate on areas in which it can claim to have special expertise
and legitimacy: regional development, integration and public goods.
An equally relevant question is what role Western ngos can play. Many of these
ngos have evolved into hybrid organizations which work on fundraising, expand-
ing their support base, representing partners’ interests, influencing policy, devel-
oping projects, subsidizing Southern ngos, providing direct aid and supporting
civilian initiatives in a large number of countries. This is understandable from a
historical perspective, but can dilute their contributions to homeopathic propor-
tions and reduce their effectiveness to little to nothing. Furthermore, subsidizing
Southern ngos through Western ngos is increasingly inappropriate in a situation
in which developing countries have their own social organizations. The point of
departure for funding should be the situation and actors in developing countries
rather than that of Western organizations. Western donors should, in principle,
provide support and funding directly to Southern ngos in accordance with the
function they require (service provider, watchdog or supporter of social
processes). Western ngos should profile their added value more emphatically if
they wish to be eligible for funding. They can achieve this by, for example, estab-
lishing special ties with organizations in countries with which Western govern-
ments cannot or do not wish to maintain relations because they are governed by
authoritarian or failing regimes. The South will, however, increasingly wish to
look after itself, meaning that in some areas Western ngos will no longer be rele-
vant. On the other hand, they may be able to play a greater role in monitoring the
impact on development of policy at national, European and global levels. Develop-
ing countries do not take part in meetings of ministries, companies and other
organizations that work – or should be working – on policy coherence for develop-
ment, and Western ngos can help make sure their voices are heard.
Where and what?
It is therefore primarily a matter of properly considering what donors can do in the
coming decade in Sub-Saharan Africa, a subcontinent with well over 900 million
inhabitants, but a gross national product comparable to that of the Netherlands or
South Korea. It is underpopulated, making building infrastructure and irrigation
much more expensive than in the heavily populated parts of Asia, and in many
areas has depleted soil and a one-sided economy heavily dependent on raw mate-
rials. Sub-Saharan Africa is also a subcontinent where the majority of countries
may have a more or less functioning government, but seldom one which as yet
merits full confidence. In many cases, aid will therefore have to be tied to a sensi-
ble political strategy and support for civil society. In countries with a state appara-
tus that hardly functions, such as classical fragile states like the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Somalia, the difficult task will be to help shape the state
apparatus, often by initially investing in security and stability. Many donors –
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including Sweden, Denmark, Canada, the uk and the eu – have developed a sepa-
rate African strategy in recent years, and with good reason.
Selecting a limited number of countries does not mean that the relationships with
other countries, for example middle-income countries, are no longer important.
These should however no longer be made the focus of development aid, but of
cooperation using other tools than financial support, aimed at specific goals in 
the field of knowledge exchange, environmental policy, economic activity, etc. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that countries which have emerged from the
phase of absolute poverty benefit most from the development of knowledge and
of a trained middle class. This conclusion has been fully understood by large
multinational organizations, but as yet much less so by bilateral donors. For some
time, the World Bank has been profiling itself as a knowledge bank, while the
Inter-American Development Bank (the development bank that focuses on Latin
America, where almost all low-income countries have evolved into middle-
income countries) has exchanged a large number of specialists in loan provision
for specialists in large project management.
The specific choice of countries can be based on three simple criteria: a country’s
needs, the extent to which they are already being met by other donors, and the
potential added value a specific donor can offer. The latter is new. Until now, most
donors have claimed to be able to do everything, but that is becoming increasingly
problematic. Good development aid should be designed professionally and that
calls for specific expertise. Norway has therefore concentrated its efforts on peace
and reconciliation. It also spends a substantial part of its aid funds on a wide-rang-
ing Oil for Development programme, which makes not only drilling and environ-
mental technology expertise available, but also knowledge on how to adequately
manage revenue from natural resources, and how governments can enter into
contracts with major oil companies. All manner of public and private parties coop-
erate in this programme. If necessary, countries in the South can conclude a ten-
year contract with the Norwegian government, which sets out how the support
will be provided in detail. A country like the Netherlands could develop a Water
for Development, Agriculture for Development, Justice for Development or Fighting
hiv/aids for Development programme along these lines, combining the broad
spectrum of public and private knowledge available. The choice of themes could be
more ambitious. Strikingly little attention is paid to the professionalization of
knowledge on the role and significance of civil society. The same applies to
regional cooperation – much development is not only about how to help a country
function properly, but also about regional cooperation and integration.
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9.3 beyond classical aid
Besides more focus and professionalization, promoting development also entails
paying more attention to the management of cross-border interdependencies and
realizing global development opportunities. In that respect in most countries we
have only just set out on this path. Coherence policy for development proves diffi-
cult, and that only tries to ensure that one ministry’s policy does not conflict with
that of another. It is even more complicated to manage seriously and substantively
the coherence between different cross-border issues, and to approach ultimate
global development as a strategic task. Whilst the familiar term ‘international
cooperation’ suits the era in which states maintained sovereign external relations
with one another, the term ‘global development’ expresses the fact that national
policy also has consequences for other countries, while national agendas are
coloured and influenced by what happens outside. This calls for new ways of deal-
ing with other countries and, in that context, the distinction between developing
and developed countries will, to a large extent, become outmoded.
The new world this will create demands innovative ways of dealing with the
coherence between various policy instruments. For example: a country that is seri-
ous about helping to reduce co2 emissions both at home and in developing coun-
tries will have to address knowledge policy and transfer, technology policy and
transfer, intellectual property rights and negotiations on them at the wto, tech-
nologies and energy saving and sustainable energy-generating systems adapted 
to local conditions, how to devise and set up new funding instruments with non-
governmental parties and government bodies, adequate and inclusive interna-
tional institutions, and, last, but by no means least, national and international
coherence so that more biofuel here does not lead to higher food prices and
increased poverty in the South. There are insufficient good coordination mecha-
nisms for this, both globally and nationally: the existing administrative model 
in most Western countries for addressing trade, migration, financial stability,
climate, food, fiscal policy, energy, knowledge, safety and development issues
from a coherent perspective is too ineffective, with coordination mechanisms
lodged too much at operational and not enough at political-strategic level.
At global level, more intensive attention to coherence policy and international
public goods demands investments in innovation in the shape of funding and
regulation, and in new forms of cooperation, consultation and global governance.
The un offers many worthwhile ideas and concepts, but is weak and often very
bureaucratic organizationally and in implementation. All manner of associated
structures and consultation mechanisms have emerged in many areas and on
many issues – the latest being the g20, which, since the financial crisis, has
replaced the g7/g8 as the global coordinating body. In fields like climate, fisheries,
trade and healthcare there are often separate mechanisms which are only loosely
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affiliated to the un system. However, for migration and financial stability for
example, they exist only to a limited extent or are not very effective. New forms
and structures for consultation, coordination and the exchange of agendas and
priorities will have to be developed and tested.
Western countries should take a fresh look at the existing multilateral organiza-
tions from such a perspective. The un has lost some of its authority in recent
decades and operates only to a very limited extent as a coordinating body. Many
un agencies have become primarily implementing organizations that, in daily
practice, have to compete with other implementing bodies. Concentration in
implementation is only logical in specific situations, for example to address fragile
states or provide emergency aid. Coordination, knowledge dissemination and
standard-setting should otherwise be the focus of un organizations. The World
Bank has not yet shed its Western orientation, while the eu has become the
twenty-eighth donor alongside its twenty-seven member states, rather than an
organization focusing on regional development.
Furthermore, at national level better tools and coordination systems need to be
developed. Suitable tools will to some extent have to be created ‘on the job’. As
stated, a greater role by ngos in this respect would be beneficial. Investment in
appropriate accountability frameworks should then be the next step. More justice
could be done to development policy coherence if – in future – country reports
were to juxtapose expenditure on development aid and efforts aimed at other
issues. The more inclusive question will then be how to approach, for example, a
region in Africa in terms of aid funds, migration, knowledge, trade, fiscal policy,
technology transfer, climate, etc. That would be a significant innovation.
It would therefore show suitable ambition also to take another subsequent step
and question the importance of the 0.7 percent of national income set aside for
development aid. When the standard was devised in the 1960s, it still reflected 
the estimated need for aid in developing countries. However, since the 1970s it 
has acquired the character of a politically-based international standard, which is
reconfirmed at international summits and conferences. Such a standard however
suits an isolated system of aid while development in an increasingly interdepen-
dent world depends more and more on other issues. It is more appropriate to this
new reality to attempt to formulate a new measure which includes not only aid 
but also Western efforts with regard to international regulations and global public
goods relevant to development policy. This would lead not only to a much more
fruitful debate than the eternal question of whether the budget for development
aid should be more or less than 0.7 percent of gdp; it would also provide good
input for the debate which will undoubtedly emerge about what should be used as
an international framework of reference after 2015, when the mdgs expire.
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Lastly, the coordination mechanisms at state and political-administrative system
level need to be reviewed. The distinction between a foreign ministry, which is
supposed to deal with foreign affairs, line ministries that are ‘only’ expert in their
own fields of policy or are concerned with domestic affairs, and a prime minister,
who should primarily view all of this from a distance, is no longer suitable for the
twenty-first century. It is a nineteenth-century construction from an era when
policy stopped at the border and the internet did not yet exist. In an increasing
number of fields, the distinction between national and foreign affairs is less rele-
vant, if not meaningless. International action should primarily be driven by
content and the administrative structure will then have to rapidly keep abreast of
this new reality. An obvious step would be to systematically dovetail the substan-
tive policies of line ministries with the ministry of foreign affairs by establishing
joint directorates, programme directorates and other relevant organizational
structures. Furthermore, the portfolio of the current minister for development
cooperation should be upgraded to a package of tasks focused on global develop-
ment and with two distinct components: managing specific aid programmes in a
limited number of countries and formulating a globalization agenda which consid-
ers relevant global problems in context and develops an appropriate perspective
for action.
9.4 less pretension, more ambition
Changing the organization and focus of development aid is no easy task. Develop-
ment aid has to continually tack back and forth between extremes. At home,
where television rules, there is a desire for results with immediate appeal. Devel-
oping countries would benefit more from long-term perspectives. That is a diffi-
cult gap to bridge. In the meantime, public scepticism about development aid is 
on the increase. A number of countries have recently issued policy memoranda
reviewing their development aid strategies. Some of these – like Norway, Sweden,
and (it would now seem) Canada – are reorienting themselves by making much
more defined choices. Others, with Britain at the forefront, want to do everything
they have done so far better: more professionally, more transparently, more
responsibly. So far, the Netherlands has not determined its course. Official devel-
opment policy, including part of the institutional world underpinning it, seems to
be unintentionally heading for a radical confrontation with those who now believe
that aid might just as well be abolished. That is not a sensible route to take.
In addition, it is not helpful to separate the questions of what and why from that of
how. What does help is to make choices and to structure the organization accord-
ingly. The various objectives outlined – providing direct aid, promoting develop-
ment (directly or indirectly by incorporating development effects in other poli-
cies), coherence policy and preserving international public goods – all have their
own legitimacy. How much money and energy should be spent on that is, in
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essence, a political decision based on how much importance we should attach to
the various issues. Our political decision-making process was designed to answer
questions like this. Once we have used this system to determine how much
money is available for development policy, we can decide how to divide it up
between direct aid, structural development and international public goods. The
political debate could gain quality and relevance if it focused more on this. It is
then the task of politics to align the structure of intervention with these chosen
goals.
Ultimately, this can lead to a development aid practice which can be described as
‘less pretension, more ambition’. It is not the quantity but the quality of our
contribution to a world in which people and countries are self-sufficient and in
which international public goods are adequately safeguarded, that should be the
point of departure for what we now still refer to as ‘development aid’, but perhaps
later ‘global development’. Global development is about targeted strategies, the
capacity to work in various fields at the same time, knowing when to hold back,
and differentiating between goals and thereby between levels of intervention. It is
about combining ambition with the awareness that you can only play a modest
role.
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